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CONTENTS

NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

WORLDWIDE ISSUES

Petrovskiy Discusses Eurasian Security *[MOSCOW NEWS No 16]* 1
'Historic' Meeting of German Defense Ministers *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 29 Apr]* 1
Paris Meeting to Aid E. Europe TV, Radio Held *[PRAVDA 28 Apr]* 2
Cambodian Question, PRC-SRV Relations Viewed *[Nikolayev on Moscow International]* 2
Ministry Official Cited on UN Voting *[IZVESTIYA 1 May]* 3

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

United States & Canada

Lithuanian Prime Minister Prunskiene Visits Canada 5
Meeting With Bush 3 May *[Vilnius Radio]* 5
Tour of Legislative Assembly *[TASS]* 5
Obukhov Reviews Gorbachev-Bush Meeting, Lithuania *[TASS]* 5
Frolov Talks With U.S. Senators, Analysts *[PRAVDA 28 Apr]* 5
American Academics Received at Foreign Ministry *[IZVESTIYA 30 Apr]* 6
Defense Secretary Cheney on NATO, Lithuania *[IZVESTIYA 1 May]* 6
Cheney Cited on Aircraft Request Cutbacks *[IZVESTIYA 1 May]* 6

China

Soviet Official Discusses Chinese Border Trade *[Moscow International]* 7
Li Peng Notes 'Satisfaction' With USSR Visit *[PRAVDA 28 Apr]* 7
Improvement in Soviet-Chinese Ties Examined *[MOSCOW NEWS No 16]* 7
Support for PRC on Taiwan Issue Viewed *[Mulatov on Moscow International]* 8
RENMIN RIBAO's Moscow Reporter Interviewed *[Moscow International]* 9

Northeast Asia

2,000 Koreans Died Under Stalin 'Oppression' *[Moscow International]* 9
DPRK Denounces 'Team Spirit' Exercise *[Moscow International]* 10
DPRK Cooperation Commission Session Ends *[TASS]* 10
PRAVDA, Japanese TV Film on Perestroyka *[Moscow International]* 10
Concessions on Territorial Issue Examined *[Ovchinnikov on Moscow International]* 11
Mongolian Opposition Seen to 'Exploit' Democracy *[IZVESTIYA 29 Apr]* 11

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Petrovskiy Speaks on Need for Dialogue in Asia *[Moscow International]* 11
Article on Asian, Pacific Situation Reported *[Moscow International]* 12
Soviet Association for Asia-Pacific Region Formed *[TASS]* 13
Philippine Vice President Laurel Interviewed *[Moscow International]* 13
Vietnamese Seeks Perestroyka-Strengthened CPSU *[PRAVDA 28 Apr]* 14
Burmese Pre-Election Political Developments Eyed *[Moscow International]* 15

Near East & South Asia

Iranian Minister's Remarks on Hostages Cited *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 25 Apr]* 16
Soviet-Iranian Steel Mill Agreement Signed *[Tehran Radio]* 16

U.S. Blamed for Continuing Kabul Casualties *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 26 Apr]* 17
Indo-Pakistani Relations Reviewed *[TASS]* 17
Central Committee Receives Syrian Official *[PRAVDA 29 Apr]* 17
Syrian Notes USSR Construction Cooperation *[IZVESTIYA 1 May]* 17

Sub-Saharan Africa

Foreign Ministry Official Comments on Africa *[Moscow International]* 18
South African's Call for Ties With USSR Cited *[IZVESTIYA 30 Apr]* 19
Potovskiy Commentary Examines RSA Dialogue *[Moscow International]* 19
Commentary Views Ethiopian, Arab Relations *[Moscow International]* 20
Somali Prime Minister Samantar Interviewed *[Moscow International]* 21
Gorbachev, Senegal's Diouf Exchange Telegrams *[Moscow Radio]* 22

East Europe

GDR's De Maiziere Comments on Moscow Trip *[Moscow TV]* 22
Commentary Views Impact of German Unification *[Moscow International]* 23
Polish Reforms Provide Lessons for USSR *[TRUD 25 Apr]* 24
Poland's Miller Cited on Solidarity Resolution *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 28 Apr]* 26
Rival Bucharest Rallies Show Romania's Split *[PRAVDA 30 Apr]* 26
Hungarian Ambassador Received at Foreign Ministry *[IZVESTIYA 29 Apr]* 26
HSP People's Democratic Forum Debates Platform *[Budapest MTI]* 26
Petrovskiy Meets CSFR Deputy Foreign Minister *[IZVESTIYA 26 Apr]* 27
Improvement Seen in CPCZ Election Prospects *[PRAVDA 26 Apr]* 27
Anti-Gypsy 'Pogroms' Hit Northern Bohemia *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 29 Apr]* 27

West Europe

Expert for Nuclear Weapons in United Germany *[Vienna DIE PRESSE 2 May]* 28
Munich Exhibition Shows Industries' Potential *[PRAVDA 29 Apr]* 29
CPSU's Brutents Receives SDP's Wischnewski *[PRAVDA 30 Apr]* 29
Bessmertnykh Meets Wischnewski *[IZVESTIYA 1 May]* 29
Bonn Forum Charts Europe's Economic Future *[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 27 Apr]* 29
Kovalev Discusses German Unity With FRG Envoy *[IZVESTYA 29 Apr]* 31
Zagladin, France's Cot Interviewed on Europe *[Moscow TV]* 31
Vorontsov Receives Visiting French Dignitaries *[IZVESTIYA 26 Apr]* 33
Irish Parliamentary Delegation Ends Visit *[IZVESTIYA 26 Apr]* 33
Karpov Meets Irish Envoy, Discusses Disarmament *[IZVESTIYA 29 Apr]* 33
UK's Hurd, Polish Leaders on Security Issues *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 2 May]* 33
Spanish CP General Secretary Interviewed *[PRAVDA 13 Apr]* 34
Turkey's Akbulut on Economy, East Europe *[NEW TIMES No 17]* 36
Metropolitan Filaret Has Talks in Istanbul *[IZVESTIYA 30 Apr]* 38
West Europe Union Chief Visits Moscow 25 Apr *[TASS]* 38

Latin America & Caribbean

Paraguay's Torres Interviewed on Political Scene *[PRAVDA 26 Apr]* 38

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Political & Social

'Insulting' Slogans Noted at May Day Rally *[IZVESTIYA 2 May]* 40
Protests in Red, Pushkin Squares *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 2 May]* 40
TASS Wrap-Up of Celebrations 41
Banning of Moscow Meetings, Rallies Reported *[Budapest Radio]* 42
Deputies on Gorbachev's Tasks for First '100 Days' *[SOYUZ No 11]* 42
Yakovlev on Perestroyka, Presidential Council *[Moscow International]* 44
Lenin Memorials Defaced in Various Towns *[Moscow Radio]* 45
Niece Defends Lenin's Character *[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 16]* 45
Warnings Against Leftism Recalled *[PRAVDA 27 Apr]* 47

Yeltsin, Afanasyev Criticized at Military Meeting *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 27 Apr]* 48
Afanasyev Attacked for SPIEGEL Interview *[NEDELYA No 16]* 48
KGB Deputy Chairman Shebarshin Interviewed *[PRAVDA 22 Apr]* 53
Newsprint Dearth Hinders Paper Production *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 29 Apr]* 60
Commentary on Refugee Problem *[TRUD 20 Apr]* 60
Leadership Aides' Role in System Viewed *[IZVESTIYA 26 Apr]* 62

Economic

Abalkin Favors Planned Market Economy *[EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN No 14]* 67
Economist Warns Against Foreign Market Model *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 26 Apr]* 67
Presidential Council's Shatalin on Economic Reform *[IZVESTIYA 22 Apr]* 69

Military

Officers Engineer Deputy's Expulsion From CPSU *[IZVESTIYA 30 Apr]* 74
Yazov To Inspect 9 May Victory Parade *[Moscow Radio]* 75

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Baltic Republics

Lithuania To Discuss Compromise With Moscow *[Vilnius International]* 76
Landsbergis on European Letter, Negotiations *[Vilnius Radio]* 76
Landsbergis Interviewed on Mitterand-Kohl Letter *[Paris LE FIGARO 30 Apr]* 76
Lithuania To Receive Portion of May Gas Supply *[Vilnius Radio]* 77
Report on Work of Antiblockade Committee *[Vilnius Radio]* 78
Lithuania Supported by Moscow May Day Rally *[Vilnius Radio]* 78
Vilnius Shots, Protest Action Reported *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 28 Apr]* 79
Lithuanian Supreme Council Paper Reorganized *[Vilnius Radio]* 79
Lithuanian Trade Ties to Union Examined *[EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN No 14]* 79
Future Baltic-Soviet Economic Ties Viewed *[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 17]* 81
Text of Baltic Economic Cooperation Agreement *[EKHO LITVY 17 Apr]* 85
Estonian Democratic Party Platform Published *[MOLODEZH ESTONII 7 Mar]* 87
Tartu Extremist Attacks Reported on Military *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 1 May]* 89
Riga Radio Carries 1 May Citizens Congress 89
Citizenship Law Proposed 89
CPSU Activity Debated 90
Committee Elections Held 91
Rubiks Addresses Riga May Day Rally *[Riga Radio]* 91
May Day Celebrations Held in Riga, Vilnius *[Moscow Radio]* 92
Latvian Congress Provokes 'Stormy Reaction' *[TASS]* 93
Latvian Appeal to Leadership Against Occupation *[Riga Radio]* 93

RSFSR

Results of RSFSR Repeat Elections Reviewed *[TASS]* 94
State Committee for Prices Chairman Retires *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 29 Apr]* 94
Manayenkov Supports Idea of Russian Party *[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 1 May]* 94
Draft Program for 'Revival' of Russian Party *[LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA 20 Mar]* 95
New Moscow Soviet Chairman Luzhkov Profiled *[IZVESTIYA 28 Apr]* 98
Measures Needed for a Sovereign Russia Viewed *[Moscow TV]* 98
Medvedev Addresses Gorkiy Party Group *[PRAVDA 30 Apr]* 101
Visits Motor Works *[Moscow TV]* 102
Procedural Wrangling in Leningrad Party Reported *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 1 May]* 103
Tyumen Communists Debate Party's Performance *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 28 Apr]* 104
CPSU Secretary Visits Tatar Party *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 28 Apr]* 105
Sakhalin Oblast Soviet Chairman Elected *[IZVESTIYA 1 May]* 105
Kemerovo Oblast Party Conference Reported *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 2 May]* 106
Baklanov, Ryabev at Kemerovo Party Conference *[PRAVDA 29 Apr]* 107

Western Republics

Ivashko Addresses Ukrainian Academicians *[PRAVDA UKRAINY 31 Mar]* 107
Ukrainian Separatists Lose Party Membership *[PRAVDA UKRAINY 30 Mar]* 110
Health Ministry Issues Memo on Chernobyl *[TASS]* 111
Belorussian Party Congress To Be Held in Nov *[SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA 31 Mar]* 111
Sokolov Addresses Belorussian Party Plenum *[SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA 28 Mar]* 112
Grodno, Vitebsk Oblasts Elect Chairmen *[Minsk Radio]* 116
'Bridge of Flowers' To Link Moldavia, Romania *[IZVESTIYA 28 Apr]* 116

Caucasus

Armenian Paper Shortage Forces Publishing Cut *[Moscow Radio]* 116
New Metropolian Pays First Visit to Baku *[IZVESTIYA 29 Apr]* 117
Nakhichevan ASSR Supreme Soviet Holds Session *[Baku Radio]* 117
Georgian May Day Marked by Workers' Meetings *[Moscow Radio]* 117
Georgian Resolution Postpones Elections *[ZARYA VOSTOKA 21 Mar]* 117
Georgian Liberation Movements' Declaration Signed *[MOLODEZH GRUZII 23 Mar]* 117
Georgia Makes Amendments to Republic Constitution *[ZARYA VOSTOKA 21 Mar]* 119

Central Asia

Kazakhstan Issues Appeal for USSR Unity *[IZVESTIYA 30 Apr]* 119
Kazakh Supreme Soviet Elects Officials *[Alma-Ata Radio]* 119
Oblast Party Chiefs Re-elected in Kazakhstan *[PRAVDA 29 Apr]* 119
New Dzhambul Oblast Chairman Elected *[Alma-Ata Radio]* 120
Kirghiz Supreme Soviet Commissions Named *[SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA 22 Apr]* 120
Tajik Supreme Soviet Elects Officials *[KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA 20 Apr]* 120
Pugo Comments on Tajikistan Visit *[Moscow TV]* 120
Uzbek President Meets Trade Union Aktiv *[Moscow Radio]* 120

Petrovskiy Discusses Eurasian Security

PM2704145090 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 16, 17-23 Apr 90 p 3

[Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy article: "The Eurasian Idea: New Horizons"]

[Text] Ideological blindness distorts the real world, and causes us to misinterpret the processes taking place in it. We have become convinced of this from our own experience of reducing all the differences in international relations to a struggle of two systems. We underestimated the importance of geographic and demographic factors in world policy, and we simply unable to remove our suspicions about our former "chief adversary" in the West.

As a result of this, the geopolitical reality of "Eurasia" dropped out of our field of vision and from our foreign policy strategy. This, although the realization of the historical and territorial integrity of the biggest continent in the world took place as far back as the second half of the 19th century, when Russian public thought imparted a political connotation to this concept. Vladimir Solovev and Nikolay Berdyayev wrote about Eurasia as a great historical territorial community to which our country belongs. Possibly for this reason, too, the Eurasian idea was received in the Stalinist and subsequent, right up to recent, periods as ideologically alien.

One may argue whether the centre of civilization is shifting from the West to the Asian-Pacific region. But it is indisputable that Eurasia is not only one of the most densely populated and rapidly developing geographic areas. This is a major generator of world processes; and high international standards in politics, economics, science and technology are being established there.

All permanent members of the UN Security Council, including the United States as a Pacific power, are represented in Eurasia. The reliable structure embracing all Eurasian space could become a stabilizer of the swift changes now occuring in the world, and a support for the global construction of security.

The new foreign policy thinking has given the conception of Eurasia a new lease on life. Four years ago the Soviet Union put the question on forming a system of reliable security on the whole Eurasian territory and today this concept is gradually spreading more and more.

Sometimes the question is asked: Is it necessary to speak about the world system on the scale of Eurasia when there is the UN Charter? However, we clearly see that the human values recognized by the UN member-states are only gaining when they are being concretized with reference to continents, separate regions and countries.

The formation of the Eurasian security structure presupposes the merger of the currently onging processes of forming peace-loving communities in Europe and Asia. This is neither absorbing nor unifying the existing bilateral and multilateral politico-diplomatic structures in Europe and Asia, but their mutual supplementation and mutual enrichment by know-how, and joining of efforts to achieve a common aim.

The continental security structure in Eurasia presupposes the development of continental negotiation mechanisms. The European process gives some idea of how, based on a balance of interests, this kind of cooperation could work in Asia as well. I repeat: This is not blind copying. The experience of the European process in Eurasia doesn't deny the peculiarities of the world outlook, political culture and uniqueness of the Asian peoples. In any case they will suggest solutions which are unusual for Europeans but are comprehensible and acceptable for these peoples. Indeed, the current practice in Asia contains a wide range of possibilities for conducting an all-Asian dialogue: a foreign ministers conference, meetings of experts, scientific and public forums on a continental, as well as a regional scale. As for the agenda for these forums, life poses the question of confidence-building measures, of reducing military confrontation. Next on the list is not only the settlement but also the prevention of regional conflicts, raising of obstacles to nuclear and other types of mass destruction weapons, limitation of naval activity, a radical reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments.

Together with the improvement of the negotiation mechanisms in Europe and Asia it is high time to start a dialogue on the scale of entire Eurasia. And it is not only that the formation of a Eurasian security structure is a serious and major problem calling for an ahead-of-time and many-sided elaboration. A dialogue on Eurasian affairs could contribute today to a mutual enrichment of the political cultures of Europe and Asia, to an outlining of the role of the countries on the continent in the European and Asian processes which are developing along parallel lines.

As representatives of a nuclear Eurasian power, linking the civilizations of both continents, today we experience the need to realize our common destinies and need for joint action.

'Historic' Meeting of German Defense Ministers

PM0105144190 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 29 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[V. Agayev dispatch: "FRG, GDR: Toward a Single Army. What the Ministers Agreed"]

[Text] Bonn—Absorbed in their financial and economic problems, the Germans hardly noticed that FRG and GDR Defense Ministers G. Stoltenberg and R. Eppelmann met briefly at Bonn airport 27 April. However, there is every reason to describe that meeting as historic, and not just because GDR and FRG defense ministers never used to meet in the past. This was the first step toward a future German army. It is true that so far no one knows what the future army will look like, nor is it clear in what way this aim will be approached. However,

some points have already been defined. Minister Stoltenberg said after the meeting with his GDR colleague: "We believe that a united Germany must be a member of NATO; however, NATO military structures and installations will not be extended to the territory of the present GDR." True, it is difficult to see how this is compatible with the words of Deputy Minister Wellershoff, who said recently: "Any country must be defended on the border." However, in Bonn the ministers stressed: During the establishment of a single army, the interests of all our neighbors, and especially the interests of the Soviet Union, must be taken into account.

In order to bring the still-vague future closer, it is necessary right now to begin to elaborate the legal foundations of a united German army, and to give thought to its structures, forms, and management principles. In parallel, cooperation between the existing armies must also be developed: Possible spheres of such cooperation right now are monitoring flight safety, participation in humanitarian actions, reciprocal arms control, and reciprocal visits and meetings, above all at servicemen's level. In Eppelmann's opinion such encounters are the quickest way to overcome the enemy image. Incidentally Eppelmann, whose full title is minister of disarmament and defense, is a clergymen who refused to do his service in the GDR Army. On the eve of the meeting he expressed puzzlement: Why is this year's FRG defense budget bigger than in any previous year? However, judging by appearances, he did not mention this during the meeting, but declared that he intends to reduce the Volksarmee from 170,000 to 135,000 men, and gradually bring his troop numbers down to 100,000.

Stoltenberg agrees with him up to a point. He believes that, if the Vienna disarmament talks are successful, it will be possible also to give some thought to cutting the number of men. During the first stage to 400,000, i.e. 100,000 fewer than now. This applies above all to servicemen doing their military service. If disarmament progresses further, it will be possible to exceed this limit. And to reduce military service from the current 15 months to 12 months. Incidentally, thanks to the small size of the country, most servicemen doing their military service only spend their working hours, that is around eight hours a day, in their units. They spend the night at home. Eppelmann intends to cut his expenditure for hardware by 46 percent. Stoltenberg is thinking on the same lines but not in such radical terms. He is proposing, for instance, to continue research on the Jaeger-90 aircraft (the most expensive military project in the FRG today).

A few days ago, the leaders of three Western countries—our former allies—expressed themselves in favor of abolishing the special rights and special responsibility of the victorious powers in respect of Berlin and Germany as a whole. "We have come to the conclusion," Bush said, "that a united Germany must have full control over its territory. Without any discriminatory restrictions on its sovereignty." The first meeting of the foreign ministers of the countries taking part in the "Two Plus Four" conference will take place in Bonn 5 May.

Paris Meeting to Aid E. Europe TV, Radio Held

PM0105155390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[PRAVDA-TASS report under the "Current Affairs" rubric]

[Text] **France**

A meeting of radio and television journalists from East and West, held in Paris, was dedicated to strengthening cooperation between journalists and organizing, through joint efforts, efficient work by the new television and radio structures being formed in East European countries. The meeting was organized on the initiative of UNESCO and the International Radio and Television Broadcasting Organization. A total of 110 journalists from 21 European countries, including the Soviet Union, and also the United States and Canada, as well as representatives of a dozen international organizations took part.

Cambodian Question, PRC-SRV Relations Viewed

OW0205080990 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0100 GMT 27 Apr 90

[Nikolayev commentary]

[Text] As part of the visit to the USSR by Li Peng, premier of the PRC State Council, Chinese and Soviet Foreign Ministers held talks in Moscow. The two sides pledged to make active efforts to find a solution to the Cambodian question.

Station commentator Nikolayev wrote: After being put on the back burner for a while, diplomatic activities aimed at finding a political solution to the Cambodian question have been renewed again. Naturally, Cambodia's internal affairs, which constitute a major aspect of the Cambodian question, should be solved by the Cambodian people themselves. Other parties concerned certainly can offer them assistance in this aspect. The role the Soviet Union and China can play in this regard is no by means insignificant. Here I would like to remind the listeners that in the Soviet-Chinese Joint Communique issued at last May's summit the two sides reaffirmed their continued efforts to promote an early political settlement of the Cambodian question in a fair and reasonable way.

At the meeting of Soviet and Chinese foreign ministers, they noted that progress has been made at negotiations on Cambodia, including increased understanding on various aspects of a settlement. Apparently, the Soviet Union, China, the United States, France, and Britain, as the permanent members of the UN Security Council, have an important role to play. The five major powers are expected to hold another round of meetings on the

Cambodian question in May. If conditions mature, the five major powers will hold negotiations with representatives of the Cambodian four parties. They will first discuss questions including holding general elections under UN supervision, bringing about a cease-fire in Cambodia, halting military assistance to the Cambodian parties at war, and establishing an international mechanism for monitoring compliance of the agreements.

The role the United Nations can play in the political solution to the Cambodian question is becoming more and more clear. Both Shevardnadze and Qian Qichen pointed this out during their Moscow meeting. However, they do not hold exactly identical views on some aspects of the Cambodian question. There is no secret about that. However, the time that differences on this question stood in the way of the development of normal Soviet-Chinese relations is gone. Today, the two sides calmly can exchange views on this question to seek a common ground. For this reason, it has become increasingly more urgent for greater contact between China and Vietnam. For example, the proposal that Vietnam, China, and Thailand hold a meeting on the Cambodian question is obviosuly a very constructive one. As everybody knows, Hanoi has indicated that it is ready to attend the meeting. Consequently, observers have placed hope on Vietnamese Vice Foreign Minister Dinh Nho Liem's coming visit to China in May.

During his talks with Chinese Foreign Minister, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze welcomed the upcoming contacts between Chinese and Vietnamese representatives. He expressed confidence that normalization of Chinese-Vietnamese relations would be very instrumental in achieving a healthier situation in Southeast Asia.

Ministry Official Cited on UN Voting

PM0105120190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 May 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Interview with A.V. Kozyrev, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry International Organizations Administration, by "our correspondent" M. Yusin; first paragraph is introduction; date and place of interview not stated: "USSR-United States: Opponents or Partners"]

[Text] As IZVESTIYA has already reported, the State Department's annual report has been published in the United States analyzing the statistics of voting in the United Nations—how often did the opinion of representatives of a particular country coincide with the U.S. position? Is a similar calculation done in the USSR? Our correspondent put this question to A.V. Kozyrev, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry International Organizations Administration.

[Kozyrev] This year for the first time the USSR Foreign Ministry sent the Supreme Soviet detailed information on the results of the UN General Assembly session. Unfortunately, E.A. Shevardnadze's report to the Supreme Soviet received far less coverage in our mass media than Secretary of State J. Baker's report to congress.

[Yusin] Andrey Vladimirovich, one figure was surprising in the U.S. report. During voting at the General Assembly session and in the Security Council the positions of the USSR and the United States coincided in only one case out of 10. And that despite the fact that in recent years constructive Soviet-U.S. cooperation has in general been set up in the international arena....

[Kozyrev] The figure you cite from the State Department report needs comment. Here it is a case only of UN resolutions put to the vote. But such resolutions are in the minority. At the recent, 44th, General Assembly session, approximately 70 percent of resolutions were adopted by consensus, that is all UN states acted from the same positions. If you take into account that fact, then the picture changes substantially. Considering the "consensus resolutions," the opinion of USSR and U.S. representatives coincided in three cases out of four.

This figure is a far more accurate reflection of present-day processes—the gradual transition of Moscow and Washington from rivalry toward partnership in the international arena. Formerly both we and the Americans would reject out of hand any proposal which proceeded from the opposite side. But now we are seeking to find a grain of reason in each other's positions. Here is a recent example. The United States has put forward an initiative on the need to hold honest and regular elections as the lawful source of power in any country. A few years ago we would have assessed this way of putting the question as an act of ideological subversion. But today the Soviet Union supported the U.S. proposal and it was adopted by a consensus, which was a specific contribution by the United Nations to the consolidation of democratic processes in the world.

[Yusin] Have there been examples in recent years of the USSR altering its approach toward a particular problem and, for instance, voting in the United Nations against resolutions it previously supported?

[Kozyrev] Yes, that has happened. In the past USSR representatives objected to openness in military questions, including defense budgets. Now the situation has changed. The Soviet Union not only supports measures to reveal military budgets but has also become the coauthor of an important resolution in this field.

One more example of the evolution of the Soviet approach. Every year at General Assembly sessions a group of states comes out with a resolution on the nonrecognition of the powers of the Israeli delegation in the United Nations. Formerly we would essentially vote for that resolution. But at the last session we abstained. After all in this case it is not a question of the Soviet Union's attitude toward the policy of the Israeli Government but of a specific legal question—can the delegation of a sovereign state take part in the work of the United Nations?

[Yusin] On what other questions discussed in the United Nations are we and the Americans successfully overcoming differences and increasingly frequently finding ourselves allies?

[Kozyrev] I would refrain from using the word "ally." In the United Nations even traditional allies seldom act in a unified bloc. It would be more accurate to call us not allies but partners....

[Yusin] How have the changes in East Europe affected the work of the United Nations? How did these states' representatives vote at the recent General Assembly session? It may be supposed that their position far from always coincided with the Soviet position....

[Kozyrev] The recent session was not indicative in that case. It took place from September through December last year, when changes had not yet taken place in a number of countries. After all, in early fall the old regimes were still in power in the GDR and Czechoslovakia while in Romania Ceausescu's dictatorship collapsed only a few days before the end of the work of the General Assembly session.... I think that the trend you mentioned will be manifested at the next session. New nuances may appear in the position of the East European countries, for instance with regard to the Near East conflict. After all the majority of these states have established diplomatic relations with Israel. Or take the Korean problem. The recent establishment of diplomatic relations between East Europe and Seoul is a new element in international politics which may quite possibly be reflected on the position of our allies, if this subject is raised.

It may be predicted that on specific questions in the United Nations the opinion of the Soviet Union and its allies will now coincide more rarely than in previous year. We are retreating from a barracks-like unanimity, our cooperation is acquiring the features of civilized, equal collaboration. Within the country, it is true, alarmed voices can be heard from time to time. People are frightened that the monolithic socialist bloc will be replaced by a pluralism that did not exist before? But what is terrible about that? After all, during the voting by NATO countries in the United Nations there has long been no unanimity, sometimes even on fundamental political questions.

The situation should not be dramatized. I am sure that our differences with our partners from East Europe will not be of a fundamental nature. After all, ultimately both we and they advocate democracy, peaceful dialogue, and cooperation with all countries.

United States & Canada

Lithuanian Prime Minister Prunskiene Visits Canada

Meeting With Bush 3 May

LD0105195590 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1900 GMT 1 May 90

[Text] Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene is visiting Canada. She has met with Canadian Foreign Minister Clarke. Foreign journalists report that the prime minister expects to obtain in Canada a credit for Lithuania up to $18 million.

This week the head of the Lithuanian government will visit the United States. On Thursday, in Washington, she will speak about the situation in Lithuania at a meeting of the U.S. Helsinki commission. The White House press spokesman Fitzwater stated that Kazimiera Prunskiene will be received by U.S. President Bush, himself. According to him, the president wants to learn first hand about the situation in Lithuania.

Tour of Legislative Assembly

LD0205093390 Moscow TASS in English 0912 GMT 2 May 90

[Text] Ottawa May 2 TASS—Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene who is in Canada at the invitation of local Lithuanian organisations visited the legislative assembly of the Ontario Province on Tuesday.

The Province's Premier David Peterson gave a luncheon in honour of the Lithuanina guest which was attended by many local officials.

Prunskiene said she was sure that other Soviet republics and regions would help Lithuania.

Peterson emphasised that his province was ready to help Lithuania and consult it in such issues as the creation of financial markets. He also said that Ontario would, apparently, send a delegation to Lithuania later this year.

Obukhov Reviews Gorbachev-Bush Meeting, Lithuania

LD0105115490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1030 GMT 1 May 90

[Text] Moscow, 1 May (TASS)—I have no grounds for pessimism regarding the meeting of the two presidents, Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush, Aleksey Obukhov, head of the United States and Canada Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said in a conversation with a correspondent from the weekly MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI [MOSCOW NEWS]. He reminded us that at the meeting planned for the end of May agreements in various areas should be reached. In the first place this concerns the initialling of the treaty on a 50-percent cut in strategic offensive weapons. It is stipulated that before the end of the year the missing details will be worked out and the treaty will be ready for signing. One of the unsolved problems is the problem of air- and sea-based cruise missiles.

The Soviet side, Obukhov noted, favors the quickest possible constructive advancement at talks and mutual efforts in these goals. Of course the talks on this issue are not simple; various positions are advanced, and they are being examined in the interests of achieving an agreement. We want the treaty on strategic offensive weapons to become reality and securely close all possible channels for continuing the arms race in this area. This is the mood with which our delegation is working in Geneva.

Stressing that the course for agreement is the most important thing now, Aleksey Obukhov indicated that "the Lithuanian problem" should not influence perestroyka. "I hope our balanced course on Lithuania, based on the requirements of the USSR Constitution, finds understanding from official U.S. representatives," the head of the USSR Foreign Ministry United States and Canada section said.

Frolov Talks With U.S. Senators, Analysts

PM0105145190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[PRAVDA special correspondents V. Gan, S. Kolesnikov, V. Linnik, V. Sukhoy dispatch: "'PRAVDA' in U.S. Senate"]

[Text] Washington, 27 Apr—The Russian word "pravda" has probably been heard more today than any other in one of the U.S. Senate buildings on Capitol Hill. A large group of legislators and foreign policy experts used the word literally every time they put a question to I.T. Frolov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chief editor of PRAVDA.

Which dominates in the newspaper's publications on the United States—the positive or the negative? What form will PRAVDA take under a multiparty system? Will it publish advertisements when the switch is made to a market economy? Do alternative views on the situation in Lithuania find a place in its pages?

Asking these questions, Senators R. Kasten, R. Lugar, P. Leahy, and others did not conceal their genuine interest in what is happening in the Soviet Union and in the prospects for the development of Soviet-U.S. relations. Naturally, the view of perestroyka from Washington does not coincide with our own ideas and assessments in many respects. During the conversation they offered their own solutions to the problems now seriously facing Soviet society. But it seems that simple answers to the very difficult questions posed by life are not always appropriate for totally different circumstances, times, and places. However, that certainly does not rule out the possibility of finding some points of contact even with regard to the most difficult problems. It was noted in particular at the meeting that the U.S. Administration

wants to take a considered, realistic approach to determining the priorities in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States.

I.T. Frolov's meeting with prominent political scientists Z. Brzezinski, J. Kirkpatrick, and G. Kramer was an original continuation of the discussion with the American legislators. Predictions for the future were the main feature in the conversation with well-known American futurologist J. Nesbitt [name as published].

Perestroyka, which has made common human values the basis of the new political thinking, opens up broad opportunities to develop those scientific disciplines (bioethics, genetics, and biomedicine) which closely research nature and the rich potential of the human personality. Academician I.T. Frolov talked about this at the international symposium which opened in Washington today on the problems of biomedical ethics; the symposium is organized by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences. The successes of modern science, he said, open up prospects before society for an all-around transformation in people's lives. Discussing the main aspects in the development of humanist ideas, I.T. Frolov stressed in particular that attention must focus primarily on civilization's spiritual values and that the individual must form the basis of all ethical concepts.

The ensuing discussion touched on such fundamental problems as the role of science in modern society and the ethical and moral criteria of the scientist.

American Academics Received at Foreign Ministry

PM0105090790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading: "Official Announcements"]

[Text] On 28 April A.A. Bessmertnykh, USSR first deputy foreign minister, received the well-known American public figure Pamela Harrison, along with prominent U.S. academics R. Legvold, V. Hyuit, K. Shulman, D. Kipper, and S. Talbott [names as transliterated], who are studying the problems of Soviet-U.S. relations.

During the conversation they discussed conceptual aspects of the future development of international relations and the role of the USSR and the United States in this process.

Defense Secretary Cheney on NATO, Lithuania

PM0105101190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 May 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Item from roundup of TASS, REUTER, and UPI reports: "Cheney in Favor of Reforms in NATO"]

[Text] In a statement on ABC [TV], U.S. Defense Secretary Cheney expressed himself in favor of carrying out reforms in NATO and reducing the U.S. military presence in West Europe. At the same time he rejected the possibility of the dissolution of the NATO military organization and the total withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe in the foreseeable future.

Cheney confirmed the U.S. Administration's policy with regard to Lithuania. He pointed out that the Soviet Union's use of military force there "would have a substantial adverse effect on the development of Soviet-U.S. relations and many achievements of recent years would be jettisoned."

Cheney Cited on Aircraft Request Cutbacks

PM0105135590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 May 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Dispatch by own correspondent A. Blinov: "Pentagon's Truncated Application"]

[Text] Washington—U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney informed the congressional committees at the end of last week that he has decided to cut back on applications for military aircraft of the latest generation. Programs for their production will be cut back by $34 billion.

Previously the Pentagon had planned to order 132 B-2 bombers designed with the use of "Stealth" technology—it makes it more difficult to detect the bombers by radar. Now it has been deemed enough to purchase only 75 of these aircraft—the most expensive aircraft in the U.S. Air Force. The start of the mass production of the ATF [Advanced Tactical Fighter], constructed according to the same technology, will be moved from 1994 to 1996. Orders for the C-17 transport aircraft and the A-12 carrier-based attack aircraft will also be reduced.

R. Cheney, who met with members of congress, announced that the decision which has been taken is the result of a four-month review of the Air Force military programs. It is based primarily on the fact of the reduction of the military threat and the curtailment of the Soviet Armed Forces.

It was noted in congress that Cheney is seeking to preserve all the latest aviation arms programs, although he is displaying readiness to waive the quantitative aspect. As a result the cost of each aircraft will increase. Cheney explained the approach he has chosen by "the United States' traditional desire for superiority in the air" and the intention to "preserve the military-industrial base."

The first comments in congress attest that not all U.S. legislators share the administration's strategy in the approach toward the military budget. Thus, L. Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, has stated that the Pentagon's proposals do not take adequate account of the fact of the reduction of the military threat to the United States. In a series of statements Senator S. Nunn, who heads the analogous committee in the Senate, has expressed himself in favor of deeper reductions of military expenditure.

China

Soviet Official Discusses Chinese Border Trade

OW2804142290 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0200 GMT 31 Mar 90

[From the "Current Events and Music" program]

[Text] An economic and trade exposition will take place in Harbin, capital of China's Heilongjiang Province, from 6 to 15 June this year. In addition to Chinese organizations and corporations, corporations from the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of Mongolia, North Korea [bei chao xian], and some East European countries will also participate. We have interviewed (Barabayi), official who is in charge of the Soviet pavilion at the exposition. The following is what he said to us:

[A male is heard speaking in Russian, then two announcers take over in Mandarin one after another] (Barabayi) says: Our purposes of taking part in the Harbin exposition are to develop border trade and economic ties with Heilongjiang Province, promote foreign trade relations with China, and sign trade contracts and barter trade contracts.

It should be pointed out that Heilongjiang's border trade and economic cooperation with the Soviet Union have been developing rapidly in recent years. The volume of border trade between the Soviet Union and Heilongjiang reached 199 million Swiss Francs in 1988. That was the total volume of border trade between Heilongjiang and the Soviet Union during the 15-year period before 1988. Heilongjiang's economic and trade relations with the Soviet Union further developed in 1989. In that year, the volume of their border trade reached 600 million Swiss Francs, 154 contracts of economic and technical cooperation were signed, more than 10,000 workers were sent from Heilongjiang to work in the Soviet Union, and the number of commodities exported to the USSR increased to nearly 3,000 kinds from merely a few dozen kinds before. So far, more than 600 organizations and corporations in six Soviet republics have trade partners in Heilongjiang.

How many Soviet organizations and corporations will take part in the Harbin exposition?

[A male is heard speaking in Russian, then a female announcer takes over in Mandarin] (Barabayi), the official in charge of the Soviet pavilion, replies: The Chinese side has assigned a space of some 400 square meters for the Soviet pavillion. This being the case, no more than 30 Soviet corporations will take part in the exposition. To be on display at the exposition will primarily be information about the Soviet Union's manufacturing industries. Not many things will be on display at the exposition. To ensure the success of the exposition and recoup all the expenditures, we as an organizer will work with the Soviet-Chinese Association for Industrial Cooperation in helping Soviet participants search their partners among Chinese corporations. We will turn over to the Heilongjiang Import-Export Corporation all the information about the commodities on display in the Soviet pavilion. Chinese industrialists visiting the pavilion will also be furnished with such information.

Li Peng Notes 'Satisfaction' With USSR Visit

PM0105120590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "From on Board the Aircraft"]

[Text] As he left Soviet territory, Li Peng, premier of the PRC State Council, sent a telegram to N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, from on board the aircraft. In the telegram he said:

Following the successful conclusion of our official visit to your country, allow me once again to express our gratitude to you and the Soviet Government. During our stay in the Soviet Union we were surrounded by wonderful hospitality and could feel the Soviet people's good feelings of friendship toward the Chinese people, which made a deep impression on us.

During our visit we held in-depth talks with you, President M.S. Gorbachev, and other Soviet leaders. A series of documents on the development of bilateral cooperation were also signed between our countries. In this connection I would like to express satisfaction with the results of the visit.

Improvement in Soviet-Chinese Ties Examined

PM2704145890 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 16, 22 Apr 90 p 12

[Andrey Denisov article: "Let's Exercise Restraint. Glasnost And Soviet-Chinese Relations"]

[Text] China's Premier of the State Council Li Peng arrives in Moscow on April 23. This is a return visit following last May's visit to Beijing by the Soviet leader.

Soviet-Chinese relations have continued to improve over the last year. But there is a danger that we begin to take this for granted. So it seems at times that May 1989 has become history. Time today moves quickly, and new happenings crowd out events that in other conditions would remain fresh in our minds. Beijing's normalization formula is well known: to close the past, to open the future. The first part of it has been acted upon and we hope there will be no return to the past. As for the opening of the future, both sides are only starting this, well aware of how much patience it takes. I think one shouldn't regret that the dialogue is moving too slowly, as did Aleksandr Bovin (MN, No. 14).

The USSR's contacts with China in 1989 can't be dismissed as sterile or too weak. Our exchanges with other countries, with the exception of the United States, are no more active. Was the year fruitful? The answer to

this question will be given by the talks the head of China's government will have in Moscow and the documents to be signed.

The two capitals have entered a mutually productive dialogue. It is a balanced rather than a superficial and self-congratulatory dialogue, as some people see it. Our countries did not normalize relations as part of some subterfuge. What matters is the content of our assessments not their form, which can be intentionally barbed sometimes. There have been many harsh words in the history of Soviet-Chinese relations. It's about time we stop teaching each other how "to build socialism." Haven't those who now would like to teach their neighbours about democracy learned their lessons?

As for reforms in China, they didn't start in the economy, as Bovin believes. The reforms started with the "liberation of minds", and the recognition that social practice is the criterion of truth, not the withered dogmas of Soviet and Chinese "teachers."

It's too early, I think, to speak about the eclipse of economic reforms in China. The reforms struck deep roots over the past ten years and have become irreversible. What we really witness are measures to bolster the overheated economy on the macrolevel because without these measures a market can become a free-for-all.

As for economic and political changes, I can only say that China's population of one billion is 90 per cent peasants a quarter of a million of whom are illiterate, so the country's road to democracy may not be the one we would see from afar.

Here I come to the most complex point—the reaction to the tragic events in Beijing last June. They are now part of the history of the "decade of reforms" in China.

While we are all of new thinking, for dialogue as a means to resolve conflicts, for upholding universal human values, the realities of the world don't always match them.

There is no doubt about the sincerity and purity of intentions of most of the young Beijing demonstrators. Just as there is no doubt that when the demonstrations started no one in Beijing expected the final outcome. What are the direct (I stress the word) consequences of the "lunge for democracy"? The blood on the concrete slabs of Beijing's wide streets, and the further worsening of the already painful process of change.

Soviet-Chinese relations are like a living pulsating but so far raw nerve which sharply reacts to each clumsy move, no matter how well-intentioned. This situation has yet to be consolidated through mutually advantageous cooperation, which we both need. So why try to tweak the nose of the neighbour with whom we have a 7,000 km common border? We don't like some of the things our neighbour does, but then the neighbour is not inclined to applaud much of what is happening here.

So let's keep a check on what we are saying, let's try to hold on to what we have so far achieved through so much pain.

Support for PRC on Taiwan Issue Viewed

OW0205091790 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1400 GMT 27 Apr 90

[Mulatov Commentary; from the "Half Hour with Wang Xiao" program]

[Text] You are now listening to the "Half Hour with Wang Xaio" program of Radio Moscow. Of course, you already know the contents of the agreements signed by Li Peng, premier of the State Council of China, during his visit to the Soviet Union. Every agreement was entered into on the basis of the understanding of, and respect for, mutual interests. These agreements serve to enhance a new atmosphere of friendship and trust between the two countries. The formation of this kind of atmosphere was brought about by the historical visit to your country by Soviet leader Gorbachev last year. The visit has made both the Soviet and Chinese peoples satisfied.

I think a profound understanding of, and respect for, mutual interests is one of the most outstanding characteristics of current Sino-Soviet relations. As is known to all, every country among us has its own difficulties and serious problems remaining to be solved. However, when the situation concerns the major problem of the other side, it is incumbent on each of the two sides to scrupulously abide by the principle of noninterference in each other's internal affairs by adopting an attitude expressing concern, as well as a sense of propriety, attaching importance to it, and showing understanding. When we take the example of the stand taken by the Soviet Union on the Taiwan issue left over from the past, we'll have a clear picture of this point. It is a knotty problem which has existed in Sino-U.S. relations for quite a long time. For decades, the Soviet Union has supported China's policy for a solution of the Taiwan issue.

At the recent Sino-Soviet talks, the Chinese side announced once again that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China, and that China is resolutely opposed to any attempt to bring about two China's, one China and one Taiwan, or Taiwan independence. Dear listeners, I wish to emphasize in particular that the Soviet side confirms that it steadfastly supports the stand taken by the Chinese Government [on the Taiwan issue].

Station observer Mulatov pointed out in this regard that the Soviet Union has not taken any expedient measures in deciding on and implementing its line of giving support to China over the Taiwan issue. Moreover, it remains unswervingly staunch in this stand. He added, the Soviet Union was the first of all countries in the world to recognize the PRC and terminate its diplomatic relations and all other relations with the Kuomintang regime as early as 2 October 1949. Since then, the Soviet Union has supported this just stand of China's in every

stage of the struggle waged by the Chinese people for accomplishing the great undertaking of their motherland's reunification. In recent years, the policy put forward by the leadership of China for a peaceful solution of the Taiwan issue, which was left over from the past, on the basis of "One country, two systems," of course, also obtained full support from the Soviet Union.

Understanding mutual interests, respecting the sovereignty and legitimate rights of the other side, and supporting each other in the areas where the interests of either side are at stake are naturally the organic parts of Sino-Soviet relations. The prospect for their development is most promising. They are also [words indistinct] in the new bilateral agreements for cooperation in all fields of endeavor.

RENMIN RIBAO's Moscow Reporter Interviewed

OW2704060990 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0100 GMT 8 Apr 90

[Station reporter (Machenko's) interview with (Zhong Xiangguang), head of China's RENMIN RIBAO press station in the Soviet Union—live; from the "Current Events and Commentaries" program]

[Text] [(Machenko)] Comrade (Zhong), with what sentiments did you come to Moscow?

[(Zhong Xiangguang)] I felt very happy. It is after a 30-year hiatus that RENMIN RIBAO has reestablished a press station in Moscow, and I'm the first reporter assigned to this station. The Soviet Union is the world's first socialist state. RENMIN RIBAO readers are very concerned about the Soviet Union—about the current domestic changes there. They are also very interested in the trends of development in the Soviet Union. As a resident RENMIN RIBAO correspondent in Moscow, I feel my tasks are very arduous. Of course, I shall do my best to fulfill my readers' wishes.

[(Machenko)] Have you been to the Soviet Union before?

[(Zhong Xiangguang)] I have been to Moscow several times. However, those were only short trips or stopovers. It is the first time I have been assigned to work here as a resident correspondent.

[(Machenko)] You speak good Russian. Where did you learn it?

[(Zhong Xiangguang)] My Russian cannot be said to be very good. I learned it at quite an early date—in the early 1950s—at Shanghai's Foreign Language Institute. I have almost forgotten the language, because I have had little opportunity to practice it in the past 30-odd years [laughing].

[(Machenko)] Recently, there has been a marked increase in journalistic contacts between our two countries. Your trip to the Soviet Union attests to this. How would you assess such contacts?

[(Zhong Xiangguang)] I think it is extremely significant to strengthen exchanges and contacts between the Chinese and Soviet media. Media people of the two countries have one common mission—to do propaganda work in promoting mutual understanding and friendship between the two peoples. Media friends from your country have a good understanding of the situation here. Take me, for example. I have had much assistance from my Soviet media friends since my arrival here. They have been willing to provide me with information, have contacted people for me to interview, and so on. All this has been of great help to me. I think the strengthening of such contacts is beneficial to both sides.

[(Machenko)] Your assignment to Moscow is prior to Chinese Premier Li Peng's official trip to the Soviet Union. Is it a coincidence?

[(Zhong Xiangguang)] It is, of course, a coincidence. However, it has turned out to be one of the factors in our timing for establishing a press station. Although we decided to set up the station a long time ago, it took us a long time to prepare. We decided to quicken the pace of our preparatory work by coming here ahead of schedule, after learning that Premier Li Peng was going to visit the Soviet Union.

[(Machenko)] What are your initial impressions of the capital of our country?

[(Zhong Xiangguang)] It has been exactly one month since I arrived in Moscow. My deepest impression has been my Soviet friends, who range from the leadership to ordinary people. They have a deep affection for the Chinese people. The Soviet media have shown particular concern for me. When I visited the PRAVDA Editorial Department three days ago, Frolov, a member of the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat and editor-in-chief of PRAVDA, met me and extended a welcome to RENMIN RIBAO's reestablishment of a press station. He indicated that PRAVDA would render me all kinds of assistance. The Press Office of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs formally granted me a press accreditation card as a resident correspondent the day after my arrival in Moscow. Soviet friends have made many things easy for me. Although my press station is currently still in the planning stage, and cannot immediately assume regular coverage duties, I believe that, with assistance from my Soviet friends, it will soon go into regular operations.

Northeast Asia

2,000 Koreans Died Under Stalin 'Oppression'

SK0105112290 Moscow International Service in Korean 0900 GMT 29 Apr 90

[Excerpt] On 9 May, our country will celebrate the 45th anniversary of victory in the great fatherland war. This victory was made possible by the efforts of all Soviet people.

Station reporter (Gaviana Khenbilteva) wrote about the contributions of Koreans to this great victory.

The late 1930s and the early 1940s was a tragic period in the life of Koreans in the Soviet Union. In the course of oppression under Stalin, Koreans lost approximately 2,000 outstanding sons—(?economic) functionaries, soldiers, teachers, and writers.

The forcible migration of Koreans to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan left harsh traces. In this course, hundreds of aged people and children died.

This notwithstanding, when the war began, thousands of Koreans submitted to the military conscription department their petitions to be sent to the front. However, the banished people lost the right to defend their country, and only a few people were sent to the front.

These few people confirmed their loyalty to the fatherland through their heroism. The title of Soviet hero was awarded to two Koreans after their death.

In this hour, I will talk about Min (Aleksandr), one of the two. [passage omitted]

DPRK Denounces 'Team Spirit' Exercise

SK0205041790 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 26 Apr 90

[From the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] The DPRK appealed to the United States not to conduct such war exercises as the "Team Spirit" in South Korea, to withdraw its armed forces and nuclear weapons from South Korea, and to take practical steps for easing tension on the Korean peninsula.

This was pointed out in a statement issued by a spokesman of the DPRK Foreign Ministry in connection with the ending of the joint military exercise which is staged each year by the United States and South Korea.

The statement emphasized the peace-loving proposals of the DPRK for the solution of the Korean issues including designation of Korea as a nuclear-free, peace zone and phased arms reduction.

DPRK Cooperation Commission Session Ends

LD2804142390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1414 GMT 27 Apr 90

[Text] Pyongyang, 27 Apr (TASS)—A routine 24th session of the intergovernmental Soviet-Korean consultative commission on economic, scientific, and technical issues took place here between 24 and 27 April.

The Soviet delegation was headed by V.V. Nikitin, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and the Korean by Kim Pok-sin, vice-premier of the DPRK Administration Council.

The session discussed questions connected with the state of and prospects for the development of bilateral trade and economic relations and scientific and technical cooperation. An objective analysis was given of the situation which has arisen over the fulfilment of the sides' obligations with regard to reciprocal supplies of goods and the utilization of production capacities of industrial facilities built in the DPRK with assistance from the USSR on a barter arrangement.

The sides' agreement in principle on questions of transfer to conducting reciprocal trade at world prices and making payments in freely convertible currency is of importance.

Accords have been reached on the further development of cooperation in power engineering, the production of light industry goods as on an own materials basis, shipbuilding, electronics, and also in agriculture in the Far East of the USSR.

In the sphere of scientific and technical cooperation it is planned to expand direct ties between appropriate associations, organizations and institutes, primarily in such areas as machinebuilding, medicine and microbiology, mineral prospecting, and joint work on problems of exploiting marine resources and protecting rice from agricultural pests and diseases.

A protocol was signed on trade exchange and payments between the USSR and the DPRK for 1990. In accordance with this, deliveries are envisaged from the USSR of goods of such importance to the DPRK as machinery and equipment, oil and oil products, and coking coal. In its turn, the DPRK will supply to the USSR metal-cutting machine tools, batteries, barytes, zinc, magnesite clinker, and consumer goods.

The session of the commission took place in a friendly and businesslike atmosphere. A joint protocol on the results of the work was signed.

On the same day V.V. Nikitin was received by Yon Hyong-muk, member of the Politburo of the Korean Workers Party Central Committee and premier of the DPRK Administration Council, who gave a positive assessment of the results of the commission session and told of the DPRK's striving to continue to develop Soviet-Korean economic cooperation.

Kim Pok-sin and B.M. Morozov, USSR charge d'affaires in the DPRK, took part in the conversation, which passed in a friendly and businesslike atmosphere.

PRAVDA, Japanese TV Film on Perestroyka

OW2804111390 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1000 GMT 15 Apr 90

[From the "Siberian Tour" program]

[Excerpt] Listeners: The Soviet newspaper PRAVDA recently carried reporter (Idanov)'s report summarizing

the joint activities of PRAVDA and the Japanese television station NTV. These activities have concluded.

The report told of the production of the first segment of a documentary film entitled: Perestroyka on 10,000 Kilometers. There will be second and third parts. The 10,000 kilometers refers to the length of the Soviet Union from east to west.

In the first part, the teams gathered news at Khabarovsk Oblast on the east coast, Amur Oblast, the Yakut ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic], and [word indistinct] in the border area. The next target of the project is to cover the Ozer Baykal area.

Reporter (Idanov) writes about the team's news gathering activities there as follows:

According to local residents, this is the first time in 40 years that spring has come to the Ozer Baykal area so early. Even though there is still snow in the woods and valleys in spots, fallen leaves can be seen on the ground and a pleasant spring wind is helping the azaleas to show pink blossoms. This is a scene normally seen only in early May.

With the exception of Mr. Minami, who is the 47-year-old executive producer, members of the news team are all young people in their thirties. They all have abundant experience. Many of them have travelled in their own country and to Italy, Spain, the United States, and Asian nations on assignments. There are members who amaze Russian people with their fluency in Russian. Mr. Micho Tsukamoto is one. Mr. Tsukamoto, who celebrated his 39th birthday while staying at [word indistinct], revealed that he is a graduate of Moscow University. He thinks he owes President Gorbachev for having the chance to not only refresh his knowledge of Russian, but to actually improve it.

Thanks to the policies of President Gorbachev, he said, interest in the Soviet Union has increased in Japan to a surprising extent, and Japan's exchanges with the Soviet Union have expanded in a remarkable manner. Russian language experts are very popular these days. He said he himself has had offers from many places.

He said: The words of Dostoevskiy and Tolstoy—which are so difficult to understand, but so beautiful—have become so important to me. He added: For very personal reasons, I am hoping that Soviet perestroyka will be a success. [passage omitted]

Concessions on Territorial Issue Examined

OW2904141190 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1200 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Text] In replying to a reader's question on how the Soviet Union should deal with Japan's territorial claim for the four Kuril Islands and how the deadlocked Soviet-Japan relations should be improved, PRAVDA political commentator Ovchinnikov gave the following answer:

Such a problem can be solved only on the basis of mutual concessions. Japan's attempt to force the Soviet Union to give in on this issue is meaningless. If the two confronting parties should pull a piece of knotted rope from both sides, the knot would become too tight to untie

Few Japaneses know the fact that the Soviet Union has returned the (Khorsterawood) cultivation base to Finland as a token of the Soviet Union's goodwill. The Soviet Union obtained this base on the basis of measures to settle various postwar problems. We can give another example. The Soviet Union has leased its territory to Finland for constructing the Saimaa Canal. It is clear that such concessions can be made only under the atmosphere of truly good-neighborly relations. And these examples are worthy of serious consideration.

This is the answer that political commentator Ovchinnikov has given to a question of a PRAVDA's reader.

Mongolian Opposition Seen to 'Exploit' Democracy

PM0105150390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Mongolian Government Statement"]

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, 28 Apr—The picketing of Government House is nothing more than the action of a group of extremists seeking power. That is the assessment given by a Mongolian Government statement published in the press today to the demonstration staged yesterday in front of Government House by the leaders of the Mongolian Democratic Union and the Mongolian Democratic Party.

The document notes that these actions attest to the desire of some Mongolian Democratic Union and Mongolian Democratic Party leaders to exploit young people's desire for democracy to suit their own political interests. They are aimed against the state and could impede the implementation of measures to extricate the economy from its crisis situation. The hasty, ultimatum-like nature of the demands shows that the leaders of these organizations repudiate practical steps to renew society and, by their actions, are impeding the creation of normal conditions in labor collectives and steady work by enterprises and establishments, thereby intensifying the complex socioeconomic situation in the country, the statement stresses.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Petrovskiy Speaks on Need for Dialogue in Asia

SK0205002090 Moscow International Service in Korean 0900 GMT 19 Apr 90

["Gist" of article "Europe-Asia Plan and New Prospects" by Valdimir Petrovskiy, Soviet vice minister of foreign affairs, carried in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI]

[Text] Ideological blindness distorts the appearance of the world and leads to the misinterpretation of events. It regards the distinctiveness in international relations only as a clash between the two blocs, underrates the significance of the geographic and populational factors in the arena of international politics, and cherishes only one's own experience.

We have been unable to take our eyes of suspicion from our major adversaries of the past in (?all directions). As a result, the geopolitical reality of Europe and Asia has been skipped in our view and in the strategy of international politics.

Debates can be held over the question of whether the (?focus of attention) is shifting to the Asia-Pacific region. However, the continent of Europe and Asia is one of the most densely populated, and most rapidly developing regions. At the same time, it is a very important area of global events and an area of high international scientific and technological standards. This fact is not at all debatable.

New political thinking has produced the Europe-Asia plan. The Soviet Union put forth the question of establishing a security system on a Europe-Asia scale. At present, the plan is becoming more widespread.

Establishing a Europe-Asia security system promises an integration of the courses of establishing peace-loving cooperative systems currently underway in Europe and Asia into a general trend. This means neither an absorption or a merger of the equal, bilateral, or multilateral political and diplomatic structures of Europe and Asia. This means pooling strength for mutual benefit and exchange of experiences as well as for realizing certain goals.

As for the situation in Asia, at present, Asia has its own great possibility of a pan-Asia dialogue. In other words, foreign ministers talks, meetings of specialists, and continental or regional academic or social conferences are examples.

As for agenda items, the question of social and military conflict is put forth in reality.

As for the pending issues, the arbitration or prevention of regional conflicts, the establishment of a mechanism opposing nuclear or other mass-destruction weapons, the (?reduction of naval forces), [words indistinct] can be cited.

Time has come to establish a mechanism of dialogue in Europe and Asia and to start dialogue in (?all areas) of Europe and Asia. The question is not that the establishment of a Europe-Asia security system is a difficult and enormous task.

Dialogue regarding the question of Europe and Asia can help mutually develop (?economy) and culture in Europe and Asia, and can help define the roles of Europe and Asia, at a time when events are taking place across those continents.

As those who represent the Soviet Union which spans from Europe to Asia, while linking the peoples of the two continents, and which is a nuclear country, we feel the need to realize the commonness of the people and the need for a joint action.

Article on Asian, Pacific Situation Reported

SK0205000490 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 27 Apr 90

[From the "Focus on Asia" Program]

[Text] The Soviet paper KRASNYA ZVEZDA carries a special article on the military and political situation in Asia and the Pacific. Lieutenant General (Policichen), author of the special article, writes: As is known, the Soviet Union has put forward a series of proposals to alleviate military confrontation in Asia and the Pacific. However, to our regret, dialogue on the security issue in Asia and the Pacific, the first step in the process of alleviating military confrontation in this region, has been unreasonably delayed because of some countries, including the United States, which do not want to have dialogue.

Regarding this region as the second basic strategic area following Europe and as one of the (?stages) for all-out confrontation with the Soviet Union, the United States has deployed some 530,000 allied forces there, the second largest allied forces in terms of combat capability. Some 280 U.S. military bases have been deployed in the Far East and Southeast Asia. Among them are some 80 large U.S. Air Force and Naval bases. Most of them are in Japan and South Korea.

The strengthening of the military and political alliance among the United States, Japan, and South Korea is one of the basic factors which obstruct the efforts for alleviation of tensions. The trend in which Japan's role is increasing within the frame of the Japan-U.S. Agreement of Mutual Cooperation and Security can be interpreted as Tokyo's desire to turn the country into a world military power. [Words indistinct] the possibility of mutual reuduction of the armed forces and military arms of the Soviet Union and the United States in this region has been cautiously [?reviewed].

We cannot but pay attention to the following fact. Very vigorous propaganda activities have been conducted to prove military cooperation between the United States and Japan and Tokyo's military policy. Official planning documents of Japan have claimed that the Soviet Union's steps to reduce its armed forces and military equipment deployed in its eastern region have failed to bring about changes in principle in the Soviet military potential in this region.

In the period from 1984 to 1989, our Pacific Fleet was reduced by 57 battleships. The Soviet Union has failed to receive an affirmative response to the well-known proposals that it has put forward thus far to improve the military and political situation in Asia and the Pacific.

Despite of the lack of affirmative response to its proposals the Soviet Union has continued to take a series of practical steps to diminish military activities in this region. This is indeed noteworthy. For example, the Soviet Union has reduced military (?activities) in Cam Ranh port according to an agreement with the Vietnamese side. The Soviet Union has withdrawn some military arms from the port.

The recent improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and China has affirmatively influenced the military and political situation in Asia and the Pacific. The improvement of Soviet-Sino relations has provided good conditions for mutually reducing armed forces on the Soviet-Sino border area and for strengthening mutual trust.

As Soviet President Gorbachev stressed, the process of building a joint peace-loving body in Europe and Asia will eventually end with forming a joint security system in the entire area of Europe and Asia. However, Soviet general (Policichen's) special article carried in KRASNYA ZVEZDA stressed that this should be achieved through joint efforts of countries, small and large, which have military alliances and the Nonaligned Movement.

Soviet Association for Asia-Pacific Region Formed

LD3004112590 Moscow TASS in English 1024 GMT 30 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent Georgiy Shmelev]

[Text] Moscow April 30 TASS—The Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee together and a number of other public organisations have decided to set up the Soviet public association "for dialogue and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region".

The new association will facilitate the development of cooperation with the broadest spectrum of movements and foundations in the region, Committee Secretary Sergey Kompaneyets told TASS.

The Asia-Pacific region, Kompaneyets said, is turning into a new international economic and political centre that may become the hub of the "Pacific Rim civilisation" in the 21st century.

However, the present level of relations between the social and political circles of the Soviet Union and countries of the Asia- Pacific region considerably lags behind the level of inter-state relations, he said.

The committee secretary also pointed out that, unlike other continents, Asia lacks a permanent cooperation mechanism or a universal all-Asia forum either at state or public level, within which a dialogue on the most topical problems could be conducted.

Contacts with representatives of various socio-political organisations in the region illustrate the lively interest being shown in the Soviet Union's perestroyka and democratisation and readiness to develop cooperation and dialogue with the Soviet public on a wide range of matters.

The new association plans to hold conferences, seminars, round-table meetings, television bridges and contests. It will also exchange delegations and tourist groups and organise joint international cruises on soviet liners, and other activities.

The association was founded by the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, the Soviet peace fund, the All-Union Central Council of Soviet Trade Unions, the Siberian, Ural and Far Eastern Branches of the Academy of Sciences and a number of research institutes and Soviet periodicals.

A constituent conference of the association is expected to be held this year.

Philippine Vice President Laurel Interviewed

HK3004063590 Moscow in Tagalog to the Philippines 1300 GMT 29 Apr 90

[Interview with Philippine Vice President Salvador Laurel by unidentified reporter—recorded in Moscow, date not given]

[Text] [Reporter] Recently, the 11th international meeting of the mass media and the third conference of the World Peace Association was held in Moscow. Among those attending was Philippine Vice President Salvador Laurel. I asked him what issues the conference tackled, particularly regarding the media.

[Laurel] The World Media Affairs Council and the World Peace Council, which held the discussions about problems between the Latins and the Americans, was held here in Moscow precisely because people want to see what is really taking place here. This is because the current program of perestroyka and glasnost is known around the world and we all want to know how these new measures instituted by your President Mikhail Gorbachev are working out. I am delighted that this meeting has been held here because we have discovered many things, learned many things which can truly benefit the rest of the world. This is because perestroyka—all the new changes in rules and institutions here—can benefit not only the Russian [as heard] nation but the entire world. In my opinion, each country has its own brand of perestroyka, its own set of problems that should be solved by means of the perestroyka which you are putting into practice here. This is why we are glad and thankful for the kindness displayed by your government to us visitors here. And we hope all the things you are undertaking by means of perestroyka and glasnost will be successful.

[Reporter] Mr Laurel, the policy of perestroyka being promoted by the Soviet Union does not only involve

internal matters but also foreign policy. What can you say about the Soviet Union's peaceful policy towards the Asia-Pacific region?

[Laurel] It is a wonderful policy, a good beginning. In July 18, 1986, when President Gorbachev in Vladivostok issued his proposal to help Southeast Asia prosper and become secure, we were delighted with this move. At present, we are hoping that this policy will be successful and be the answer to the problems faced by all the countries of Southeast Asia. The affirmation made by the government of the Soviet Union, whereby they say they will not support the communist rebels in the Philippines because they do not want to meddle in local problems, is something for which we are grateful. However, up to the present, the conflict continues and we are hoping that gradually this will dissipate and we will have peace. We cannot solve all this quickly but it is a good beginning. We sincerely hope that this will continue so that there will be peace in the entire Philippines because this is what we seek. We hope for peace so that we will have stability and will be able to concentrate on the nation's progress.

[Reporter] What can you say about moves for arms reduction in the Asia- Pacific region?

[Laurel] This is a wonderful thing because once there is disarmament in Southeast Asia, tension will be reduced. This is why we hope the superpowers will agree to this so that there will be peace in our region.

[Reporter] Mr Laurel, perestroyka and glasnost have opened up many opportunities for our two countries to cooperate. What is your perspective on the issue of relations between the two countries?

[Laurel] This is the beginning of an era of improved relations between the Soviet Union and the Philippines. As you know, our economic cooperation has improved. During the past year, our economic trade amounted to only $40 million. Our plans for closer economic ties will assure that this will grow and become $200 million. This is good news for our two countries. In future this will improve further and our countries will progress even more.

[Reporter] It seems to me that not just in the economic field can we improve our relations but also in the fields of education, health, and others. What is your view on this?

[Laurel] All these go hand in hand. These economic ties will result not only in economic growth but cultural and educational benefits as well. As Mr Gorbachev said when we spoke with him, our world grows smaller and smaller and we are all in the same boat which we need to keep afloat or else we all sink. This is why we need to help each other, so that this world boat of ours will not capsize.

[Reporter] Our President Mikhail Gorbachev received the delegates from various countries who have been attending this conference—can you give your impressions about President Gorbachev and his remarks at the conference.

[Laurel] I listened to President Gorbachev and I can truly tell you that I really admire his leadership, his breadth of vision, and the wisdom of his rule. I believe he is a fine man and everything he says comes from the goodness of his heart. This is why I was totally absorbed by his words—I kept quiet during the meeting so as to hear everything he said. In my opinion, the Russian nation is lucky to have such a leader as Mikhail Gorbachev. The entire world is lucky as well, that this well-known leader has such a lofty vision. He is helping bring peace and progress to the world.

[Reporter] Mr Laurel, this is your second visit to the Soviet Union, therefore you have some knowledge of the country. Can you give your impressions about our country and our people

[Laurel] I am delighted to be able to return here. During my last two trips to Moscow and Leningrad and (Zagorsk), which I visited last year, I was delighted because it was like opening the windows and doors of one's mind. It was a means to lose our prejudices, our wrong thinking about the Russian nation. The Russians are human beings like all others—with feelings, hearts, and problems like those of other countries. This is why we need to get to know, understand, and help each other. And I believe that if we get to know each other better and become closer, this will be good for peace in the entire world, and our two countries will be able to prosper.

[Reporter] Thank you very much, sir.

[Laurel] You are welcome. I hope perestroyka and glasnost will meet with even more of the success which your leadership has fostered. We in the Philippines also have our own perestrokya.

Vietnamese Seeks Perestroyka-Strengthened CPSU

PM0205091590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Apr 90 Second Edition p 4

["Letter from Vietnam" by Cam Pha resident Kho Lin (name as transliterated): "'...The More Friends It Will Have'"; first paragraph is dispatch by PRAVDA correspondent M. Domogatskikh]

[Text] Hanoi, 27 Apr—I have received a letter from the city of Cam Pha in Quang Ninh Province, from the auto repair plant constructed with the Soviet Union's technical assistance. The letter writer, Kho Lin, expresses thoughts which may be learned in Vietnam today from an economic planner and a party worker, a higher educational institution teacher and a student, be read in the newspaper, and be heard on the radio. There may be something debatable in them, that does not fit in with our ideas, but one thing is clear: These thoughts are honest. The writer is motivated by an ardent desire to actively assist perestroyka, by alarm at the fate of the

revolutionary gains, by fears that we may be overestimating the "good will" of imperialist forces, and, at the same time, by faith in the ultimate success of the cause of renewal.

Esteemed comrades! I, an ordinary Vietnamese working in a plant, have decided to write a few lines because I ardently want perestroyka to triumph in the Soviet Union and the land of the October Revolution to still further strengthen its positions in the international arena.

M.S. Gorbachev has repeatedly emphasized that perestroyka is a great revolutionary cause. And I would like a start to be made right now on elaborating a theory of perestroyka which will help to find the optimum solutions to complex questions. What suggestions would I like to make before the 28th congress? First, to broaden socialist democracy, combining it with an enhanced role for people's power. And to struggle by every means against abuses which harm citizens' democratic rights.

Despite the criticism of communist ideals, which has been mounted on the ideological front, these ideals and communist morality must be standards in life, particularly for the young generation.

The party's role in society must be strengthened by restructuring the party itself. On no account must the CPSU let go of or pass to someone else the banner of Great October, the banner of Lenin. I beg you to rid yourselves of everything that clogs up the party and of all the poisonous microbes, including in the cultural sphere, which are poisoning the soul of the young generation.

Despite the changes in the international climate, I believe that the essence of socialism's enemies has not changed. A Russian proverb is very relevant here: "However well you feed a wolf, it always looks to the forest." We must not reckon that imperialism today will be "kind" to us. It is right that we are abandoning the "cold war," but our enemies have not abandoned the ideological, cultural, and other kinds of war whose purpose is to break up and destroy socialism.

It is necessary to improve and strengthen Soviet-Vietnamese ties and do everything to ensure that they serve our countries' prosperity. Many unutilized reserves still exist in this regard. These ties must also influence the development of goodneighborliness in the Asia-Pacific region and in Southeast Asia.

There is another suggestion I would like to make. I beg you to more actively conduct good propaganda of the ideas of perestroyka. The sooner and the better people abroad realize what a revolutionary cause the CPSU has undertaken, the more friends the Soviet country will have. You must more boldly and actively counter all unfriendly and hostile forces and slanderers with your own ideas.

Kho Lin—Cam Pha, Vietnam

Burmese Pre-Election Political Developments Eyed

BK2904105790 Moscow in Burmese to Burma 1030 GMT 27 Apr 90

[Station observer (Andrey Petchesin) Commentary]

[Text] Dear listeners, in your letters to Radio Moscow, you have frequently asked about how those in the Soviet Union view the pre-election situation in Myanmar [Burma]. Our correspondent, (Andrey Petchesin), posed the same question to the Soviet diplomats, scientists, and journalists who specialize in the affairs of South Asia and Southeast Asia. We hope this report by our correspondent will interest listener U Thein Win of Yangon [Rangoon], Maung Than Win of Pakkoku, and the other listeners.

(Andrey Petchesin) first pointed out that most of the experts that he had discussed with think the military leaders have a firm control over the situation in Myanmar. That thinking by the experts was not only influenced by the present pre-election situation in the distribution of power but also by the State Law and Order Restoration Council's declaration that the military will never allow the country to plunge over the edge of a precipice.

Experts on Oriental studies in Moscow pointed out that the Myanmar military government was able to guide the development of politics in the country according to its own blueprint because it had a tactical hold on the leadership. The opposition forces were unable to politically counter that situation. Not all political groupings are courageous enough to take part in the pre-election campaign activities. It must also be pointed out that not all parties are in a position to pay a 10,000 kyat deposit for each candidate contesting in the elections.

The majority of the observers are under the impression that the military government is utilizing all available authoritative and administrative powers to place heavy restrictions on the pre-election campaign activities of political parties. It is quite evident that 10 minutes of air time to make campaign speeches on radio and a brief summary of these speeches published in the only newspaper of the country is definitely not enough. It must also be pointed out that even those published campaign speeches are censored very tightly.

Of course, the observers of Burma also do notice the way the military government had systematically and skillfully removed all leaders who criticized the State Law and Order Restoration Council [SLORC]. Today, the military government has managed to remove almost all of the key popular leaders and prevented them from contesting in the upcoming elections. They have removed these leaders with the excuse that they are either insurgents or are under foreign influence.

It is a fact that the leaders of the National Unity Party and the Democratic Front for National Reconstruction have not been placed under house arrest.

Whatever the situation, Radio Moscow observers are of the opinion that nothing can be said with certainty in regards to the outcome of the elections even though the military leaders have placed the opposition leaders under arrest and imposed other restrictions. If we study the political history of many nations, there are many examples showing that arresting a leader of a popular political party with a definitive political line only serves to win the sympathy of voters for that party and that a front of democratic forces can succeed even though conditions are very tough and difficult.

If we look at the situation in Myanmar carefully, we see a lack of unity among the opposition forces as well as weaknesses in the party programs for the pre-election period. The leading opposition party, the National League for Democracy, is declining to team up with the other influential forces. It perhaps hopes to become the sole and strongest opposition party. In addition, U Aung Gyi [leading patron of the United Nationals Democracy Party] and the other political leaders have announced that they do not intend to join forces with other organizations.

According to observers in Yangon, most of the future programs outlined by political parties to date are merely political slogans and advertisements. All parties, including the National Unity Party, only see the economy of the country operating under an open-door economic system to bring in foreign investments. On the political front, opposition parties want to set up a bourgeois liberal type of multiparty system with the Defense Services playing a subordinate role.

For Myanmar, the makeup of the nation is an important issue. It is indeed good news to note that so far, none of the nationality regions or the parties of the nationalities have announced their intention to secede from the Union of Myanmar. Some organizations, however, have been demanding for a federal system of government and for a greater form of self-rule for the nationality regions, and their demand seems to be rational.

It must be pointed out here that not one of the political parties have stated in detail how they intend to implement their work programs in the (?post-election) period. Only the Democratic Front for National Reconstruction has said that it intends to establish a People's Democratic Republic with an unrestricted economy participated by all sectors.

The majority or 80 percent of the people in Myanmar reside in the rural areas, and by tradition, the rural folks are divorced from politics and waver in their political beliefs. If the elections are held honestly, none of the political parties may win a majority in the next parliament. There has been concern that a new parliament may not have the power to draw up general policies because the members of parliament are different in political beliefs and at times, only look at their self-interests.

A staff member of an institute of Oriental studies in Moscow said the scenario reminds him of 1962 when the military took over state power because of an unstable civilian government.

Near East & South Asia

Iranian Minister's Remarks on Hostages Cited

PM2604142890 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 25 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report under the rubric "World Events": "Lebanon: Imminent Freedom"]

[Text] The news from Lebanon attests that in the very near future one more hostage will be freed. Iranian Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati made a statement about this on Monday.

As AP reports, he did not specify which of the hostages detained in Lebanon is in question. However, the Iranian president's political adviser Mir Hoseyn Musavi, the agency notes, said that one of the 17 Western hostages will be freed.

Commenting on a report by Iranian radio, which called on Western countries to show "goodwill" in response to the freeing of Western hostages in Lebanon, 'A.A. Velayati made an appeal to U.S. President G. Bush. He said in particular that Washington should use its influence on Christian groups in the Lebanon, with the aim of freeing Iranian citizens, who are in Velayati's opinion being detained by the phalangists. With the same goal the Iranian minister called on the United States to exercise its influence on Israel, which kidnapped the Lebanese Shiite Shaykh 'Abd-al-Karim 'Ubayd in July 1989 and holds him to this day.

Soviet-Iranian Steel Mill Agreement Signed

LD2804094790 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 0330 GMT 28 Apr 90

[Text] Within the framework of the agreements already reached between Iran and the Soviet Union through the two countries' permanent commission for economic cooperation, yesterday afternoon in Moscow the two countries signed an agreement on bringing the production capacity of the Esfahan steel mill up to its nominal level.

According to the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY, at the end of talks between the officials of the national Iranian Steel Corporation and the Soviet Union's (Tegentrumeksport) which were held in Moscow last week, the two sides agreed on ways and means of implementing the project to increase the production of the Esfahan steel mill to its final, projected level. On the basis of this agreement, the output of the Esfahan steel mill will reach its highest projected level at the end of current solar year [Iranian year ending 20 March 1991], which is estimated at 1.9 million tons of steel per year.

U.S. Blamed for Continuing Kabul Casualties

PM2704134790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Apr 90 First Edition p 3

[Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel A. Oliynik dispatch: "Civilians Die"]

[Excerpts] Kabul—[passage omitted] At the Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Internal Affairs, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's correspondent was acquainted with an analysis of bombardments of the Afghan capital, which have been conducted methodically and with sophistication since 1985. Their intensity grows from year to year.

Corresponding to the growing intensity of rocket bombardments of the capital is a growing number of casualties among the peaceful population. In 1987 14 people died and 37 were wounded by the bombardments, in 1988 the figures were 233 and 530 respectively. In 1989 595 people died and 1,635 were wounded. In the first three months of this year 400 people fell victim to the irreconcilable opposition's crimes, 79 being killed and 322 maimed. [passage omitted]

And how can there be no mention of official Washington's position here? In words the United States is a guarantor of the Geneva agreements and fights for an end to the war in Afghanistan. But in deed not only does it not hinder the armed opposition's criminal activities but, on the contrary, it eggs them on to a path toward confrontation and the blocking of a settlement, while supplying the rebels with ever newer types of weaponry.

Indo-Pakistani Relations Reviewed

LD2504085490 Moscow TASS in English 0829 GMT 25 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent Artem Yarikov]

[Text] New Delhi April 25 TASS—The situation in Jammu and Kashmir is returning to normal, Indian spokesmen report.

The threat of war with Pakistan, which supports the secessionist movement, has somewhat receded in recent days.

According to Bhabani Sen Gupta, a prominent political analyst, the military hysteria that gripped the two country [as received] has subsided, primarily due to the New York meeting of the foreign ministers of India and Pakistan.

They did not discuss the Kashmir issue but arrived at a conclusion about the need to stop the war of words and open the way for the start of a dialogue at diplomatic level, Bhabani Sen Gupta points out.

Nevertheless, even the most optimistic forecasts do not rule out the possibility of an outbreak of armed conflict between India and Pakistan.

The two countries' armies continue to move closer to border areas while, in Pakistan, reservists have been called up and all servicemen were ordered to stay with their military units.

In addition, it has become known to Indian intelligence that about 5,000 Kashmiris crossed the control line that divides India and Pakistan and are undergoing special military training with the aid of Pakistani instructors.

They can return to Indian territory at any moment and, according to the Indian Express news service, are now looking for safe routes to India.

Taking all these factors into consideration, India keeps its troops in a state of heightened alert and even intends to reinforce the armed forces by new formations.

This was pointed out by Indian Prime Minister Vishwanath Pratap Singh who addressed members of the Janata Dal Party in Raipur.

He said it was planned in particular to set up a national rifles organisation, which would consist of retired military men and would serve as a connecting link between military and paramilitary formations of security forces.

In his remarks Singh accused the former congress government of slashing India's military budget. This did great damage to the country at at time when Pakistan doubled and even trebled its armed forces, he said.

Central Committee Receives Syrian Official

PM0105101790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Apr 90 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] Talks were held at the CPSU Central Committee International Department 28 April with D. Ni'mah, member of the central leadership of the Syrian National Progressive Front, who has come to Moscow among the officials accompanying President H. al-Asad of the Syrian Arab Republic.

Syrian Notes USSR Construction Cooperation

PM0105130990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 May 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Dispatch by own correspondent M. Kozhevnikov: "Syrians Construct for Us"]

[Text] Damascus—We have somehow already become accustomed to Finns, Yugoslavs, and Italians constructing hotels and other installations in various cities or ours. But now Arabic is being heard at some construction sites—specialists and workers from Syria are working there....

The activity of the Syrian state construction companies on USSR territory is one of the new avenues of cooperation between our countries. Previously this was not practised. What work and projects are we talking about?

That was the question which began my talk with Hasan Fattahi, director of the bureau for the affairs of the Syrian Supreme Council of State Construction Companies.

[Fattahi] The protocol providing for this form of bilateral cooperation was signed back in June 1987 in Damascus. In September of the same year the sides signed another document defining the types of projects in whose installation Syrian construction workers could take part.

"I shall enumerate these projects—they are within the jurisdiction of four Soviet departments. The first is the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. It is a case of the fulfillment of finishing work by our forces in three trade union tourist hotels in Sochi, Stavropol, and Ochamchira. The second department is the State Committee for Tourism. It is planned to construct a new hotel of a high international class in Odessa. The third department is the USSR State Committee for Physical Culture and Sports. For this committee it is planned to construct sports clothing and sports footwear factories and also to carry out finishing work at the dormitory block of the sailing base in Sochi.

In addition an agreement in principle has been reached at the Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee on our participation in the construction of the first section of a new zoological garden in the capital. But it is too early to talk of the practical aspect of the question since, as we know, the site for the zoological garden has not been finalized. So far Syrian organizations are fulfilling work at six of these projects on a contract basis.

[Kozhevnikov] What are the conditions of the contracts?

[Fattahi] The Syrian side is organizing deliveries of the construction material and equipment in its possession necessary to fulfill the work. It will ensure the supply of finishing materials including marble, natural stone, ceramic tiles, and so forth. In addition, if the Soviet partners deem it necessary, we are prepared to fit completed projects with furniture under individual contracts.

I should note that this form of ccoperation between our countries has no precedent. Many complex tasks of collaboration between Soviet and Syrian organizations have to be resolved. In all we have already sent over 400 of our highly qualified specialists to work at construction projects in the USSR. A further 150 workers will arrival soon.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Foreign Ministry Official Comments on Africa

MB0105191590 Moscow in Zulu to Southern Africa 1930 GMT 30 Apr 90

[Text] The first visit by a Soviet foreign minister to Africa is indicative of the Soviet Union's active and open encouragement of international cooperation in the resolution of Namibia's problems as well as regional problems in other parts of the world. This also indicates a change in Soviet relations with Africa. How can we substantiate this, and what could we point out as an example of change in Soviet policy toward Africa? All these questions have been directed to Yuriy Yukalov, the Soviet Foreign Ministry's director of African affairs.

[Begin Yukalov recording in Russian fading into Zulu translation] We cannot just stop at noting changes in Soviet policy toward Africa; we also have to cite relevant examples. In the past, the Soviet Union made a marked contribution toward the success of African countries' independence struggles, and in so doing built quite a name internationally—and there is no doubt about that. But it must be realized that the old era of the anticolonial struggles in Africa that ran parallel to the cold war between the superpowers, when polarization between the capitalist and socialist systems was still strong, is a thing of the past. Today, it is doubtful that one would still find old era diehards within the Foreign Ministry.

New Soviet foreign policy favors nonpolarization of the world on ideological lines, and objects to confrontation as a means of solving problems between nations. The Soviet Union has come to the conclusion that Africa cannot experience significant development without cooperating with the international community. Africa's main task now is fighting backwardness, and this should be done through international cooperation. The Soviet Union should help in this work even today. The Soviet Union is in the process of formulating new ways of promoting trade with Africa, in a spirit of mutual trust and to the benefit of all sides involved. The road to economic freedom and development for Africa is uphill, and the plight of Africa is presently high on Soviet Union's agenda.

Initially, it is necessary to minimize regional conflict, and it is encouraging to see changes for the better in southern Africa. Favorable conditions now exist for ending unnecessary defense expenses in Africa, and for promoting peace and cooperation among neighbors. It is also necessary that the continent be declared a nuclear-free zone. This was an issue that Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze discussed with African countries during his tour.

The Soviet Foreign Ministry, although it does not generate any revenue, needs funds to run its affairs, which otherwise are of immense benefit to the country. The question has been raised of benefits accruing from Soviet foreign policy toward African countries. If there are losses, what is their extent? Soviet involvement in the resolution of the Namibian question cost money—to the tune of tens of millions of dollars. If we were to question the benefits to the Soviet Government of diplomatic relations with African countries, statistics would show losses to be very little compared to money expended in the Afghanistan conflict or money lost due to the souring of relations with China.

As to the question of gain, for example following Namibia's independence, there is no need to expend too much money in support of SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization], an organization that waged an armed struggle in Namibia to victory. The exodus of South African troops from Angola and Namibia stopped armed combat; therefore, the Soviet Union has been able to reduce the amount of armaments it sent to Angola. Likewise, Cuba also experienced a reduction in funds expended in Angola. In addition, Cuban troop withdrawal continues.

The cooling down of conflict in southern Africa has also resulted in the reduction of Soviet military personnel that assisted in Angola and Mozambique and other southern African nations that have relations with the Soviet Union. The money expended is not counted in the billions, as was the case in Afghanistan, but in mere millions. And yet the money is minimal compared to the opportunities gained for multifaceted cooperation with African nations. In southern Africa, as in Angola and Mozambique, there would not have been any meaningful cooperation without the creation of peace and reconciliation—not to mention, of course, the mutual benefit of opportunities now opened for economic and trade cooperation.

The benefit to be accrued through Soviet foreign policy favoring the ending of conflict in southern Africa is immense indeed. The lengthy Angolan conflict cost between $12 and 15 billion; the Mozambican one cost $15 billion. The funds expended through the United Nations in Namibia will quickly show profitablility. Funds expended initially tend to be mind-boggling sums, but this assistance, whatever form it takes, is certainly better than funds used to accumulate of weapons of war. This applies to whatever region in which the Soviet Union is involved in fostering peace and progress. [end recording]

Asked his view on the question of establishing diplomatic relations and fostering mutual cooperation, in the event that apartheid rule is eradicated in South Africa in the not so distant future, he said:

[Begin Yukalov recording in Russian fading into Zulu translation] We would wish that the idea that the end of apartheid rule and the introduction of a new era would indeed be in the near future. The Soviet Union needs to give serious thought to establishing diplomatic relations with South Africa at the ambassadorial level, and to establishing cooperation in the economic, cultural, scientific, and other spheres in the event of the demise of apartheid. But the time is not yet ripe for discussing such issues.

True enough, the Pretoria regime has recently taken positive steps toward creating conditions favorable to starting negotiations toward a new and democratic South Africa. These steps taken by President de Klerk's government have found favor in the Soviet Union. However, while the negotiations have not started in earnest, and white apartheid legislation remains in force and blacks are deprived of their civil and political rights, the Soviet Union obviously cannot change its policies toward South Africa. The Soviet Union will continue to support the struggle and adhere to the United Nations resolution that no one should institute relations with the Pretoria regime until all apartheid legislation and practices are ended. [end recording]

South African's Call for Ties With USSR Cited

PM0105091990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Unattributed report under the "IZVESTIYA Teleprinter Hall, Sunday" rubric: "RSA-USSR: Is Dialogue Possible?"]

[Text] During a parliamentary debate on foreign policy questions B.L. Heldenhuys, member of the House of Assembly from the RSA's [Republic of South Africa] ruling National Party, said the following: South Africa and Russia have a great deal in common on which to establish official ties. There is no reason why the friendly relations that existed at the beginning of the century between Russia and the Boer republic should not be restored at this stage with South Africa. Until recently the Soviet Union's expansionist policy stood in the way of this. However, it is now becoming a thing of the past, and processes are taking place in Russia which virtually rule out the possibility of a return to the old practices. What is more, economic considerations such as, for instance, the high concentration in the RSA and the USSR of world stocks of basic strategic materials also dictate the need to establish lasting bilateral ties.

Potovskiy Commentary Examines RSA Dialogue

MB2204175590 Moscow English to Southern Africa 1900 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Igor Potovskiy commentary—read by announcer]

[Text] According to a news agency report, when addressing parliament on Thursday [19 April] President de Klerk lifted the curtain of secrecy over the government's strategy at the preliminary talks with the leaders of the black majority in early May. Commentary is by Igor Potovskiy:

According to the president, the ruling National Party [NP] will make a statement shortly concerning the main contents of the dialogue about the future of the country.

However, the party does not plan to discuss in detail the laws of apartheid and still, contrary to the expectations of the press, De Klerk declared his intention to reconsider or abolish the four pillars of apartheid: The Group Areas Act, the Land Act, the Population Registration Act, and the Separate Amenities Act. The government has broad powers for complete elimination of the discriminatory legislature. Our intentions in this respect are quite serious, declared the president.

He quite justifiably believes that the country's new constitution would be viable only in case it gets reasonably wide support from every group of the population. So far, all that looks rather problematic and the president's statement contains quite a number of reservations in that respect.

President de Klerk stated that the NP (?comes out) for the right to vote for all the adult population, while preserving the principle of not dominating any of the races—the measures of control and counterbalances in decision-taking. [sentence as heard] Observers view that as a (?striving) to attain the right of veto for the whites guaranteed by the constitution. This provision is unacceptable to the ANC [African National Congress].

There are also differences between the government and the ANC on the issue on armed struggle. The (?situation) inside both the black and the white communities remains complex. White liberals welcomed the president's statement, saying that it brings De Klerk closer to them, while the right declared that the president's reforms lead the country toward a civil war.

And the recent incident when the right extremists stole arms from an air force base to start off counterrevolution makes one regard their irreconcilability seriously. But the most acute problem to date is perhaps the situation in the black community—if, despite all the differences between the government and the ANC, the contacts between them continue, while a dialogue between the ANC and Inkatha is not materializing. [sentence as heard]

The Inkatha leader Buthelezi accuses the ANC of (?a) striving to assume the right to be the only mouthpiece of the 27 million black South Africans, and claims that for a long time already he is the central figure in any settlement process. In his view now too, both the ANC and government are coming increasingly closer to accepting his position.

The complexity of the current situation in South Africa lies in the fact that, with the release of Nelson Mandela and the legalization of the ANC and other organizations, the situation in the country has changed and is constantly on the move. Time is needed for that (?situation) to consolidate in its new shape. Nevertheless, the president's strategy at the upcoming talks scheduled from 2-4 May gives ground for a constructive dialogue. The main thing now is the readiness of the divided democratic forces for a dialogue.

Commentary Views Ethiopian, Arab Relations

EA2704132090 Moscow International Service in Amharic 1530 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Maksim Yevgenyev Commentary]

[Text] It is reported that when students recently demonstrated in front of the Libyan and Sudanese Embassies in Addis Ababa they were chanting: Hands off Ethiopia. Foreign diplomats suggest that the demonstrations were in response to an ETHIOPIAN NEWS AGENCY report that some Arab rulers were supporting the Eritrean secessionists.

Another surprising event took place at the end of last March. Two Libyan diplomats in Ethiopia were accused of engaging in activities contrary to Ethiopia's national interests. This was deemed a violation of their diplomatic status. They were deprived of their diplomatic rights and expelled from the country. The commentator pointed out that a year ago it seemed as if nothing like that could happen. It will be recalled that at that time Ethiopia-Arab relations were good. For example, Ethiopia's relations with Libya were based on the 1981 friendship and cooperation agreement. There were closer (?relations) with Khartoum, and it will be recalled that the country's military ruler chose Addis Ababa for peace talks with the representatives of the opposition group, the Sudanese People's Liberation Army [SPLA]. Ethiopia established diplomatic relations with Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. It also resumed relations with Iraq. Ethiopia's relations with Egypt, North and South Yemen and other eastern Islamic countries were improved and expanded. Prior to that, the deteriorating relations with Somalia had been improved.

It seemed as if the efforts to establish good-neighborliness in the region to bring about a lasting solution were viable. But suddenly Ethiopian-Arab relations deteriorated with each side directing accusations at the other.

What is the reason for the deterioration in these relations ? According to observers' views, Ethiopia's resumption of diplomatic ties with Israel last November created a deep fear in the Arab world. Relations were cut off between them 16 years ago during the Middle East conflict when joint actions were taken by the members of the OAU in opposition to the Israeli activity.

In addition reports by some western mass media, especially by the SUNDAY TIMES, saying that Ethiopia and Israel were establishing close military cooperation, have added fuel to the fire which has been raging. Ethiopia has denied this, and has said that the report is baseless.

The current close relations between Israel and Ethiopia have become a reason for many Arab countries to alter their close relations withmhiopia. The mass media of Libya, Sudan and other countries have intensified their anti-Ethiopia propaganda campaign. It was recently stated in Mogadishu that Addis Ababa gives support to Somali opposition groups and as such interferes in the internal affairs of Somalia.

Ethiopia has recently been accused by the organization known as the (?Islamic) Conference of encouraging the Ethiopian Falashas to be settled in occupied Palestinian territory. Ethiopia has taken this as a new propaganda ploy. In fact, all the defamation and accusations reflect the Arab countries' opposition to Israel's presence and military expansion in the southern part of the Red Sea.

While the Arab countries fear Israel's presence in the Horn of Africa, Addis Ababa on the other hand accuses some Islamic regimes of providing weapons to the Eritrean secessionists. For example, it has been officially said that when fighting started around Mits'iwa, the secessionists used naval boats provided for them by Arab countries [words indistinct] that has been created between Ethiopia and her neighboring Arab countries today brings fear and sorrow, and adds new contradictions and problems to the Horn of Africa on top of the previous ones.

In order to prevent the situation from being exacerbated all concerned parties must make efforts towards understanding and respect, concludes the commentator.

Somali Prime Minister Samantar Interviewed

EA2804080190 Moscow International Service in Somali 1600 GMT 26 Apr 90

[Text] Our reporter Anatoliy Doronin recently visited Somalia. We sent him on this trip to Somalia to interview Somali leaders. Esteemed listeners, we present to you today the first interview. The questions of Radio Moscow are being answered by Mohamed Ali Samantar, the prime minister.

[Begin recording] [Doronin] Mr. Prime Minister, you were among the spokesmen of the Somali revolution and you have once again been appointed to the post of the leader of the government, an appointment which comes at a time when important political changes are taking place in Somalia. Therefore, the question is: What are the responsibilities of the Council of Ministers? What is the role of the council in this difficult situation?

[Samantar] It is true that I am one of the founders of the revolution. It is also true that at present, there are difficult issues facing the government and the country generally, at a time when political, economic, and social changes are taking place in the country. If I may come back to your question, the government I am leading has worked out a plan to give priority to two issues, the first of which is to bring stability to the country. It is working very hard for peace. As you know, for some time the country has been undergoing certain certain experiences which has greatly undermined its internal security and stability. These were perpetrated by rebels opposing this regime. The most important point in the government program is to work for peace.

As you know, we have been working for this for some time. Under the previous government, the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party Central Committee resolved to search for peace. The president has a number of times announced our readiness to meet the opposition, wherever they may be, and discuss matters with them. We are working on that policy of searching for peace first.

Our second priority is to do something about the economy. Many factors affect the economy, but the most important is what it means to [word indistinct] the economy for the government to work, to fight corruption and anything that can harm the economy and may bring about maladministration.

[Doronin] How do you regard the situation in the north of the country? What steps is the new government taking to settle the northern problem?

[Samantar] If I may continue with my first answer: The north is the worst of the problem areas facing the country. However, the situation in the north is stable to some degree. It is not as it was before. The government has taken steps to do something about the situation in the north. You are aware that recently an inspection tour by a high-powered delegation led by an interior minister and including many ministers came back from the north. The objective of the inspection tour was for the government to learn about the real situation in the regions. The rebels are still operating in some areas, but they are very few and very limited. Many people who fled from their homes have come back to most of the regions. The government is busy doing something about their lives. It is carrying out a program of resettling the people and doing something about their lives. Meanwhile, it is seeking to hold peace talks with either those outside or those inside in the country in an effort to achieve the unity of Somalis.

[Doronin] As you have already said, the country is in a very difficult economic situation. What steps is the new government taking to rectify this situation?

[Samantar] The economic problem facing the country is well known. It is a fact that the economic situation in the country is not good. In general, the overall economy of Somalia is not bad. The country has an economic potential if it is exploited and worked on properly. The problem is low productivity that requires finance for increased production and defense against maladministration and smuggling. Our export potential is large, but most of our exports leave the country in a disorganized fashion and illegally. They are smuggled out through many places on the borders. The government has devised an economic program that works to counter such problems by drastically cutting government expenditures and public expenditure in general, and by increasing revenue. Naturally, as in all the developing world, we always need external help from friendly countries, but we rely on our own abilities. We stress self-reliance [previous word in English] for what we can achieve internally and do not place great emphasis on foreign aid.

[Doronin] Even though the situation in the Horn of Africa has improved to a degree, it is still confused. Therefore, what steps is the Somali Government planning to take to change the Horn of Africa into a region of lasting peace, a region of cooperation for the benefit of all?

[Doronin] It is a clear and good question. The Horn of Africa was for some time a hot region. By hot I do not mean in terms of climate, but of war and problems. Most of the problems were between us and the Government of

Ethiopia. We reached an agreement to end the problems between us and started negotiations. Agreements were reached on a few articles as a preliminary for solving the big problem between us. The articles were implemented. They included the exchange of POW's, the (?resumption) of diplomatic relations, the disengagement of troops from the common border, noninterference in the internal affairs of the other country, and the ending of propaganda. A few such issues were agreed upon. Since then it can be said that the situation is just up and down [previous three words in English], sometimes not as we wanted.

It is a fact that we have some misgivings about the Government of Ethiopia. We have evidence that the Government of Ethiopia has not fulfilled the articles of the agreement to the letter.

One of the articles agreed upon was not to aid opposition movements in both countries. We have respected that promise and agreement. There are liberation movements in our country, but we have not allowed them to become active since the agreement. But we are aware that the Government of Ethiopia has not completely abandoned the affairs of the anti-Somali rebels. It still has a hand in them. The two governments have met on these issues and currently there are talks between the delegations at the level of foreign ministers to meet on such issues and discuss them.

Likewise, our policy towar our neighboring African countries like Kenya and Djibouti is based on fraternal relations and goodneighborliness. We hope that they will be good in the future.

[Doronin] The last qustion concerns the relations between USSR and Somalia. These relations are improving. How do you see the level of these relations today and in the future?

[Samantar] The relations between us and the Soviet Government have been improving lately. You know that long ago, we had very good relations. In between these two periods, about 10 years ago, our relations deteriorated. However, in the past few years, our relations have improved. Steps are taking place to make our mutual relations good. In the near future, a parliamentary delegation will leave, and we hope that they will continue with the work of improving the relations betwee the two countries politically, socially, and economically. They are taking place in the USSR and in Somalia. We hope to exchange information and experience on these changes. We very much hope to improve relations. We greatly hope to improve relations and take advantage of the changes to bring the relations back to the previous level of friendship between the two countries and peoples. [end recording]

Gorbachev, Senegal's Diouf Exchange Telegrams

LD2804132590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 28 Apr 90

[Text] Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev has sent Abdou Diouf, president of the Republic of Senegal, a telegram congratulating the country's leadership and the people on the 30th anniversary of Senegal's independence.

In an answering telegram, Diouf thanked the USSR president for his congratulations and, for his part, declared himself to be in favor of joint efforts by the two countries to consolidate world peace.

East Europe

GDR's De Maiziere Comments on Moscow Trip

LD0105134890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1837 GMT 1 May 90

[Interview with Lothar de Maziere, chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers, by Gosteleradio, political observer Aleksandr Zholkver in Moscow; De Maiziere's responses are in German, fading into Russian translation by Zholkver; date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Zholkver] Lothar de Maiziere, chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers, has concluded his working visit to Moscow. He was received by President Gorbachev, had talks with Comrade Ryzhkov and Comrade Shevardnadze.

Mr. De Maiziere, this is your first visit to Moscow as head of the GDR Government. Several ministers of your cabinet came with you. No doubt this reflects the range of problems discussed in Moscow?

[De Maiziere] This is the foreign visit of our governmental delegation, the first following the election of our government and my government statement, and I would like this visit to be a signal for the Soviet people. Its aim is to show the great importance which we attach to the close relations established between our countries. The ministers of foreign affairs, disarmament and defense, and economy came to Moscow with me and this clearly demonstrates the program of our talks and our intentions.

[Zholkver] Our television viewers, as far as one can judge from their letters, are particularly interested in the international status of a future united Germany. What are you ideas on this matter?

[De Maiziere] This issue is now also being very widely discussed by political figures. Until the recent events of last autumn, we worked on the assumption that the German question should be decided in close connection with the question of the Europe's future. But the radical changes that happened in GDR have led to a situation in which the German unification process is happening faster than the process of creating a peaceful order in Europe. That is why we are forced to search for a model

for the transitional period. Many different options are being discussed now. We were talking about the neutrality of the whole Germany, But this does not seem a suitable way to us. The model of the whole Germany's membership in NATO with a special status on the present territory of the GDR was also suggested. I think more thought needs to be given here to how it would look in concrete terms. Matters of disarmament, moving away from military bloc structures and the transition to a system of political unions are now being brought into the foreground. Our aim is not to move the blocs, but rather to overcome them.

[Zholkver] What role does the "two plus four" mechanisms play in this?

[De Maiziere] This mechanism of the two German states and four victorious states is called upon precisely to discuss the external aspects of the German unity. It is this mechanism that should work out a mutually acceptable model, as at the Vienna disarmament talks.

[Zholkver] Now, the question of borders. As is known, the GDR recognized the inviolability of Poland's border along the Oder and Neisse in the Goerlitz Treaty. Recently the Polish foreign minister approached the FRG and GDR Governments with a draft treaty for signing on confirming the inviolability of this border. What is your attitude toward this?

[De Maiziere] First of all, I would like to point out that the GDR People's Chamber at its very first sitting following the elections of 18 March, made a statement that it proceeds from the premise of the absolute inviolability of Poland's Western border. This is the most authoritative recognition of this matter by the people of the country. It seems to me parliamentary recognition is even more important than the signing of any treaty. I have just received the Polish draft treaty and we will discuss and examine it.

I think the future German government will also have to deal with this matter. I would like to reiterate that even now, the parliaments of both German states have supported the inviolability of Poland's borders. This is the most sensible and most fitting solution to the issue.

[Zholkver] Mr. Prime Minister, I would not like to conceal from you the fact that a large number of letters which we receive from our listeners express anxiety about the intrigues of right-wing radical forces in GDR. Our people are especially indignant about the desecration of the Soviet soldiers' graves. What could you say about this matter?

[De Maiziere] This is also a cause of worry to us and we have now taken energetic security measures. But, at the same time, I would like to point out that the trend toward the polarization of political forces exists in many countries. Previously this was kept quiet. It was not reported in the mass media. Glasnost has resulted in things that existed before being spoken about. It seems to me it is easier to deal with negative phenomena, which are spoken about for all to hear, than with those which are kept quiet.

[Zholkver] During my work as a correspondent in the GDR, I witnessed the establishment of close economic ties between many enterprises of the republic and the Soviet Union, and the development of GDR citizens' friendship with our country. How do you see the future of our relations?

[De Maiziere] We regard these relations as our big asset, which we should also like to introduce into a united Germany. Our enterprises are very interested in preserving ties with the Soviet Union. After all, 35 percent of workers in our country are engaged at enterprises which export their produce to the Soviet Union. The USSR is our most important trade partner and should remain so.

[Zholkver] Thank you for this interview.

[De Maiziere] I would like to pass on my best wishes to your viewers.

Commentary Views Impact of German Unification

LD0105182890 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 1 May 90

[Text] What impact will German unification have on European security? This question was discussed on Sunday [29 April] in Moscow where the East German prime minister, Mr. Lothar de Maiziere, had come for a visit. It will be a major topic of high level consultations at NATO's headquarters in Brussels involving the Secretary of State James Baker. And 5 May will see a conference in Bonn between the foreign ministers of East and West Germany, the USSR, the United States, Britain and France under the "two plus four" formula. Under discussion will be the external aspects of building a unified Germany. This is what Radio Moscow's [Moscow World Service] Yuriy Solton writes on the subject:

The unification of the two German states is virtually a decided matter. This is an historic event and not only for the Germans, but also for all Europeans. The process of building German unity might well stimualte the construction of a common European home, too, or it might upset the existing balance of forces and lead to tensions and mutual suspicion.

The principle issue here is the political and military status of a unified German state. The idea of including the unified Germany in NATO at once is faulty. he argument that its membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will bind it and prevent it from being aggressive toward its neighbors is unconvincing and not because of the possible aggressiveness. The trouble is that such a step would destroy the existing

system of European security before a new one is created. The building of a new system will take time and a period of transition is inevitable.

To drag a unified Germany into NATO hastily means to undermine the accelerating Helsinki process of strengthening cooperation and trust and resolving disarmament problems. It's essential to look for other ways.

The Bonn conference under the "two plus four" formula will undoubteldy be important. The Soviet Union, as Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze said, stands for discussing by the six countries the need to synchronize the building of Germany unity with the Helsinki process. As for the political and military status of a unified Gernmany, the six could draft a peace treaty or another adequate document.

This matter concerns not only the six countries, of course. Questions bearing on the interests of other nations will certainly crop up during their work. At the relevant stages such nations could join in the the discussion. In principle, Moscow shares the viewpoint of those countries which believe that the results of work done by the six should be considered by a European summit attended by the United States and Canada, and maybe even approved by it. Many governments have consented in principle to convene such a summit this very year.

Polish Reforms Provide Lessons for USSR

90UF0121A Moscow TRUD in Russian 25 Apr 90 p 3

[Article by Stanislav Prokopchuk, new TRUD staff correspondent in Warsaw: "What Lies Ahead?"]

[Text] I had the feeling that my call and request to meet again with Janusz Kozlowski, chairman of the local trade union committee of the Warsaw Television Plant, were not at all a surprise. What is more, he ostensibly even expected it, although not much time has passed since our first interview. Is it possible that he had not said everything he wanted to say that January evening, which dragged on until midnight?

To me everything was new, having arrived in Warsaw for the first time. As I found out later, he needed a fresh and unbiased opinion from someone not directly involved about what his collective was living on today.

We know that Poland decided to rush into a free market. And in this solid worker collective of the 4,000-member Warsaw Television Plant one can see and feel, as if in focus, the concentration of very critical problems that every Pole has encountered today.

I visited the plant the first time during winter, when the policy of "shock therapy" for the Polish economy was just beginning. The average wage in those winter months was barely enough from paycheck to paycheck. For the first time in years of work at the Warsaw Television Plant, many parents could not send their children to summer camp. Incidentally, a majority of the pupils and students will have to remain at home this summer—the prices for vouchers, and also for the trip to the vacation location, can no longer be afforded by those families who live on wages alone.

But pensioners have found themselves in a particularly desperate plight. And they constitute almost half of the plant's trade union organization...

It was at the end of "black January," when the inconceivable high cost of living and the visible prospect of unemployment was felt by thousands of people, that the chairman of the local Warsaw Television Plant trade union committee and his assistants came up with the idea of engaging in operationally independent economic activity. There was no alternative. There is virtually no hope for the meager fund of the local trade union committee, which consists of trade union dues, (0.4 percent of basic earnings). Expect subsidies from management? Hardly likely! Even if it had the resources, it could not (and it cannot now) raise wages or increase the fund for material assistance. If the wage fund is exceeded by 1 zloty, for example, a five times greater fine has to be paid. In other words, abandoning all instruments of administrative control over prices, the government applied economic "brakes." This also compelled enterprises to engage in a unique hide-and-seek—seeking ways of a true growth in labor productivity and the production of good quality, competitive products that could enter even the foreign market tomorrow or the day after tomorrow.

The television plant's trade union committee began to engage in negotiating activity. It established direct ties, bypassing trade, with a number of enterprises—manufacturers of that product which enjoys the highest demand among the workers. Refrigerators, domestic electrical appliances, shoes, tableware... They are acquired, as the saying goes, almost right off the assembly line at prices minus a considerable trade "extra charge"—considerably lower than in stores, but they are sold, naturally, somewhat higher than the owner of the product asked. It is this difference that constitutes the "fat" of the local trade union committee.

"Do you have a lot from your own economic activity," I inquired of J. Kozlowski.

"We have already made 60 million. I think that we will soon double this amount."

This also made it possible in these difficult days to materially support both a substantially greater number of people and with far greater sums.

Trade union members started to pay half as much for medical treatment vouchers. It became possible also to "throw in" a sizable sum for those having a baby and for those who had a family misfortune. And pensioners, yesterday's plant workers, now go to vacation places and return free of charge, owing to trade union assistance.

I will reveal a small secret about "Kozlowski's firm"—by the end of the year the television plant trade union

committee intends to organize its own product output from one of the television electronic centers whose sales promise considerable profits. Another question that is vital to the collective is also being worked on specifically: How to reduce the price of today's most expensive food product—meat—for the workers? With whom to sign a contract for the supply of carcasses, how to preserve them, and from whom to buy the necessary refrigeration lockers?

I do not know whether the television workers arrived at this idea themselves, or whether they borrowed it at "Ursus..." I was also at this, the biggest tractor enterprise of the country, and I saw how briskly the sale of beef and pork was taking place in the plant kiosk. It was fresh and cut right there. The trade union, which is also enrolled in the system of the all-Polish compact, organized the purchase of meat directly from peasant warehouses, and of course at favorable prices.

Genrik Brzezinski, chairman of the trade union of the enterprise, explained to me that through their own independent economic activity they are seeking any opportunity to replenish the trade union treasury.

Now they themselves, without any middlemen, organize paying for recreational evenings and youth entertainment programs in the plant palace of culture, concerts of well-known artists, and popular ensembles. During the conduct of the plant's New Year holiday, the local trade union committee, for example, earned about 2 million zlotys. The sum is not that great by current price standards for products, but it is these kinds of trifles that make up the fund, which goes to help pensioners, the sick, large families, and for additional increases in unemployment benefits, which several scores of workers at the tractor plant are already receiving.

The harsh reality: The demand for the large "Ursus's" and the "Massey Ferguson's" has dropped—their cost scares off the farmer. It was necessary to displace the output of several models. I saw stopped assembly lines in many shops, and I saw the watchful and sullen faces of assemblers who were not overloaded with work. To avoid mass layoffs the trade union committee, together with the administration, quickly organized production that did not seem characteristic for the plant—the output of heating batteries. Today the shop is besieged by customers, but the main thing is that they achieved their aim: They retained the people (for the time being), and the profit is not insignificant.

"What awaits us tomorrow?" Marjan Kobretski, foreman of the installers of licensed tractors, then said hopelessly.

What can one say? In my opinion, today nobody in Poland would venture to give a simple forecast in answer to this question. It can be said firmly about something else: The processes occurring in the Polish economy today are not only contradictory, but they are also very instructive for us who are getting ready to take a step on the main road to a "free market."

The stratification of society into those who now barely get by and those who are swimming in abundance is being examined more and more closely in Poland. One wants to believe that this is a temporary "transitional" difficulty that can be corrected tomorrow. As the saying goes, God grant... But why then do we hear less and less frequently words about social justice and the excessive privileges of the leadership from the mouths of those today who are totally occupied with the full reconstruction of the economic management mechanism of the state? And this is under conditions when statistics confirm that the real wage of Poles fell by 43.3 percent, and that in the last half year the consumption of meat and butter decreased by 30-40 percent...

The unemployment situation is becoming catastrophic. According to government forecasts for this year, out of 400,000 persons the number who were not on the job at those enterprises that stopped production because of their unprofitability or that are switching to less labor-intensive technology already reached 360,000 in April.

"By the end of the year," noted Gustav Bokszczanin, manager of the department of the All-Polish Trade Union Compact (OPZZ), "the number of unemployed, according to our estimates, will be in the neighborhood of one and a half million persons. If various international agreements which we recently signed are not included, then next year the number of those that the market economy will toss outside the gates of bankrupt plants and factories will reach two to two and a half million."

Where and by what means will new work positions be created, especially for young people? How are thousands of people to be retrained? How do you compel those to work creatively, enterprisingly, and economically who remained at machines of state sector enterprises and who in fact forgot how to do a good day's work because of their parasitic and self-seeking inclinations (for decades directly prodded by the state with various subsidies, benefits, and credits)? Will the Polish working class, finally, be able to take some kind of revenge in the near future for the loss in the world race for labor productivity and quality.

Questions, questions. The trade unions of the republic are not only pondering them but are gradually attempting to answer them. The interesting experiment with independent economic activity is an affirmation of this. "If we do not tackle this in a proper way, relying only on trade union dues," said the attentively courteous persons in the OPZZ whom I was interviewing, "we would immediately go bankrupt in the economic situation we are in." And they cited convincing figures. For normally functioning activity, the All- Polish Trade Union Compact requires 6 billion zloty annually. The total trade union dues (still decreasing) do not constitute more than... 100 million zloty, also annually. It is because of the investment of its resources in publication activity, enterprises, and a number of new cooperatives, and because of other enterprising measures that the

OPZZ is replenishing its inadequate resources. Incidentally, that is what many industrial federations of the "Solidarity" trade unions are doing.

The more carefully and objectively we study the experience of our neighbor friends, the fewer errors we will make there where they as pathfinders had to learn the hard way....

Poland's Miller Cited on Solidarity Resolution

PM0105095590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Apr 90 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Against 'Professional Ban'"]

[Text] Warsaw, 27 Apr—L. Miller, general secretary of the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland [SdRP] Central Executive Committee, has sharply denounced the discriminatory resolution in the spirit of the "bans on professions" adopted at the recent "Solidarity" congress.

The congress resolution, with its demand to refuse to accept for work in schools and other enlightenment and cultural institutions, former workers in the Polish United Workers Party apparatus and the youth organizations connected with it or Interior Ministry staffers is causing anger and protest, the statement by the SdRP leader issued here says.

This document compromises the "Solidarity" trade union. In the past such ideas were put forward by the fascist authorities and extreme right-wing circles in the United States and the FRG. This practice of persecuting people for their convictions has been denounced by all democratic forces of the world. The "Solidarity" congress resolution, running in the direction of the violation of human rights, is a signal to enlightened people in Poland and to European politicians and international public opinion that there are forces in Poland which are interested in disrupting the calm, evolutionary nature of the changes in the country.

Rival Bucharest Rallies Show Romania's Split

PM0105095190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[Report by PRAVDA correspondent V. Vedrashko: "Like a Coiled Spring..."]

[Text] Bucharest, 29 Apr—Downtown Bucharest. Midday. Hundreds of people chanting: "Freedom! Freedom! Freedom!"

Dozens of people were sleeping side by side on the wide lawn, some had taken refuge in a tourist tent. The demonstration on University Square, Bucharest, has been going on for a week.

Political and public figures with a variety of views have been constantly addressing the gathering from the balcony of the university building. The unifying feature of this demonstration is the desire to make the country's current leadership resign. It is accused of leading the state by the old, "communist methods." The demonstrators' main target is Provisional Council for National Accord Chairman Ion Iliescu.

Do all Romanians share these sentiments? No. Otherwise tens of thousands of people would not have assembled on another Bucharest square to express their support for the National Salvation Front.

This political movement has many sincere supporters throughout the country. They sent representatives to the rally, who, together with the Bucharest people, convincingly demonstrated that the Front today is a force to reckon with. Naturally, the situation in the city center was assessed during the rally. The assessment was formulated in the National Salvation Front "Bucharest Appeal": The University Square demonstration is supported by a number of political parties which are seeking to destabilize the situation.

Romanian society is experiencing a split. This is evidenced by the daily television reports on the different stances adopted by labor collectives vis-a-vis the demonstrators in Bucharest. The bulk of the statements mentioned by the announcers condemns the demonstrators. But there is a good number expressing support on behalf of thousands of people and members of various trade unions for the Bucharest demonstrators' slogans. The situation in the country is like a coiled spring.

Hungarian Ambassador Received at Foreign Ministry

PM0105111990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Apr 90 Morning Edition p4

[TASS report under the general heading "Official Reports"]

[Text] On 27 April I.P. Aboimov, USSR deputy foreign minister, received S. Gyorke, Hungarian ambassador to the USSR, at the latter's request.

HSP People's Democratic Forum Debates Platform

LD2904232190 Budapest MTI in English 1809 GMT 29 Apr 90

[Text] Budapest, April 19 (MTI)—During its national conference on Sunday, the People's Democratic Platform of the Hungarian Socialist Party [HSP] discussed a debate document on the party's political character and formulated the platform's position.

Participants in the meeting stressed the party could only increase its mass basis and political levarage by consistently representing employees' interests.

The more than six months behind have proved in practice the platform-alliance principle of party organization. The HSP's altered political position requires to update this principle, and not to eradicate it. The congress will have the task of determining the place of the parliamentary faction within the party.

Participants proposed reducing to a minimum personnel coincidences between HSP's newly elected presidium and parliamentary faction. They called for the party presidium to be renewed, with a greater say given to young people.

Petrovskiy Meets CSFR Deputy Foreign Minister

PM2604151190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] On 24 April USSR Deputy Foreign Minister V.F. Petrovskiy received R. Harencar, Czechoslovakia's first deputy foreign minister.

A detailed exchange of opinions took place on a wide range of questions.

R. Slansky, ambassador of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic in Moscow, participated in the talks.

Improvement Seen in CPCZ Election Prospects

PM2604154190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Apr 90 First Edition pp 1, 4

[Dispatch by PRAVDA correspondent S. Vtorushin: "Contest for Parliamentary Seats"]

[Text] Prague—The election campaign starts officially in Czechoslovakia this coming Sunday. Many people are wondering what chance the CPCZ [Communist Party of Czechoslovakia], which was the ruling party until quite recently, has in the elections. The question, it has to be said, is not an empty one. And the point is not that representatives of another 22 parties and social organizations in addition to the Communist Party will be running for seats in the country's supreme legislative organ.

The crisis caused in the CPCZ by the previous leadership's mistakes has undermined its authority among the masses. Party membership has virtually halved. Moreover, its political opponents have managed to carry out several major anticommunist actions on the threshold of the election campaign. I am thinking first and foremost of the campaign regarding CPCZ property and the Prague prosecutor's letter which spoke of the possible banning of the Communist Party. That will undoubtedly influence a certain section of the electorate.

However, it can be said right now that there will be enough seats in the new parliament for the Communist Party, too. Recent public opinion polls show that the CPCZ' popularity in society is beginning to grow, despite the attempts to discredit it.

Many people found this breakthrough in public awareness to some extent unexpected. This was talked about at the CPCZ Central Committee plenum which discussed and approved the election platform. The reason for this breakthrough lies not just in the activation of Czechoslovak Communists themselves but in certain miscalculations on the part of their opponents. I refer to the anticommunist actions, which evoked a far from clear-cut assessment in society. People are beginning to fear that the monopoly of power abandoned by the CPCZ could pass into other hands which are not always clean.

Lack of confidence in the future is growing. Quite a few people think that leveling was not the best manifestation of social justice, but when it existed no one feared being left without a crust of bread. The market economy which the country's new leadership is seeking is perhaps better, but certain sacrifices have to be made en route. A planned increase in prices of a whole series of goods and services has already been announced.

This change in attitude toward the CPCZ is also assisted by the fact that it has abandoned many past dogmas and ideas. The CPCZ has declared itself a parliamentary-type party which is ready to enter a coalition with any other party or social movement which advocates the principles of defending working people's interests and consolidating democracy and social justice.

The elections will be a serious test for Communists, just as they will be for all the other political parties and movements. They will show the extent of the population's trust in their policy and the balance of forces in society. They will confirm the right of each party represnted by deputies in parliament to a lawful and legal existence.

Today, according to public opinion polls, 12 percent of the electorate is ready to vote Communist.

The elections to the federal and republic parliaments are set for 8-9 June.

Anti-Gypsy 'Pogroms' Hit Northern Bohemia

PM0105154390 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 29 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[Unattributed report: "Czechoslovakia: Wave of Pogroms"]

[Text] A wave of violence and pogroms of uncommon brutality has engulfed cities in Northern Bohemia. Bloody clashes between juvenile gangs of "skinheads" and punks and the gypsy population have taken place here in recent days. Vietnamese citizens have also come under attack. In the ensuing battles inhabitants of these cities have also come to grief.

The number of casualties is rising with every passing day. A critical situation has arisen in one of the districts of the mining city of Most, which is under siege. The gypsy population is being subjected to downright terror. Many of them have had to give up their jobs and they are keeping their children away from school. At Usti nad Labem the rampaging racists have forbidden gypsies to use public transport.

P. Pithart, head of the Czech Republic Government, has spoken on Central Czechoslovak Television. He declared that an explosive situation has arisen in the North Bohemian Region. The pogroms have been caused by the racist moods among a certain section of citizens and create a breeding ground for the rebirth of fascism. Calling on the hotheads to halt the violence, the head of government emphasized that otherwise state organs will have to take resolute and consistent steps.

The Central Committee of the Democratic Union of Gypsies in the Czech Republic has demanded that the government take a firm attitude toward the conduct of the "skinheads" and punks.

West Europe

Expert for Nuclear Weapons in United Germany

AU0205104190 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 2 May 90 p 4

[Interview with Vitaliy Zhurkin, director of the European Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, by Benedikt Kommenda; place and date not given: "Small Steps, No Leaps"]

[Text] [Kommenda] Which position will the Soviet Union adopt at the negotiations between the four victor powers and the two German states on a united Germany, which will start at the weekend [5-6 April]?

[Zhurkin] There are many problems which have to be discussed in the "two plus four" negotiations. The biggest will certainly be that of the political-military status of a united Germany. Here one has to note that the standpoints of the Soviet Union and of the majority of the Western countries, including the FRG, clearly differ: The Soviet Union is against NATO membership of the united Germany, the West and the FRG is for such membership.

[Kommenda] Is a solution emerging?

[Zhurkin] Despite the differences in opinion, both sides have the wish to find a solution. We are at the beginning of a number of talks; 5 May is just the beginning of a long process. Even if we stress the differing standpoints, we should also say that there are positive elements. For instance, the Soviet Union has come out clearly and without any hesitation in favor of Germany's unification and has accepted the obligation, so to speak, not to try to prevent unification. On the other hand, the West wants to find a solution that is not forced upon the other side but is achieved through negotiations.

[Kommenda] Will Soviet troops stay on GDR territory?

[Zhurkin] From my point of view, the Soviet troops will remain in the eastern part of the united Germany in any kind of solution. Many people in the West give the Soviet troops this right.

[Kommenda] In general, Moscow is advocating a withdrawal of foreign troops from foreign territories.

[Zhurkin] It is difficult to say whether in the current situation in Europe the Soviet Union will continue to advocate the withdrawal of all troops. During the turbulences of the past years we have increasingly realized that both NATO and the Warsaw Pact are playing a stabilizing role to a certain extent. If we recognize this and if, for instance, NATO thinks that foreign troops should participate in this process of stabilization, then it is NATO's business to decide this. If a state wants foreign troops to remain on its territory, no outsider has the right to demand anything else of him.

[Kommenda] Will the Soviet Union demand the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Germany?

[Zhurkin] It is my very personal opinion that a certain degree of mutual nuclear deterrence in Europe should be maintained for some time so that the success of conventional disarmament is ensured. Certainly a reduced degree. In particular destabilizing systems should be withdrawn.

[Kommenda] What are you thinking of?

[Zhurkin] Take nuclear artillery, for instance. Theoretically, it can be used only on the orders of the supreme command, but it is distributed among the troops in such a way that it contains destabilizing elements. If there are talks on nuclear weapons, a strongly reduced nuclear potential, which is equal on both sides, should remain perhaps even for a long time for the sake of stability. For instance 100 or 200 aircraft with nuclear weapons, because these can be discovered easily from the air and they cannot be used as quickly as missiles. They could be concentrated in certain areas so that each side can check on them.

[Kommenda] Does Moscow not want a nuclear-free Europe?

[Zhurkin] The official Soviet position is that of a denuclearized Europe. But even in order to achieve this position, one should make individual, perhaps small steps. One cannot leap in this direction. In particular if conventional forces, which are unreasonably high, are reduced on both sides, this process may cause worries. In this field remaining nuclear components may provide a feeling of security.

[Kommenda] How do you assess the position of NATO in this respect?

[Zhurkin] NATO is against a denuclearized Europe. But it is not against a reduction of nuclear weapons. In the case of tactical nuclear missiles NATO is certainly for a reduction, because the Soviet Union has 14 or 15 times more. I am rather optimistic concerning the possibilities of talks about nuclear weapons in Europe. I do not think that they will lead to a complete abolition, but perhaps to a drastic reduction.

Munich Exhibition Shows Industries' Potential

PM0105114790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Apr 90 Second Edition p 4

[Dispatch by PRAVDA correspondent Ye. Grigoryev: "We Acquire Experience. Success of 'Conversion-90' Exhibition"]

[Text] Bonn, 28 Apr—The specialized Soviet exhibition "Conversion-90" has ended in Munich after five days. The peaceful output and technological potential of more than 300 of our defense industry enterprises which have been put on a civilian footing were on display in the beautifully mounted exhibition. It was not called a "world premiere" for nothing. Nothing like it has ever been arranged anywhere before.

The exhibition aroused great interest. Not counting the public, more than 8,000 specialists, experts, and representatives of the business world visited it. And interest was shown not only by hundreds of West German firms but also by businessmen from other West European countries and also the United States and Japan.

"The exhibition was a focus of attention in the mass media, and reports on it went right round the world. And this alone justified holding 'Conversion-90,'" according to W. Merzin, general director of the Munich Fairs and Exhibitions Society, which organized this event together with our "Ekspotsentr." "As for business and scientific circles, they were interested, above all, in Soviet products with a very high degree of technological complexity. Obviously, new opportunities for cooperation were opened up here. In the main this is, of course, something for the future. However, some things have also been achieved within the framework of the exhibition itself."

Specific results, my interlocutor continued, include a number of export and import agreements to the tune of approximately 50 million Deutsche marks. In the sphere of finished products Western importers were attracted to television sets, engines, and ships. But the main area is, of course, industrial collaboration and cooperation. Approximately 50 agreements have been prepared here, and it is planned to conclude quite a few more in the future. It is a question of holography, laser, medical, communications, and space technology, aircraft building, and the production of inorganic chemical output. Following the talks that were held, an accord was reached on the creation of 20 joint ventures for the production of laser-diagnostic equipment, as well as in the sphere of powder metallurgy and aircraft building.

The exhibition was also unusual in that it was accompanied by business seminars, at which Soviet specialists familiarized their Western colleagues with the level of development of production and technology in the USSR. The international forum "Structural Changes as a Result of Disarmament—Prospects for the Nineties" was held in conclusion. It gathered together more than 400 participants. Representatives of West German industrial, scientific, and trade union circles and emissaries from Soviet ministries, U.S. universities, and international research institutes and organizations participated in the debate. All this contributes to a practical shift of public thought toward the problems and practice of conversion closely associated with the disarmament process.

"Politicians tackle disarmament," W. Merzin pointed out at the end of our conversation. "They create the framework for this process. But it is up to the business world and industry to fill this framework. And, in my view, we have taken a very important step here. 'Conversion-90' is a promising beginning."

CPSU's Brutents Receives SDP's Wischnewski

PM0105094390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS "Official Announcement"]

[Text] On 29 April K.N. Brutents, first deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Department, received Bundestag Deputy H.-J. Wischnewski, member of the Socialist Democratic Party of Germany Board.

There was an exchange of opinions on a wide range of international issues, including the Afghan question and the situations in the Near East and Central America.

Bessmertnykh Meets Wischnewski

PM0105103990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 May 90 Morning Edition p 3

[TASS report under general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] On 29 April a meeting took place between A.A. Bessmertnykh, USSR first deputy foreign minister, and H.-J. Wischnewski, an FRG Bundestag deputy from the Social Democratic Party of Germany and deputy chairman of the Bundestag foreign policy committee.

During the talk there was a discussion of topical problems of international life and the political settlement of a number of regional conflicts.

Bonn Forum Charts Europe's Economic Future

90UF0123A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 27 Apr 90 p 3

[Article by TASS political observer A. Balebanov: "On the Threshold of a Common Home"]

[Text] **A conference on economic cooperation in Europe has just ended in the capital of the FRG.**

West German authorities assigned a specially constructed immense hotel, the Maritime, for it. In the crystal-chandeliered halls of this hotel complex for three weeks there were multilateral negotiations whose significance is difficult to overestimate. The summary document of the meeting was to be the basis for the economic development of all of Europe for the long-range future.

The Bonn forum was the largest economic meeting in the history of East-West relations and it revealed the new possibilities of cooperation opened up as a result of the end of the cold war epoch and the rapid changes in the Soviet Union and the countries of East Europe. Of course there were also politics in the meeting halls—for the discussion at the conference was about the development of qualitatively new relations in the future Europe.

The conference was a convenient opportunity to open up large-scale discussion of the new structure of Europe based on the gradual formation of a unified economic community founded on a market economy on the basis of integration of the economies of the USSR and the East European states into the world system of management. Many participants emphasized that the Bonn forum is a kind of point of departure in the fulfillment and concretization of the Soviet idea of the creation of a European economic space.

The four work groups of the conference discussed questions of improving the overall conditions for business relations, industrial cooperation, its legal and administrative aspects, cooperation in individual areas, and also questions of the currency policy, foreign trade, and price reform.

The work of the conference far from always went smoothly. National egoism and the desire to extract unilateral advantages frequently took the upper hand in the positions of certain countries. In the approach of the delegation from the United States one could see the intention to impose the primacy of private property on all participants in the conference, and in the positions of representatives of members of the European Community (EC) an attitude in favor of a policy of total privatization of the state sector of the national economy prevailed. In spite of this, they ultimately managed to draw up a summary document which became a kind of economic code for the changing Europe.

The exchange of opinions that took place at the forum showed that the main structures in operation now should not become fixed and closed, that in the European economic space (OEP) common "rules of the game" should be in effect." Derived from what? From the generalized experience of existing integrations: the EC, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the profoundly transformed CEMA. From the discussion it became clear that the French idea of creating a European confederation converges with the Soviet proposal to form a common European home: Both of these initiatives are being realized within the framework of the Helsinki process.

Participants in the Bonn conference devoted attention to the so-called Alpine-Adriatic initiative in which they saw a prototype for future European structures for security and cooperation—in the proposed association for the first time NATO and Warsaw Pact countries and neutral countries are to participate simultaneously. The opinion was expressed that there should be more associations like this since they do not impede the creation of common European structures, including economic ones.

The realization of the idea of creating a common European space is proceeding with difficulty. And the main reason for this is the lack of a fully developed concept. True, certain projects and proposals exist. While the United States, for example, is showing a restrained attitude toward the common European space since it is afraid that this will lead to a departure of Europe from America, the EC is in favor of such a space and believes that it should be established in stages. As a first stage the EC suggests forming its own unified internal market, and in the second stage it would come closer to the EFTA right up to the point of merging their trade and economic structures and then, on this basis, beginning to set up close economic ties between the EC-EFTA and the CEMA. Here the community is proceeding from the notion that today practically everyone in Europe recognizes that the EC in its integration process has accumulated such colossal experience that it could become the experience of all of Europe.

It is remarkable that at the Bonn conference there was a large degree of understanding of the fact that in order to create a common European economic space it will be necessary to create conditions for the free movement of people, goods, services, and capital from country to country, to form legal frameworks, and to prepare what is necessary for a unified market.

It was noted at the conference that there is a direct connection between the arrangement of close economic cooperation between East and West and the integration of the USSR and the other countries of East Europe into the world economy, particularly through participation in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). There is no doubt that with the enlistment of East Europe into the existing world economic structures there will be a melting away of various kinds of barriers which the West has raised in trade with the East, including the notorious COCOM [Coordinating Committee for East-West Trade Policy] "black lists."

Although the problem of COCOM was not on the conference agenda, nonetheless it was an invisible presence in the national discussions in the work group for problems of cooperation in the area of science and technology. Now that the conference is over, one can say that if the Vienna meeting of representatives of states participating in the CSCE had taken place today it would have defined the mandate of the Bonn conference differently and more broadly. If at that time the West as a whole had decided to cooperate with the USSR in the areas of science and technology, the results of the negotiations in Bonn show that the West is changing its attitude toward this problem, albeit slowly.

Of course the document approved in Bonn is the result of a compromise of the countries participating in the conference. But this compromise reflects the main thing—a mutual striving for businesslike cooperation and the resolve to build a common European home in which all the doors would be open, all would be equal, and everyone would live in peace and well-being.

Something else is also undoubted. The results of the Bonn conference will be of no small practical significance for the Soviet economy, especially now that the process of its radical reform and changeover to a basis of effectiveness, a market, and economic accountability has begun.

Kovalev Discusses German Unity With FRG Envoy

PM0105105990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading "Official Reports"]

[Text] On 28 April A.G. Kovalev, USSR first deputy foreign minister, received K. Blech, FRG ambassador to the USSR. During their conversation they touched on questions connected with the building of German unity and its international aspects.

Zagladin, France's Cot Interviewed on Europe

LD0105182990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1740 GMT 28 Apr 90

["Topical Interview" program; interview with Jean-Pierre Cot, president of the Socialist Group in the European Parliament; and Vadim Valentinovich Zagladin, adviser to the USSR president and chairman of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation; by Georgiy Zubkov; date not given; in Moscow—live or recorded]

[Text] [Zubkov] Deputies of the European Parliament in Moscow. This meeting is one of the many manifestations of the rapprochement between East and West. The home of the European Parliament is the French city of Strasbourg. Twelve countries of Western Europe are represented in the parliament. There are 518 deputies and ten political parties. The socialists make up the largest group. Our interview is with Jean-Pierre Cot, president of the Socialist Group of the European Parliament, and Vadim Valentinovich Zagladin, adviser to the USSR president and chairman of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation. [video shows meeting of European parliamentarians in Moscow and then switches to interview]

Events in Europe, in Eastern and Central Europe, are changing so rapidly that they are surprising not only ordinary citizens in these countries, but also politicians. What do you think, what kind of situation is there for bringing Western and Eastern Europe closer and for developing relations and cooperation, and what role can the European Parliament have in this?

[Cot] In actual fact, events are developing very rapidly and with such speed that they are leaving political figures, diplomats and, of course, public opinion behind. One of the problems is the difference in time. For example, the unification of Germany is happening literally before our very eyes while, at the same time, within the overall framework of security, this is a very lengthy, difficult and slow business, and by no means straightforward. For my part, I would like these events to develop toward a rapprochement between East and West in Europe and, in particular, between the European Economic Community and the Soviet Union. But this is not so evident and one can think that we have been set a challenge that is difficult for both sides. We should advance matters toward rapprochement so that the dynamics of the process become positive.

[Zagladin] Mr Jean-Pierre Cot is right that the situation is not straightforward and is contradictory, that difficulties may arise, and indeed they are already arising. But there is also a positive side which, in my view, prevails and which we must support and stimulate. It seems to me that these changes promote rapprochement to a greater extent than they hinder it. Why is this? Well, if one speaks about the psychological side of the matter, what in the past often used to hinder mutual understanding was the difference in economic systems, forms of ownership. In the East, state form of ownership reigned, whereas in the West it was various pluralistic forms. Now, this difference is gradually fading away. it is not vanishing altogether, but it is significantly diminishing. Politically, in the East there were one-party systems or, of multiparty systems, then fairly simplified ones. In the West there was political pluralism. today, there is political pluralism in both the West and East. There is a division of powers in both the former and latter. In other words, certain principles developed over centuries are becoming common to both East and West. This does not erase the difference in social guidelines and in ideals, but it provides an opportunity for far more mutual understanding and more cooperation.

[Zubkov] In these changes, the issue naturally arises—a very acute issue—of the reunification of Germany. How do you both evaluate the state of affairs? How do you view this, as a positive or a negative phenomenon for the future and development of Europe?

[Cot] I think that this is a serious problem which affects us and you, and above all, the Socialist Group in the European Parliament, which includes representatives of 12 nationalities: Germans, Irish, Danes, French, British, those who have already experienced war, and also representatives of the Soviet Union who share all the worries and concerns pertaining to the future of Germany. We think that the unification of Germany is inevitable. One can proceed from this as a reality. Unification should occur in such a way as not to upset the disarmament process which is taking place in Europe. I believe that here we can have two types of guarantees. On the one hand, the security of Europe must be guaranteed in the form of military obligations.

Everything should be established by a series of talks. This affects all of Europe, not only Germany. For example, there are the matters of the number of military forces in Europe, of the role of nuclear weapons and of the corresponding influence on each other of the two alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and the question of a ban on the production by Germany of nuclear and chemical weapons. This is obvious. And on the other hand, a guarantee that Germany is democratic since we know that military guarantees are insufficient. It must be democratic so as to pursue a policy of peace. This democracy will not allow tendencies of nationalism and fascism to prevail among the German people.

[Zagladin] Well, first of all, I should say that on the whole I agree with what Jean-Pierre Cot has said. France and the Soviet Union have histories that have much in common, including history relating to wars, wars brought about by Germany. For our people this is a complex and serious issue, but it has to be said that a Soviet public opinion poll has shown that all in all, the majority do understand the need for the restoration of the unity of the German nation. I would not use the term reunification, which you used and which Mr. Cot used. I would rather talk of the unification of the two German states because in this case, it is completely clear what we are talking about. We are talking about the FRG and the GDR and not about Polish or any other territories. And this problem, the problem of the borders of a future Germany, this is the first thing, I agree here, for which full guarantees must be found. The process is indeed moving very fast and we must not waste time here. We need, we usually say that the process of German unification should proceed alongside the all-European process. I completely agree with this. But I would also add: At the same time also as the process of the activation of cooperation between leftwing, democratic and peace-loving forces of Europe. That is also very important.

[Zubkov] The changes taking place both within our country and in the countries of Eastern Europe are increasingly revealing our interest in the life of countries in which socialists are either in power or operate very actively as a party. And, as you know, many parties have been transformed, or renamed, from communist parties into socialist. How do you evaluate this phenomenon, you as a socialist and then you, as a communist?

[Cot] I think Mr. Zagladin has already spoken about this. We are moving toward rapprochement and I am glad that this process is taking place. Contacts between our parties are becoming closer and they are brought closer by the concepts of democratic socialism, political pluralism, the process of respect for human and civil rights and a number of other aspects on which we have a common stance. This is an altogether reassuring process. This is one of the reasons for my visit to Moscow, together with the Socialist Group. To express approval for the rapprochement between our parties and to show support for perestroyka and for President Gorbachev.

[Zagladin] As for me, I will start, perhaps, from this point. When the problems of changes in Eastern Europe today, and even perestroyka here, are being discussed, it is often said that the socialist idea has suffered a downfall. I believe that this is a completely incorrect idea, an incorrect way of posing the question. Because, if something has suffered a downfall, and after all something indeed has, then it is that model of social development which existed in our country, in our country and in the Eastern countries, and which has led us nowhere. The idea, on the contrary, is, in my view, developing anew and is, as it were, adapting to the changed world. And here, changes in the names of parties or changes in the existence of those parties fit in, I think, with this process.

Everyone is looking for new paths, each in his own way, and I do not think that any of us, neither we nor our French friends, wish to foist on others our own ideas. But, objectively, the objective process is leading toward these ideas drawing closer, and this also gladdens me, just as it does our friend Jean-Pierre Cot. They are drawing closer because ultimately, the ideas of democratic socialism, humanist values and human rights are conmmon. This does not mean that we are becoming identical, just as all communist parties are not identical and socialist parties are different.

[Cot] I would like to add to what has been said, about the question of Lithuania, where a tense situation has developed. The European Parliament has expressed its view and I would like to call for the historical right of the Lithuanian people to be respected, for talks between Lithuania and Moscow to be proceed in the spirit of Helsinki. We are concerned that it should be so. Much of what we are now discussing, in particular, the development of relations between European states, will depend on the ability to conduct a dialogue that will provide an acceptable solution.

[Zagladin] Very briefly, I can say that the wish of our leadership is for this matter to be resolved in precisely the way which Jean-Pierre Cot has mentioned, that is, in the spirit of dialogue and on the basis of legality, on the basis of the law, and only thus. Unfortunately, this is not working out because our Lithuanian friends, right from the outset, from 11 March of this year, took the path of totally ignoring existing laws. We want only one thing: To resume dialogue or begin dialogue on the basis of observance of existing laws. Every republic has the right of secession from the Soviet Union and the Congress of People's Deputies confirmed this constitutional norm once again, but if this happens or can happen, then only on the basis of existing laws.

[Zubkov] And my last question. Your delegation is here at the invitation both of our country's Supreme Soviet and the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation in Europe, of which Vadim Zagladin is the chairman, and your correspondent is a member of this committee. How do you evaluate the participation of the broad sections of the public in European rapprochement and in the development of the European process?

[Cot] I believe that it is very important to make the public aware of current politics, first and foremost, of the role of parliament, in particular the Supreme Soviet, and also of the European Parliament. I would like to congratulate all of us on the exchanges of delegations between the European Parliament and the Supreme Soviet. We received a delegation of the Supreme Soviet in Strasbourg led by Comrade Falin, and now we are in Moscow ourselves.

[Zagladin] I confirm that we discussed interesting projects about which we will speak later, but for the moment, we have agreed to maintain permanent contacts between the Socialist Group of the European Parliament and our committee. I believe this will be very useful for both sides.

[Zubkov] Thank you. Allow me to wish you success in your activity and to say thank you very much for this interview.

Vorontsov Receives Visiting French Dignitaries

PM0205105790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Apr 90 Moscow Evening Edition p 5

[Unattributed report: "Conversation"]

[Text] Yu.M. Vorontsov, USSR First Deputy Foreign Minister, received on 25 April for a conversation a group of prominent French politicians and public figures—M. Couve de Murville, senator and former prime minister and foreign minister; A. Peyrefitte, National Assembly deputy and former minister; and A. Froment-Meurice, former French ambassador to the USSR, who are in Moscow to attend an academic colloquium on C. de Gaulle's birth centenary.

Noting General de Gaulle's role in establishing relations of detente, concord, and cooperation between the USSR and France, the conversation participants stressed the significance of these relations for establishing a climate of trust and mutual understanding in Europe in the sixties. In the current international atmosphere, Soviet-French dialogue and collaboration retain their significance for maintaining stability on the European continent.

Yu.M. Vorontsov gave a luncheon in the French visitors' honor.

Irish Parliamentary Delegation Ends Visit

PM0205102190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Apr 90 Moscow Evening Edition p 5

["Joint Statement on the Results of the Visit to the USSR by a Delegation from the Irish Parliament"]

[Text] A delegation from the Irish Parliament, headed by Senate Chairman S. Doherty, was in the Soviet Union 16-24 April at the invitation of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The delegation was received by A.I. Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet. It had conversations with I.D. Laptev and R.N. Nishanov, chairmen of the USSR Supreme Soviet chambers, at the USSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee and the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities Commission for Nationalities Policy and Interethnic Relations, at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, and the USSR Academy of Sciences Europe Institute.

The delegation went to the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, where it had a conversation at the republic's Supreme Soviet, visited an industrial enterprise and an agricultural enterprise, and saw the historic monuments in Samarkand.

During the conversations, which took place in a spirit of friendship and mutual interest, the sides exchanged opinions on various aspects of Soviet-Irish relations and vital and important international issues. They stressed the significance of parliamentarians' joint efforts in their solution. Backing was given to the all-around deepening and widening of contacts between the two countries' supreme representative organs and their active involvement in the further development of cooperation between the USSR and Ireland, and also in ensuring peace, security, and stability in the world, above all in Europe.

On behalf of the Irish Parliament's leaders, S. Doherty invited a USSR Supreme Soviet delegation to visit Ireland at a time to be agreed. The invitation was gratefully accepted.

Karpov Meets Irish Envoy, Discusses Disarmament

PM0105110590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Apr 90 Morning Edition p4

[TASS report under the general heading "Official Reports"]

[Text] On 27 April V.P. Karpov, USSR deputy foreign minister, received P. McCabe, Irish ambassador to the USSR, at the latter's request.

During their conversation they discussed the situation at the arms limitation and disarmament talks, as well as European security problems.

UK's Hurd, Polish Leaders on Security Issues

PM0205110590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 May 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Polish-British Talks"]

[Text] Warsaw, 1 May—Problems of all-European security and the consequences for Europe of Germany's unification occupied the central place in the talks which D. Hurd, British secretary for foreign and Commonwealth affairs, who is on an official visit to Poland, had in Warsaw.

The head of the British diplomatic department was received by Republic of Poland President W. Jaruzelski. It was emphasized during a discussion of international problems that the unification of the two German states can give Europe great opportunities but can also be a source of danger, particularly for Germany's neighbors, if it is not suitably tied in with the formation of a new, all-European system of security.

Questions of the creation of a new European security system, of preparations for a top-level conference of the CSCE countries, and of the treaty regularization of the Polish border with Germany were discussed at D. Hurd's meeting with T. Mazowiecki, chairman of the Polish Council of Ministers.

At the Polish Foreign Ministry D. Hurd had a meeting with Polish Foreign Minister K. Skubiszewski, and Polish-British plenary talks were held.

Spanish CP General Secretary Interviewed

90UF0080A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
13 Apr 90 Second Edition p 7

[Report on interview with Julio Anguita, general secretary of the Spanish Communist Party, by V. Volkov, datelined Madrid, April: "We Must Not Be Pessimists"]

[Text] **The press conference lasted almost an hour and a half. Julio Anguita calmly, even with a certain amount of humor, parried what would seem to be the most pointed questions. There was laughter in the hall from time to time.**

In the office of the general secretary, which is located on the fourth floor of the PCE [Spanish Communist Party] Central Committee building where we went after the press conference, the furnishing were modest: book shelves, a desk, tattered armchairs, and a divan. Our conversation began with a question about the results of the recently completed Sixth National PCE Conference, which was devoted to the 70th anniversary of the Spanish Communist Party.

[Volkov] Seven decades of party history—this is a significant occasion for summing up the results, stopping, looking around, and earmarking a program of action. What in your view are the landmarks in the struggle of the Spanish communists, and how have they been reflected in party activity?

[Anguita] The history of the Spanish Communist Party is a constituent part of the international revolutionary movement. We feel that we are heirs to the most important events of the past two centuries, whether it be the French Revolution of 1789, the Paris Commune, or the Great October Socialist Revolution. I should especially like to discuss the significance of the last event. Many modern scientific and technical achievements would be unthinkable without the 1917 revolution in Russia; without its influence it would have been impossible to eliminate the old colonial empire. Workers of the capitalist states would never have been able to achieve many of the social conquests were it not for the fact that the working classes of Russia were the first to eliminate the system of exploitation of man by man.

Originating in those fiery years the Spanish Communist Party, which in the figurative words of Dolores Ibarruri, "became a powerful branch growing out of the trunk of the socialist workers movement," grew and became strong under the direct influence of Great October. Even our enemies cannot deny the immense role played by Spanish communists in the protection of the young republic at the beginning of the thirties. In 1932 and 1934 the PCE demonstrated its real militancy by resolutely entering into combat against those who wanted to bring fascism to Spain. The ability to find an adequate answer to the concrete historical challenge was expressed in the creation of the People's Front, which played a key role in the resistance of democratic forces to the fascist insurgents.

After the defeat of the republic the PCE continued to defend the interests of the working people underground, being subjected to the cruelest repressive measures by Franco supporters. Later, having analyzed the condition and methods of fighting against the dictator, the PCE radically changed its course both in its fighting methods and in the consciousness of the masses so as to put an end to the split, the main cause of which was the unhealed wound of the civil war.

Unfortunately, along with our successes we also made a number of mistakes for which we had to pay dearly. Frequently they were subjective in nature and were manifested in the fact that we blindly followed foreign ideas without sufficient critical analysis taking national specifics into account. Our previous mistakes—and there is nowhere to escape from them—were reflected in the party's foreign and domestic policy. Because of them for a certain amount of time the party lost its ability to carry on democratic dialogue with the masses, which then led to internal dissension and ultimately to the split. The cause, I repeat, was the blind following of dogmas and abstract ideas, and ideological voluntarism imposed from outside. The PCE paid a high price for these mistakes and ended up on the verge of disappearing.

But courage, political maturity, and the ability for self-criticism helped us to get out of our deep crisis and regain the confidence of the working masses. Since that time there has been an iron rule in the PCE: All aspects of party activity, regardless of how complex they may be, must be decided by PCE members themselves.

[Volkov] The Communist Party has successfully held its anniversary conference and developed a broad program of action within the framework of the "United Left Wing," which includes the Communist Party, and achieved good results in the latest parliamentary elections in October of last year. A million more voted for us than in the preceding elections. The "United Left Wing"

have actually become a third political force in the country. The voice of communists and their allies in the coalition has regained its proper weight and influence.

On the philosophical plane, I wish to emphasize—and this is not only my viewpoint but the position reflected in the program document of the Sixth National Conference—that communist ideas based on freedom, democracy, human solidarity, and equality have not only not died but are acquiring even more lasting theoretical and ideological significance. At the same time we must admit that the models of socialism and communism based on totalitarianism, whereby elementary freedoms and strict democratic control are lacking and which use the worst methods of suppression of creative thought in order to continue their existence, must inevitably vacate the political arena...

[Volkov] What kind of influence, in your opinion, are the changes in the USSR exerting on the international situation as a whole and on the policy of the communist parties in capitalist countries?

[Anguita] First of all I wish to emphasize that the PCE considers the policy of perestroyka to be a revolutionary process which has given a new impetus to all mankind. Perestroyka confirms the viability of the ideas of socialism, but humane, democratic socialism which keeps man at the center of its attention.

We value highly the courage with which the CPSU is self-critically interpreting and rectifying the mistakes of the past.

As concerns the influence of perestroyka on the activity of communist parties in capitalist countries, it is also constructive. I shall refer to the example of the relations between the PCE and the CPSU. For it has not been that long since Spanish communists were something like "dissidents" in the international communist movement only because they did not support the CPSU position in the Czechoslovakian question and condemned the armed intervention in Afghanistan, not to mention the Eurocommunist "deviations." Because of this, for many long years relations were, frankly, quite cool. I think that this kind of thing must not be repeated in the current stage of the development of our ties.

There is a constant exchange of opinions between the PCE and the CPSU, a dialogue of equals concerning the most complex problems of modernity. But still if in PRAVDA it is permitted to make critical remarks against the CPSU, many Spanish communists cannot understand the position of the party apparatus, which has still been unable to include on the calendar of its general secretary time for a meeting with the general secretary of the PCE. Although we are very well aware of how loaded down the Soviet leadership is with urgent matters both within the country and in the fulfillment of international commitments. The current situation requires a constant dialogue among communists of all countries, closer coordination of their actions, and an honest exchange of opinions both on problems of interparty relations and on international problems.

[Volkov] Recently it has almost become fashionable for parties to change their names, eliminating the word "communist." What is the position of the PCE regarding this?

[Anguita] A correspondent from one of the bourgeois newspapers asked me that quite recently. I do not want to repeat myself but my answer was approximately as follows: The name "communist" has carried and continues to carry glorious traditions which should be underscored and multiplied. Can one really forget about the struggle communists waged against fascism or deny their credit in the cause of supporting national liberation movements? For those who have rejected the name of their party or intend to do this it is more a question of an opportunistic approach. I shall not conceal the fact that certain people are also presenting this idea to us, especially taking into account the circumstance that the PCE is now counting on increasing its influence among the masses through active work within the coalition of the "United Left Wing." When we are told that if the names of the communist parties were changed the "United Left Wing" could achieve even greater success, we know that this is based primarily on a desire for us to reject Marxism. But Marxism is still a crucial teaching for us. The name of the Spanish Communist Party is covered with eternal glory and we do not intend to change this name.

[Volkov] Nonetheless these processes are occurring primarily in the countries where until recently the communist parties were the ruling ones...

[Anguita] The problems arising in the countries of East Europe and the processes of renewal and democratization there are a special issue. It seems to me that the main mistake made by our comrades from the former ruling parties in these countries is their distancing themselves from reality, from the needs and aspirations of the people. The lack of dialogue with the masses and the replacement of profound ideological work with current dogmatic slogans has had its effect. These comrades thought that they would always have power, and instead of engaging in painstaking daily activity they inflated the party-bureaucratic apparatus.

I wish to express one more idea. In spite of the sometimes dramatic changes in the countries of East Europe, in my view, in no case can we refrain from dialogue with the newly arisen parties. But this dialogue must be conducted on a new basis, we must exchange pieces of both positive and negative experience, and we must deepen relations of friendship and sincerity while maintaining complete independence and maximum honesty.

[Volkov] The 70th anniversary of the Spanish Communist Party almost coincides with another anniversary—the 120th anniversary of the birth of V.I. Lenin. In your view, what of V.I. Lenin's legacy is close and crucial for the present generation of communists?

[Anguita] The world is experiencing a difficult period in its development. Quite recently, when I saw on television how in one of the countries they were literally dragging—there is no other word for it—the statue of Lenin from its pedestal, I came to the conclusion that the best way to immortalize Lenin's ideas is probably not to erect pompous monuments to him but to embody his legacy in our lives. I think that the general enthusiasm for "deification" of the figure of Lenin, which actually, paradoxical as it may sound, ended up as an emasculation of his ideas, should be stopped. To transform almost into an "idol" a man who in his life was uncommonly simple and open and was always ready for friendly discussion—is this really not a delusion.?

As concerns his theoretical legacy, here we need a differentiated approach. I am against resorting excessively to citing his work, whether the quotations are to the point or not. But can a communist really get by in his daily practice, for example, without an in- depth Leninist analysis of the essence of imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism?

Finally, Lenin is one of the first theoreticians of Marxism to warn us of the danger of the stagnant prejudices of dogmatists and the loud phrases of pseudo-revolutionaries. Lenin sometimes found the only correct answers to many problems that arise unexpectedly. And he too was sometimes mistaken, but he was not afraid to admit his mistakes. Modern political activists must not forget Lenin's lessons of a tactical and strategic nature—we must constantly learn from them.

Turkey's Akbulut on Economy, East Europe

PM0105155490 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No. 17, 24-30 Apr 90 pp 12-13

[Undated interview with Turkish Prime Minister Yildrim Akbulut by Viktor Borovoy: "Turkey: A Breakthrough Into the 21st Century"—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Yildirim Akbulut, 55, a member of President Turgut Ozal's Team, was designated Prime Minister on November 9, 1989. As the mastermind behind the Turkish "economic miracle," the President couldn't have made a better choice. Leader of the ruling Motherland Party and a prominent jurist, Yildirim Akbulut was at one time Minister of the interior and for several years Speaker of the Grand National Assembly. He is determined to steer the country further along the path of economic progress and democracy.

New Times. In recent years, the Republic of Turkey has achieved much in economic development, which gives rise to hope that in the near future Turkey will emerge as one of the world's developed nations. What do you think are the recipes of economic prosperity?

Yildirim Akbulut. Turkey adopted an economic stabilization programme at the beginning of 1980 which put the country on a path of economic recovery and adjustment. A new set of economic stabilization and restructuring measures have been introduced within the framework of this programme based on increased reliance on market forces. These measures included a flexible foreign exchange rate policy leading to convertibility, price deregulations especially in state economic enterprises, a tight monetary policy, liberalization of foreign trade and payments regulations, an interest rate policy designed to encourage dometsic savings, introduction of a new foreign investment policy and institutional changes aiming at improving the effectiveness of the economic policy. Eventually, Turkey has relinquished the policy of import substitution and interventionism which lasted more than 50 years and switched to a considerably open and market-oriented economy.

Today, market forces and intensified efforts for exportation have become the "driving force" of the economy. The most notable outcome of the latter is that the value of merchandise exports jumped from 2.9 billion dollars on 1980 to 11.7 billion dollars in 1989. Equally important is the substantial diversification accomplished.

In 1986 and 1987, there were some shifts in priorities without deviating from the basic principles of the economic liberalization strategy. A high growth rate has been achieved. The average real GNP growth of 1986-87 exceeded 7.5 per cent, allowing a visible decline in the level of unemployment, but also giving rise to less desirable macro-economic consequences on the inflation front. In 1989, our government took additional measures to control aggregate demand and to curb inflation.

We are of the opinion that the present strategy which is aiming at a full-fledged market economy will lead us to higher levels of development thereby transforming Turkey into one of the more advanced countries in the world by the next century.

N.T. As is known, the Republic of Turkey signed the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, a great part of which is devoted to human rights. What steps does Turkey intend to take to become a pluralistic society of the European type?

Y.A. Pluralistic democratic system should be seen as the outcome of the century-old process of westernization in turkey. With the reforms introduced by M. Kemal Ataturk following the proclamation of the republic in 1923, the social and political structure of Turkey widely developed in the direction of western values. These reforms constitute the very basis of pluralistic democracy which is now regarded as the indispensable feature of the Turkish political life.

The general elections held in November 1983 have marked a turning point in the revitalization of the democratic process in Turkey.

The Turkish government has during this period taken various concrete and eficient steps for the protection of

human rights and the attainment of full-fledged democracy. It has recognized as of January 1987 the right of individual petition to the European Commission of Human Rights. During 1988, it has ratified both the U.N. and the European conventions on the prevention of torture: in June 1989 it has ratified the European Social Charter: in January 1990 it has recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the European Council of Human Rights. In accordance with the related article of the Turkish Constitution (Article 90) these conventions have, upon ratification, become an integral part of the Turkish national legislation.

Turkey, which is an active participant to the CSCE process, is ready to implement all the requirements of the monitoring mechanism of the human dimension as stipulated in the concluding document of he CSCE Vienna follow-up meeting.

It must be recognized, however, that despite the Turkish government's determined stand on human rights issues and the efficient measures taken to combat all abuses, some isolated incidents unfortunately to take place in Turkey from time to time, as can be witnessed in other countries as well. What is important is the existence of the political will to avoid such incidents, and to take the necessary measures for their prevention. Every allegation brought to the notice of the appropriate authorities is investigated thoroughly and those found guilty are duly penalized.

N.T. Today the whole world is watching the developments in Eastern Europe with hope and anxiety. Serious changes have taken place in the neighbouring Bulgaria as well. Bulgaria returned civil rights to the Turkish-speaking and Muslim population. How do you view the future of the Turkish-Bulgarian relations?

Y.A. We are following with interest the developments taking place towards pluralistic democratic systems. We believe that the liberal pluralistic political systems replacing totalitarian regimes in East European countries will lead to the improvement of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and enhance trust and confidence among nations.

We are pleased to observe that the recent changes in Eastern Europe have found their reflection in Bulgaria. We consider the reform and democratization process underway as an internal matter of Bulgaria.

The policies introduced and implemented by the Zhivkov administration have isolated Bulgaria from the realities of contemporary world. As a matter of fact, the opposition groups as well as the leadership have come to realize that such an anachronistic attitude was not serving the interests of Bulgaria and the Bulgarian nation.

We welcome the decisions of the new Bulgarian administration as promising steps in the right direction. It is our hope that the decisions and principles agreed upon will soon be put into implementation. It should be borne in mind that the Bulgarian government has so far not taken any positive step other than stating its intentions with regard to the restoration of the rights of the Turkish minority.

We can only be optimistic about the future, if the errors of the past are corrected and the members of the Turkish minority fully enjoy in peace and tranquillity their status as Bulgarian citizens.

N.T. I know that you advocate a united Cypriot state modelled after the Swiss Confederation. What is your idea of a confederation?

Y.A. The constituent elements of the Turkish approach to a solution in Cyprus are as follows: bi-zonality; political equality of the two distinct peoples of the island; and a guarantee system to ensure the non-recurrence of the pre-1974 Greek Cypriot oppression and persecution of the Turkish Cypriots.

What is sought by the Turkish side in Cyprus therefore is not simply any solution under any form but a just and lasting peace. Such an accommodation should in the first instance create a partnership state which should be based on the principle of the political equality of both the Turkish and the Greek Cypriots. More significantly, what is genuinely required in Cyprus is not a matter of drafting constitutional models on paper but a politically feasible and viable compromise which could eventually remove the long-standing mistrust between the peoples of the Island.

I therefore believe that such a solution to the question can only be voluntarily worked out by the parties through the exercise of their right to self-determination and by direct talks without outside interference.

N.T. Which prospects do you see for development of relations between our two countries and which steps will have to be taken on both sides to develop mutually beneficial relations?

Y.A. I believe that the basic agreements which establish the infrastructural and institutional framework necessary for a rapidly growing trade and expanded economic relationship between Turkey and the Soviet Union have already been concluded. Therefore we have to identify and develop new areas of trade and economic cooperation as well as to further promote areas of mutual interest already established, such as natural gas agreement, turn-key construction projects, border and shore trading, joint ventures, tourism-related activities and others. The target of 3-4 billions dollars' worth of annual total trade volume between the two countries should be within reach within few years.

We are gratified to note that reforms are gradually and successfully being implemented in the Soviet Union within the framework of "perestroyka." I am convinced that these reforms will yield positive results which in

turn will contribute to the further expansion of trade and economic relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union.

Metropolitan Filaret Has Talks in Istanbul

PM0105100990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS correspondent Azer Dzhangirov report under the general heading: "Official Announcements"]

[Text] Istanbul, 28 Apr—Representatives of the Ecumenical Constantinople and Moscow Patriarchates have stressed Orthodoxy's responsibility and role in a changing world and indicated the need for unity and cooperation between the fraternal Orthodox churches in their approach to the modern situation.

Members of the two churches reached this conclusion during the visit to Istanbul 25 through 28 April by a delegation from the Moscow Patriarchy chaired by Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev and Galich and exarch of the Ukraine.

"The ecumenical patriarchate has shown great interest in the processes of renewal of Soviet society and expressed delight at the opportunities that perestroyka and democratization are giving both churches and religions and all Soviet people with regard to freedom of religion, freedom of conscience, and the spiritual development of the individual," Metropolitan Filaret noted during a conversation with a TASS correspondent.

The delegation from the Moscow Patriarchate left for home today.

West Europe Union Chief Visits Moscow 25 Apr

LD2904122690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2020 GMT 28 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 28 Apr (TASS)—Willem van Eekelen, general secretary of the Western European Union, was in Moscow from 25 to 28 April at the invitation of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation. During the visit he held meetings with Vladimir Petrovskiy, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, and Mikhail Moiseyev, chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, as well as in the Committee for defense and State Security Issues of the USSR Supreme Soviet and in a number of institutes.

The discussions were about possible ways and means of creating new and stable all-European security structures, the prospects for and the mutual relations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and the intensification and institutionalization of the Helsinki process.

During a discussion of the problem of reinforcing security and stability in Europe at a meeting today between Vladimir Petrovskiy and Willem van Eekelen, the focus was placed on the external aspects of the German unification process, on issues connected with the convening of a 1990 summit meeting of CSCE participant countries and with the creation of all-European security and cooperation structures, and also on the problems of cutting armed forces and arms in Europe. Agreement was reached on setting up a regular exchange of views.

Latin America & Caribbean

Paraguay's Torres Interviewed on Political Scene

PM0105141590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Apr 90 Second Edition p 4

[Interview with Paraguayan Education Minister Dionisio Gonzalez Torres, by P. Bogomolov in Moscow; date of interview not given: "Dionisio Gonzalez Torres: 'While Making No Secret of My Right-Wing Views....'"]

[Text] Dionisio Gonzalez Torres is the name of the first Paraguayan statesman to visit Moscow for many decades. The minister of education and worship of the distant South American country is 83. But when this lean and nimble figure appeared in the corridors of the international information forum, held recently at the Soviet Information Center, it was hard to believe that our visitor was of such a venerable age.

"But, please, do not call my visit a working visit, let alone an official visit," Mr. Gonzalez Torres warned in advance, "after all, our countries do not have diplomatic relations. So I came to Moscow as a private individual, because I was interested in the theme of the 11th conference of the World Media Association, and, I must admit, I wanted to see your capital."

[Bogomolov] Would you, in return, be kind enough to inform us about the current situation in Paraguay, which, to be honest, has hitherto not been the most open and hospitable Latin American country as far as Soviet journalists are concerned.

[Gonzalez] Sure, although I must say right away that when I am talking about Paraguayan affairs I make no secret of my rather right-wing views. So, first of all, I will give you my assessment of the recent overthrow of in Paraguay of the dictator, General Alfredo Stroessner. In my view, it was absolutely necessary and opportune. The former top people in Paraguay's ruling "Colorado" party were so steeped in corruption and lawlessness that opposition sentiments had to some extent spread to the country's ruling circles. Note that I am telling you this as one of the oldest members of the "Colorado" party.

[Bogomolov] So an anti-Stroessner rebellion was inevitable at some stage....

[Gonzalez] Precisely, also because many officers from the country's richest families supported it as well. My son, an admiral, is an example. But immediately after the victory over Stroessner, new, fresh forces began to join in our "big politics." I am talking mainly about respectable, in my view, members of bourgeois parties, who have been emigres for years and have returned

home in recent months. They are very fine people, one of them was even speaker of our parliament—congress.

[Bogomolov] Are you as well-disposed toward representatives of the country's left-wing forces, who are returning to Paraguay having been in exile until recently?

[Gonzalez] To be honest, no. Recently, incidentally, I met with an old opponent of mine—a communist and former political emigre. Imagine, he says: It is time the Paraguayan Government abandoned the old, typically anticommunist stereotypes. Times have changed, he says—no one would seriously consider a rebellion against the latifundistas. I replied with a question: Isn't that why your supporters are returning to Paraguay one by one? Do you think we have forgotten the events of 1959-1962, when numerous groups of militants from the "1 May" partisan movement swept in from neighboring countries?

[Bogomolov] But with such undisguised prejudice against left-wing forces, can you consider yourself a minister of a new Paraguay that has embarked on the path of democratization?

[Gonzalez] I think I can. After all, I am an active supporter of the continuing investigation into the crimes of Stroessner's secret police. Anyone who has been involved in illegal persecution, torture, or shootings must be convicted. As head of the education department, I favor a significant increase in appropriations for educational needs and other social purposes. But I am not breaking any new ground here—I do not know of any education minister in the world who is happy with his budget.

[Bogomolov] But the mounting labor conflicts in Paraguay, the demonstrations in defense of human rights, the activity of left-wing parties, and the appearance of a progressive press—evidently, you do not like any of this?

[Gonzalez] Indeed, and the point is that all this social activity makes foreign investors and creditors apprehensive. By and large, international capital is prepared to help Paraguay turn into a pretty much developed agro-industrial state. But only if everything is calm and peaceful here. Otherwise we will remain for many years a country growing cotton and soybeans but incapable of processing them properly.

[Bogomolov] In short, you favor limited democracy for Paraguay?

[Gonzalez] Yes, at least at the present stage. After all, democracy is like new slippers. You have to get used to them.

Political & Social

'Insulting' Slogans Noted at May Day Rally

PM0105151690 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 May 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Report by I. Andreyev, R. Armeyev, V. Belikov, and A. Protsenko: "A Spring of Worries and Hopes: The May Day Rally in Red Square"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The participants in the rally leave Red Square, where the front ranks of a demonstration taking place on the initiative of the Moscow Association of Voters are beginning to arrive. People's deputies of the USSR, RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], Moscow City Soviet, and rayon soviets were marching.

Although the word "informals" has barely become established in the Soviet lexicon, people are already trying to use it less frequently, because it is less and less appropriate to the political situation in the country. The May Day demonstration organized by the Moscow Association of Voters with the support of the new Moscow City Soviet has not been categorized even in official documents as some kind of "alternative" expression of will. Under the government resolution of 26 April supporters of the Moscow Association of Voters were granted the same rights of access to Red Square in front of the Mausoleum as the Muscovites whom the Moscow City Trade Unions Council assembled for the May Day rally.

It was officially announced in the newspapers that those wishing to join the demonstration should assemble at 0900 hours at five places in Moscow—at the "Barrikadnaya" subway station, at the Belorussia Station, on Kalyayevskaya Street, on Zubovskaya Square, and on Olimpiyskiy Avenue. The columns set off at 1000. At 1100 the second demonstration reached Red Square.

All those wishing to do so were invited to participate—representatives of all parties, movements, and political associations, nonparty people, and simply sympathizers. The organizers made it known to the official authorities that there was no censorship of the banners to be carried by the demonstrators. The only requirement was that they should not be anticonstitutional.

But when the columns marched across Red Square carrying frankly offensive banners, it became clear that the "tender age" of our democracy had—alas!—played another bitter joke on the Muscovites. Such a demonstration would hardly be permitted by the authorities in the capital of any country considering itself civilized. In our country they permitted it, relying on the political wisdom of the march organizers. But for some reason some of the informals who came to Red Square thought that merely by means of wholesale disparagement of the government and outright insults to the president, they would not only demonstrate their bravery, but also accelerate changes in the country. Let us not, however, rule out the possibility that they may ultimately achieve some kind of "acceleration." The only question is—in what direction will the changes be?

By all appearances it is not only a question of the elementary political illiteracy of the rally leaders and their desire at all costs to whip up an already heated atmosphere. Among the banners were some that were frankly provocative. Many slogans were aimed at direct confrontation with the constitutional authorities. In this situation those present on the platform, among them the newly elected Moscow City Soviet Chairman G.Kh. Popov, were forced to leave Red Square, and the last columns of informals were demonstrating only to one another.

But the problem is a serious one. Of course, the patent lack of general culture and political culture leaves its mark on the "extreme left democrats." But they call themselves democrats. Although calls for general and immediate destruction (which, unfortunately, are all too familiar to us from our own history) have nothing in common with either democracy or progress. While assuring everyone, and especially themselves, that they act in the name of the people and on their instructions, these people did not consider it necessary actually to ask the people: Do they want yet more "historical upheavals," or do they prefer a path that is perhaps less rapid, but safer—the path of political and economic reforms based on the realities of life and on accurate and sober calculation.

However, the vociferous contributions of the "Democratic Union" and its followers are hardly likely to have influenced the political situation in the country. There turned out to be far fewer demonstrators wishing to participate in this action than the organizers had expected to assemble. But we must admit that they managed to spoil the holiday....

The May Day rally and demonstration of Muscovites, which lasted more than two hours, reflected the entire spectrum of sociopolitical opinions, views, and moods that are now present among the masses and were proclaimed on the May Day holiday. The Moscow of the working people and the working class, the tens of thousands of inhabitants of the capital who took part in the Red Square celebration and at numerous local rallies, expressed with the utmost clarity their resolute will—"no" to stagnationist conservatism and rampant leftist extremism, "yes" to the processes of perestroyka, to considered, thoughtful steps toward economic renewal and the consolidation of all our society's healthy forces.

Protests in Red, Pushkin Squares

PM0205125590 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 2 May 90 p 1

[Report by K. Belyaninov and A. Krayniy: "What Was Seen"]

[Excerpt] **"In the Column of Demonstrators...."**

Life was simpler before. At least the color of each nationwide festival was agreed and fixed in advance, and it was impossible to confuse 5-foot-long May Day carnations with the ribbons of the Order of St. George of Victory Day. But in the sixth year of perestroyka it has become clear that slogans, even when painted in the most indelible paint on scarlet calico, do fade sooner or later. Who could have imagined even a couple of years back that, instead of the mandatory "Peace! Labor! May!," you would find hard by Red Square itself a slogan consisting of just one word "Consensus!"? And that three students carrying the black flag of the Confederation of Anarchosyndicalists could convincingly prove to a militiaman their right to take part in the May Day demonstration?

"It is not au-tho-rized, you understand?"—said the sergeant, who was already plainly sick and tired of pointing out the obvious to students. "But what will happen if we do all march into Red Square with such flags?"

However, despite the sergeant's misgivings, nothing out of the ordinary happened on Red Square. The red flags carried by workers from Moscow plants coexisted peacefully with the "tricolor" of the Russian People's Front, and so did universally recognized slogans like "More Democracy, More Socialism" with the slogan of the student column reading "Give Us Some Space."

Although economic rather than political demands undoubtedly predominated at this year's May Day celebration, it was not at all because the rally was organized by the trade unions.

"We are now on the brink of a crisis, and if perestroyka of the economy does not start very soon, all the political transformations will founder," explained Andrey Pantsov, a worker at Moscow's Lenin Komsomol Automotive Plant.

Andrey was carrying a slogan reading "Yes to Market Economy, No to Unemployment." Perhaps a time of looking for compromises is really coming, when the country's main route will be determined not only by those who stand on the Mausoleum balcony but also by those who come on to Red Square with their own slogans? After all, our aims, despite the colors of the flags, are the same.

...On Pushkin Square

...While one of us "demonstrated in the column," the other headed for Pushkin Square, where a demonstration—true, very lightly attended—had also assembled. A group of Azeris and Meskhetian Turks stood with slogans reading "Freedom to the Fighters for Perestroyka in Azerbaijan!" and "Return Our Homeland!" beneath fluttering sickle and crescent flags, patiently waiting at the barriers across Gorkiy Street for permission to enter Red Square.

The demonstrators attracted no particular attention from passersby. Was this a case of "immunity to demonstrations?" The people were in fact hurrying to McDonalds, but we approached the column and spoke with Dzhavat Kuchiyev, a winner of the Lenin Prize and twice decorated with the Order of Lenin.

"I am a Meskhetian Turk. Our people were deported from Georgia in November 1944, and for 46 years now my family and I have lived in Uzbekistan. Or more accurately, lived there until recently.

"We are now in the position of refugess, but why? All those years I worked honestly, harvested the cotton crop, and was then made chairman of the 'Kommunizm' Kolkhoz [collective farm] in Komsomolskiy Rayon. Now my people and I have been driven out. Where are we to go?

"Today, May Day, we have come to Moscow's central thoroughfare to attract the attention of democratic forces. We are asking for help."

...After some discussion, the militia directed the column of demonstrators along Tverskiy Boulevard.

The militia was wearing white gloves today, but that was perhaps the only sign of a holiday. Senior Sergeant Yuriy Miroshnichenko observed gloomily: "How can you have a holiday when there are so many problems around?" [passage omitted]

TASS Wrap-Up of Celebrations

LD0105143990 Moscow TASS in English 1330 GMT 1 May 90

[By TASS correspondents]

[Text] Moscow May 1 TASS—In various cities in the Soviet Union, non-traditional May Day celebrations are marking the international day of solidarity among working people.

There were eight rallying points—all sites of the first revolutionary meetings—in Vladivostok, the Soviet Far East, for the first festive celebrations. Rallies, demonstrations, and meetings with leaders of the territory were combined with public merry-making and a diverse cultural and sport programme.

The May Day celebration procedure, which previously remained unchanged for decades, was now different in Leningrad for the first time over the past 70-odd years. A meeting of democratic movements of the city took place in Palace Square instead of a civilian demonstration, breaking a 70-year tradition.

There were many foreigners among the festive throng. "As a businessman I can only welcome perestroyka, for it opened up new opportunities for international cooperation," Klaus-Peter Meier, general director of a Soviet-West German joint venture for the production of computer systems, told TASS.

"This is vividly illustrated by the activities of our enterprise. Although the firm was established quite recently, it has already provided quite a sizeable income to each side."

In another development, in Kiev, Vladimir Ivashko, Politburo member and first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, and other leaders of the republic marched together with the columns of work collectives through Kreshchatik, Kiev's main thoroughfare.

The Chernobyl accident, which had occurred on the eve of May Day four years ago, added an alarming note to the spring-time festival and highlighted in a new way the habitual notion of Solidarity. Streamers and placards carried the words of compassion and support addressed to the victims of the accident and its aftermath, calling for unity and solidarity of people in the fight against nuclear misfortune and for ecological security.

In Kazakhstan, demonstrations and meetings took place in Alma Ata and other cities. There were no scenarios prepared in advance, as previously was the case. All activities were held in a much less constrained atmosphere.

Placards also changed. They now call mainly for peace and good-neighbourly international cooperation, for closing the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site and saving the Aral Sea. Working people insist on increasing the pace of perestroyka.

Anuar Alimzhanov, people's deputy of Kazakhstan, a prominent Soviet writer, chairman of the Kazakh Peace Committee and activist for the Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement, told TASS: "Our national parliament has been renewed by 80 per cent. It is now working to benefit people in a very creative atmosphere.

"There are arguments and discussions, of course. But it is for the first time delegates are not just obediently rubber-stamping suggested decisions. They are discussing in detail the composition of the government. In a broader context, the chances of universal peace have grown stronger due to Soviet policy. Notwithstanding all the complexities of the current period, we are looking ahead optimistically," Alimzhanov said.

In Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, the city committee of the Communist Party and the Executive Committee decided not to hold a May Day demonstration in accord with the wishes of working people. There are fairs, public merry making and concerts in the city.

Builders who arrived in Armenia to restore the earthquake-ravaged towns and villages marked the holiday at their workplaces. They realise that every hour of their work means new houses for the homeless and therefore work without holidays or days off.

Carnations were laid today at the foot of Lenin Monument in Ulyanovsk, Lenin's birthplace in the middle reaches of the Volga. The ceremony marked the beginning of a May Day demonstration involving not less than 100,000 people.

As before, numerous foreign tourists also celebrated May Day in the native city of Lenin. This time they arrived from North Korea, Vietnam, Nicaragua, Mongolia, Hungary, East Germany and other countries.

The Ulyanovsk branch of the All-Union Society of Ethnic Germans "Rebirth" for the first time helped organise the festive demonstrations in the city.

On a suggestion from the activists in the society, the regional council of people's deputies passed a special decision on the eve of May Day and invited ethnic Germans from Altai, Siberia, Kazakhstan and Kirghizia—to where they had been forcibly deported in 1941—to reside permanently on the outskirts of Ulyanovsk.

Banning of Moscow Meetings, Rallies Reported

LD0105172690 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1700 GMT 1 May 90

[Text] According to reports which have not been officially confirmed, all public meetings and mass programs have been banned in Moscow with immediate effect, because after the 1 May procession, 20,000 demonstrated and demanded the resignation of the Politburo and personally of President Gorbachev.

A Soviet analyst close to the Moscow leadership has told MTI that the anticommunist action is expected to further strengthen the conservative forces which oppose democratization in the Soviet Union, and it is not precluded that it might move Gorbachev himself in their direction. According to his statement, the Soviet president and several other high-ranking leaders obviously left the mausoleum's parapet because of the provocative demonstrations.

Deputies on Gorbachev's Tasks for First '100 Days'

90UN1371A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 11, 12-18 Mar 90 p 3

[Comments by Aleksandr Yakovlev, doctor of juridical sciences and chief of a department of the State and Law Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and Pavel Bunich, corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences and chief of a department of the Moscow Institute of Management imeni S. Ordzhonikidze, to an unidentified SOYUZ correspondent: "USSR People's Deputies on Presidential Authority in the Country"]

[Text] **Aleksandr YAKOVLEV, doctor of juridical sciences and chief of a department of the Institute of the State and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences**

[SOYUZ] In your opinion, what does the president have to do in the first 100 days?

[A. Yakovlev] What do I expect of the president? I think that for him these days will be filled with concerns and

anxieties in two spheres of state activity. But specifically in the formulation of treaty relations among the republics for the transition to a federation—this must be done quickly, because they will not wait more than 100 days. Second, there must be a linking up, finally, of freedom of political development with freedom of economic development. I will explain in more detail. In my opinion, all of our newly adopted basic laws—about leasing, about land, and about property—have one real legal "Achilles heel": They say nothing about free market relations. They are only assumed. But economic freedom is possible only within this framework. There is something for us to remember: After prohibiting the freedom of trade turnover, we quickly eliminated the NEP [New Economic Policy]. If today's owner-peasant, farmer, cooperative worker, or worker-stockholder is prohibited from selling and purchasing as the laws of the market stipulate, then he will be the same kind of owner as, let us say, the Chinese emperor. And the first business of our president will have to be to use political freedom for freedom in the economy—otherwise there will be no reform, and there will be nothing. Only after creating a single all-union market can we arrive at a point when the republics not only "will not scatter" from the Soviet Union, but, on the contrary, will rush to join our federation. We need a federation based on the consent of economically and politically free republics.

[SOYUZ] Here at the congress I had occasion to hear that the institution of the presidency in our country was established especially for M.S. Gorbachev.

[A. Yakovlev] You have touched upon the relationship of specific institutions of state authority and specific people. I cannot deny the scale of the personality of Gorbachev, who is capable, in my opinion, of leading under the present circumstances. I do not see a worthy alternative to him. On the other hand, the authority and influence of Gorbachev undoubtedly had an effect on the establishment of the institution of the presidency. I am confident that history will give him his due. But it is quite apparent that the presidency is calculated to and will exist regardless of personality. Without personification, in accordance with the democratic structure of the presidency, and not the opposite. There is a system of balances in the law, which provides for the influence of parliament on the presidency, and for his influence on the functions of the parliament; there is the idea of the separation of powers—so that the institution of the presidency, which is growing before our eyes, is not locked into a personality.

[SOYUZ] Will M.S. Gorbachev show himself to be a strong president in a short time?

[A. Yakovlev] I think the situation today is so indefinite and the influencing factors are so spontaneous that a prediction can be made by proceeding only from Gorbachev's past political decisions. Up until now he has been able in an optimal way to get out of very complex problems—perhaps, not as much as possible. I have in mind the situation in the party, interethnic conflicts, etc. I believe, it is true, that the economy requires more decisive actions. Many of our troubles come from this. I, for example, am disturbed by the national movement in some republics which is developing in the traditions of the 17th and 18th centuries, but to blame only him for this is wrong. Democracy and free market relations take second place there. All because the economy of the republics, even of the Baltic republics, is a "solidly" integrated part of the all-Union economy which exists within the framework of a command system. But if we break down this large command system into 15 small systems, then we are exchanging all-Union feudalism for a national republic feudalism. This is a terrible danger.

Pavel BUNICH, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and head of a department of the Moscow Institute of Management imeni S. Ordzhonikidze

[SOYUZ] What can the president do in 100 days?

[P. Bunich] I would like to say how late we are already: about half a year. We could have quietly discussed the law, conducted a referendum, and then held elections for president from below—and everyone would have been satisfied. Still, although we have now lost the tempo and dispelled false rumors, we have to try. If it turns out that in our situation the presidency by itself is not enough, nothing prevents us from taking other steps.

What can realistically be changed in 100 days. I think this is possible only on extraordinary questions—in the fight against crime and banditry, and also in suppressing militant nationalism and chauvinism—all of this has assumed a threatening character. Criminals have become insolent, and no one is punishing them. Everywhere there is dissension and strife, people are not listening to words, and the chauvinists did not hesitate to take advantage of this, coming out onto the streets with nationalist slogans. If anyone allowed himself to do anything like this in America, they immediately would be "bundled up" and put into prison: In the entire civilized world, these actions are punishable by law. We have a real numbing of authority in our country, and this is worse than anything. These are the two factors—which if the president works on their resolution in the near future—could lead to a stabilization of the situation in the country.

[SOYUZ] Whom did you nominate to the post of president and why?

[P. Bunich] Life at present did not put forth anyone other than Gorbachev, and I do not see anyone else in this post. I have occasion to come into contact with him, and I believe that he is not only an intelligent and appealing politician, but also a fascinating person. It is typical of him that in our terrifying life he remembers the troubles of specific people—he shows concern for their health and asks about how an emergency operation went. I am not embarrassed to talk about this. We frequently overlook someone else's pain, but he is able to retain such "details" in his head. This astounds me, but.... I

came to a very sad analogy—with Chile and with Allende—urgings and reliance on good people. The period of M.S. Gorbachev's rule is similar. But life goes on helter-skelter in all directions. But I am still hoping.... If the institution of the presidency turns out to be inadequate for the country to confidently follow the path of democratic changes, we will have to think about other mechanisms. But they will be created not at rallies—there they are destroyed. Specialists representing various interests—workers, miners, directors, peasants—must sit behind a small table and decide what to do. Because today we have breathing space. How shall we fill it?

Yakovlev on Perestroyka, Presidential Council

LD0105171690 Moscow World Service in Russian 0930 GMT 1 May 90

[Third of three installments of interview with Aleksandr Yakovlev, Presidential Council member and Central Committee member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union]

[Text] Today we are presenting for your attention the third, and final, part of the interview with Aleksandr Yakovlev, member of the Presidential Council and CPSU Central Committee Politburo member, with Aleksandr Plevako, director of Moscow Radio. I will remind you that the participants in the conversations have discussed the new view on the theory of convergence within the framework of the new political thinking, and appraised the possibilities of sowing economic and political problems offered by the introduction of the institution of the presidency in our country. They came to the conclusion that perestroyka could have begun at full pace 30 or more years ago. But now, the final part of the conversation:

[Begin recording] [Plevako] Can one say that at the moment there is a process of perestroyka within perestroyka, and this perestroyka is in process in state government? And to what extent is it thought through and how much needs to be done, as they say, on the run?

[Yakovlev] No, I think, nevertheless, that it is not on the run. All of this was envisaged earlier but it was not fully carried through for one reason or another.

I think that this delay is costly. This is a difficult hour and I don't (?think there is any need) to look for a culprit. Circumstances (?so developed that) the correct measure was not taken two years ago but now, only now, let's say, including the state administration. But you know, the essence of the matter lay, basically, in the concept of the market. After all, the state administration is in itself only a small part of success or the lack of it. However, if we don't change economic relations, it is impossible to expect anything from purely state, or changes in the administration. This is an illusion, pure vanity.

[Plevako] And has the situation been solved yet?

[Yakovlev] It has not yet been solved. And I don't yet know how we will solve it, because there are different attitudes about it. Different attitudes. I personally consider that it needs to be done rationally, so to speak, not hastily, but decisively. Otherwise we shall not be able to satisfy the interest, or interests, or the many interests of every one of the 290 million, by state actions. Or let's put it like this: There is no other way for a just exchange of labor equivalents apart from the market. No kind soul in a chancellery can tell you exactly that this is worth four (?cents). It is not the bazaar that will tell you this, but the market. The market.

[Plevako] The state administration has a great significance especially now, since there is some sort of redistribution going on.

[Yakovlev] Certainly.

[Plevako] People abroad have said, let's say, that the significance of the Government and of the Politburo is changing; the role of the Politburo is decreasing and the role of the Presidential Council is increasing.

[Yakovlev] I don't think the main issue is what is decreasing and what is increasing. But striving to ensure that the new forum of administration should be adequate to meet the changes taking place in society and its needs, this task, of course, is being implemented. It arises indisputably, objectively, from the nature of things.

[Plevako] Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev said that he had convinced supporters, in all the members of his council. Are they all people who think exactly like him? And what is the mechanism for working out decisions that would be in accordance with the principles that you have just been talking about?

[Yakovlev] I do not think that the like-mindedness used by Mikhail Sergeyevich is on the level of identity of views about the methods for solving this or that issue. It shouldn't be like that. You won't get any real, effective improvement on the basis that from the start we do not argue before taking a decision. You won't get anywhere serious by doing that.

[Plevako] That would be unanimously?

[Yakovlev] Yes, yes. But at this session, all members of the Presidential Council confirmed their devotion to perestroyka and to the changes taking place in society. There really was unanimity about this idea, which is why Mikhail Sergeyevich had every ground to say what he did.

[Plevako] Aleksandr Nikolayevich, what are your functions in the Presidential Council? Or what do you personally consider to be the most important of those functions for yourself?

[Yakovlev] I am in charge of political questions. As you rightly understand (?it represents) a broad spectrum of problems. But answering the second part of your question, I would say this. For myself I would consider the

main task to search for ways to strengthen society. I don't know whether I have fully answered your question, but I want to add that, you know, presidential power is only just taking shape, and it is premature to expect some sort of definitive opinions and decisions from each of us now.

[Plevako] People abroad write a lot about you and other members of the Presidential Council; they talk about your closeness to Mikhail Sergeyevich, that you are his comrade-in-arms, a long time colleague, comrades in the party and in the Politburo, and naturally there is an interest in your attitudes to him. Tell us please, what are your relations with him, if that's possible. For example, how often—if at all—do you have occasion to argue and not to agree, to persuade him, to make him change his mind?

[Yakovlev] I consider that our relations are very, very good. They really are. They are very businesslike and frank.

[Plevako] We are now broadcasting in 70 languages, we consider that we have more than 100 million listeners. What would you like to say to them? What would you like to wish them?

[Yakovlev] It's obvious what I would like to wish them: That all people should live with dignity, without fear, safely, not experiencing any unnecessary worries or concerns—although, of course, probably it is difficult for a person to progress without them—but it's a matter of what concerns and what worries. This is what I would like to say in addition to this. We know that the number of wars—and they began to count those wars that are known to historical research from about 600 B.C., we have more or less accurate information—that hundreds of millions of people were killed in them, and such a quantity of money has been spent on all sorts of arms' races, on the construction of arms, on their design, that mankind could probably now be living three or four times more richly than we do. [sentence as heard]. According to our scheme of perestroyka, mankind now has more and more realistic possibilities to enter (?many years) of peace, a peaceful period of its existence.

But no kindly soul will bring peace to the house if man himself does not invest his responsibility, his desires in it, and his conviction that it is finally time for people to put an end to wars and to weapons, and also to intolerance on religious grounds, class grounds, social grounds or national grounds. [end recording]

[Presenter] You have been listening to the final part of an interview with Aleksandr Yakovlev, Presidential Council member, and CPSU Politburo member.

Lenin Memorials Defaced in Various Towns

LD2604102290 Moscow World Service in Russian 0930 GMT 26 Apr 90

[Text] In a number of towns of the USSR, memorials to Lenin, founder of the Communist Party and the Soviet state, have been defaced. In Tselinograd, unknown people threw bottles of paint at memorials on one of the central squares, and also near a major industrial concern. A bust of Lenin was disfigured at the railway station near the famous Yessentuki spa in the Northern Caucasus.

Niece Defends Lenin's Character

90US0840A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 16, 21-27 Apr 90 p 1

[Report on an interview with Olga Dmitriyevna Ulyanova, niece of V.I. Ulyanov (Lenin), by ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent A. Binev: "And Once Again About Lenin"]

[Text] *April 22 marks 120 years since the birth of V.I. Lenin, leader of the October Revolution. The phenomenon of Lenin is remarkable for the fact that the positions of today's politicians are realistically reflected in their attitudes toward him and his ideas.*

[Binev] From childhood we have been taught that Lenin was "the most humane of all people." At the same time they were more and more intentionally making his image into a kind of monument. What do you think, Olga Dmitriyevna, when did it all start?

[Ulyanova] Canonization of V.I. Lenin's image was, undoubtedly, a mistake. But what is much worse is the ideological sabotage directed against him, the intentional distortion of his teaching. This was started by Stalin. He always considered himself a disciple of V.I. Lenin, which was not really true. He deviated from Leninism and distorted its essence. The opponents of Leninism have given new interpretation to the old formula: Stalin is Lenin's disciple. They try to show that all Stalin's crimes—the repressions and the horrors that our people lived through—originated from Lenin. But this is so obviously a falsehood! You cannot equate Lenin and Stalin. And in my opinion our main priority is **to separate Leninism from Stalinism.** We must know the genuine teachings of Lenin, we must **study Lenin** instead of pulling quotations out of his works and manipulating them.

[Binev] Can you cite any concrete examples?

[Ulyanova] Of course, I can. Author V. Soloukhin, for instance. The attacks on Lenin and Leninism, both in the press and on TV, do not cease. They are nothing but attempts to destroy our national shrine and to split the party. The resounding words of Julius Fucik are ringing now: People, be vigilant!

[Binev] As far as I know, J. Fucik had fascism in mind.

[Ulyanova] As early as in January 1924 Umberto Terracini, one of the founders of the Italian Communist Party, said that fascists considered it a virtue to tear up Lenin's portrait. And now we are witnessing medieval barbaric acts as we stand at the threshold of the 21st century.

[Binev] One cannot but agree with this, of course. But democratization processes are now going on all over the world and they touch upon all spheres of political life.

[Ulyanova] But something sacred must remain! I correspond with young people, I receive lots of letters, including some from other countries. Recently, for instance, a letter came from senior high school students from Tataria. Let me quote these lines to you: "Whatever is happening in our country, anything connected with the name of Vladimir Ilich Lenin and with the name of the Ulyanovs we hold as dear as always."

But it is very upsetting to read the newspaper articles reporting on the extremists and neo-Nazis in some Eastern European countries destroying monuments to Lenin because of the raging anti-Soviet feelings there. These monuments expressed the gratitude of the people of these countries to the great thinker and revolutionary.

At the same time some of the capitalist countries like France, Finland, and Switzerland preserve their V.I. Lenin museums and the memorial plaques installed on the houses where he used to live.

Speaking of this, this March in France V.I. Lenin was declared a most important personality of the 20th century. At the same time his monuments were being destroyed in our country, in Georgia—in the cities of Gori and Rustavi, as I have learned. But Lenin spoke as an advocate of the Georgians' ethnic distinction; he defended them and criticized Stalin for his "Great Russian" approach to the problem of nationalities.

[Binev] Could Lenin possibly have envisioned that Stalin, his "follower," would use his teaching for his own benefit and to the leader's disadvantage?

[Ulyanova] I want to reiterate that Stalin was not his follower. Lenin would have never done what this person did. More than that, it was he who figured Stalin out. I want to direct you to the "Letter to the Congress" in which Lenin recommended Stalin's removal from the position of Central Committee general secretary. Unfortunately, this did not happen.

It is important to know what kind of a person Vladimir Ilich was in real life. As a politician, a scientist, and a philosopher he was totally devoid of any ambition, craving for power or career making, pursuit of personal gains or cruelty. The goal of his entire life was the great cause of liberating "all the mankind from any exploitation."

[Binev] It might seem strange but, unfortunately, very little is known about the Ulyanovs. Every new book that appears somewhat repeats the previous ones. Isn't it damaging?

[Ulyanova] Features of Lenin as a personality are described in a marvelous way in the book "By the Great Grave" which was published right after his death in the spring of 1924. Later it remained hidden from the people for scores of years. First my father and then our family preserved this unique book with great care. It contains memoirs of many colleagues and friends of Vladimir Ilich, of his contemporaries and political opponents. This allows a proper look at Ilich. Now this book is a bibliographical rarity. It should be reprinted and the people should see and read it.

Generally speaking, preserving the traditions of our family has been part of my entire life. In that I try to follow the behests of my father, Dmitriy Ilich, his sisters—Mariya Ilyinichna and Anna Ilyinichna, and, of course, Nadezhda Konstantinovna. They wrote very truthful memoirs about Vladimir Ilich.

I have been studying the Ulyanovsk archives for over 30 years, though my profession is chemistry. I used to teach at Moscow State University.

[Binev] Most readers do not know much about your father, Dmitriy Ilich, either. Maybe you could tell us more about him?

[Ulyanova] My father was a doctor. In 1901 he graduated from the university in Yuryev, now Tartu, Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic, but earlier, in 1893, he entered the Moscow University. He was expelled from the Moscow University for revolutionary activity. In 1896 he joined the party. He combined his medical practice with underground activity. My father helped bring Soviet power to the Crimea. He came to Moscow as late as 1921, only when Vladimir Ilich got sick. Father always kept up the traditions of our family, of his generation, and of his brother.

My father died in 1943 from an attack of angina. My mother, Aleksandra Fedorovna, died in 1956.

[Binev] Since we are talking about your family, it would be interesting to find out about the Ulyanovs' ancestry.

[Ulyanova] My father, his brother and sisters knew that their ancestors came from Astrakhan but they did not know how they got there. Only in 1968 did it become known that Ilya Nikolayevich's father, Nikolay Vasilyevich, was a serf and that he came to Astrakhan from Nizhniy Novgorod Province (now Gorky Oblast). Later we found out that Lenin's grandfather and his great-grandfather were serfs of the landowner Brekhov, of Nizhniy Novgorod Province. His great-grandfather, Vasiliy Nikitovich Ylyanin, had several sons. One of them, Nikolay Vasilyevich, was freed and went to Astrakhan where he started working. His paternal ancestors were all Russians. Vladimir Ilich and his brothers and sisters always wrote in all their papers that they were Russian and that their native language was Russian.

I cannot say anything definite about the ancestors of his mother, Mariya Aleksandrovna. She was also Russian, though there is some idea of a Swedish connection. But there is no documentary proof of that.

[Binev] Are you the last survivor of your family?

[Ulyanova] I have a daughter and she has her own daughter—my granddaughter. So our dynasty is continuing and so are, I hope, the Ulyanovs' traditions.

Warnings Against Leftism Recalled

PM0205084590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Apr 90 Second Edition p 3

[Candidate of Historical Sciences A. Svalov article: "Being Ahead. On the 70th Anniversary of Lenin's Work"]

[Text] During those April days Vladimir Ilich turned 50—no ordinary event. It was celebrated modestly, in a low-key fashion. It was not the custom to "celebrate anniversaries," and there was no time. As always, work came first. As always, there were lots of things to do, large and small. Among the large ones was the main job, one which could not be put off or delegated. Lenin was writing a book about a disorder. Of course, not a disorder afflicting an individual person. It affected the precious, recently emerged—post-October—international communist movement. This could not fail to cause concern.

The diagnosis borne out with each passing day was: "Leftism"—a growth disorder which is dangerous but not fatal. Given timely treatment, of course.

Lenin was in a hurry. Five days after his birthday he would finish the main, 94-page text of the manuscript. He would show it to Chicherin, he would seek advice. And he would send what he had written to Petrograd, to the publishers. It had to be published quickly! The disasters of "infantilism" could not be allowed to develop! It must be treated by the joint efforts of communists in various countries! By the Second Comintern Congress (July-August 1920) people were reading the book in Russian, French, and English.

Lenin's work helped stop this disorder. But new ones, alas, could not be avoided. The worst of these gave rise to Stalinism, whose metastases are having an effect to this day. So it is not only the strictly historical content of the book which interests us. What can be done to ensure that communists are ahead of and not lagging behind the masses? That is how Lenin put the question as far back as 1920. This question is still extremely acute in 1990.

I fear that those who love catechistic answers will be disappointed. Lenin does not describe a precise prescription, but rather specifies the approach to treatment. He thinks that communists need to learn dialectics in politics, which "resemble algebra more than arithmetic, and even more higher mathematics than lower."

What does this mean? A lot. Above all, looking at life soberly, taking into account not only yesterday's but also the latest experience of history. Adapting to it, building policy, correcting strategy and tactics, and demonstrating flexibility. Let us recall a simple example from the book. Three is greater than two, sages claim. Of course. What if a "minus" sign appears? What then? Should you be stubborn and ignore it?

For Lenin the latest thing is the experience of Bolshevism, the October breakthrough. Hence the exceptional attention paid to the scientific generalization of it. This experience must warn against mistakes—"left-wing" and "right-wing"—and help to "travel the most direct and rapid road to the universal victory of Soviet power and the dictatorship of the proletariat." But let's pose the question: Can Lenin's call be taken literally today? Of course not. Just as one cannot call the experience of Bolshevism the latest thing once and for all time. If we do not want to become the sages about whom Lenin spoke ironically, this experience should be enriched with the achievements of recent decades. So at the end of the 20th century in another historical context we repeat the words from "Infantile Disorder...": The entire world has changed, everywhere the bourgeoisie has also changed.... We not only repeat, but also affirm the new political thinking.

Higher mathematics in politics does not permit copies. History is not a copier, it doesn't produce duplicates. And one of the most complex themes on which Lenin reflects is the dialectics of the general and the particular. He warns the young communist parties exceedingly persistently against mechanically transferring the October experience to their own countries. Do you remember the well known lines? "One should analyze, study, seek, guess, seize what is nationally particular, nationally specific in the concrete approaches of each country toward solving the common international task...." Again let us refer not just to the 1920's, to the "left-wing" doctrinaires. Let us admit that we ourselves were not lacking in complacency. Yes, we helped our friends sincerely, honestly, a lot, often giving up things that we ourselves needed—no one has the right to forget this. But there was something else. Deliberate lectures, duplication of our own experience, the declaration of unwelcome decisions and models of development to be revisionist. We, too, will learn a lesson from this.

If politics is akin to higher mathematics, then, of course, blunders are possible. A serious party, according to Lenin, does not fear mistakes. It must openly admit them, reveal the reasons, carefully discuss ways to correct them. Study and teach, educate the masses not only by positive, but also negative experience, study it in total, and learn lessons. Rejoice in victories, not panic, not order a requiem when defeated. Is this topical? Very, I think. And stupidity is most dangerous of all. The follies of obstinacy and bitterness....

Abstract interpretations are alien to Lenin. Lessons in dialectics are subordinate to the problem of all problems—strengthening the relations between the party, class, and the working masses. The entire book is a passionate call to reject the "leaderism" and sectarianism to which the tactics of the "leftwing" forces led. Vladimir Ilich is categorical: Communists must "be able

to lead not only their party" but also the masses, be able to communicate, to get close, if you like, to merge with them.

In "Infantile Disorder..." Lenin recalls another aspect of the problem. The struggle for the masses is a political struggle. Let us not be carried away by direct parallels and comparisons. But, just as it was back then, the political struggle is being developed in competitive conditions. Many years later we have to master the art of it once again.

Yeltsin, Afanasyev Criticized at Military Meeting

PM2704123990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Apr 90 First Edition p 1

[Report by Colonel P. Palchikov, party bureau deputy secretary: "On a Principled Basis"]

[Text] The primary party organization where Army General I. Shkadov is party bureau secretary has discussed the CPSU Central Committee open letter to the country's communists. The speakers noted its relevance and constructiveness. Approving the assessments of the situation in the CPSU, communists spoke out in favor of rallying party ranks on a principled basis and in favor of the perestroyka policy being conducted by the Communist Party and its Central Committee.

The draft CPSU Central Committee platform and the Central Committee open letter are very important documents at the present stage of renewal and the result of an enormous amount of collective work by all party organizations.

A number of speakers at the meeting stressed the idea of the intolerability of some party organizations' conciliatory attitude to unconstructive [dekonstruktivnyye] statements by B. Yeltsin, Yu. Afanasyev, and others and also by the communist leaders of those mass media which are being used to publicly deny the correctness of the socialist choice made by the Soviet people and to call for the restoration of capitalism.

On the eve of the 28th Congress, the CPSU must cleanse itself and protect itself against those who threaten to split it. This will contribute to the consolidation of healthy party forces and confident progress along the path to humane, democratic socialism.

Afanasyev Attacked for SPIEGEL Interview

90US0834A Moscow NEDELYA in Russian No 16, 16 Apr 90 pp 10-11

[SPIEGEL (TASS, Bonn) interview with Yu. Afanasyev; response by USSR People's Deputy, economist A.M. Kanarovskaya; and NEDELYA commentary: "The Pendulum of Destruction"]

[Text] **SPIEGEL Interview With Yu. Afanasyev**

On 12 March in the USSR Congress of People's Deputies in Moscow Yuriy Afanasyev accused Lenin, the founder of the Soviet state, of "raising lawlessness to the rank of state policy." Such harsh criticism against Lenin, who has assumed the image of a saint, has never before been heard in a high state organ. Then the 56-year-old historian Afanasyev also spoke out against that completeness of presidential power which Gorbachev is trying to obtain from the deputies.

[SPIEGEL] Yuriy Nikolayevich, you are a USSR people's deputy and a member of the CPSU. At the same time you publicly call communism "an idea that has outlived its time" which the Soviet Union must get rid of as quickly as possible. Why?

[Afanasyev] It is an idea that leads nowhere. This is confirmed by the experience not only of the USSR, but also in all other countries which until recently have been considered socialist.

[SPIEGEL] Did it lead to an impasse from the very beginning?

[Afanasyev] Yes, since 1917. We wanted to embody in practice the ideas of Karl Marx, perceiving them from petit bourgeois positions. If he could see the result today he would turn over in his grave more than once.

[SPIEGEL] This sounds as though you fully deny the 72 years of Soviet history.

[Afanasyev] One cannot deny history. Moreover, we have had some things that were positive.... Today I am convinced that communism with its rejection of private ownership and its attraction to collectivization of any production is close to its demise.

[SPIEGEL] And you include Lenin in your criticism of the fundamentals.

[Afanasyev] Yes, and that is why at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies I placed the blame on him for laying the basis for the "policy of lawlessness, violence, and mass terror."

[SPIEGEL] Is this the viewpoint of Afanasyev the historian or Afanasyev the politician?

[Afanasyev] In the first place I am primarily a historian....

[SPIEGEL] Against the people and not with the people—is this the essence of your criticism of Lenin?

[Afanasyev] The blame cannot be removed from Lenin. The dialectic of state power and the society is still determining the nature of our life. And up to this point none of the reforms has changed these fatal interrelations; they have changed only the forms of the exercise of power.

[SPIEGEL] Does this pertain to the perestroyka conducted by Gorbachev?

[Afanasyev] Let us just take the last Congress of People's Deputies. What did it produce besides a colossal shift in

the direction of power that is legal in some measure, but is wielded by an oligarchy, an anonymous junta...?

[SPIEGEL] Does this mean a return to the old way of doing things that existed before democracy?

[Afanasyev] During all of its 72 years, the power in the Soviet Union has never been anything other than an embodiment of violence and terror. It is painful to admit this, naturally, especially on the psychological plane. Everyone must admit that for more than seven decades we have been on the wrong path. Who is willing to declare that his life has been in vain?

[SPIEGEL] From the very beginning Mikhail Gorbachev has defined his policy of reform as a return to real Leninist principles. Can you really not find anything positive in them?

[Afanasyev] This depends on what you mean by Leninist principles. Lenin made many mistakes. At the decisive moment his policy was replaced by adventurism for he knew too well that Russia was in no way prepared for his idea of socialism. It was not until 1922 when he recognized that no world revolution was going to take place that he understood with terror the consequences this could produce for the isolated Soviet system.

[SPIEGEL] Is Gorbachev not trying today, more than 50 years too late, to make corrections for which Lenin at that time was too weak as compared to Stalin?

[Afanasyev] ...In the interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union it was more reasonable to break completely with the traditions of Lenin.

[SPIEGEL] Opponents of the changes assert that in October 1917 the people made their choice once and for all.

[Afanasyev] I consider this assertion to be especially stupid propaganda....

[SPIEGEL] Did the question of creating a coalition government never come up for him (Lenin)?

[Afanasyev] Lenin's way of thinking did not even allow for the possibility of a coalition with a democratic program.... For his ultimate socialist goal envisioned a political monopoly for the party. The NEP [New Economic Policy] would inevitably have failed under the conditions of this bureaucratic monopoly on power.

[SPIEGEL] But, after all, Stalin abolished the NEP.

[Afanasyev] Indeed, but Lenin laid the ground rules in this area by eliminating economic diversity and monopolizing policy. There were alternatives even after his death: For example, if in 1928 they had now followed a course toward forced collectivization of agriculture, if they had overthrown Stalin as early as the 17th CPSU Congress, developments would have taken an altogether different, democratic path. And there were many crucial points like this.

[SPIEGEL] But only a few people were aware of them at the time and subsequently they were practically erased from their memory. Why?

[Afanasyev] Because our party has never been ready even to question its fundamental idea of eliminating private property. This is in spite of the fact that the economy of the Soviet Union clearly bears witness to the bad prospects from this harmful idea. What is even worse: That which could not function in Russia through forced collectivization was then extended to all 15 republics, as a result of which a monstrous bomb is now ticking—and all this is the result of Leninism.

[SPIEGEL] How widespread is it still among the population... this uncritical reverence for Lenin...?

[Afanasyev] In many respects Lenin still remains a saint. But this situation is beginning to change. I have spoken a good deal among the most diverse audiences and everywhere the majority responds in a normally critical way to disputes with Lenin as a politician, theoretician, and person. Some of them will not express their attitudes at all and only a small proportion, mainly participants in the war, protest strongly against such attacks on their deity.

[SPIEGEL] How long will you be able to remain a member of the CPSU with your ideas of Lenin now that you have called communism—publicly, and the entire country learned about it from television—a power of violence which has ended up in a political impasse?

[Afanasyev] In terms of my world view and morality and, if you will, in my soul I no longer consider myself bound to this party and I say this quite openly. My ties with the CPSU are purely formal in nature. But I have set a time period for myself since I feel it necessary to rally the best forces of the party and then leave together....

[SPIEGEL] The Germans in the GDR, including some of the working class, in whom Lenin in his day placed such great hopes, recently gave a vote of no confidence (after more than 40 years of "real socialism") to all socialist parties, including the social democrats. Could something similar happen in the Soviet Union?

[Afanasyev] It is quite possible. At the present moment the concept "socialism" evokes only repulsive associations in many people, including in our country. And we have not yet recognized the full scope of this tragedy which began in 1917. I have in mind not only the tens of millions of people who paid with their lives for this insane idea; I have in mind the colossal moral harm caused to those who remain living. We still do not know what sacrifices it will take to disassemble this monster—"socialism in the Soviet Union."

[SPIEGEL] Why did you personally cease being a Leninist?

[Afanasyev] This did not happen all at once. I had my first doubts at the end of the sixties—with my acquisition of scholarly knowledge, after I became familiar with Western literature. But it was only the influence of Andrey Sakharov that literally forced me to recognize the monstrousness of our system and the history of its appearance.

[SPIEGEL] Why was Mikhail Gorbachev in such a hurry to acquire such wide-reaching authority as president?

[Afanasyev] This is obvious. The party is falling apart.... If your own home is falling down... you must quickly find a new apartment so that at least you can keep the power in your hands.... Even today one can generally understand that we are faced with an existential question: Who are we and what are we and of what is Mikhail Gorbachev the president? And the only answer goes something like this: The Soviet Union is not a country, not a state, and not a great power, but a varied community of the most diverse peoples, cultures, and civilizations living on this Eurasian territory....

[SPIEGEL] If Gorbachev responded to your demand and became a candidate in direct popular elections would he be elected today at all?

[Afanasyev] Probably, but only by a small margin. With the present alternatives I do not rule out the possibility that the first round would end up in a draw. But in the second round Gorbachev would win.

[SPIEGEL] Do you see an alternative to Gorbachev in the political life of the Soviet Union?

[Afanasyev] This is our eternal problem: In general we have gotten out of the habit of thinking in alternatives.

[SPIEGEL] But in the West where they have now developed quite different traditions in thinking they do not see any alternative to Gorbachev either.

[Afanasyev] I am aware of this viewpoint in the West and how they are hypnotized by Gorbachev's personality. That is understandable for the overthrow of the authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe and many other things which from the Western view point are significant progress are linked to his name. On the one hand his maneuvers clear the way for perestroyka, but on the other they are the reason why our attitude toward Gorbachev cannot be called purely positive.

[SPIEGEL] Your cochairman in the interethnic group of deputies, Boris Yeltsin, is constantly predicting Gorbachev's imminent fall, giving various dates, some of which have not yet passed. Do you still have hope for positive social and economic development under Gorbachev?

[Afanasyev] Take all of these half-hearted decisions about private ownership of the means of production, ownership of the land, cooperatives, the nationalities policy—and this is a policy without a future. In spite of all this as a politician Gorbachev is not without hope: He has repeatedly demonstrated his ability to change according to the circumstances—although since March 1989 these changes have mainly been marked by a slide toward the right. But this can change. In one way or another he is a representative of realistic forces in leadership with which compromise seems possible.

[SPIEGEL] What is your most optimistic prediction for the Soviet Union in the year 2000?

[Afanasyev] It is that by that time the Soviet Union will not exist in its previous form. This will probably occur much sooner. God meted out a terrible punishment on us with this hybrid, the USSR, because we were not in a condition to correctly take advantage of the material and cultural wealth bequeathed to us by nature and history. But at the same time He gave us the possibility of coexisting in this geographical space with rich and happy people in a community of free, independent, and cooperating states.

Political Show?

I am asking the editors to publish my notes.

I understand that Lenin and October need no defense, but my heart aches for our country. Therefore in a comparative analysis I wish to offer the reader an opportunity to draw his own conclusions about who is in the opposition today and how they have arrived at their present position.

Having heard the speech on 12 March at the Third Congress of People's Deputies by Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.N. Afanasyev, rector of the State Historical Archives, I was confused by the blasphemy in his assertions. I immediately wondered: On what subjects did he write his dissertations? What was it in history that especially interested him? I made a deputy inquiry and obtained the names of his candidate and doctoral dissertations:

1. "Modern French Bourgeois Historiography of the Great October Socialist Revolution"—1971.

2. "The French Historical School of 'Annals' in Modern Bourgeois Historiography. 1929-1979 (Critical Analysis of the Evolution of Theoretical-Methodological Fundamentals)"—1980.

Further, I requested the dissertations themselves and read them, comparing them with their author's speech at the congress and I became quite bitter.

I shall not make my own comments. I shall merely convey for the readers' reflection a few of the issues that were raised by the author in his scholarly works which earned him the high title of doctor of sciences:

"falsification by French historians of the question of objective tasks and the social content of the October Revolution":

"the question of the national character of October in the works of French historians;"

"the formation of the 'Annals' school and Marxism," and so forth ...

I quote the author's ideas verbatim:

"It was to Lenin's credit that he was able to profoundly reveal the dialectical interconnection between the bourgeois-democratic and socialist revolutions and, based on the concrete historical reality of Russia, establish the outgrowth of the former into the latter. V.I. Lenin comprehensively revealed the vital need for the bourgeois-democratic revolution" (page 130 of the candidate dissertation).

For a complete representation of the author's position I shall quote verbatim another excerpt from his candidate dissertation:

"But at the same time because of his class interests and the limited nature of the bourgeois way of thinking they (the French historians) cannot, of course, give a truthful assessment of the historical significance of the October Revolution. Therefore along with general phrases about the significance of October, the main thing for all modern anti-Marxist historiography is still a desire to minimize the historical significance of the first successful socialist revolution and to dispute its inevitability and predictability" (pp 180-183).

After which the author writes: "One of the aspects of the world historical significance of the October Revolution is that it enriched the world revolutionary movement with new political experience. Being an indispensable part of the world revolutionary process, the October Revolution confirmed the truthfulness of the main conclusion of scientific communism concerning the inevitability of the downfall of capitalism and the triumph of socialism. The Russian Revolution reflected in special form the general patterns and the main features of the socialist revolution which acquired international significance in the sense that they would inevitably be repeated and were repeated in other countries."

Yu.N. Afanasyev quotes the historian Sh.-O. Karbonel, accompanying his statement with his own deprecatory rejoinders ("Sh.-O. Karbonel prophesies," "Karbonel calumniates"), and draws the conclusion:

"In all of these considerations, except for the deliberate distortion of historical reality, Sh.-O. Karbonel reveals his vulgar understanding of the strategy and tactics of the revolutionary struggle and the repeatability of the main features and patterns of the socialist revolution, which he reduces to simply copying, a schematic repetition of what happened in October. Moreover, for Sh.-O. Karbonel, as for the majority of bourgeois historians, it is typical to take a purely scholastic approach to the question of the utilization of historical experience of the October Revolution in other countries."

This is what Yu.N. Afanasyev asserted and defended in 1971. But how are we to understand his response to the magazine SPIEGEL? To the question: "Why did you personally cease to be a Leninist?"—he responds: "My first doubts appeared at the end of the sixties with my acquisition of scholarly knowledge, after I became familiar with Western literature...."

So is insincerity a part of obtaining a scholarly degree—I doubt it—to think one thing and say another! It would be interesting to know if the author experienced moral pangs.

In his dissertation Yu.N. Afanasyev reports: "All works of historical Marxists of various countries on the question of the international significance of the experience of the October Revolution emphasize primarily the circumstance that the Russian working class gave the international proletariat its first political experience in how to accomplish a socialist revolution, and that Soviet Russia opened up for the working class of all countries the prospects for the development of a socialist revolution and the construction of a new society."

And again: "The experience of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the working class of Russia strengthened the faith of the international proletariat in their own powers and proved that the path from capitalism to socialism is not a path of reforms and agreements with the bourgeoisie, but a path of revolutionary struggle, the overthrow of its dominance, and the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat."

Yu.N. Afanasyev defended his doctoral dissertation in 1980 when he no longer had doubts but had firm views on Marxism-Leninism and the revolution to judge from his responses to SPIEGEL. But nonetheless in his doctoral dissertation the author restates the assertions of his candidate dissertation.

The author of the doctoral dissertation considered the question of the legitimacy of the takeover of power by the Bolsheviks to be one of the fundamental questions of the revolution.

I shall quote the author's generalized opinion: "The latest Soviet literature on the history of October is distinguished by a desire to show the process of the formation of political attitudes in all stages of the revolution and to reveal considerably more deeply and completely the role of political parties in the formation of the social psychology, above all the Bolshevik party, which, by expressing the most essential interests of the workers, has pointed the way to their realization and has contributed to the strengthening of the workers' confidence in their powers."

But now Yu.N. Afanasyev's opinion is diametrically opposed. I quote an excerpt from his speech at the third congress:

"People have various views of the events that are taking place, and from my viewpoint to look the truth in the eye

means above all to reject the outdated communist idea. We must admit that the path we have followed for the past 70 years has led us to an impasse. And from this we must draw the appropriate conclusions concerning laying new foundations for the structure of our life."

And further: "If our leader and founder did indeed lay the basis of anything it was to make a principle out of the state policy of mass violence and terror. And, moreover, he made a principle out of the state policy of lawlessness."

But I find more authority in the statements of N.I. Rerikh, Rabindranat Tagore, Mahatma Gandhi, Romain Rolland, and hundreds of other enlightened people on earth.

All 55 volumes of Lenin's work and his life tell of his titanic work for the new system for the working man.

And it is not his fault that after he died his "successor" corrupted everything.

How can Stalin's actions be ascribed to Lenin and October?!

N.K. Rerikh when handing over to Chicherin a box of Himalayan soil to be placed on Lenin's grave, gave him also an accompanying note in which the leader of the revolution is called Mahatma: "There is no other who could take on such a heavy burden for the sake of the common good"—this is about Lenin.

The word "Mahatma" means "great soul!"

In conclusion I shall make my personal suggestion. Logically, Yu.N. Afanasyev should carry out his threat to "turn in his party card" while at the same time relinquishing his scholarly degrees, for he has publicly disavowed the content of his scholarly work.

[Signed] A.M. Kanarovskaya, people's deputy, economist.

Our Commentary

Among the multitude of reports from Eastern Europe, which is experiencing a time of turbulent changes just as we are, this one slipped through: An 11-year-old Romanian boy committed suicide. The son of a person who had collaborated with the former regime, he was persecuted by his classmates who in their childishly blind and merciless way had transferred to their world the attitudes of the current adult world. A child who was not guilty of anything before anyone, one who was barely aware of the world into which he chanced to be born, ended his life.

He could not yet distinguish communists from liberals, Marxists from Christian Democrats, totalitarianism from freedom. But his life was cut off by those political disagreements in the society which had reached maximum tension, the thirst for settling accounts, and the desire for revenge awakened also by a fervent wish to trample in the dust that which yesterday they bowed down to and worshipped.

Does this tragedy have any relationship to the materials presented above? Let us think about it.

Our relationship to the past—each person individually and the society as a whole—is a subject which is extremely complicated and absolutely necessary for life. To have a scornful or nihilistic attitude toward the past, toward history, brings the threat of the harshest consequences. Our own history of the past seven decades is a clear confirmation of this: self-destructive and fruitless attempts all at once to change sharply, crudely, and mercilessly the creation of millions of people, each of whom interprets and thinks in his own way about the path our country has taken because each has his own experience and his own memory of what he has experienced.

Sweeping, biting new slogans instead of the previous simple verdicts which excruciatingly recall peremptory commands of the recent past, complete rejection to replace yesterday's praise—is this really the path that is dictated by common sense and leads to truth?

Does Yu.N. Afanasyev, the historian and now USSR people's deputy, really not understand this? Apparently he does understand—he says in his interview that it is painful to admit the error of our ways. But then he pitilessly continues to rub salt in the wound as if he does not suspect that there is a certain pain threshold beyond which people simply lose their feeling and switch off, and blank spots and gaps appear in their consciousness, which are filled with either despair or disbelief, or, in their haste, with new dogmas which frequently have as little to do with the truth of history as the previous postulates did.

To use the words of Mikhail Bulgakov, everything in Yu.M. Afanasyev's interview is somehow too much. Everything is too straightforward, too monochromatic to be fair or simply historical.

The zealous public reprisal against former views, the absolute overthrow of them, naturally evokes both surprise and doubt, about which USSR People's Deputy A.M. Kanarovskaya writes. Surprise that it is possible to criticize so mercilessly and thoroughly the entire history of the party and still remain in its ranks. Doubt that such a position is principled and honest. It is more likely to evoke a mass of questions than understanding. And the letter from A.M. Kanarovskaya was dictated by these questions. Incidentally, Yu.M. Afanasyev himself in his interview gives a fairly clear answer to why he is doing this: We must wait for the time when it will be possible to leave the party with which we have had nothing in common for so long not alone, but as a part of a unified group in order to have a real instrument for the further struggle for power.... And so that the party will be split once and for all.

One cannot but pay attention to the fact that in this interview, which is based only on denial and rejection, Yu.N. Afanasyev contradicts himself. And how he contradicts himself! In the most basic question that faces our society today—in the question of whether our society has democratic alternatives and, consequently, whether today we can take the path of reforms and improvement, or is the idea of our society decisively futile?

"An impasse from the very beginning... the embodiment of violence and terror"—and right there: "There were alternatives.... And if Stalin had been overthrown in 1934 our development would have taken a quite different, democratic path. And there were many of these crucial points."

Does this mean that our society, in spite of everything, does have the potential to follow the democratic path? So is there any point in shattering everything around in the blind fury of despair? Would it not be more correct to determine where and how we are to advance further?

And so should we summarily dismiss the past, renounce it, or should we draw lessons from it? Judging from everything, Yu.N. Afanasyev prefers the former. But is he ready to take responsibility for the consequences of this decision? The countries of Eastern Europe, where experience in change is being witnessed by everyone today, provide food for thought. Including this fact: The 58-year-old Yulius Gribik committed an act of self-immolation in Bratislava. In a letter addressed to his wife and sons he said that this was now his only possible form of protest against his unjustified firing and against the injustices and defamation that had rained down on communists.

Yes, having started to swing too forcefully in one direction, the pendulum flies back just as forcefully in the opposite. And woe to those who end up in its path.... But human consciousness is not a pendulum. In any case it should not be. It has reason, and decency, and morality. And simply the instinct for self-preservation should go into operation. But it does not. It is terrifying to think about the consequences.

Here are some more thoughts that will not let us rest. All of us are children of our times. We all bear their stamp; we have been shaped by their spirit and atmosphere. This is probably both our fault and our plague. But do we have the right—moral or civil—to remove from ourselves all the responsibility for what has happened in recent years?

Who has not on occasion not only been deluded, but has also had to adapt, to remain silent when he wanted to protest, and to force his views into established patterns? Well, times are different now. My God, we are now discovering so many heroes who, it turns out, have courageously struggled with the past even before this became something that was quite safe and even profitable. One automatically wonders: Why were Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn and their few followers so tragically alone?

Is there not hidden behind today's extreme views a desire somehow to remove, to shift from ourselves the blame for the situation in which the country has ended up? Is this not why we find so revolting the idea that all of us except for the small children bear our share of the blame and we do not have the moral right to forget about it in the heat of political fights. We have already had enough of separating politics from morals and morality. We have gone through this. We are fed up.

An evolution of views is a natural and normal phenomenon. One cannot reproach a person for changing his attitude toward one phenomenon of history or another under the influence of new knowledge and previously unknown facts. But history knows a number of cases in which the "newcomer" becomes the cruelest and most unfair persecutor and enemy of those who hold the previous belief. Blind and merciless. And today this is a real danger.

Because some people find the very idea of consolidation of the society and unification of it in order to save the country to be extremely unpleasant. Today some people are not thinking about what unites us but are increasingly counting on the differences in views, approaches, and attitudes toward the past, from whose living flesh they rip out episodes that affect one group or another. As a result the country ends up in danger. This is why any attempt at mutual understanding and the ability to see in the views of opponents that which can unite us become especially valuable now. But there are so few of these attempts!

We are not even speaking about the ways in which the "newcomers" are right and wrong. We are speaking about a desire to lash out indiscriminately, without making any special effort to distinguish right from wrong, and ultimately it is all about the desire to destroy everything down to the foundation without worrying too much about what will happen next....

KGB Deputy Chairman Shebarshin Interviewed

PM2404095190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Apr 90 Second Edition p 4

[Interview with General L.V. Shebarshin, deputy chairman of the USSR KGB and chief of the First Main Directorate, by V. Snegirev: "Intelligence in Today's World: Without Cloak or Dagger"—no place or date given; first two paragraphs are an introduction]

[Text] The leader of the intelligence department occupies a spacious corner office on the second story of a modern building. The general willingly granted my request to have a close look around the room, so as to be able to describe it for my readers. "Please go ahead, there are no secrets here."

Indeed, had it not been for the portrait of F.E. Dzerzhinskiy, which is traditional for all Chekists' offices, it would be difficult to determine at first glance the occupation of the man whose office this is. Two of the four

walls are glass from floor to ceiling—plenty of light inside, with the windows looking onto beautiful forests in the distance. A wooden column in the middle of the office adds an air of informality. Bookshelves with books on the KGB published in the West, regional reference books, volumes of works by Mozhayev, Solzhenitsyn, Rybakov. A framed photograph of a six-year old boy stands on one of the shelves. "My grandson," the general explained. A side table with about a dozen telephones. "Direct lines all over the world." A bureau next to a desk unlittered by paperwork. "Sometimes I work standing up—my spine aches from too much sitting."

Why Is This Necessary

[Snegirev] What do you say, Leonid Vladimirovich, shall we begin our conversation? By the looks of it, glasnost has also scaled your high fences. This is the first time in PRAVDA's history that the KGB intelligence chief will appear in print in its pages. We have a lot of questions to ask you and, in keeping with the demands of our exacting times, not all of them will be convenient. To begin with, maybe you would describe—within the bounds of the possible—the structure of Soviet intelligence and the main avenues of its operations?

[Shebarshin] Indeed, just two-three years it was totally unacceptable to speak in public about the existence of Soviet intelligence, which was obviously unfair to our compatriots who got the impression that something was being concealed from them, and to the intelligence itself which needs public support. This unfairness is being eliminated in the conditions when the country is marching along the path toward strengthening genuine rule by the people and creating a rule-of-law state. Of course, intelligence without conspiracy is no longer intelligence, not everything can be revealed, but Soviet people must know the basic outlines of our work.

A conversation about the USSR KGB's foreign intelligence should begin with 1920, when a decision was made to set up the overseas service of the VChK [All-Russia Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counterrevolution and Sabotage]. This decision pointed out: "Only serious and properly organized intelligence will save us from stumbling casually and blindly...." F.E. Dzerzhinskiy signed the order creating the VChK Foreign Department 20 December 1920. V.I. Lenin was personally involved in defining the basic avenues of intelligence operations.

Intelligence is an organic component of the USSR KGB. We operate in close collaboration with the counterintelligence and other subdivisions of the KGB. Experience has confirmed the efficiency of this structure.

The main aspect of intelligence work today is to assist in implementing the Soviet state's foreign policy course and in strengthening our country's security, defense capability, and economy.

Life proves that success in foreign policy is possible only when this policy is based on realities and precise guidelines. Today's interdependent world is an exceptionally complex phenomenon, distinguished by new major opportunities and major problems. The importance of tried and tested foreign policy decisions, based on sound knowledge of the international situation, is growing immeasurably.

Our operations are aimed at gathering military-strategic, political, economic, military-technical, and counterintelligence information.

Intelligence is striving to reveal everything positive in world politics, all the opportunities to further improve international relations and arrive at mutually acceptable solutions. It is, however, part of the intelligence service's specific nature that it must give special attention to aspects of international relations which pose a threat to the Soviet Union's security, to its positions and interests. Moreover, such phenomena must be detected right at their inception, at their initial stage. Let me emphasize: This does not mean that intelligence perceives everything in dark hues. The hero in one of Le Carre's novels says: "In our game, in intelligence, there are two views of history—conspiracy or failed conspiracy." This attitude, so tempting in its simplicity, is not suitable for us. Intelligence analysts strive to extract the objective causation of processes, phenomena, and events, to perceive their position within the broader picture, to examine various facts not as static but as dynamic.

We are perfectly well aware that prejudice must be avoided when assessing any information received, that under no circumstances should intrigues and plots by hostile forces be sought in everything. It is actually a matter of securing our country against unpleasant surprises from outside, of helping the state leadership to promptly take the necessary measures.

Important practical steps were taken during the years of perestroyka toward attaining our country's lofty objective—creating a world without wars and weapons. So far, however, the military-industrial complex in the West has not yet disappeared, new military doctrines and plans are being worked out, armaments are being improved. Of course, we cannot placidly observe all this. Therefore, one of the functions of Soviet intelligence is to closely follow the development of military science and technology and the emergence of new types and categories of arms.

Take for example the processes of disarmament and arms limitation. The interests of our state's security demand that any future treaties, which we will perform without fail, should be the best possible for the Soviet Union from the viewpoint of the realities of the international situation and should ensure a fair balance of the sides' military-strategic interests.

The tasks facing the intelligence service also determine its structure. The First Main Directorate has subdivisions which control operations abroad, and also has a

well-organized information analysis service capable of producing objective, reliable, and comprehensively verified information reports. This is by no means an easy job. There are some perfectly understandable difficulties in acquiring classified data, we often receive contradictory or fragmented information. There are, of course, objective limitations to forecasting, especially of dynamically developing situations. Incidentally, the hardest of all when assessing problems is to take into account the factor of slips and errors which are inevitably present in all human affairs.

When analyzing information, we take advantage of all opportunities, attaching great importance to open sources and to links with our scientists even though, of course, we do not advertise these contacts.

There are, of course, subdivisions providing technical backup for intelligence operations. Intelligence would be impossible without taking advantage of the achievements of science and technology.

[Snegirev] You have substantiated the need for intelligence without reference to any specific time, as it were. We worm out their secrets, they steal ours—this is how it has been since time immemorial, this is how it looks like remaining for a long time to come. Nonetheless, you must agree that the world is changing before our very eyes. We can see what is happening in East European countries, in Central America. Soviet troops have left Afghanistan. In their foreign policy, the great powers are switching from confrontation to mutually advantageous cooperation, to cutbacks in their military potentials, to greater trust and openness. This probably has a certain effect on specific operations like intelligence?

[Shebarshin] The world is becoming different—this is perfectly true. The Soviet state's foreign policy is radically changing, the very atmosphere of international relations is changing. The KGB and its intelligence have no autonomous political interests of their own. They are instruments, organs of the state helping the state to pursue its policy. We realistically perceive our position in our country's rather voluminous and well organized foreign policy machinery, and are by no means inclined to exaggerate the importance of intelligence. It would be superfluous to state that the desire to impose our point of view, let alone to elevate departmental interests above those of the state and to treat our tasks as a goal in themselves, is totally alien to us.

The world is suffering—no matter how paradoxical this might sound—not from a shortage of information but from a surfeit of it, or rather from a clamor of information. The data acquired by intelligence is often not valuable in itself. It serves as a compass in the boundless ocean of information. We strive to perceive that which is hidden from people's eyes, to examine everything from the intelligence angle. Emphasis is placed on secrecy, veracity, and topicality.

Information tasks are constantly updated. During the "cold war" period, our service's attention focused primarily on military-political activity by NATO and the fortuitously defunct SEATO and CENTO blocs. For obvious reasons, it is still early to talk about specific actions along these avenues, but the secret side of these alliances' activity was no secret for us and, objectively speaking, it gave us exceptionally serious causes for anxiety. I categorically disagree with those who are now trying to shift the blame for the "cold war" onto the Soviet Union. Now we are striving much harder to bring to light everything positive in world politics, all the opportunities to further improve international relations and to seek mutually acceptable solutions.

We are now getting over the remnants of confrontational thinking in international politics, when we all often acted according to the principle of "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth," when we were guided primarily by the desire to hurt as much as possible those we considered to be our opponents.

It is part of the specific nature of intelligence to reveal whatever threatens our country from outside. After all, interference in our affairs still goes on. There are forces which cannot wait to exploit the highly complex situation in today's Soviet society. True enough, interference increasingly takes open political forms, and it must be countered by political means. But there are also instances of secret actions, specifically the transmission of weapons from abroad to forces striving for a violent overthrow of the Soviet constitutional system. The task of intelligence and counterintelligence alike is to protect our country from such dangerous actions.

In its activity, our service now gives more attention to economic problems, and has taken the avenue of combatting organized crime.

Changes are also having their effect on the professional aspect. We do not use any strongarm methods in our work. The "sinister" image of the KGB which is painted in the West is far removed from reality. Emphasis is placed more and more on technical means, on the processing of open sources, which makes it overall possible to follow the situation in the world. I would like to emphasize that we do not, under any circumstances, force anyone to cooperate. People come to us of their own free will.

Game Without Rules?

[Snegirev] Of their own free will? But people say that intelligence is a game without rules. At the same time, KGB leaders emphasize in their public statements that cruelty, inhumanity, and gross trampling of moral norms are not typical of our intelligence. On the other hand, the Western press—where the topic of the KGB is, incidentally, highly popular—abounds with claims about "crimes by Soviet spies." Prior to our conversation, I read through U.S. and British publications of the last few months, and here is what I gleaned from them. "The KGB commits three or four assassinations abroad each

year." "Moscow uses prostitutes and homosexuals to recruit agents...." And so on, in the selfsame spirit. You must agree that it would be hard to avoid this "reef" in our conversation?

[Shebarshin] Soviet intelligence agents do not have and cannot have any "license to kill." All this is downright fabrication, calculated to confuse the man in the street.

Yes, intelligence is a game without rules, but we are firmly convinced that there must be certain moral boundaries. It is impossible to follow the principle that "the end justifies the means." We rule out violence, cruelty, and interference in other countries' internal affairs. The framework of intelligence operations is dictated by our attitude toward human rights and the Soviet state's moral principles. There are, of course, forces which would like to turn back to the good old days of confrontation between intelligence services. We are not interested in this, not because we are afraid of such a confrontation but because it has outlived its usefulness.

The sundry "sensational reports" about KGB involvement in the attempt on the pope's life or the assassination of Pakistan's former President Ziaul Haq are downright fabrications. Who would benefit from such fabrications? What objectives do they pursue? What traces do they cover up?

I think that, by no means least, this is an attempt to justify so-called secret operations conducted by U.S. intelligence. I would not like to rake past history, but it might be worth recalling the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, the facts surrounding Salvador Allende's death, the preparations for an attempt on Fidel Castro's life, the deliveries of missiles to shell peaceful Afghan cities, and so on.

[Snegirev] Another question. If we were to put on a table two documents originating from one and the same country and dealing with, let us say, the state of that country's government—a report from your residency and a Foreign Ministry coded telegram—in what way would they differ? Is this not a duplication of efforts by our officials abroad? After all, embassies abroad also play the role of information gatherers and analysts.

[Shebarshin] They may or may not coincide. This is not the point. It is important to have a true picture of various events in the world, of development trends in international relations, of foreign states' intentions and plans.

The task of intelligence is to gather classified information which cannot be acquired through official channels.

The point is that the most important decisions—quite naturally—remain secret. But what if these decisions affect the Soviet state's interests or determine the development prospects of world politics? In many instances, it is impossible to clarify these designs in any other way but through intelligence. Despite the propaganda of openness in developed capitalist countries (and maybe in view of their perception of the conditions in which an open society functions), there is a clearly noticeable desire by the West to classify matters of foreign policy, the economy, and military strategy as top secret. According to U.S. press reports, the number of documents classified by U.S. state departments in 1988 increased by 24 percent compared with the previous year. A fair proportion of the secrets they contain affect the Soviet Union's interests to some extent or another.

Dependence on a single channel, on a single source of information is fraught with incorrect conclusions. It is hard to overestimate the role played by intelligence here. It is a specific feature of intelligence information that it is prepared on the basis of secret data. Of course, it is not worth treating intelligence information as some sort of a "crystal ball" in which everything under the sun is visible, but it is, nonetheless, intelligence that reveals what others would like to conceal or present in a different light. It makes it possible to judge the true intentions of foreign governments, to verify whether our international partners' actual deeds comply with accords that have been reached and statements that have been made. This might appear paradoxical, but intelligence makes its contribution toward the strengthening of trust between states.

[Snegirev] Meanwhile, a lot is being written in the West about stepped up "aggressiveness" by the KGB foreign service....

[Shebarshin] Yes, there more than enough statements by leaders of special services in the United States and some other countries to this effect. In an interview with THE WASHINGTON TIMES on 14 February this year, the CIA director repeated claims about "stepped up" work by Soviet intelligence in the United States. But they are unable to cite any examples there. There are no examples. On the contrary, and in contrast with the times of East-West confrontation, Chekist intelligence officers are deliberately abandoning the most controversial [naiboleye ostryye] forms of work. This is our contribution toward improving the atmosphere in international relations.

Why is it that the myth about the omnipresent "hand of the KGB" still circulates in newspaper pages and on television screens in the West?

This campaign pursues political objectives at several levels: to hinder the establishment of the USSR's new image, to maintain the atmosphere of suspicion surrounding Soviet organizations and institutions abroad, to hamper as much as possible the KGB foreign intelligence operations.

R. Gates, while deputy director of the CIA, said: "Discrediting past and present KGB operations could inflict noticeable damage on this organization's prestige and the moral state of its cadres, thus expanding opportunities for U.S. intelligence to operate in the Soviet Union."

[Snegirev] It is well known that the U.S. CIA keeps its expenditure a secret. The KGB does not publicize its

budget, either. Nonetheless, what could be said about our expenses on intelligence operations? Has anyone calculated the economic effect of intelligence, as it were? What do we put in and what do we get out? You must agree that this is a very topical question at present.

[Shebarshin] Indeed, this is a very topical and complex problem. We have certain criteria to evaluate and, correspondingly, to pay for any information that is acquired. It is, however, much more complex to make an overall evaluation of expenditure on intelligence and the ensuing "profit." A U.S. journal recently wrote that Soviet intelligence officers were smart enough to acquire military-technical blueprints worth $3 million for just a few hundred dollars. I will neither confirm nor deny this report. Let me say only that the "expenditure-revenue" proportion in this case is certainly not from the realms of fantasy.

How does one evaluate political or military information that has been promptly acquired and reported? How many millions of human lives and how many billions of rubles could have been saved, what monstrous privations could have been avoided, if only Stalin had believed the intelligence reports about the impending attack by Hitler's Germany on the Soviet Union?

Obviously, by no means everything lends itself to economic evaluation in "current prices." As one American put it, direct relationship between the quantity of invested resources and labor productivity in intelligence exists in just one formula: zero investment yields zero return. On the whole, however, intelligence is highly profitable work.

I must say, though, that our work adheres to the principle of most rigid savings in everything. As regards our expenditure and that incurred by the Americans, there is simply no comparison. According to published data, the U.S. intelligence community spends more than $30 billion a year. I would not like to be more specific about this amount, but it is not far removed from the truth. When the budget of the entire KGB, naturally including intelligence expenditure, is published, you will see how modest it is. I think that we are now operating within the framework of reasonable sufficiency.

"Foreigner" by Profession

[Snegirev] I heard it said somewhere that the KGB intelligence has an opportunity to staff its ranks with the most capable people in the country, with society's intellectual elite as it were. Is this so? And generally speaking, how do you select people for your service? What do you teach them, and how long does it take?

[Shebarshin] We really try to recruit the most capable young people. Intelligence work requires intellect, industriousness, imagination and inventiveness, communicability and skills at deliberate self-constraint, a swift and analytical mind. I cannot list all the qualities an intelligence officer needs and, as a matter of fact, it is hardly possible to find all of them in one single person. In addition to intellectual qualities, we give special attention to the moral, ideological, and psychological aspects of personality. The paramount demand of our staffers is absolute devotion to the fatherland. If you cannot guarantee that an intelligence officer will stand firm in times of difficulty and will not succumb to sundry temptations, he will be worthless. I personally fear egotists, people who are in love with their own selves, even if they are intellectual giants. A hypertrophied sense of one's own importance and infallibility, inability to make an objective self-appraisal, indulgence for one's own shortcomings and intolerance for other people's—these are the qualities of a potential traitor. Such a person will remain on our side for as long as his work is successful. As soon as difficulties emerge, he is capable of committing any base act.

Our system for selecting and training cadres for work in the service has developed over many years. Other committee subdivisions and our staffers, active and retired alike, are involved in it. This system enables our cadre officers to reach people who possess the necessary political, moral, and operational qualities. We take long, searching looks at candidates.

The intelligence has its own training establishment, attended by people with higher education. In our view, the training is interesting. Specifically, the ability to operate in complex conditions is developed at special courses in Moscow and other cities.

We have many linguists who are perfectly fluent in foreign languages—nobody can tell the true origins or nationalities of these people.

[Snegirev] Let us remain on the subject of cadres. I have already referred to foreign press material. You know better than I that the authors of these articles, as a rule, in their turn refer to testimony by our intelligence officers who have betrayed the motherland. The names of Dzhirkvelov, Levchenko, Gordiyevskiy, and other traitors are mentioned. Let me ask you an awkward question in this context. Nowadays, we adopt a much more calm attitude than before toward people who have defected from the Soviet Union for various reasons. It is, of course, impossible to forgive those whose defection harms the country's interests. I can guess at the problems which arise in your department if a well-briefed staffer defects. Yet, people have defected and continue to defect.... This is what I would like to ask you, Leonid Vladimirovich: Has the First Main Directorate, like many of our institutions associated with work abroad, not become a refuge for "wellborn" children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren for whom the vocation of intelligence officer is nothing more than an opportunity to live a comfortable life abroad?

[Shebarshin] Every family has its black sheep, as the saying goes. But our "rejects" have been reduced to a minimum.

It must be borne in mind that intelligence work means being on the frontline, it involves a kind of "perpetual

combat," a duel of intellect, will, and character. Losses do occur, serious ones at times. The other side also incurs losses.

We do not have any test-tubes where sterile and pure First Main Directorate staffers are incubated. It would be wrong to assume that Chekist intelligence officers were not affected by elements of social apathy, lack of spirituality, and the corrosion of the "stagnation" times. After all, intelligence is not a caste, it is an organic part of our society and carries, to a greater or lesser extent, the shortcomings inherent in society.

There are isolated First Main Directorate staffers who lose sight of moral and ideological guidelines. There are also loafers and people who, as you put it, want "a comfortable life abroad." We mercilessly part company with such people. Let me assure you that, in our concern for departmental honor, we would send to trial any staffer found to have broken the law.

But these are exceptions. Anyone who loves an "easy life" will find it hard to acclimatize in intelligence. You can immediately see what people are like in "the field." After all, this requires a tremendous exertion of intellectual, physical, and especially nervous energy. It goes without saying that a proper intelligence officer is always running risks. There is no room in intelligence for anyone who expects "a comfortable life abroad."

As regards "well-born" children and grandchildren, I must say at once that the family connections of a candidate for intelligence work have not even the slightest importance. On the contrary, in order to avoid any outside pressure, we strive not to recruit such people in intelligence, and this attitude of ours is perfectly well understood.

[Snegirev] But is the human factor now the main, the determining element in your work? On reading certain articles by U.S. authors on achievements in the sphere of intelligence technology, one gets the impression that the center of gravity has shifted to "hardware." Objects no larger than a tennis ball are photographed around the clock from outer space. Telephone conversations are bugged, once again using satellites. A strip of ordinary adhesive tape can be turned into a radio transmitter....

[Shebarshin] Of course, the stormy progress of the technological revolution permeates all spheres of life, including intelligence operations. As I already said, this work today is impossible to imagine without extensive use of the latest achievements of science and technology, without the involvement of specialists and scientists, without the use of mathematical methods. The KGB develops its own equipment and makes use of the best foreign models. But technical means are not universal. Their potential is limited.

People are, of course, the main factor. In its operations abroad, intelligence relies on dedicated and often selfless helpers who have linked their lives forever with our country.

"My decision to actively struggle against the reaction was not the result of a sudden change of faith," Kim Philby, an outstanding intelligence officer, narrated. "Back in 1929, when I enrolled in Cambridge University, my world philosophy had not yet taken shape but my sympathies were already with the poor, the weak, and the oppressed, not with the rich, the powers that be, or the haughty.... It was only during my last term in Cambridge, in the summer of 1933, that I cast off all doubts. Having graduated, I firmly resolved to devote my life to the cause of communism."

The Americans at times try to give the impression that their information gathering relies on the use of technical means, official conversations, and the processing of open sources. This contains a proportion of the truth, but it is also a smoke screen. Their main means is "human intelligence," in other words an intelligence service based on agents. Major targeted appropriations are channeled toward the boosting of this avenue of intelligence operations. The proportion of these appropriations in the total expenditure incurred by U.S. intelligence services doubled in 1989. CIA Director W. Webster declared as recently as 20 March this year: "Despite the constant improvement of space and airborne intelligence, intelligence based on agents is irreplaceable, it is the sole means for acquiring information about the opponent's plans and intentions. It is absolutely necessary for the United States as a superpower. Therefore, the number of staffers participating in the gathering of intelligence information through the agency will not be reduced by a single man."

Now there has been a sharp swelling of the flow of Soviet citizens taking brief trips abroad. The KGB welcomes this process and is not trying to slow it down. At the same time, intelligence and counterintelligence cannot but bear the new situation in mind.

The greatest danger attaches to attempts by Western special services to recruit permanent and long-term sources who would work for them in the Soviet Union under any circumstances. Whereas earlier the special services were not averse to running after any Soviet citizen, nowadays they are more selective. The main objects of their interest are Soviet diplomats, military personnel, senior or up-and-coming officials in state institutions, and—of course—intelligence officers. The Western special services have a tremendous interest in what is being done in the scientific and technical sphere. We, as far as I know, have developments and ideas of world class. Hence the interest of intelligence services in the United States and other countries in scientific and technical workers. (As a matter of fact, the "brain drain" could obviously and very soon become a serious problem for our country).

Unfortunately, there is a noticeable trend toward stepping up recruitment approaches by foreign special services to Soviet citizens and attempts to persuade them not to return home. More than 200 such operations were recorded abroad in 1985-1989. In 1988 they committed

three times as many attempts as in 1985 to talk our compatriots into covert cooperation or failure to return home.

One of our important tasks is to infiltrate special services which are engaged in work against our country.

Who Stole the "Atomic Secrets"

[Snegirev] I have had occasion to hear the following: Our people—at the cost of great risks at times—acquire information that is useful for the country like, for example, some of the latest technological developments, and yet others in the Soviet Union are in no great hurry to take advantage of it. My question raises two points. Can it be said that, despite what would appear to be blatant immorality, the "acquisition" of such information is a matter of routine in the intelligence world? And the other point: If there is no demand for technological secrets in our country, is it worth your department expending energy and foreign currency and putting people in danger?

[Shebarshin] Industrial espionage in the West is as commonplace and as widespread as Coca-Cola or MacDonalds. We are, after all, talking about business and competition. Many people strive to acquire the secrets of competing firms. There is a great demand for technological secrets there.

As far as Soviet intelligence is concerned, we cannot but be interested in the latest scientific ideas and technologies associated with the development [razrabotka] of fundamentally new types and categories of arms. The planned military reform and the doctrine of reasonable sufficiency presuppose that our army should possess the most sophisticated weapons. The Soviet defense industry standards are quite high, and any interesting information helps to maintain these standards.

You raised a broader issue, the issue of our industry's lack of receptiveness for innovations. Scientists and inventors alike complain about this. As I understand it, one of the main tasks of the radical economic reform is to overcome this situation.

[Snegirev] It would be a pity not to ask you now about a story which has been the subject of numerous books in the West. I mean the "theft" of the atom bomb secrets from the Americans. Our nuclear scientists express contradictory views on this issue: Some say that intelligence was of substantial help in the creation [sozdaniye] of the Soviet atom bomb, others say that it was not all that helpful. What, in your opinion, happened in reality?

[Shebarshin] Here are the facts. The news that the Americans were developing atomic weapons was first reported to the Soviet leadership in October 1941. Reports on this topic were filed regularly thereafter. The intelligence suggested creating a special organ to coordinate our scientific efforts in this sphere. This resulted in the creation of No. 2 Laboratory headed by I.V. Kurchatov, and intelligence cooperated closely with it for many years. Evaluating the material acquired by intelligence, Igor Vasilyevich remarked: "The information on nuclear energy was of tremendous and incalculable importance for our state and science."

[Snegirev] Rather scanty information, but at least it is something.... We seem to agree that the absolute concealment and secrecy which formerly shrouded the First Main Directorate were more harmful than useful. Here, by way of an example, is a fact. PRAVDA, using USSR KGB archive material, recently carried material about the life of Dmitriy Bystroletov, an outstanding Soviet intelligence officer. At long last, after so many decades (!), we retrieved from oblivion the name of a remarkable patriot and genuine hero. Is there no longer any need to showcase such people? How much more invaluable material on the lives of people like him can be found in your secret archives?

Hundreds of books on intelligence operations have been published abroad. All popular magazines have a section on this subject. And yet, for many years on end, we either paraded the same old names or rested satisfied with Yulian Semenov's talented works of fiction....

[Shebarshin] It is hard to disagree with you. The obsession with secrecy has grown deep roots in our society's mentality. How could you expect intelligence work to be publicized?

Fortunately, however, times have changed. We are prepared to make available, and are making available archive material about the lives of Chekists, we are prepared to speak more openly about current affairs. Even though, of course, there must be a sense of moderation.

[Snegirev] In this case, let me ask you for an example of a successful operation conducted by the First Main Directorate in the last few years.

[Shebarshin] It may not be the most sensational, but it s very indicative because it concerns Soviet people's lives. As you may recall, four Soviet officials on duty abroad were taken hostage by terrorists in Beirut in 1985. Unfortunately, one of them died immediately. But the rest were successfully gotent out safe and sound. Their release became possible as a result of a large and complex package of measures implemented by the USSR KGB foreign intelligence.

[Snegirev] Joint enterprises and associations with autonomous access to the world market are sprouting before our very eyes, like mushrooms after the rain. But getting out is a very complex matter, especially after 60 years of stewing in our own juices. Could your service be of any help at all here?

[Shebarshin] We are striving to help the country to more effectively utilize foreign economic ties, to provide information about the complex and contradictory processes

occurring in the world economy, about backstage plans and actions in this sphere which affect our national economy.

A lot of work has to be done to prevent any damage to the Soviet economy, specifically the involvement of enterprises in disadvantageous large-scale deals. Many of our economic managers are unfamiliar with the cutthroat habits of the world market. Many large foreign companies have their own services performing intelligence and counterintelligence functions. There are also firms which use illicit methods, financial intrigues, bribery, and so on. Soviet foreign economic organizations have sadly suffered through the financial collapse of banks, have incurred losses due to bribes received by some foreign trade functionaries, and so on. Even now, some foreign firms with extremely dubious reputations are pushing to cooperate with Soviet enterprises.

The economic sphere is still not just a field of international cooperation, but also a sphere of competition where an important role is played by special services.

[Snegirev] V.A. Kryuchkov, head of our intelligence at the time, was among those who accompanied M.S. Gorbachev in the United States. The Americans wrote with amazement that this was the first time throughout the existence of state security organs that such a high-ranking leader had crossed the ocean. It seems as if, in the near future, this will no longer amaze anyone. Are your contacts with the West's special services becoming a daily routine?

[Shebarshin] Yes, a steady trend has developed here. Our country is now placing emphasis on universal human values. We are in favor of pooling efforts in the struggle against international terrorism, organized crime, and drug trafficking. There is a long established tradition of cooperation in ensuring security at summit meetings.

[Snegirev] Readers would be interested to know a bit more about the leader of Soviet intelligence. Tell us, please, how did you join the KGB and what did you do before becoming head of the committee's largest directorate?

[Shebarshin] My career is like that of any other First Main Directorate staffer: institute, civilian department, intelligence school, work at the Center and abroad. I joined the CPSU in 1964.

[Snegirev] Thank you for the conversation.

Newsprint Dearth Hinders Paper Production

PM0105143590 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 29 Apr 90 p 1

[Letter from PRAVDA publishing house deputy director to KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA chief editor]

[Text] To the chief editor of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA.

We are writing to inform you that because of the PRAVDA publishing house's lack of newsprint stocks (the yearly deficit is 42,600 tonnes) the newspaper KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA was not published on 27 April in Cheboksary, and on 28 April and the days immediately after it will not be published in Cheboksary and Saratov.

Newsprint stocks are low in Astrakhan, Volgograd, Voronezh, Voroshilovgrad, Dnepropetrovsk, Donetsk, Mineralnyye Vody, Omsk, Orenburg, Simferopol, Tyumen, and Kharkov.

The paper did not come out in Yerevan on 25, 27, and 28 April because there was no newsprint due to the blockade.

The publishing house is making every effort to rectify the situation.

M. Troshin, deputy director of the PRAVDA publishing house.

From the Editorial Board: Here is the news on the eve of Press Day.

Question to the CPSU Central Committee and Communist Youth League Central Committee: Why not buy newsprint, even at contract prices, out of our paper's multimillion profits. After all, a reader who has already paid for the paper a year in advance may not be interested in any "objective problems."

Commentary on Refugee Problem

90US0839A Moscow TRUD in Russian 20 Apr 90 p 2

[Three articles under the heading "How Does One Live Without His Motherland?"]

[Text] We just left noisy Moscow: the screeching of cars, gasoline exhaust, and a buzzing human anthill. However, after half an hour of driving we suddenly encountered a knoll from which birch trees invitingly waved their branches.

It appears that the trees greeted the guests better than the people. As soon as more than 100 refugees—Armenians, Azeris, Russians—came from Baku to the Vatutinki resort belonging to the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers, rumors swept the settlement: "They will take away our apartments and occupy new houses...." Several days later, general commotion occurred at the resort: The lights came on in all windows, and children started crying. It turned out that teenagers got into the compound and started throwing snowballs at the windows. The people shuddered and thought that this was a pogrom. Later, they felt relieved: It was just a childish prank.

However, often we create ourselves the soil on which the shoots of enmity sprout, without even noticing it.

It would seem to be a trifle: The management of the Vatutinki resort did not allow the refugees to make

long-distance phone calls, despite the people leaving their relatives and friends behind in Baku. The refugees have no recent newspapers—this is a trifle. Their children are offended in school—this is a trifle. Are there not too many of these trifles?

The refugees recall: "After we were led through the roaring crowds to the train with an escort of soldiers, we could not calm down for a long time. The men did not sleep at all en route and guarded the women and children. We did not turn on the light in the cars. At times the train stopped, and we thought: This is it, they are going to uncouple the car.... Finally, we crossed the border, the conductor turned on the lights, and everybody in the car shouted 'Hooray.' We came to Russia, to the Russians...."

They, the Armenians, the Azeris, and the Russians who have lost their dwellings, possessions, and in some cases their loved ones, came to us seeking protection. This has been the case for centuries. Have we really become different?

...Where do they suggest that these people establish themselves? For the most part, in the countryside. They offered an engineer the job of a cattle-farm worker, and offered a designer tractor repair....

Some people tried to find jobs themselves.

One of the refugees said: "I went to Podolsk, and came to Motor Pool No. 1127. I found the manager and told him that I was a motor mechanic. He was glad. He took me around the compound himself, showed me the sauna, the locker room, and my work station. He asked me to come and said that they would hire me. Later on, it turned out that he did not have the right to hire a resident of another oblast."

...It began to get dark imperceptibly. Electric lights came on in the windows of Vatutinki resort.... Only one window remained dark. Next to it, there was a young woman holding a baby in her arms. She looked toward the east, sorrow in her eyes. How is the child to live without his motherland? Will Russia become his native land?

[Signed] I. Travin, Moscow Oblast

Ilmira Tkhilova is only two months old. She was born in a family of Meskhetian Turks but already on the land of Smolensk. Her mother Guldaton works as a milkmaid at the Sozh Sovkhoz [state farm] in Smolenskiy Rayon. Her father is an electrician. Fortunately, the toddler was spared the nightmare that befell her parents during their evacuation from Kokand last year.

The Smolensk area has always given refuge to those wronged, persecuted, and suffering. For ages, compassion for people in trouble has been characteristic of the local people. The people of the Smolensk area were the very first in Russia to receive refugees, about 2,000 of them, when tragic events occurred in the Fergana Valley and blood was spilled. They were given housing, clothing, food, furniture, TV sets, and refrigerators. The main point is that jobs were found for all of them, and their children were given an opportunity to continue their education.

It will soon be a year since the time the Meskhetian Turks appeared on the farms of the oblast. Life goes on, and children are born. The first weddings have already taken place. The people have recovered little by little since the horrible tragedy, settled at the new location, and made friends with their neighbors. They have been giving everything to their work, as is their custom. In their conversations they increasingly refer to the land of Smolensk as their second home. They are grateful for hospitality and moral support. Yet resentment caused by injustice and old grief for the native land they had to leave many years ago remain.

In Sozh, a suburban vegetable-producing sovkhoz, I likewise did not hear complaints from anyone. Large families of the Gadziyevs, Tkhilovs, and Chudanovs settled here. The men work as metal craftsmen, mechanics, and carpenters. Some of the women work on the farm, in the infirmary, in the greenhouses, and those with many children, in the household. They live in houses with all the amenities.

Indeed, nobody complains about living conditions. However, these people are not cheerful or confident about their future either. S. Gadziyev said bitterly that his kinsmen are isolated, dispersed at the farms of the oblasts. They communicate through "the grapevine"—one of them hears something and passes it on. But in Kokand they were used to living as a community.

Ali Muzafarovich Tkhilov, the oldest among those resettled, suffers seeing that the ethnic customs and traditions of his people will soon be lost altogether....

S. Gadziyev believes that recently his people have been forgotten entirely, as if all of their problems had been solved once and for all. He paid keen attention to the coverage of the Second and Third Congresses of People's Deputies but failed to hear any word about how the issue of returning the Meskhetian Turks to the land of their ancestors is going to be resolved. There is nobody to protect their interests in the Supreme Soviet either....

[Signed] A. Shilkin, correspondent of the oblast newspaper RABOCHIY PUT, Smolensk

Commentary by the Department of Social Issues

Violence has bred fear and despair. In a short period of time three waves of refugees have swept the country. In the winter of last year, trouble came to Armenia and Azerbaijan. More than 400,000 people abandoned their native localities due to interethnic strife. Refugees from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan came literally several months later. The entire country started talking about the Meskhetian Turks and the citizens of the ethnic groups of North Caucasus. In January and February of this year, one more number was added to the sorrowful

resettlement statistics: One hundred thousand Russians and Armenians fled Azerbaijan under fire from commandos.

However, there also were and are mini-waves of migration. They arise every now and then in various regions: Too much resentment and too many mutual rebukes have accumulated in recent years. Hundreds of refugees from Lithuania have appeared, and Russian workers in Moldavia are raising the issue of leaving—such is the information they have in the recently established Migration and Resettlement Administration of the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems.... According to tentative data, 600,000 people in all have become migrants and have lost their dwellings, their relatives, and loved ones. A stream of misfortunes has flooded the republics. At this time the stream is not gushing as angrily as it used to; it has quieted down and come to a halt. We would like to hope that it will not flare up with renewed strength because there is hardly anything more barbaric and nonsensical than blind hatred for those whose eyes are a different color, who speak another language and live by other traditions.

However, the problem also is that, by all signs, our society and the government turned out to be unprepared for migration cataclysms of this kind. At present, refugees do not enjoy many constitutional rights.

What can a migrant count on? Recently new, unprecedented lines appeared in Moscow. A refugee registration facility was set up on Chernyshevskiy Street. Those who had lost their passports were issued temporary cards here, and all of them without exception were issued R100 from the reserve funds of the USSR Council of Ministers. They were put up in hotels in the capital city and boarding houses in its vicinity in order to stay free of charge for three months. In addition, 200 rubles were issued to buy clothing.

However, what is going to happen later, when the preferential term of stay comes to an end? It is not clear. The state cannot give every refugee an apartment or a house—the housing problem is already as acute as can be. It is hard to find a job similar to the old one. Many refugees came to Moscow but cannot find work here because a special regimen of residence permits is in effect in the capital city and its oblast. (A question comes up: Why did they set up registration facilities in Moscow?) Incidentally, in other regions nobody has canceled residential permits either. To be sure, on 15 March a letter from the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs was sent to the local agencies confirming the right to "issue residence authorizations" to citizens who are forced to leave their places of permanent residence.

However, let us compare the time when the waves of migration rose with the date of the confirmation. Besides, the letter, even if it is an instruction, is merely a temporary relaxation of the law rather than the law. That is, a conflict will flare up again when the period of preferential treatment runs out.

Every large group of refugees was protected by a relevant government resolution. Measures were taken and preferences of some kind were established on every occasion. Certainly all of this is humane and fair. However, under the circumstances it was easy to overlook small groups of migrants and fail to notice conflicts that were smaller in scope but no less acute in terms of their inner tension. This has indeed happened. Refugees from Dushanbe and the Baltic area are considered refugees only de facto rather than de jure. This is why no matter how much they have suffered they do not have the right to get a moving allowance of R100, R200 in "clothing money," or an opportunity to obtain a residence permit.

So far, we have been talking about interethnic conflicts only. However, there are refugees of another kind, for example, those who were forced to flee radiation or to evacuate following an ecological disaster. These peoples also put their lives and health at risk. Many of them lost their assets and dwellings. What is to be done about them? It is necessary to define flexibly the status of a refugee. Programs of aid to them are necessary.

So far, there have been considerably more questions than answers. For example, who is going to pay indemnities for financial losses? As a rule the union government has incurred the expense to date. However, an arrangement for compensating losses at the expense of the republics where the stream of refugees originated should be worked out. After all, we cannot shift to others the responsibility for our own miscalculations, including those associated with solving interethnic problems. Why should a pretext be given and grounds be prepared for conflicts at the refugees' new location of residence?

To be sure, a lot is being done to extinguish the fire of troubles, but unfortunately it is too early to consider this issue resolved. Meanwhile, waiting for radical decisions to be made may be very difficult, especially for those who spend their nights in a small hotel room with 10 people, who do not know what they are going to live off tomorrow, who cannot get medical attention at a polyclinic or take their children to school or a day care center. It is hardly reasonable to make decisions after the event on every occasion.

In the following issues of TRUD we will familiarize our readers with the operation of the Migration and Resettlement Administration of the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems.

Leadership Aides' Role in System Viewed

PM3004115190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Special correspondent Leonid Shinkarev article: "Corridors of Power. Halfway to the Offices Where Decisions Are Made"]

[Text] In the fall of 1961, when I was IZVESTIYA's Irkutsk correspondent, I was charged with accompanying Khrushchev on a tour of East Siberia. The reserved

train with him, his working staff, and his guards on board was approaching Krasnoyarsk. The kray's leaders were standing on the snow-covered platform. As the train slowed down, one of Khrushchev's aides leaped onto the platform. Quickly shaking hands with the welcoming party, he took the program from the kraykom [kray party committee] secretary and ran his eyes over it: "He doesn't need this...! The tire plant is possible.... The house-building combine... all right...! But this, no way!" "But people everywhere have been notified," the kraykom secretary looked him in the eye—"Maybe for a few minutes?" "Haven't you understood?!"

I was struck by the scene: The kray's leaders—CPSU Central Committee members and USSR Supreme Soviet deputies—were standing at attention in front of Khrushchev's aide, rooted to the spot before his real power, which was unknown to others but well known to them.

A smiling Khrushchev was already getting out of the car. "What have the Siberians got to show us?" You could guess what feelings were wrestling within the soul of the Krasnoyarsk host. Seeing Khrushchev's disposition toward him, I had no doubt that all suggestions would be gladly accepted. But the kraykom secretary, stammering, named only what had been permitted a couple of minutes previously by the aide, who was now standing by unconcerned.

Our generation, which is witnessing a drastic replacement of political structures, finds it hard to shed its anxieties and suspicions with regard to power. The outlines of the actual hierarchy, which does not always coincide with the official allocation of powers, have now also been blurred. Vagueness about what kind of people are in the corridors guarded on every side and about who specifically has access to the levers conjures up in the imagination the specter of an "eminence grise": a mysterious individual or group of apparatchiks little by little gaining absolute sway over society.

These ideas stem from a naive, emotional view of power. The fleeting happening on the platform at Krasnoyarsk Station provided grounds for judging, maybe, the morals within the top echelon. But it did not point, as might have been thought, to the true allocation of functions within the system. Apparatchiks, even those closest to the leadership, know their place in it. An autonomous force, hidden in the shadow and acting independently, would destroy the whole logic of the construction: The rigid subordination under which a low rung of the hierarchy cannot make a decision without the agreement of a higher rung.

Today we understand statesmen just a little better, particularly those who have stood bathed in sweat before people's deputies no longer concerned, for the first time, that someone very important should put in a word for them. But the close entourage of each of them is still hidden from society: aides, consultants, advisers, office chiefs.... In short, those trusted people who write their reports, speeches, and articles, compile drafts of their assignments, answer telephone calls for them, give them verbal briefings on events, scan the mail for them, and select cuttings from the morning newspapers, accustoming the leadership to look at the world through the eyes of office staffers. In the opinion of subordinates, aides identify with their leaders—which endows them with apparent authoritative functions, as displayed by Shevchenko, Khrushchev's aide, in jumping from the car two minutes before the first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

My profession has repeatedly taken me into party and state offices at various levels of the pyramid, from the bottom to the very top, but, on approaching this topic and still feeling a lack of personal observations, I asked aides, advisers, consultants, and other associates of the leadership—the past and the present leadership—to help me. Some refused, citing a vow of silence. Others agreed, demonstrating that their offices were ajar to new winds.

World history has known no instance where regimes, parties, and public movements have existed without apparatuses. But in our country the administrative system has gained the upper hand over other structures, ordering them about and whipping them up. It is maintained by the division of society into estates, which has permeated all strata. The leadership's entourage is no exception. The weight each person carries depends not on personal qualities but on the place in the hierarchy of the person they serve. The aides of a higher-ranking chief constitute an apparatus aristocracy. It is on equal terms with a lower-ranking chief, but not with his aide.

On whatever stage of state building we focus attention, we will discover leaders' efforts to enhance the social prestige of the people on their team. The desire to broaden their opportunities and thereby strengthen his own authoritative force led Lenin to the idea of bringing Krupskaya and Stasova onto the Central Committee. But he encountered an objection from his comrades and did not insist. His office staffers, enterprising people who were devoted to him and had all but deprived themselves of a private life for the sake of the cause, behaved in an independent manner, not dreaming of the possibilities of abusing their proximity to power.

Fotiyeva failed the test of trust. She passed to Stalin and Kamenev secrets of Lenin's office ("in order to hold on to her post," Stalin aide Bazhanov would later report). It was she who, having the sick Lenin's "Letter to the Congress" in her hands, passed this political testament to them, contrary to his insistence on absolute secrecy. Who would venture to predict how events would have developed in the country if the secretary had not gone against Lenin's will?

Stalin's aides were not burdened by overscrupulousness either. They quickly grasped the essence of the rigid administrative system under which, by being outside the door of a powerful office, it was possible to have greater

opportunities than party members with official posts. Even Stalin's people's commissars trembled before Poskrebyshev.

It was in the Kremlin corridors during the twenties and thirties that the technology for making the masses fanatically loyal by means of total suggestion of the idea of a leader of genius began to be developed. By strengthening the cult of the "master," the methods of mass political wizardry which had then been tested by the apparatus extended the functionaries' limits of competence. The means of satisfying vanity reflected the times like a mirror. Stalin aide Tovstukha ensured his position by making an expert examination of the secret ballot papers after the 13th party congress and drawing up lists of "enemies" for the leader.

The tradition of glorifying one's "master" was characteristic of the Bolshevik leaders' entourage in the twenties and thirties. Bukharin's aides—young party ideologues who worshiped their idol—defended his views, reviewed his works, and created his biography. This did not promise them material prosperity, not that their souls straining for battle craved it, but leaders of managerial structures did emerge from among those 25-30-year-old apparatchiks.

The elite of party functionaries under Brezhnev was obliged for its elevation, it is said, to Kissinger, although the latter never suspected it. The authority of the U.S. president's national security adviser and his ability to direct the course of the president's thoughts were enigmatic. Seeking to increase the influence of his entourage in the structures of power, Brezhnev promoted staffers close to him to be Central Committee members and Supreme Soviet deputies. This opened up new opportunities before them but did not accord the advantage that Prof. Kissinger, Ph.D., of Harvard University had: He had no reason for holding on to his post other than the realization that precisely his head was needed to formulate U.S. policy.

The close entourage of our leaders participated in writing, editing, and compiling their books and books about them, created movie scripts, and advised on movies. Well-known directors, artists, and writers curried favor with aides, consultants, etc, justifying themselves among friends by saying that this was necessary for the cause. It cost aides nothing to persuade "himself" to permit something seditious, strengthening his reputation in society as a liberal and their own reputation as freethinkers. It seems that three of Khrushchev's aides—Lebedev, Shevchenko, and Shuyskiy—launched an initiative that was widely adopted after they received the Lenin prize for the reportage "Face to Face with America": prizes for the closest staffers of the first (general) secretary! In the spheres of literature and art, moreover. Kissinger was awarded the Nobel prize for his contribution to ending the war in Vietnam.

The possibility of answering for nothing in law by possessing authoritative force backed up by the name of one's leader is tried by temptations which the closest staffers find it hard to resist. Brovin, Brezhnev's duty secretary, had only to telephone the oblast party committee first secretary in Rostov by chance to inquire how things were with the director of the No. 1 Dry Goods Store (storm clouds had gathered over her at the time), not dwelling on that but mentioning it in passing—and the storm clouds dispersed. But it was not until Brovin ended up in the intensified-regime corrective labor colony in Nizhniy Tagil for bribetaking that society actually learned the name of one of Brezhnev's secretaries.

Observing the office staff and their endless business, working 12-14 hours, frequently on Saturdays and days off, I believed an aide when he confessed that he had contact with the outside world only on rare meetings with relatives when they came to Moscow and by looking at the streets from the car window on the way from home to the Kremlin and from the Kremlin home—and he had been living like this for some 30 years.

Let us try to imagine the working day of an aide, that rare day when he is not yet burdened by an urgent new assignment requiring him to set all business aside, and when he can tackle current affairs with his customary thoughtfulness. Day-to-day papers have already piled up on his desk—from ministries, state establishments, subordinate organizations. Here are suggestions, requests, drafts, frequently with a version of a decision which, so the authors believe, has only to be signed. The aide tries to grasp the meaning of the documents, sends copies to leading workers connected with the problem, and ascertains their viewpoint. If someone's interests have not been taken into account in the documents, he may return them with a comment.

You can understand main administration chiefs when they curry favor with a minister's aides, and understand ministers when they value relations with aides of the chairman of the Council of Ministers: They know in which offices the fate of their papers—and, along with it, their reputation too—is actually decided. Even though the public constantly mentions the names of ministers, even though it knows their faces. On the approaches to the top of the hierarchy people are better informed about what depends on whom. Frequently a person unknown in society, immured in an office piled high with papers and isolated from the life that is seething outside the thick walls with narrow windows, turns out to be a figure capable of strengthening someone important in his position by means of a fleetingly uttered word or, on the contrary, of giving rise to doubts.

It is he who has control over the fulfillment of his leader's written or verbal instructions. It is a thankless task to telephone a minister, let us assume, to remind him of an assignment while suspecting that this goading will irritate the minister and that the fact that he is being addressed not by "himself" but only by an aide will grate upon him. The aide always gains the upper hand in these

little psychological wars. Because the minister is sensitive to the logic of life formulated by the clever Sancho: A good swordbearer can become a good governor. There have been examples: Having previously held no elected post, Brezhnev aide Rusakov was at once elected a CPSU Central Committee secretary.

Everyday awareness confidently suggests that a long period of work in one place gives a functionary experience that enables him to find his bearings in a situation. Within the framework of managerial structures this merit can also entail many minuses, indicated by major politicians. "Out of fear of changes and a reluctance to change my habits, for a long time I kept the very same staffers by me, not counting the most responsible posts. The overall atmosphere and cordiality in personal relations benefited as a result, but this also had adverse consequences, which were intuitively felt by the public: After a while members of the team were able to shut themselves up in their own narrow little world, and such isolation from contacts with the outside world and with people close to them would affect the acuteness of their perception of problems" (Giscard d'Estaing).

Every leader has his own way of interacting with the people on his team. Before a Politburo session Andropov would gather together his aides and hear their reports on the questions submitted for discussion. He took an interest in each one's opinion and agreed or insisted on his own viewpoint. It was hard to make him change his mind (harder than Brezhnev, who was more complacent with regard to another's opinion). At any rate, after a discussion with his entourage he would go to the session well prepared. It is said that Suslov did not notice his aides and endeavored to have no dealings with them, preferring to obtain information directly from Central Committee departments or from research institutes.

...Information from ministries, cipher communications from ambassadors abroad, TASS reviews, radio intercepts, foreign press commentaries, and KGB and military intelligence reports are placed on the desk of the CPSU Central Committee general secretary's aide each morning. As many as 300 or even 500 pages every day. He has to be versed in the state of affairs and be ready at any hour of day or night to report on the situation, making his own assessments and suggestions. Brezhnev and Andropov preferred to receive a brief news report from aides who came to them with laconic bulletins several times a day. They were shown only the most important telegrams (usually relating to extraordinary events) in the original. Gorbachev told his aides right at the start that he would look at all important information himself, instructing them to read it in parallel in order to note the principal points and promptly prepare draft resolutions. In this way the decision maker does not miss nuances which might be lost in a verbal transfer by even a most conscientious aide: Like anyone, he might not be free from subjective assessments.

The team is under special stress on bustling days when a working group formed by an aide or even by the leader himself gathers at an out-of-town dacha to prepare a report or a speech. Usually this is before congresses, plenums, conferences, aktiv meetings, etc. Every leader has his own narrow circle of political experts, philosophers, economists, and journalists who are well known to each other, enjoy the leadership's confidence, and are well received in their offices. Their visits are not kept secret from office staffers, but are made known. This enhances prestige: In the eyes of the apparatus it means more to someone to be accepted by "himself" than if, for example, he had invented the theory of relativity but was not "well received."

From the fifties through the seventies the chief criterion for selecting an entourage was the ability to write the leader's speeches and to find formulas for trivial thoughts that would create an illusion of novelty. Really outstanding minds racked their brains over this. Political thought is obliged to them for the combinations of words put into the leader's mouth and then introduced into society and included in text books, like "developed socialism" and "five-year plan of quality," and for promises of "living under communism," etc. In newspaper and journal articles the very people who invented them would describe as "historic" these very formulas of theirs, pronounced from high rostrums.

Khrushchev would usually dictate his speeches himself: They were frequently disjointed, always illiterate, not at all concerned about form, but quite clear as regards thought. His aides speak well of him: He did not mind it when his text was rewritten in such a way that nothing remained of the original form.

Brezhnev never wrote his own speeches but was able to dictate something. He liked to be on the working group that compiled his report. When an argument flared up, he would not interfere but would leave the noisy room. He would return pleased: "Well, have you agreed?" When the report was ready, he would ask for it to be reread to him several times, comparing it sentence by sentence with his own speech-making possibilities. Sometimes he would interrupt with a rejoinder: "We are trying to be a bit too clever, writing a dissertation...." or "Well, this is already a lampoon!"

Each leader had his own staff to write the texts of speeches. It is hard to understand why their reports are so identical—not even in terms of ideas—but in terms of the way of expressing a thought, the smooth style, the banal rhetoric. Why, with the exception of Khrushchev with his unpredictable and now so funny ad-libbing, did not one of them venture to joke in his text, to sharpen a thought, or to blow up? People of different education, intellect, and temperament, but everything said by them or signed in their name is as alike as two peas. This phenomenon explains to some extent the words that I heard from a former aide to a Central Committee general secretary when he sighed in sincere simplicity, recalling work on speeches: "We had to CUSHION every sentence."

The immediate entourage would include old friends of the leader, known to his family, informed about his private life, spending time together at his dacha, playing billiards with him, and telling anecdotes, most frequently ones in which "himself" is the hero. They might be inseparable in the hunt and be very quick to understand each other. But there must be no delusions as to their closeness.

An aide might not know until the last minute about political decisions made by the top echelon of power. Aleksandrov-Agentov, aide to the CPSU Central Committee general secretary, told me how at the end of 1979 telegrams from Amin were piling up on his desk: Amin was asking for Soviet troops to be sent into Afghanistan and suggesting ways to justify this to the world community. For example, to guard industrial enterprises being constructed with the USSR's technical assistance. When a lot of telegrams had piled up, the aide telephoned the USSR KGB chairman: "Yuriy Vladimirovich, what reply shall we give Amin?" "What Amin?" Andropov said. "Karmal has been in place since this morning, and our troops are in Kabul!"

This was like a bolt from the blue to Brezhnev's aide on foreign policy questions, the generator of many ideas in the sphere of international relations during the sixties and seventies: Several times a day he had been seeing almost everyone involved in discussing the problem, and they had spoken of all kinds of things with him, but no one had breathed a word about the chief thing. If this was how they treated close people in the entourage, it can be explained in terms not of trust or mistrust but of the laws of the system.

The groups of advisers—also reckoned as part of the entourage, although not as close as the aides—are still less well informed. An outstanding individual, a prominent specialist (frequently a doctor or candidate of sciences), a person with his own ideas and hopes for realizing them is customarily invited to hold this post. As soon as he is installed in the political structure, he begins to experience a strange attitude toward people such as him, which he had not suspected before. When an adviser has become part of the apparatus, he is valued not for the baggage which he brought with him but for his performance.

If Spinoza were to end up an adviser, he, too, would busily fulfill urgent assignments. No one would suggest that he think about a concept or formulate an idea. He would be given missions from the top leadership at second or third hand. He would be loaded down with missions by the leader of a group of advisers, a deputy department head, or a department head. His intellectual potential would be required to elaborate a policy to which preference had already been given, and no one would take any interest in the alternatives that had occurred to him.

This is in addition to the fact that in the corridors of power, as throughout our disordered world, there are successful people, aggrieved people, and suffering people. Here you come up against political ambition, wounded pride, and the disappointment of unrecognized theoreticians. And the fact that collisions occur close to the summits does not make them less painful for everyone who is drawn into the whirlpool of apparatus life. In the 16th century Muscovite state the relations between the rulers and the hierarchy, which were devoid of concerted joint work, were denoted by the ancient word "inimicalness." According to S. Solovyev, inimicalness was becoming increasingly deep-rooted, turning into a bad political habit on both sides. It is possible, once again, to get rid of a certain alienation within the managerial structures under conditions when society is informed about what kind of people are there and who professes what.

People in the immediate entourage of leaders have created a vast literature in which they themselves have pointed out what is lacking for the state machine to spin: "a combination of revolutionary scope with the businesslike efficiency and concreteness of leadership, with persistent organizational work." This was said in an article by Chernenko (during the sixties, chief of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Secretariat), who became general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

Yesterday's abstract formulas are hardly suitable for the corridors of power in the nineties. The functions of power are increasingly being limited by the law, which has to be taken into account by new persons taking up posts in the management apparatuses, including those close to legislative and executive power. Leaders select them in accordance with their own work style, endowing them with powers which depend not on vague formal duties but more on the leader's idea of the potential of each associate. If the team is seized by a common desire and everyone trusts each other, it will help the mechanism of power to work better.

The functions of the former institutions of power are changing in the country today, new structures are emerging, and each one needs a working apparatus: the president, the Presidential Council, the Federation Council. The 2,000 USSR people's deputies have or will have their own aides. Participating in rallies and advancing platforms, we put so much trust in the power itself that we take little interest in the corridors hidden from us, which can make it more effective but which can also turn into a bog where wheels skid.

What is the point of our discussion? I do not think that we will see today advertisements proclaiming: "A competition is announced to fill a vacancy for a most highly qualified aide..." or "...independently-minded consultant urgently required, prepared to champion his own views. Apply to the Kremlin...." The leadership will most probably continue to seek these staffers among a familiar circle. But I think that the emergence of the leadership's immediate entourage "from underground" will strengthen our trust in the power. And it will, maybe,

help it to implement more widely the right to choose when creating new structures.

Economic

Abalkin Favors Planned Market Economy

904A0291A Moscow EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN in Russian No 14, Apr 90 p 19

[Unattributed article: "Soviet Supereconomist Leonid Abalkin Is in Favor of a Planned Market Economy"; published under the "DAGENS INDUSTRI" logo]

[Text] Leonid Abalkin has, perhaps, the most unenviable job in the world. As a deputy prime minister, he oversees the development of the Soviet economy and the course of economic reforms.

A correspondent of DAGENS INDUSTRI, the Swedish business newspaper, met with Leonid Abalkin soon after a plenum of the Communist Party Central Committee. At the plenum, many influential members of the Central Committee demanded that a monetary reform be implemented in order to neutralize "the super-high incomes" of new entrepreneurs.

Abalkin said: "As our calculations indicate, the monetary reform fails to produce positive results. This is why this year there is not going to be such a reform, or it is going to be carried out by some other government."

Abalkin is a scientist who has become a politician. He was and still is the most respected economist in the Soviet Union. Elected last year to the post of superminister of the economy of sorts, he reports only to the prime minister. A strikingly analytical approach to the issues considered is characteristic of Abalkin. His most favorite words are "pragmatism" and "wisdom," and the most pejorative word is "emotions."

As little as several years ago, in the extent and pace of economic reform the Soviet Union was second only to Hungary, if not the leader in the field. However, at present, when all East European countries are declaring their intention to introduce a pure market economy, the Soviet Union looks hopelessly conservative with its concept of "a planned market economy."

Commenting on the situation in Eastern Europe, Abalkin said: "Over there, they are at a stage when feelings prevail over wisdom. Propagating the pure market economy means proceeding from the same inflexible, simplistic positions from which we previously defended a fully planned economy."

Abalkin explained that the planned market economy represents a combination of an effective market economy, a universal system of social security, and a far-reaching economic policy.

Abalkin showed on a graph how far the dynamics of wages and the production of consumer goods are diverging.

Increasing artificially low prices and simultaneously discontinuing price control would be a sure way to extinguish surplus demand rapidly and at the same time take a big step toward the market economy. However, Abalkin is against such an undertaking in 1990.

He thought that "at present, free-market prices only for products such as fruits, vegetables, potatoes, and a number of other goods are in effect in our country. If we succeed in implementing a universal price reform in 1991 it is going to be good."

Apart from technical difficulties, Abalkin points to the need to defend the interests of 40 million low-income people, as well as unpredictable consequences in the sphere of interethnic relations.

The Soviet minister of economics said that the entire country felt the discontinuation of production in Azerbaijan and Armenia. At present, we in the Soviet Union need political stability first of all.

Economist Warns Against Foreign Market Model

PM0105102690 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 26 Apr 90 Second Edition p 2

[Article by Doctor of Economic Sciences A. Ivanov, professor at the CPSU Central Committee Social Sciences Academy: "An Alien Mold: Looking at the Model for a Market Economy"]

[Text] Radical economic reform is impossible without scientifically substantiated objectives and reliable programs for achieving them. We should have a clear idea of the economic system we intend to construct, and we should clearly understand the starting point for our calculations and ensure the consistency of the steps adopted.

The CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th Party Congress appears to answer these questions. The objective of the reform is the formation of a planned market economy. We have already assimilated the principles of planning, so it remains to clarify the question of what the market is and in what way the transition to "planned market" relations is to be implemented.

In the mass awareness, the market system means the opportunity freely, without allocations or quotas, to sell your output and acquire raw materials, semifinished materials, and equipment. Thus we should go over from planned distribution relations to relations of supply and demand, replacing fixed prices with a flexible system of prices based on market equilibrium.

The formation of a market system presupposes an initial balance between production and consumption of all types of resources, the budget, the money supply and the goods available, and so forth. Otherwise a market system will inevitably lead to soaring prices, differentiation in the incomes of labor collectives and individuals, and a fall in living standards for certain social groups of the population. But what situation do we have today? The

extent of unsatisfied demand is 165 billion rubles, the internal state debt is R400 billion, the budget deficit is R92 billion, and monetary emissions, increasing annually, totaled R18 billion last year alone. In these conditions it will be necessary not only to boost prices and drastically reduce living standards, but also to abandon the principle of social protection of the population and compensation for the increased cost of living. Are we prepared for such a turn of events?

I often visit the collectives. And I admit that as an economist I do not feel entirely "comfortable" under the hail of such questions. After all, today everyone knows that the starting point for our transition is, I repeat, an ever deeper deficit, distorted speculative demand, and the pressure of a vast money supply on the consumer market. In these conditions, the workers ask, how does the government intend to make the transition to the market? Are our enterprises and their economic and commercial services ready for such a step? We should find out beforehand: Are these realities the natural outcome of the socialist system of economic management, or have they occurred as a result of distortions of socialism? Is a market in production factors (manpower, stocks and shares, financial resources, and so forth) compatible with the fundamental values of the socialist system? After all, market relations will inevitably lead to mass unemployment, the exploitation of hired labor, private ownership, the free flow of capital investments—all this is by no means in society's interests. So why are these questions and other similar questions remaining unanswered?

The formation of market relations should begin in sectors producing consumer goods, agricultural produce, and so forth. It is here that components of the market mechanism could and should be effectively put into practice: competition among producers, rivalry for buyers, improved quality of goods, reduced costs, and so forth. However, even on this fertile soil we sometimes reap bitter fruits today: shortages, rising prices, administrative edict methods in the distribution of goods in mass demand. It is even on the agenda to set norms and issue coupons for the distribution of essentials and food!

The more complex public-sector production is and the higher its technical and organizational level, the less effective market forms of coordination and liaison among individual producers are and the more obvious the need for planned management of the economy. How else is it possible to ensure the production of highly complex output for manufacturing and technical purposes, as well as certain types of consumer goods, for instance cars, in which it is necessary efficiently to coordinate the work of hundreds of enterprises and to pool the efforts of tens of thousands of people?

Major Western economists who call on us to make use of our own achievements in the sphere of production organization and planning can hardly be suspected of sympathizing with socialism. Unfortunately, many of us are deaf to these recommendations.

The experience that already exists in the transition to new economic relations has revealed the contradictory and complex nature of changes in our society. The collective interest or producers has degenerated into clearly manifested group egotism, regional economic autonomy becomes economic and now even political extremism. All this testifies to the growth of instability in society. The recently adopted "package" of laws (on land, ownership, and the lease system) reinforces the property and social inequality of individuals, groups, enterprises, sectors, and regions. The mechanism of growing inequality and instability is very simple: It is based on the reinforcement, on a monopoly basis, of existing favorable economic conditions and their exploitation exclusively for one's own purposes.

By all appearances progressive instability will henceforth be an inevitable companion of our life. Permanent, "creeping" price rises should be recognized as a necessary condition of economic stabilization, and this leads to indexation of incomes, and perhaps not only for low-paid population groups, pensioners, and students. This in turn will require the formation of corresponding structures in the organs of soviet power at all levels and the stepping up of the role of the trade unions and possibly informal organizations too in the social protection of the population.

Yes, the insuperable difficulty is to make the transition from a profoundly distorted economy and ever deeper shortages to a balanced market—everyone agrees on that.

How can this be done? We are offered just one solution to the problem—the abandonment of administrative distribution and the granting of economic autonomy to all participants in the production process. It would be quite possible to assume that direct links and contractual prices will eradicate all the existing shortcomings and distortions. However, the path of liberalization has already proved to be an impasse: The producers increase prices, refuse to conclude traditional contracts for deliveries of output without "special terms," forget about scientific and technical progress, and demand payment in currency or in kind ("one scarce commodity in return for another"). The producers' appetites have increased to such an extent that they are now extending to turnover tax. Yet many goods, especially food, are sold in our country at loss-making prices. Naturally, in order to maintain equilibrium in the economy it is necessary also to have high-profit groups of goods. If every collective going over to the new forms of economic management thinks that the turnover tax is its own property, we are never going to resolve the problem of the budget deficit.

The next step is the dismantling of the administrative edict system. The administrative economy has exhausted its potential and reserves, there is no doubt of that. The question is by what methods, in what forms, and on what time scale could we make a painless transition from the former system of management to a new one based on economic methods. The difficulty of the transition is due

to the fact that although administrative methods generated disproportions in the economy, it also regulated them. In many instances the attempt to destroy the administrative mechanism has broken the producers' material and commodity links, which has immediately led to even greater shortages and imbalance.

Material and technical supply has recently worsened considerably in the country. Wholesale trade, on which so many hopes were pinned, naturally cannot develop in conditions of shortages. Performance discipline is declining drastically. It is more advantageous to enterprises to pay symbolic sums in fines for disrupting output deliveries, making up for the losses of income by selling above-plan output. The question of free pricing is on the agenda—as yet, however, only for output produced over and above the state order.

All this is evidence that the reform of the administrative system must be approached cautiously. In the present complex conditions it is this system that is enabling the economy to remain afloat, and irresponsibly wrecking it is tantamount to economic failure. Incidentally, even the most zealous advocates of the market concept are beginning to grasp this fact.

Finally, about monetary reform. Society is differentiated increasingly sharply in terms of incomes and social inequality. Dealers in the shadow economy are rubbing their hands in satisfaction, while the army of nearly 40 million workers on the poverty line can hardly make ends meet. Is it not time at last to put an end to futile discussions and decide in a principled way, without abstract arguments, this question: To which social groups is it advantageous (or conversely disadvantageous) to carry out monetary reform, what are the conditions for its implementation, and what goals should it pursue?

In the working people's minds monetary reform is directly associated with the idea of social justice and is seen as a realistic way to bring about the recovery of the ruble and stabilize its purchasing power. Naturally, this reform could prove useless if it is carried out in isolation from other economic recovery measures. It is a question of reliably closing sources of unearned funds, eliminating the cooperatives' role as channels whereby "noncash" rubles are transferred into cash circulation, strengthening financial discipline, reforming the financial and credit system, pricing, and banking activity, and going over to an efficient system of taxation. Only after the adoption of these measures can the question be raised of indexation of the cost of living and social protection for the population with fixed incomes and for low-paid categories of working people.

The barriers of dogmatic accretions from the past must be removed from the path of economic reforms, and the directions and possible consequences of radical transformations must be soberly and carefully evaluated. It is necessary to reckon with the realities of the economic and social milieu in which we live, and even with the stereotypes in thinking and behavior that we have cultivated in people's minds even in the recent past. Much remains to be done in other spheres too, which at first glance appear far removed from the economy—general culture and education, vocational training, the style of activity... All this should not be mechanically copied from foreign models, but cautiously and skillfully interwoven into the specific traditions, national characteristics, and cultural values of our peoples.

Presidential Council's Shatalin on Economic Reform

PM2504161190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Interview with Academician S.S. Shatalin, member of the USSR Presidential Council, by Aleksandr Voznesenskiy: "Academician Stanislav Shatalin: The Risk of Going Over to a Market Is Less Than the Cost of Marking Time"; date, place not given]

[Text] [Voznesenskiy] Stanislav Sergeyevich, the question submitted to the joint session of the Federation Council and the USSR Presidential Council is very topical. Our economy really is "suspended" in the transitional, interim state characterized as a crisis state. There is still no wholesale market, and the retail market long since ceased to exist. On the other hand, there is a market of coupons, of coupons for coupons, workplace merchandise sales, etc. It seems that in a little while longer we, like semiprimitive commodity producers, will go over to simply exchanging the products of labor. Why have we come to this pass? For there are examples where certain countries have begun transformations later than us but achieved far more.

[Shatalin] It is difficult to answer unequivocally. I am certainly not saying this in order to avoid giving a direct answer. The point is that when people compare our reform with the transformations in the GDR or Hungary, for example, where more has been done in two or three months than we have done in five years of perestroyka, this is understandable and explicable on an emotional level. But from the viewpoint of a professional economist such conclusions sound flippant, to say the least. This is, above all, because the said countries (and I could extend the list of them) are at the center of Europe, where social democratic, economic, market traditions have long existed and without interruption. Although they have lost something in recent years, the skills and culture of the nation and the working person have nonetheless been preserved.

[Voznesenskiy] And yet five years have already passed. A considerable time at today's pace of sociopolitical and socioeconomic development...

[Shatalin] Forgive me, but this is once again a dilettante approach. Let us be honest and objective. Perestroyka is into its fifth year. But we formulated the ideas of the economic reform only in June 1987, and the first steps were taken only at the beginning of 1988. So it is, in my opinion, premature to speak of the failure of a reform

that has been under way just two years. In addition, today it is possible to state almost with confidence that the economic transformations are receiving ever-greater political support. Consequently, the five years of perestroyka have not been wasted.

Further. Throughout the past decades we gave up a mass of concepts and virtually destroyed institutions inherent in a normal market economy. What are prices, inflation, credit, currency exchange rates, interest rates, etc? You will find few specialists today with a full grasp of this, for more than one generation of Soviet economists has been brought up on quite different concepts. Therefore, before looking for the forces slowing down perestroyka in the Central Committee or the government (I am not saying that such forces do not exist there), I would suggest that critics—economists in particular—think about their own competence. For the overwhelming majority of them do not understand what a modern market economy is, or how to build it. And this is a real fact, another of the reasons for the economic reform's slow progress.

I have recently been accused of becoming almost an apologist for Gorbachev, Ryzhkov, and their program. This is quite wrong. But I realize that even they, who began perestroyka, cannot—or, if you like, do not have this biological possibility—instantly change their philosophy and switch from the established way of thinking to the new realities. They, like everyone else, spent decades absorbing the idea of a rigid plan and a technocratic approach to resolving economic questions. And, in criticizing them, we forget about this.

Only now that the euphoria of the first years is over have they (and many of us, too) begun to realize that under our conditions it is impossible to go over in two or three years to an economy of a fundamentally new type without losses and costs—economic, political, psychological. And those who declare that we could have a new economy as early as 1991-1992 are, in my opinion, simply adventurists.

In complaining of the reform's sluggishness we fail to take account of one more factor: A large section of the working people is not prepared to accept new technologies and an entire new economic structure as a whole. Our people are talented, but they have forgotten how to work and have grown accustomed to freeloading.

[Voznesenskiy] Does this mean that you disagree with the radical economists' proposal to introduce real market relations without delay and with selling everything at free market prices?

[Shatalin] Absolutely, since this would be more terrible than the great crisis of the late twenties and early thirties. What is needed above all is preparation and a well-considered market infrastructure: a new financial-credit, monetary, currency, price, and fiscal policy, a banking system (including a reserve system), a social protection mechanism, and much besides. Without all this only kamikazes seeking simultaneously to destroy the country can introduce a market today.

But this certainly does not mean that we cannot give the economy's further development a strong boost over the next year or two, remove social tension, and make people really feel that the right direction has been chosen.

[Voznesenskiy] The conditions necessary for a switch to a new economy, which you have enumerated, are in fact levers for state regulation of the market...

[Shatalin] Naturally. And the degree of state influence on the market in our country initially must be greater than in countries that have already traveled this path. For the market has taken shape over millennia before us.

It is, of course, possible to act according to Napoleon's principle: The chief thing is to do battle, and then we shall see. This sounds fine, and he undoubtedly was a talented military leader. But he battled Russia and got bogged down.

[Voznesenskiy] So maybe the deterioration in the economy over the past few years is connected precisely with the fact that we were acting according to the Napoleonic principle: We introduced some elements of the market mechanism but failed to create state regulation mechanisms consonant with them, did we not?

[Shatalin] We not only failed to create them but also strengthened (I do not know whether intentionally or not) the former management mechanism. We left the majority of ministries, enlarged some of them by merging them, and said: Just coordinate your sector's activity now, and nothing more. But we left all material resources at their disposal, i.e. we created still more gigantic monopolies capable of living without any technical progress just by raising prices. And at the same time we also urge them to struggle against the monopolism of their own enterprises. In my opinion the Soviet economy in general is the most monopolized economy in the world. This means that we must also think about how to overcome the long-standing monopoly of the state and its organs on decisionmaking.

Let us return, however, to the idea of introducing a market without delay, and let us examine it from a purely economic position. For we have a Far Eastern market, an East Siberian market, a Baltic market, a Central Asian market, and a mass of others. They all differ substantially from one another, and each one has its own traditions, culture, religion, level of corruption, attitude toward private property, etc. So we still have a long, long way to go to the concept of a single market.

[Voznesenskiy] To continue this thought, it is necessary to gradually create conditions for a switch to a new economy in each region separately, and then unite everything in a single market. But how, then, are we to view your, quite frankly, harsh criticism of regional economic accountability?

[Shatalin] In my opinion regional economic accountability is a phantasmagoria. It sounds roughly like economic accountability of the Council of Ministers, the

KGB, or the Supreme Soviet. The point is that the majority of campaigners for regional economic accountability invest this concept with political meaning above all. But for me economic accountability is a purely economic concept, realized only in systems which really produce output and services. For it is not a region that produces output but specific enterprises.

We have created a totally abnormal nomenclature economy: enterprises of union jurisdiction, union republic jurisdiction, republic jurisdiction, etc. Today all republics are hampered by enterprises of union jurisdiction. OK, let us hand them over to the republics. What will change? Nothing! They will simply get new chiefs. To whom are Mitsubishi or General Motors subordinate? The president? Some state or prefecture? No, they are subordinate only to the economic and juridical laws of the state in question.

Therefore, for the time being the Ukraine, Kirghizia, Lithuania, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, and all the other republics are constituent parts of one state; business on their territory has nothing to do with them. They are governed only by the economy, the market. The authority—I repeat—intervenes only when juridical norms are violated. And it supports business if there is an interest in developing it. The basic function of the authority is to tackle social questions on its territory. Build roads, feed the unemployed, improve medical services and trade. It is also possible to tackle production activity which accords with local interests.

We make business (enterprises) have social development and housing construction funds and oblige it to grow vegetables and fatten piglets. It is possible to transfer the Kuzbass to economic accountability, and, instead of extracting coal, it will grow potatoes. It is the local authority's job to provide the population with what the region lacks. Or to create conditions for the emergence of the appropriate independently run enterprise.

[Voznesenskiy] But for this the local authority must possess considerable means.

[Shatalin] Right. And it is necessary "just" to create an adequate mechanism for forming the local (municipal), republic, and union budgets by means of taxes on enterprises (of any "jurisdiction") and on the population. Then taxpayers will be able to call their authorities to account for the quality of their social policy. And the problem of enterprises of union and other jurisdiction will also be resolved. Unfortunately, this is not yet the case. There is only talk of transferring all power to the soviets of people's deputies. And the question of money and the local budget takes second place. What kind of power is it without money? In my opinion this simply discredits Soviet power.

[Voznesenskiy] OK, the question seems clear with regard to processing enterprises and those who produce the end product. But who owns the natural resources, extracting enterprises, and their products: gas, oil, gold, diamonds? Certain concepts of economic independence advance the idea of the region's exclusive ownership of them.

[Shatalin] Extracting enterprises, like all others, must belong to the economy and to no one else. As for natural resources, if a region is separated by borders from the country, they become the region's property. But if it is not separated, then the resources belong to the USSR as a whole. They are its property. This thesis was removed from the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform, but I will continue to champion it. Imagine: Gold belongs exclusively to Kolyma, diamonds to Yakutia, oil to Tyumen, nickel to Norilsk. What are the Non-Chernozem Zone, the Baltic region, and others in whose land God did not place resources to do? They will have to accept any terms laid down by the monopolists, and all this will be called regional economic accountability.

[Voznesenskiy] How, then, are relations to be built with extracting enterprises? It turns out, on the one hand, that they are subordinate only to the laws of economics and the state while, on the other, the resources extracted by them are not their property but the property of the whole people. In this situation how are we to avoid violating one of the basic principles of independent management—freedom in selling the output produced?

[Shatalin] There may be exceptional instances where an extracting enterprise is subordinate to the state and sells all output in accordance with state orders. For example, a unique project such as the Norilsk combine. But all the rest operate according to normal market laws and sell the resources extracted by them according to requests from purchasers. These purchasers might include the government, if it needs certain resources to fulfill statewide programs. For it is a perfectly normal term—"government purchases"—and normal economic relations. For God's sake, let the state order gold, tanks, aircraft, and everything it needs from free enterprises. But there is no need to subordinate these enterprises to it. As for fears that free producers will rush to sell their products on the world market to the detriment of our domestic market, in my opinion they are naive. What, then, is the state regulation of market relations for? Why does an instrument such as licensing exist?

[Voznesenskiy] To take a theoretical view, the thesis that the overwhelming mass of enterprises belongs exclusively to the economy seems very attractive. But you will agree that, like any theory, it is somewhat abstract. It is still easy to "hitch" to it the equally theoretically abstract thesis of the entire people's ownership of the means of production. In real life and in economic practice we have to find if not the owners then at least the proprietors of these enterprises. Who are they?

[Shatalin] If we arrive at normal (from an economic, not an ideological viewpoint) enterprise, I am sure that share ownership is the optimum for us. Consequently, the proprietors of enterprises are shareholders, although this does not sound absolutely correct from the position of pure science. However, there is an "underwater reef"

here for our thinking today. The point is that by buying shares in the Norilsk combine, for example, I automatically become a private owner exploiting someone else's labor. And I must not engage in self-deception. No one is opposed to people getting interest on honestly earned money invested in the Savings Bank. And yet interest is private property just the same.

[Voznesenskiy] At present shares are sold primarily to the working people of a given enterprise. From the viewpoint of ideology all is upright here: The working person works himself and gets an income himself, and so there is no exploitation. But in the long term, it seems to me, this idyll could be destroyed.

[Shatalin] Imagine that you work at a plant producing electronic equipment, while I work at a small boot cream factory. Each of us has shares only in his own enterprise. But you get an income many times larger than mine, even if we work equally well. Therefore, forgive me, the sale of shares only to the working people of a given enterprise is another instance of demagoguery, which will lead inevitably to still greater property stratification.

[Voznesenskiy] And yet the possibility cannot be ruled out that, given the absolutely free sale of shares, they will be bought up by the representatives of "shady business." What about social justice then?

[Shatalin] There are many antimonopoly and other measures being applied successfully in many countries. And I believe that part of this arsenal could suit us too.

As for "shady business," I have my own viewpoint on this. In our present economic situation many of its representatives are clever, businesslike people who profit from the slow and sluggish nature of the socioeconomic system. While this system is still thinking, they are already acting and responding to buyers' needs. The state economy cannot compete with them, but it can suppress them administratively, juridically, with its monopoly on resources, etc. And this will always be so until we create a normal economy. Of course, the representatives of "shady business" include many out-and-out thieves and scoundrels against who must be combated. But this is a job for the special organs and the law. Catch them, put them behind bars, but remember the Russian saying: "If he has not been caught, he is not a thief." And do not tar everyone with the same brush.

[Voznesenskiy] What is your attitude toward the government's program? Is it possible within its framework to arrive at those very normal economic relations?

[Shatalin] The program approved by the Second Congress of People's Deputies suffered from a number of shortcomings:

it relied too heavily on the effectiveness of the administrative-edict methods, whereas they are no longer capable of managing the economy at all successfully;

it contained too much unwarranted optimism and too many poorly substantiated macroeconomic and sectoral indicators of the efficiency and use of production resources;

the program contained virtually no realistic market economy methods for enhancing the balanced nature of socioeconomic development.

Since I am a member of the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Economic Reform, I am responsible for formulating it. But, to be fair, I will say that I criticized the program at the USSR Council of Ministers session 25 November 1989, and I believe that, not only to my regret, a number of criticisms were not taken into account. But of course, it is not just a matter of this excuse.

In the first quarter of 1990 the national economy is not developing as the government program intended. The consumer market is collapsing still further. The "chances" of increasing the state budget deficit are growing, and living standards are falling.

In this situation the country's leadership adopted the important political decision to radicalize the course of the reform and to take more decisive steps toward a regulated, socially protected market. The government's corresponding proposals were examined at a joint session of the Federation Council and the USSR Presidential Council chaired by USSR President M.S. Gorbachev. The session examined cardinal problems of changing the USSR economic system, and their thrust stems in full from the CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th party congress. Everyone agreed with the political decision to move toward a modern regulated market, seeing this as the only way to extricate the national economy from the crisis, to ensure greater efficiency in the use of production resources, to raise the population's living standards, and to create a real economic basis for strengthening our federation. At one stage the government asked for 15 months to stabilize the economy. Just over eight months remain—so the baby can still be born.

[Voznesenskiy] Well, what must be done to ensure that the "baby" is not stillborn nonetheless?

[Shatalin] What is needed is quick and comprehensive, yet minutely considered, actions. At the session everyone spoke of the need for social protection, primarily for badly-off and averagely well-off sections of the population, and of minimizing the social cost of the economy's radical perestroyka, although I believe it is still necessary to demonstrate whether it must be paid and who must pay it. In any case, to argue professionally, the risk of going over to a regulated market is far less than the cost of marking time.

One of the hardest problems of an efficient transitional period consists—I emphasize—in simultaneously creating a balance in the national economy, improving the economy's financial health by reducing the abnormally

large state budget deficit, setting up an anti-inflation mechanism, and giving the economy a dynamic boost on the basis of real pluralism of all ownership institutions—including private ownership in all its forms—by encouraging free enterprise in every possible way. The sectoral production ministries, which are, as we have already said, one of the chief factors of inefficient monopoly development, must be eliminated as quickly as possible. Many people at the session emphasized the need to "tie up hot money," sharply increase the issue of shares and bonds, and sell enterprises' above-normative stocks.

I agree with those who believe that we will not build a modern efficient economy without large-scale cooperation with the West in various forms: importing consumer goods and capital, and exporting and importing "brains," which, unfortunately, are now "draining" out of our country without payment. It is necessary to encourage not only the creation of joint ventures but also direct foreign investments on USSR territory. We have had enough of bewailing the fact that the government sells off natural resources with no concern for our grandchildren. It is not this but something else that is terrible: We make rapacious use of these resources, cast them to the winds, and live—unlike the whole civilized world—according to the "dog in the manger" principle and the idea that "if things are going to be bad, then they must be bad for everyone."

Of course, as many people at the session emphasized, we must urgently implement a broad and profound land reform and create a new type of agrarian relations. It seems to me that it is necessary to sell land to city people too, without frightening society with the fact that the bigwigs of the "shadow economy" will buy it. If you are afraid of wolves, don't go into the forest. Or will we go on living on the edge of the forest for another generation?

We must think through and adopt a broad conversion program without delay and use the most advanced technologies both to export and to saturate the domestic market. Cutting military spending at the same time, of course. It is economic adventurism to maintain the world's largest army and at the same time raise the living standards of the population in a poor country.

In addition, it is very important to create without delay normal conditions for the work of cooperatives, which I consider one of the most important engines of our economy. We need a preferential policy for supplying them, economically substantiated taxation, etc.

I cannot agree with the thesis that we will be casting doubt on the country's future if we sharply reduce production capital investments. It is necessary to further reduce funding (both centralized and local) for production construction because, given the present volume of both monetary and material resources, we cannot cope with this program. I am sure that we will not undermine the future of our development in this way. Moreover, by channeling the funds released into the modernization of existing production facilities, we will be able to give a boost to the consumer market. Of course, there will be no substantial changes in a single year, but it is perfectly realistic to convert "incomplete construction" into consumer goods inside two or three years. In addition, by closing down new construction projects, we will remove from the money flows the wages which at present are only "making air" and which will only begin bringing in a return in some five years' time.

Of course, the market deficit is terrible, and price formation is wild. But, however concerned I am for the people's lot, a reform of retail prices must be implemented. Probably not this year, but certainly in 1991. Of course, I would like the whole population to be compensated for the expense, but I will say as an economist and a mathematician that this task is practically insoluble. So I believe that the most highly paid sections of the population must be excluded from the program to compensate for the growth in prices.

And finally, in my view, we must arrange for the optimum correlation between the results of labor and incomes without ruining—and even by strengthening—the mechanisms to motivate labor and the efficient use of resources. I assert as a professional: Practically the entire increase in the population's monetary income over the past two years, this entire avalanche-like growth, has not been earned. Hence the growth in the budget deficit and the impoverishment of the consumer market. The reason for this is, on the one hand, the shortsightedness of the economic policy of a leadership which "forgot" that several mechanisms exist for turning cashless money into ready cash.

On the other hand, it is also the fault of the enterprises themselves which fail to display proper economic ethics and live the life of economic timeservers. If I were head of government I would say to enterprise leaders and workers today: You accuse us of working badly and not giving you economic freedom. Well, to some extent you are right. But you too work to such low professional standards. You cannot be relied upon, and you have no business ethics.

[Voznesenskiy] And yet, from the position of the worker whom you are addressing as head of government, it is possible to reply: I have been underpaid for decades and, although I am not producing more output today, for the first time there is a hope of getting as much as I should have been getting all these years.

[Shatalin] Yes, it is necessary to increase the wages of many categories of working people even if they have not formally increased their contribution to the national income. But this must be done professionally. Yet we opened the monetary "floodgates" for everyone at once in an economically incompetent manner, regardless of even the most immediate consequences. But I repeat: The enterprises themselves also bear an equal share of the responsibility for the situation which has been created. They realized the proclaimed principle of socialist enterprise in the worst version of a market economy.

As a result, the situation is as follows: Like it or not, we must set about limiting monetary incomes. However, as already stated, without undermining the mechanisms for motivating labor: more output or services—more (with no farfetched limitations) pay. For the time being this will have to be done to a considerable extent administratively, while in the future the functions of a regulator will inevitably pass to the market.

[Voznesenskiy] How is all the aforesaid to be viewed: as your personal viewpoint? Or as the opinion of several members of the Presidential Council? Or is it a specific program of measures approved by the president?

[Shatalin] It is beyond doubt that this is not only my viewpoint. But I think the USSR president himself will tell the people what he will do.

[Voznesenskiy] Your prognosis for 1990?

[Shatalin] I HOPE THAT WE WILL ACQUIRE THE DYNAMIC.

Military

Officers Engineer Deputy's Expulsion From CPSU

PM0105094590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Viktor Filippov report under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Why Was People's Deputy Expelled From the Party"]

[Text] Vologda—"USSR People's Deputy Major V. Lopatin was expelled from the CPSU 26 April, a day before the oblast party conference..."

That is how I thought I would begin my speech at the conference, to which I had been elected as a delegate from Vologda's city party organization. I sent two notes to the presidium. They did not give me the floor. But since V. Lopatin's fate concerns the interests of tens of thousands of his voters and is connected with the problems of democratizing life within the party, I decided to send my undelivered speech to the newspaper.

Maj. V. Lopatin was expelled from the CPSU in his absence, I would have told the conference delegates. A meeting of the staff directorate's primary party organization was organized on a day when Vladimir Nikolayevich was receiving voters. A number of events preceded his expulsion.

At the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies V. Lopatin spoke of the need for Army reform and criticized the Defense Ministry for building dachas for the top brass at a time when many thousands of officers' families are languishing without apartments. Soon afterward the troop unit where he is serving received a letter from Colonel General V. Korobushin and Colonel V. Chernysh at the Defense Ministry. They charged the people's deputy with disclosing military secrets in the article "Defending the Defender" (KOMMUNIST, No. 3, 1990) and demanded an "examination of the action taken by Communist V.N. Lopatin," whose conduct, in their opinion, "is unworthy of an officer and incompatible with membership of the CPSU."

A special service checks every manuscript before it is published in a mass publication to see whether it contains state, military, or other secrets. Thus the charge against the major ought to have been seriously investigated before. However, Colonel G. Bobin, chief of the troop unit's political department, gave orders to the secretary of the officers' mess party organization where political worker V. Lopatin was registered to immediately investigate his action. Communists from the primary party organization failed to find any grounds for instituting proceedings against their comrade. Then the political department disbanded this primary organization and on 23 April Maj. V. Lopatin was registered with the staff directorate party organization and three days later expelled from the CPSU.

I am not sure that the USSR people's deputy was treated fairly. I would ask delegates to the oblast party conference to set up a commission. Let it conduct an objective investigation into this matter.

That is all that I wanted to tell the delegates. However, my applications to speak were "disposed of" and I had to send a third note to the presidium asking for just a vote on the proposal to set up a commission to study Maj. V. Lopatin's case. The note was read out. Maj. A. Stolyarov, a colleague of USSR People's Deputy V. Lopatin, took the rostrum. This is the crux of what he said: Lopatin was expelled for losing his links with the primary party organization (where he was registered for just three days!—V.F.) and also for ducking party and official duties. Moreover, Lopatin had not paid his dues since last November.

Maj. Gen. V. Zhdanov, who spoke immediately after, said that Lopatin had been charged with disrupting the University of Marxism-Leninism.

Both failed to mention the Defense Ministry letter. I went up to the major during the recess.

"Why didn't I tell conference delegates about this letter," A. Stolyarov repeated my question. "I forgot."

The proposal to set up a commission to investigate V. Lopatin's case was not put to the vote either.

After the conference I found out that V. Lopatin's party membership card contains notes regarding his payment of membership dues through April 1990. In my view, the charge of "ducking official duties" is also groundless since it is at variance with the law "On the Status of

People's Deputy in the USSR." Maj. V. Lopatin heads a group of deputies working on the draft military reform and carries out numerous instructions from his voters; no one has the right to obstruct this activity.

"But the status of people's deputy does not seem to exist for my commanders," V. Lopatin said.

The oblast conference interrupted its work 28 April for two weeks—until the end of the elections of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress. Maj. V. Lopatin was also nominated a candidate delegate shortly before his expulsion from the party...

Yazov To Inspect 9 May Victory Parade

LD0205103390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1000 GMT 2 May 90

[Text] The country's workers are celebrating the world day of international solidarity,, but another important event lies ahead: the 45th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War. As is made clear by an order by the commander of the Moscow City Garrison, received today, a parade by troops of the Moscow Garrison is set for 1000 on 9 May on Red Square, in honor of this date. It will be received by Marshal of the Soviet Union Yazov, minister of defense of the USSR.

Baltic Republics

Lithuania To Discuss Compromise With Moscow

LD0105221890 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 1 May 90

[Text] The Lithuanian government is going to discuss the possibility of a compromise with Moscow tomorrow.

According to the Voice of America in its broadcast in Lithuanian, the head of the Lithuanian government, Kazimieria Prunskiene, has stated in Canada that Lithuania will never agree to renounce the act of independence or to revoke it in any other way. The only possibility is a slackened process of achieving real independence. However, international guarantees are necessary for that, stated the prime minister.

Landsbergis on European Letter, Negotiations

LD0105160990 Vilnius Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 1 May 90

[Radio address by Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council of the republic of Lithuania; date and place not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] Esteemed fellow citizens and those who are listening to us. Lately there has been much talk and comment concerning positions taken by the leadership of Lithuania, the leadership of the Soviet Union, and heads of state of Western Europe, including France and West Germany who sent a joint letter to the chairman of the Supreme Council of the republic of Lithuania, in other words, to me.

This letter has been reported in the press and the reports were rather inaccurate, as was the interpretation that followed.

Besides expressing support for the independence of Lithuania, there are also proposals in the letter to discuss the possibility of suspending legal acts. It referred to the decisions, but of course it meant legal acts—to suspend the consequences of these decisions to facilitate the possibility of starting negotiations. This passage and quotations of individual words were given a double interpretation. [Words indistinct] to some extent in the press of the republic of Lithuania, as if the issue at stake were the suspension of freezing up, as some put it, of the legal acts themselves without suspending the operation of these acts.

When we received this text, we received it on the same day and we were preoccupied with its translation, we realized that the issue at stake was the consequences, which is the exact translation of a French word l'effet, effects, we can say like this. And this double interpretation became the subject of talks in the capitals of Western Europe. The following day an explanation came from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs which said, in particular, that what has been proposed was suspending the results of adopted decisions so that negotiations could start. The administration in Vilnius, with which our diplomatic services maintain a permanent contact, did not go wrong in this respect. These are the exact words of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

So there was no question of a mistake. [words indistinct] since TASS very often, alas, writes untruths. Well, for us the most important thing is to make clear why [words indistinct]. Lithuania's position should be clear, although people are trying to delay [words indistinct] its independence on the legal level and is striving for a real, effective independence in those areas where it does not have it. For this, time is needed, negotiations are needed, and agreements with the Soviet Union, and, in conclusion, a transfer of all levers of control which [words indistinct]. [passage omitted]

Pressure is being put not only on Lithuania. I have here a report from Estonia, an official report from the Estonian news agency. First, the government of Estonia has discussed at its session the question of supplies to Lithuania. The point is that on 19 April, the Estonian railroad received from the USSR Ministry of Railways a telegram with instructions not to handle goods for dispatch to Lithuania. The telegram also included a long list of those goods, raw materials, and foodstuffs that must not be sent to Lithuania. It may be assumed that restrictive measures were given not only to the Estonian railwaymen. The government of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic instructed the Estonian railroad to continue transporting goods to Lithuania in order to ensure the full execution of all contracts concluded with enterprises and trade organizations of Estonia. [Words indistinct] the Ministry of Transport of the republic was given a corresponding instruction. You may have read in the papers that the minister of railways is twisting and turning, alleging that he had not issued such an instruction to the railways, but it is obvious that it exists [words indistinct] nondelivery or transit through Lithuania of goods which our enterprises need [words indistinct] in order to allow them to work normally, [words indistinct] deliveries to the Soviet Union for enterprises there which are now also suffering losses, and damage is being done in general to the already very weak economic system of the Soviet Union. So there is this insistence to break Lithuania by any means. Comrade Ryzhkov says that presidential rule needs to be introduced in Lithuania and other places. Why does not Gorbachev [words indistinct]. I am confident that a policy from a position of strength will not be able to create the favorable atmosphere necessary for a start of negotiations on matters in dispute. [passage indistinct]

Landsbergis Interviewed on Mitterand-Kohl Letter

PM0105142490 Paris LE FIGARO in French 30 Apr 90 p 32

[Interview with Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis by Pierre Bocev—date and place not given]

[Excerpt] [Bocev] You have just received a letter from President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl asking you to "suspend the effects" of Lithuania's declaration of independence in order to start dialogue with the Kremlin. How do you view this initiative?

[Landsbergis] It is entirely positive. This letter calls for dialogue to be started immediately and we are prepared to do that even if Moscow does nothing. In addition, it highlights our right to independence which is consistent with our position. With regard to the suspension measure which it suggests, this deserves to be studied very closely. We are now drawing up a reply to this message. Our answer should ask the French president and the German chancellor not to stop at this letter but to continue their initiative.

[Bocev] To start dialogue with Moscow, what practical measures can Lithuania suspend?

[Landsbergis] It is easier to say what cannot be suspended. There can be no discussion on our declaration of independence. The reason for this is very simple: This 11 March declaration is the basis of our provisional Constitution and the legislation without which our country cannot survive. Depriving us of a Constitution, accepting that the USSR's Constitution should again be in force on our territory would amount to saying that we are willingly joining the Soviet state. That is naturally out of the question, even on a temporary basis. Aside from that, all the legislation adopted since 11 March is open to discussion. This is also true of the principle of a transitional period for the implementation of our independence. But, I repeat, everything which Moscow regards as a problem in our relations, everything which the Kremlin deems to be an obstacle to opening dialogue can be the subject of discussion.

[Bocev] This is precisely the wish expressed by Francois Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl....

[Landsbergis] Yes, but I would still like to draw attention to one point. After the publication of this letter, the French president stressed that the present situation cannot be compared to that of Munich in 1938 because there is at present no power driven by imperial ambitions. I do not agree. For we Lithuanians it is perfectly clear that this is untrue. We see that such a power exists.

[Bocev] According to you, the USSR is still a power with imperial designs. Is that despite Gorbachev?

[Landsbergis] Yes, despite Gorbachev. We are now exploring the limits of the "new thinking." We have reached these limits and what have we found? Quite simply the very old thinking of the Russian empire.

[Bocev] It is sometimes suggested that Mikhail Gorbachev would be prepared for dialogue but not with you, that he would like a different interlocutor because he finds you too intransigent.

[Landsbergis] I cannot comment on the ideas attributed to somebody else. At all events, I can assure you that we have not heard anything of the kind. These are ideas which, I think, the Soviet press is trying to launch.

[Bocev] Another rumor is that there is talk of you abandoning your post to obtain medical treatment in the United States. A period of two years has even been mentioned....

[Landsbergis] That is news to me. This is another major red herring. But perhaps it is a secret proposal which is being made to persuade me to leave my country.....

[Bocev] I was not asked to convey it.... To complete the subject of rumors, what is the state of your relations with Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene? Scandalmongers are talking of a political crisis.

[Landsbergis] We have no problem. Each of us has our own sphere of activity, she has the government, I have parliament, and we have very good relations, we consult each other frequently, and there is a series of meetings which we are holding together.

[Bocev] Is this also true of Algirdas Brazauskas, the leader of the pro-independence Communist Party who holds the post of deputy prime minister and who some present as the Kremlin's preferred interlocutor?

[Landsbergis] There is no conflict between us. Some people are artificially creating problems. There are Communist Party apparatchiks who are trying to do that. It is the Moscow press which is suggesting that Brazauskas would do better than I in starting dialogue with the Kremlin. They are simply trying to divide us.

[Bocev] What do you think would enable you to persuade Moscow to lift the economic blockade which Lithuania is suffering and, at the same time, to start negotiations with Gorbachev?

[Landsbergis] This brings us back to the letter sent by Mitterrand and Kohl. We are prepared to have discussions and we have said that from the first day. The rest depends on Moscow. The method of issuing ultimatums is not the right one, it must be abandoned. In any event, we will have serious problems in adapting to the new conditions and, in particular, organizing an entirely different foreign trade from what we had in the past. We will have to find other sources of supply and above all we will have to learn to do without some products. But I am certain that we will succeed. [passage omitted]

Lithuania To Receive Portion of May Gas Supply

LD0205075990 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0700 GMT 2 May 90

[Text] According to a statement by the Soyuzgaz association, Lithuania will be supplied in May with 75 percent of its allocation of liquified gas.

An additional 3 million cubic meters of natural gas will be supplied to Lithuania for the needs of the Jonava

Azotas association. This quantity is almost sufficient for the enterprise's normal work. The Jonava Azotas will resume work tomorrow.

Report on Work of Antiblockade Committee

LD0105201590 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1630 GMT 1 May 90

[Report by Ceslovas Stankevicius]

[Text] I would like to describe what the Government Commission for Measures to Counter the Blockade has been doing. I also wish to say a few words about the losses we have sustained as a result of the blockade. They are great. We have already calculated that as of 28 April the losses amounted to R16 million and that approximately 13,000 people have already been laid off because raw and other materials have failed to be delivered.

[Passage indistinct] The commission examined strategic issues in a situation in which the Soviet Union halted trade links with Lithuania and halted the sales of many materials and raw materials to Lithuania. It examined the ways in which economic policy should change and what the government should do. Plans providing for such measures are being prepared for various branches of the economy. Incidentally, today we had a meeting with the minister of power engineering of Lithuania. We discussed the reconstruction of the oil enterprises and also of the Klaipeda oil depot and supplies to the Mazeikiai oil refinery. I can state today that reconstruction work in Klaipeda is taking place very intensively. The Klaipeda oil depot will be ready by mid-May to receive a small quantity of oil which we shall purchase abroad. It will subsequently be capable of receiving a large quantity—up to 10,000 tonnes per 24 hours. If we are not prevented by force from concluding trade deals, from receiving the oil in the port of Klaipeda, and from transporting it to the Mazeikiai oil refinery, as the government is planning to do, then toward the end of June we could hope that this enterprise will be able to operate, making use of the oil we purchase in other countries, if, of course, the Soviet Union continues to refuse to sell us oil, even for dollars.

When we speak of trade in petroleum products, here the government's plan is to sell a proportion of the refined oil and petroleum products to other countries and, for hard currency thus receive, we would purchase raw materials or oil in the Soviet Union or in other countries and in this way the oil trade would be profitable for Lithuania. Another direction in ensuring oil supplies is effective consultations on the possible participation of foreign firms in making use of the oil stockpiles to hand in Lithuania.

Already at this stage, wells which exist in Lithuania will be brought in and also suspended [as heard], but this quantity of oil is insignificant as far as fuel supplies are concerned. This local oil will only be used in agriculture, for agricultural purposes. In future, oil resources could be put to broad use but this does not mean that in the near future we will make do with our own oil without purchases abroad, whether in the west or in the east.

A package of economic measures is in the process of being compiled. These will make it possible to preserve the market in the conditions of today. (?The commission will deal with this subject intensively). Questions of prices for some goods, for instance gasoline or agricultural produce, will be examined.

Government information concerning exports abroad will be discussed, or heard. What information do we receive? Government policy concerning exports of goods to and imports of goods from the Soviet Union rests upon maintaining the balance: That is to say, we export as much produce to the Soviet Union as we receive from it. [passage indistinct] The government position with regard to this issue is very firm: we export to the Soviet Union as many goods as we receive.

The State Commission has set up a public commission in charge of supervising the blockade fund. As is known, people make donations to this fund in order to support those who have fallen on hard times. The work forces of enterprises, establishments, and organizations also contribute certain sums to the blockade fund from the material incentives fund and from the wages fund. It will be the public commission that will examine the issue of how much to set aside for a specific enterprise.

We are also aware that a broad movement in support of Lithuania and of rendering us assistance has got underway abroad. So, that is a kind of general report about the work of the Government Comission in Charge of Measures to Counter the Blockade.

Lithuania Supported by Moscow May Day Rally

LD0105203490 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1900 GMT 1 May 90

[Excerpt] There were two demonstrations today on Red Square in Moscow. The first demonstration was organized by the Trade Union Central Committee. It could be seen by television viewers. When the second demonstration, that of the Union of Moscow electors, started, Central Television discontinued its broadcast. The demonstration organized by the Moscow democratic forces, which was much more numerous than the first one, became a kind of manifestation in support of Lithuania. The demonstrators chanted "Freedom for Lithuania," and carried posters with the inscription "Hands off Lithuania." "There will be no free Russia without free Lithuania." The demonstrators demanded that the Soviet government resign. The Soviet leaders left the Mausoleum tribune before the end of the demonstration.

Gediminas Vaitkevicius continues the story. The recording of the first part of the telephone conversation is of a very poor technical quality, therefore we invite you to listen to the end of the story:

[Begin Gaitkevicius recording] It was very interesting to watch Gorbachev and Ryzhkov. It seemed to me that Ryzhkov behaved as if he did not hear anything. [words indistinct] Gorbachev kept his hand to his ear listening to the chanting. The chanting was so loud that it was impossible not to hear it. Then Gorbachev resumed his normal posture; no joy could be seen in his face, but his face was expessionless. I succeeded in taking his photograph then. The flags were as follows at the demonstration: the Russian tricolor, the Andreyev flag, and the Lithuanian tricolor. These were the three main flags. Some thirty percent of the posters were in support of Lithuania. When people saw somebody was from Lithuania, there were warm greetings, handshakes. One womean even [words indistinct]. People asked how they could help, maybe collect donations in cash, and so on. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Vilnius Shots, Protest Action Reported

PM3004140190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Apr 90 First Edition p 5

[Dispatch by Lieutenant Colonel O. Falichev: "Warning Protest Action"]

[Text] Vilnius—Yesterday the military township was fired on from behind the fence. Penetrating the glass, a bullet flew into the barracks sleeping quarters. This happened in Vilnius 23 April.

Alas, such incidents are no rarity in Lithuania. But it is something else that is surprising: the local law enforcement organs' indifference toward the acts of provocation against the military and members of their families. People are complaining that the laws are inoperative while the militia and the prosecutor's office are dodging the fulfillment of their direct obligations.

Back on 19 March, a house on Zhirmunu Street, where servicemen's families live, was fired on in Vilnius. The militia received a statement from victim L. Panfilova—the widow of an ensign and front line veteran who liberated Lithuania from the German fascist invaders and served here for many years. What was the reaction? After long bureaucratic delay I. Gaydukevich, chief of the Leninskiy Rayon internal affairs department, reported: "Your appeal regarding the breakage of a window has been examined. The case for criminal proceedings has been rejected..." But it was not a case of a "broken window" but of shooting at an officers' house. Incidentally, this fact is recorded in documentary form.

L. Aleksionok, chairman of the Panevezhis scientific dermatological society, addressing the committee of USSR citizens in Lithuania, reported on a soiree in the rayon culture center devoted to Lithuania independence day. The poet K. Banionis spoke. To the question how many Russians have to be killed for Lithuania to be free, he replied: We do not kill the poor, we give them a piece of bread with a piece of lard on top and send them back where they came from. The auditorium applauded loudly.

In this connection V. Shved, second secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU), suggested publishing a "white paper" which would include all cases of vandalism, insults, and acts of provocation.

The republic's government, as we can see, is living by completely different concerns. At a routine press conference Prime Minister K. Prunskiene again tried to reassure correspondents that nothing complicated is taking place in the republic in connection with the suspension of deliveries and the situation is under control.

But later—what awaits everyone is the law on provisional measures to overcome the blockade. Fines of up to R800 will be introduced for the illegal allocation of gasoline, as will ration cards for groups of goods, and dismissal without the consent of the trade union and even in disregard of the article of the criminal code.

At the same time various ways of saving fuel and energy are being widely publicized on television. For instance, there was a description of one Vilnius housewife's call to turn off the traffic lights for the night. She also advises turning off the hot water in the taps while husbands are lathering their cheeks while shaving. Well, thriftiness is a good quality. But will you save a lot while lathering your cheeks?

It was no accident that a two-hour warning action of protest by workers of the motor transport enterprises was held in Vilnius 27 April. From the morning hundreds of heavy trucks blocked the exits and entrances to the city and the main highways. The drivers demanded that they be provided with work and gasoline and expressed their dissatisfaction with the decline in their wages.

A statement which the motor transport enterprise workers passed on the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet says: "We believe the situation in the republic is becoming menacing and is causing alarm and uncertainty as to the future... We demand: fulfill the decisions of the third extraordinary Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR President or resign...

Lithuanian Supreme Council Paper Reorganized

LD0105201290 Vilnius Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 1 May 90

[Text] The Lithuanian Supreme Council Presidium decided from today to reorganize the newspaper of the Supreme Council and the Council of Ministers, VALSTYBES ZINIOS [Government News], into a government newspaper and name it LIETUVOS AIDAS [Lithuania's Echo]. Saulius Somas has been confirmed chief editor of the newspaper.

Lithuanian Trade Ties to Union Examined

904A0291B Moscow EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN in Russian No 14, Apr 90 p 5

[Article by economists B. Borisov and L. Mikhaylov: "Lithuania: On the Way to 'an Abyss?'"]

[Text] *There is an increasing number of letters in the mailbag of our weekly from readers who are concerned about the turn of events in the Baltic area, primarily in the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], and the decision made here to secede from the Soviet Union. The authors of these letters are asking: What could the economic consequences of this political decision be, what role does Lithuania play in the national economic complex of our country?*

At the request of the editorial office, economists B. Borisov and L. Mikhaylov respond to these and other questions.

Last year, the national income of the Lithuanian SSR amounted to R9.3 billion (in actual prices) an increase of 26 percent compared to 1985 (without taking into account "hidden" price increases), the five-year plan called for 16 percent. The share of the republic in the all-union generation of national income amounted to 1.4 percent. The national income generated per capita came to R2,500 which is nine percent higher than the union average.

A level of production efficiency exceeding the union average was achieved in Lithuania due to the predominance of processing branches in industry and a more developed production and social infrastructure.

Interterritorial contacts, specialization, and production sharing within the framework of the entire national economic complex influence the development of the economy greatly. The tables of intersectoral flows give data which prove this convincingly. We will use information from the current abbreviated-pattern table of intersectoral flows for 1988, work on which has now been completed by the statistical organs.

In 1988, the Lithuanian SSR shipped out (including exports) products worth R5,958 million, and shipped in (including imports) R7,488 million worth. Thus, the overall balance of the exchange of goods was unfavorable—R1,530 billion (in 1987, it amounted to "minus" R1,098 million).

The overall exchange of goods of the Lithuanian SSR amounted to R13.4 billion, of which the union republics accounted for 87 percent, and foreign countries—for the rest. However, the negative balance is to a considerable degree due to foreign economic contacts (47 percent of the total amount).

The Lithuanian SSR, which has limited natural resources, imports refinery products and gas (overall unfavorable balance of R563 million), ferrous and nonferrous metals ("minus" R538 million), as well as many kinds of chemical products ("minus" 467 million), machinery and equipment ("minus" 624 million), and some types of vegetables, fruits, and other types of foodstuffs (sugar, vegetable oil, and so on).

At the same time, the Lithuanian SSR has an active balance in the exchange of foodstuffs on the whole (primarily, due to meat products and dairy products, fish, and eggs) and non-food consumer goods (mainly due to light industry products, as well as furniture, household refrigerators, TV sets, bicycles, and mopeds).

It is important to note that the Lithuanian SSR imports annually more than 1 million tons of grain for meat and milk production, raw materials for the textile industry (including cotton lint and wool), hides, other types of raw materials, and subassemblies for the electrotechnical and radiotechnical industries.

The case of the Lithuanian SSR, as well as some other union republics, shows that the smaller the region is the more intensive its economic contacts with other regions are. This is shown by the quite high share of imports in the republic's consumption (27 percent) and the share of exports in production (22 percent). In large republics, these shares are lower. For example, in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] they amount to 15 and 12 percent respectively.

The above data suggest unequivocally that the operation of the national economy of not only the Lithuanian SSR but also of other republics, especially small ones, is virtually impossible in the absence of importing fuel and raw-material resources, many types of machines and equipment, and chemical products.

For example, let us look at the contacts of individual industries of the Lithuanian SSR. The republic has achieved a comparatively high degree of meeting its needs for motor gasoline, diesel fuel, and heavy fuel oil with its own products. However, oil imported from the RSFSR is the raw material.

Close mutual contacts between the Lithuanian SSR and other republics are also due to the diversity of the types of products. There are continuous exchanges of assortments. Thus, synthetic resins and plastics shipped from the republic to the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, and the Belorussian SSR account for 65 percent of the volume of production, and those shipped in from these republics for 53 percent of consumption, for paper—67 and 70 percent respectively, and for cardboard—71 and 78 percent.

The Lithuanian SSR is fully supplied with trucks, bulldozers, self-propelled cranes, truck and tractor trailers, cultivators, tractor mowers and seeders, grain and potato harvesting combines, construction and road-maintenance equipment, power equipment, and so on due to shipments from the RSFSR, with tractor plows and machinery for the application of mineral fertilizer due to shipments from the Ukrainian SSR, and with tractors due to shipments from the Belorussian SSR.

At the same time, 98 percent of the sets of equipment for producing mixed feed pellets and 97 percent of metal-cutting machine tools are shipped beyond the republic's borders.

Enterprises from Vladimir, Pskov, Yaroslavl, Leningrad Oblast, Udmurtia, Donetsk, the Bashkir ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic], and so on provide subcontracted supplies for the output of the Neris Production Association—the only enterprise in the country producing aggregates for preparing grass meal, as well as the leading producer of equipment for granulating it.

The Elfa Production Association of the Lithuanian SSR, which is one of the largest producers of electric motors for washing machines and other consumer goods, receives the dynamo [dinamnuyu] steel necessary for its production from Cherepovets and Karaganda, enameled cables from the Pskovkabel, Kamkabel, and other enterprises, insulation materials from enterprises in the Moscow area, and so on.

World-market prices are less advantageous for the Lithuanian SSR than prices in effect within the country, as is the case with a majority of union republics. As is known, the products of the light and food industries are valued relatively lower than in the union market, whereas refinery products, gas, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, and many types of machinery are valued higher in the world market than inside the country. This allows many republics to actually have an advantage, given the exchange of goods at the prices which have formed inside the country, when they acquire raw- material resources and export the products of the light and food industries.

Thus, oil received by Lithuania in 1988 was worth R399 million, and gas R118 million, whereas in world prices they would have cost 1,319 and 253 million respectively, but this time in foreign-currency rubles. On the other hand, in terms of world prices the republic would have failed to receive considerable funds for the exports of its traditional goods: knitted goods, meat and meat products, fish and fish products, and some other goods. Calculated in world prices and in foreign currency, the Lithuanian SSR would have imported products worth R7,839, and would have exported R4,152 million worth, that is, the negative balance would have amounted to 3,687 million foreign-currency rubles rather than R1,530 million. This is a great deal, even if we assume in principle that the republic would be able to give up some purchases in the environment of a shortage. It is also a lot because the republic managed to receive only 500 million foreign-currency rubles from exports in 1988.

Incidentally, exactly one-half of the currency was generated by the exports of refinery products from the Lithuanian SSR which were, once again, produced from imported oil.

The tremendous dependence of the republic's national economy on the existing union market and close economic cooperation with other union republics virtually rule out an opportunity to switch rapidly to the markets of other countries without serious, if not irreparably crippling, self-inflicted damage.

Future Baltic-Soviet Economic Ties Viewed

90UN1614A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 17, 25 Apr 90 p 14

[Article by M. Bronshteyn, USSR people's deputy: "The Baltic Knot"]

[Text] **Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia—these republics are now at the center of public attention in the country and the world.**

Today we are publishing an article by Academician M. Bronshteyn analyzing the situation in the region.

The newspaper intends to continue with the subject. In the next issue of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA you will read a report from the meeting of the USSR people's deputies club devoted to problems of the federation, confederation, and the community of republics.

The knot is tied tightly. Historians will be figuring out who exerted more effort for a long time to come. But now this is a reality on which the future not only of the Baltic area but also the Union, Europe, and ultimately the world will depend. I am not exaggerating. Reports from the Baltic area are on the front pages of the newspapers of the world. Eminent analysts are making predictions about the direction in which events will turn: Will they destroy M.S. Gorbachev's perestroyka or, on the contrary, will they lead it into a new stage? I shall try to give my view of events from within (as a deputy from Tartu where the ideas of national revival were generated) and from the outside (as a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet and chairman of the subcommittee for economic independence of the region).

To Cut It Off or Untie It?

From the outside the Baltic knot seems to have been tied with unprecedented speed. Even in 1988 and the beginning of 1989 the people's fronts, which were just beginning to take form, advanced demands for economic independence (territorial economic accountability) of the republics within the framework of the USSR and the strengthening of their political sovereignty on the basis of a new Union agreement. At the end of 1989 and the beginning 1990 the dominant theme in national movements was the restoration of the independence of the Baltic states and their withdrawal from the USSR. The first decisive steps were taken on that path: The Baltic parliaments declared illegal and invalid the 1940 decision to include the republics in the USSR. On 30 March the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] adopted a decree concerning the beginning (with the declaration of a transition period) of the restoration of an independent Estonian republic.

Moscow's reaction was quick and harsh. The Third Congress of People's Deputies declared the decision of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet invalid. This position was confirmed by the USSR president in his Appeal to the People and the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR. A warning was also given to the organs of power in

Estonia. But the high organs of the republic are refusing to abolish or amend their decision. Two rights have come into conflict:

1. The right of nations to self-determination. For the Baltic republics the situation is exacerbated by the fact that their independence has been recognized by peace treaties concluded in 1920 with the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic and later with other states. The independent statehood of these republics was suspended in 1940 as a result of an agreement between Germany and the USSR (secret protocols to the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact) which contradicts international law. Therefore many countries, including the United States, did not recognize the inclusion of the Baltic republics in the USSR.

2. The right of the USSR to maintain its territorial integrity and the effect of the USSR Constitution on the territory of all republics. It is reinforced by a desire for stable postwar borders and, correspondingly, the system of European security.

When two opposing rights come into conflict, as legal experts say, the collision is resolved by force. The forces of the USSR and the Baltic republics are not comparable. Therefore there arises the temptation to cut off the Baltic knot with a sword. There are appeals to introduce presidential rule, to isolate the separatists and extremists, and to restore the violated order. But I am convinced that severe power pressure would only consolidate all the national elements around the irreconcilable fundamentalist proponents of the idea of independence. It would reduce the support of the perestroyka processes and M.S. Gorbachev's policy on the international plane.

When making either of these decisions we must be clearly aware of the alignment of national and political forces in the Baltic republics themselves and also the degree of international support for one scenario of development or another. The desire to the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian peoples to restore their forcefully suspended statehood and become masters of their own destiny was clearly expressed in the latest elections to Supreme Soviets at which a convincing victory was won by the people's fronts, including Sajudis. And any leaders of parties or movements will be doomed to political death in their national surroundings if they do not support the idea of state independence. Incidentally, here (as also in the slow or inadequate reaction from the center) lies a sharp change in the slogans and orientation of the people's fronts. But there are certain differences in the understanding of the content of state independence.

One trend—I would call it national-romantic or national-fundamentalist—considers it necessary to restore through parliamentary methods, and also, possibly, outside the parliament, the state status chosen by residents of the republics in the form in which it existed up until 1939-1940.

Advocates of another trend—let us call it centrist—understand the impossibility, in view of the current reality in the world and the Union, of returning to the condition of the 1920-1930's. But Moscow's rigid position or the local intermovement compels advocates of this trend to join with the national romantics or even the fundamentalists.

The diversity of positions is even greater among the Russian-speaking population and their leaders. One part, represented by the intermovements, expresses interests that are not very integrated with the local population. This social group is seriously bothered by the sharp changes and demands protection of its interests. In its opinion, union laws and authority are the most reliable protector. Hence their slogan and support for the "inviolable Union." Another part has managed to integrate itself into the local environment and with a few reservations (cultural autonomy) supports the idea of restoring independent statehood. But still the majority of the Russian-speaking population who have put down roots in the Baltic states hold an intermediate and fluctuating position. They understand the fairness of the demands of the indigenous population but want to have a guarantee of their civil rights.

Such is the alignment of forces. It is interesting that the extreme (fundamentalist) positions of the "nationalists" and "internationalists" converge at one point—it is necessary to cut off the knot. And the more severe the storms that brew, the better! One of the national fundamentalists said to me: "Let them (the central authorities—M.B.) try to apply military force—all the people will rise up and the empire will crumble!" Another fundamentalist-internationalists categorically snapped out: "Let them make one move and we will stick it to them good!" As M.S. Gorbachev figuratively put it, "We are at loggerheads." I can also understand the positions of the extreme trends and their leaders: Power confrontation is their means of survival. But for the people this is a blind alley. Normal people, who comprise the majority among both the indigenous residents and the settlers, want one thing: to live and rear their children in peace and prosperity. Therefore we cannot cut off the Baltic knot with a sword. We must patiently untie it. But how? We can imagine various scenarios.

Divorce Moscow-Style

This scenario acquired the form of the law adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet, "On the Policy for Making Decisions Related to the Withdrawal of a Union Republic from the USSR." Everything looks fine on the outside: Not only does it recognize the people's right to self-determination right down to withdrawal from the USSR but it even suggests a mechanism for exercising this right. But in essence? There is no hiding that it is all like extremely complicated, many-year divorce proceedings with a scandalous dividing up of joint property. And the Union organs are preparing a many-billion-ruble bill for the property they have left, and the republics are preparing one just as large for damages caused as a result of illegal actions on the part of Union organs.

True, the Baltic republics also have another argument against the divorce proceedings proposed by the Union. We did not get married (we were coerced by force) and therefore there is nobody to divorce. Let us just separate peacefully. And the center, in my view (and I might be wrong) is prepared to get over the so-called "Khodzhi Nasreddin Complex." After this amount of time the shah, the ass, or the reading teacher will have died. Or more simply: The Baltic partners will think it over and understand that it is more reasonable and satisfying to play along with the general course of events.

And the divorce proceedings are so complicated that certain parliament wits have dubbed the new policy the "Law on Nonwithdrawal from the Union."

Divorce Lithuanian-Style

The scenario is being played out before our eyes: I did not love you, you took me by force, you are a stranger to me, I am free and I am taking all the community property in compensation for the harm you have done me. And let the person who does not value the inalienable right to love and freedom cast the first stone at me. One does not wish to throw a stone at the beautiful Lithuanian woman (and for me this is found also in the image of my good friend Kazimiera Prunskiene).

The Lithuanian scenario for divorce is attended by proposals and actions of Estonian and Latvian national romantics. In purely human terms I respect the leaders of the parties and movements for the independence of Estonia and Latvia that have arisen in the past couple of years. These people have carried the same colors from the very beginning: blue, black, and white or, claret, white, and claret. In Estonia this was initially quite a small group but it became the motive force for the appearance of the Congress of Estonia under whose banner almost 600,000 people gathered.

Why do I call many of them romantics? They suggest returning to the conditions that existed before 1939-1940—right down to giving the right to solve all problems only to people who were citizens in 1940 and their descendants. But even the ancients knew that one cannot step in the same river twice. And too much water has flowed since that time, and even the banks are different.

Yes, there is the experience of the 20 years of statehood of the three Baltic states (and in Lithuania it goes back centuries). The experience is largely positive and instructive.

The independent Baltic republics, having lost the Russian market, were economically reoriented toward the West: They had their permanent niche there, mainly in sales of agricultural products (up to 40-50 percent of the animal husbandry products) and they purchased needed industrial goods and raw material there. It was not easy—there was stiff competition on the Western market—and the crisis of 1929-1932 brought devastating consequences—unemployment and bankruptcy of the peasant farms. But each minus also had its plus. The strong competition contributed to the development of cooperation, improvement of product quality, and growth of qualifications and labor productivity. Now this market is no longer there. The West has a surplus of animal husbandry products and they pay a subsidy for underproducing or exporting them outside the EEC. The majority of industrial goods cannot compete either. If there is no sales market and nothing to sell, there is nothing with which to buy things. It will take years to adjust to the Western market, and loss of the Eastern market where the Baltic republics are competitive even now is leading to an economic collapse. And an economic blockade is absolutely unnecessary. They will trade, but as with "foreign" countries—at world prices and for hard currency, and this means losses of billions per year and a sharp drop in the standard of living.

Certain national romantics are even prepared for this: "We shall be poor but we shall be independent." But still it would not hurt to ask their people: Do they agree to the prospect of "proud poverty"? I think that the best hands and heads will go to the West, and that which the migrants could not do will be done by immigrants: The indigenous population will become a minority.

The demographic situation has also changed since the war, especially in Latvia and Estonia. Republics with basically one nationality have become multinational. We can complain about the migrants and the old leaders of ministries and departments as much as we wish, but 50 percent of the population in Latvia is now Russian-speaking, and in Estonia 40 percent. Experience has shown that attempts to use force to change the demographic situation or lower civilian status do nothing but aggravate the situation. The nonindigenous population are already suggesting the creation of autonomous or independent oblasts and republics, right down to the point of withdrawal from Lithuania or Estonia. Decisions are being made concerning the disobedience of local power organs (for example, in Sillamyae, Kokhtla-Yarve, and Narva) toward republic organs. The result could be a civil war like the ones in Karabakh or Sri Lanka since it is possible that part of the population will turn to outside forces for help. It cannot be ruled out that the republic governments will also ask for help from the Union in order to pacify "their own" fundamentalists. God forbid that we would see this "black" scenario in life.

Is a Reasonable Union Possible?

Let us agree at the outset that it must be reasonable for the Baltics, for the Union, and for the world as a whole. It should correspond to their interests and concepts of the new thinking and should not rule out mutually acceptable compromises. But first a little history.

For hundreds of years the Baltic area was a corridor where drafts frequently blew: Foreign troops moved to the West or the East and up to three-fourths of the local residents died from the sword or disease. Or it was a bridge over which trade caravans moved and foreign

merchants and craftsmen along with the indigenous population built beautiful cities: Tallinn, Riga, Vilnius. These were years of development and flourishing. And another thing. Even when under the dominance of foreigners the Baltic area almost always had a special status: its own government organs, taxes, and money.

Two insurmountable tendencies have been in operation in the 20th century: 1. The aspiration of each people to become master of their own land and destiny. 2. The strengthening of the interconnection between the peoples and the countries, which ensues from the modern condition of productive and destructive forces.

No politician, party, or movement can ignore these tendencies. The problem can be reduced to their organic unification taking the concrete place and time into account. For the Baltics this is primarily the restoration of their suspended statehood and the status of a subject of international law which they had up until 1940. And the foreign and domestic realities inevitably motivate the leaders of sovereign republics to establish contractual ties with the economic and political structures of both East and West. The economic realities—the attachment mainly to the Union market—inevitably force the Baltic republics to enter into the structures being created there, but as a subject with equal rights with other Union republics. And in places where there are economic ties, political ones inevitably arise as well. It is no accident that permanently functioning in the EEC system are such organs as the EEC Council of Ministers, the Commission of European Communities, and the Europarliament.

The Baltic states as independent subjects of international law will inevitably strive to establish ties with political and economic structures as well: the United Nations, the European Council, the Council of Northern Countries, and, finally, the EEC. Should we be afraid of these processes? After all, the Baltic countries were members of the League of Nations. And the Ukraine and Belorussia are currently members of the United Nations. The northern countries of Europe have their specific interests. And, finally, we must all look for our own niche in the European and world markets. It is quite obvious that at the present time the EEC will not accept the Baltic countries as full-fledged members—a hefty waiting line has already formed. But the status of associate member (and this is already being discussed in the inner circles of the EEC) with relative benefits would be advantageous for the Baltic republics, the Union, and Europe as a whole. In essence this is a realization of the idea of a peaceful bridge between East and West, the beginning of the real embodiment of a common European home.

But I immediately hear angry objections: Why give these privileges to the Baltic states? Either we go together as a unified system into the new European community, or nobody goes. Either you are in the Union federation or you are not. In general it is a familiar principle—either...or... Well, is this another case of hail to uniformity? No, only a diversity of forms is a reliable condition for development. Such is the general law of nature and society. Then the USSR should assume different forms as well. This was discussed by our president in his "inaugural" speech where he advanced the principle of a differentiated approach to the renewed Union agreement. How does it look to us?

The Union for Love or Convenience?

Marriage specialists have come to an almost unanimous conclusion: Marriage for love is less stable than marriage for convenience. Excessively great hopes are linked to love and the spouse is held too accountable when the hopes are unrealized. Incidentally, our television viewers could observe with a bitter feeling this phenomenon of "disenchantment" and "submitting bills" during the Third Congress of People's Deputies. Representatives of Russia declared that they were being robbed by other republics (from 40 to 70 billion rubles from the Russian coffers through nonequivalent exchange). The Central Asian republics have their own bill: Low prices and the single crop of cotton have poisoned the land and dried up the Aral. Business is very bad for the autonomous republics and peoples of the North: The richer the natural resources, the worse—the land is transformed into dumps and deserts, and the wealth has disappeared into the bottomless Union treasury.

What is the solution? To get a divorce and begin a separate account of property and the results of labor? This will be necessary for a beginning. This is the essence of the laws adopted concerning the economic independence of the republics. Incidentally, under the conditions of independence it will be disadvantageous to pass the less advantageous branches off onto others: energy, chemistry, or the production of pulp. But after the divorce you will begin to understand fairly quickly that independence from others is illusory—you cannot live without exchange and integration. Even for relatively large republics an attempt to create all kinds of production will require immense investments. Centrifugal interests and forces only impair the country economically and politically and create new hotbeds of tension which require expenditures of many billions to quell.

So how does one arrange a marriage of convenience? The world knows a sparkling example: the European Economic Community. Twelve West European countries burdened with past and present offenses frequently represented by incensed ladies and gentlemen have found and are finding over and over again the degree of coordination and actions necessary for their common development. This is primarily an economic interest—a unified marketplace where all members of the EEC have advantages in prices and tariffs and also protection from foreign competitors. Here also lies the key to their common well- being and growing love for one another. By 1993, apparently, the borders will disappear among the dozen European countries and a unified currency and financial union and unified programs in the area of science and new technology will be created. The economic integration will be reinforced by political integration. The role of the Europarliament will change, and

what was a consultative organ will to an ever increasing degree become a legislative one. And thus it will be even more difficult for a newcomer to break into the marriage of the dozen countries.

And what will become of the economic and political space so proudly called the Soviet Federation? In real life we have no unified market space. We have only a "national economic complex" where the appearance of some kind of order is imposed with difficulty by planners and suppliers from the central departments. But in reality random elements prevail, in which random individuals at various levels participate in a free and easy way conducting exchange within the country and abroad (taking a share for themselves, naturally) according to the primitive principle of commodity for commodity. Just as it was in prehistoric times: an axe for a hide. With a customs system full of holes on the borders of the "power," a heavy lock has been placed on the entry ways and back rooms where the sacred business of dividing up the spoils takes place. The political union is being torn apart by interethnic conflicts which are reaching the point civil war in some places. Therefore the attraction of such a union whatever it might be called—federation or confederation—is at the lowest point.

We cannot continue to construct a Union on force and coercion alone. But it cannot be done on powerlessness either. A marriage of convenience becomes durable under the conditions of a healthy economy where free partners with equal rights operate in a unified marketplace and also have benefits and advantages (in prices, tariffs, subsidies, and so forth) over foreign partners. Then withdrawal from the Union economic and political structures will be perceived as a punishment. And the possible choice of the closeness of ties with these structures will make the Union truly free. In my view, the formation of such a Union will remove the problem of the withdrawal of the Baltic states and will correspond to the interests of the republics, the Union, Europe, and the world. The Baltic republics will change from a destabilizing factor in politics into a creative and constructive one.

Where to Begin?

The wise old grandmother of Mikhail Svetlov taught her grandson the art of putting on his pants: You absolutely must button the top button right because otherwise there will be no place for the next button to go and you will end up a person with an extra button.

We too must begin with the top button: We must recognize the expression of the will of the people of the Baltic states and begin to discuss the problem of restoration of their statehood and the establishment of new forms of ties with the economic and political structures of the Union.

The second and third buttons: Immediate development of a new and differentiated Union agreement among sovereign republics and also a law on the mechanism for the formation and functioning of the Union- wide market.

And it is quite pointless to play a game of power and ambition from any viewpoint. The stakes are too high.

Text of Baltic Economic Cooperation Agreement

90UN1605A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 17 Apr 90 pp 1, 2

["Agreement on Economic Cooperation by Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia"]

[Text] Guided by the principles of the sovereignty of these republics and proceeding from the aims of developing mutually favorable economic and humanitarian relations among them, and deeming the following to be essential:

—unification of efforts to realize the sovereignty of the republics, define a common economic strategy and tactics, and improve the quality of life for the peoples of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia;

—action to promote the creation by the Baltic republics of a common economic complex with simultaneous development of economic ties with the USSR and its republics and with other states;

—the exchange of information and experience;

the governments of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia deem it expedient to conclude this intergovernmental agreement on economic cooperation (the Agreement) and to create a Baltic market.

It is planned to regulate the activity of the common economic complex of the Baltic republics primarily through the market. Intervention in the economic life by the state will be done mainly through the instruments of the market economy.

1. General Principles of Cooperation.

1.1 Realization of the sovereignty of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia results from the need also to create conditions for the development of close mutually advantageous economic cooperation, including the creation of a Baltic market.

1.2 The sides proceed from the premise that a Baltic market will be the highest level of integration among the independent national economies. Here, in their mutual relations, the sides will try to eliminate administrative, legal, financial, and other restrictions preventing the mutual flow of goods and services.

1.3 The sides believe that a real opportunity exists for creating true market relations, primarily within the framework of direct ties among independent enterprises and organizations and other legal entities.

1.4 The sides pledge themselves to develop cooperation, starting from 1990, on the basis of extension and deepening of the division of labor and integration based on the principles of equality, equal partnership, and mutual advantage.

2. The Main Avenues of Cooperation.

2.1 The sides believe that the following are the main subjects for mutual integration:

—legislation;
—financial policy and pricing;
—scientific and technical cooperation;
—information science;
—the ecology;
—industry;
—agriculture and food;
—fisheries;
—construction;
—fuel and energy;
—transportation and communications;
—trade and material-technical supply;
—foreign economic ties;
—tourism and sport.

For each of these directions the sides will work out mutual agreements (protocols) for a transition period and subsequent periods for defining common policy for the republics making up the Baltic market.

2.2 The sides will try to reach mutual agreement on laws and will pass legislative enactments regulating their joint activity, primarily with respect to ownership, entrepreneurship, taxes and tax collection, customs, standards, and so forth.

2.3 The sides deem it necessary in 1990 to establish a Financial Foundation for the Baltic republics for the following purposes:

—to create a balanced economic structure;
—to finance the activity of institutions engaged in cooperation;
—to provide mutual assistance in the event of extraordinary circumstances.

2.4 The sides will create a Baltic Investment Bank that will accumulate free capital, including foreign capital, and implement credit projects and programs of interests to the sides.

2.5 The sides determine that the creation of the Baltic market will be effected in two stages.

During the first stage (1990-91) fundamental laws and legislative enactments will be drawn up and adopted and agreements (protocols) for cooperation will be concluded in conformity with clause 2.1 for the directions of activity and the creation of conditions to realize them.

In the subsequent stage, on the principles contained in this Agreement and the experience gained, the mechanism of market functions will be perfected and annual agreements will be concluded.

2.6 In order to insure the efficient operation of the Baltic market, the sides will do the following:

—pursue a unified policy for the development and location of production forces;
—devise and implement mutually agreed measures for economic integration of enterprises and organizations located on the territories of the corresponding republics;
—be guided by the principle of most-favored nation status in the organization of mutual trade and the movement of material resources and capital;
—introduce national currencies;
—establish a common customs and trade policy;
—pursue an antimonpoly policy;
—use procedures that enable agreement on economic policy for the sides and elimination of misalignments in balance of payments and currency policy.

2.7 In order to effect a unified market strategy and tactics both within the Baltic market and outside it, the sides will in 1990 create a Marketing Association for the Baltic market with an information system on commercial activity, and they will organize trade representations.

2.8 In 1990 the sides will establish international centers to train and retrain specialists.

3. Institutions of Cooperation.

3.1 Implementation of the tasks of cooperative will be guaranteed by the following: the Baltic Council for Cooperation (the Council) and its Commission, which will act within the framework of powers as determined by provisions approved by the governments of the sides.

3.2 The Council will be organized from equal numbers of representatives for the sides being members of the Baltic market, appointed by the governments of the sides.

3.3 The Council will insure coordination of common provisions in the economic policies of the sides and comply with the conditions set forth in this Agreement. The Council will have the right of decisionmaking within the limits of its competence.

Decisions of the Council will be made by consensus among the sides.

3.4 The Commission will be an executive organ that implements decisions of the Council. The Commission will have the independent right to resolve current, operational tasks in pursuing economic cooperation among the Baltic republics and other participants in the Baltic market. In order to insure the activity and development of the Baltic market, the Commission will do the following:

—monitor the realization of this Agreement and normative documents adopted by its founders on the basis of the Agreement;
—submit recommendations or conclusions on matters stemming from this Agreement;
—have the right to submit decisions to the Council and be involved in the preparation of draft documents of the Council within the framework of its competence;
—exercise the powers delegated to it by the Council.

Working groups will be formed within the Commission for the various avenues of cooperation.

Members of the Commission will be appointed by the governments of the sides.

The location of the Commission will be the city of Riga.

4. Economic Responsibility of the Sides.

4.1 The contracting sides will take steps of a common or private nature to insure compliance with the obligations stemming from this Agreement or from enactments passed by the institutions of cooperation.

4.2 The sides will refrain from actions that could harm them, in particular the following:

—directly or indirectly imposing prices or other unfair conditions for deals;
—restricting technical development in production and marketing to the detriment of any of the sides;
—applying unequal conditions on trading partners for equivalent deliveries;
—forcing a partner to accept additional conditions that because of their nature or by dint of trade practice are not connected with the subject of the contract.

4.3 The responsibility of the sides under the terms of this Agreement will be regulated by contracts and private agreements concluded among the sides.

5. Period the Agreement Will Remain in Force.

5.1 This Agreement will be submitted by the sides for ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of the republics.

The Agreement will come into force on the day the instruments of ratification are exchanged.

From that moment the sides will proclaim the creation of the Baltic market and announce that it is open for participation by the USSR and its republics and for foreign countries under mutually advantageous conditions.

5.2 The Agreement will cease to be in force or its conditions will be altered on the basis of a decision by the governments of the sides.

5.3 The Agreement is concluded for the period through the year 2000.

This Agreement, composed one copy each in the Latvian, Lithuanian, Estonian, Russian, and English languages with all five texts being equally valid, will be deposited in the archives of the Government of Lithuania, which will deliver certified true copies in the languages listed to each of the governments signing this Agreement.
[Signed] V. Bresis, chairman of the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers.
K-D. Prunskiene, prime minister of the Lithuanian Republic.
E. Savisaar, chairman of the Estonian SSR Government.
12 April 1990

Estonian Democratic Party Platform Published

90UN1273A Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII in Russian 7 Mar 90 p 2

["Preelection Platform of the Democratic Party of Estonia"]

[Text] We are for the unity of the Estonian people en route to a democratic independent state.

We are for the speediest legislative and constitutional solution of the question of land and property.

We are for a strong social policy guaranteeing humane living conditions for all members of society.

We are for the speediest and full dismantling of the Stalinist model of socialism.

The Political Situation

Perestroyka in the republic has become a struggle for power of two extreme parts of the party and state machinery adhering to diametrically opposite political positions. One of them is attempting to portray itself as the sole spokesman for the interests of the Estonian nation. The other, taking as a basis the party and economic activists of the union enterprises, is presenting itself as the defender of the interests of the Russian-speaking part of the population.

Reality is such that under the conditions of the political hullabaloo which is constantly being ignited among the population, particularly since the All-Estonia Congress, elections to the republic Supreme Soviet could become (and inevitably will become) a farce and a struggle of populist ideas constantly accompanied by a variety of political speculation. We counterpose to this the principles of unity, equality, and justice. Society is most in need of a sense of responsibility on the part of all movements and parties laying claim to the role of spokesman for the interests of this part of the population or the other. The election struggle should be a struggle of democratic platforms.

At the present time Russia, by which we are constantly being intimidated, is increasingly catching up with us in its democratic development and in the common struggle of its people against the party and state machinery. This

struggle, as the experience of a number of East European countries has shown, is the sole correct path. In Estonia, on the other hand, which is constantly wallowing in political quarrels, there is the ever-increasing possibility of a switch to a new authoritarian regime—national-authoritarian in an "independent" republic this time.

Democratic Processes

The Democratic Party believes that the USSR should be a voluntary union of states, not a union of the center and allegedly sovereign republics.

For this reason the point of departure should be a union agreement, primarily with Russia and also with the other sovereign republics. The terms of its conclusion on the part of Estonia should be determined by a democratically elected parliament which has acquired a full-fledged mandate of trust on the part of the people of Estonia. If necessary, the question of the official status of Estonia should be put by parliament to a public referendum.

The Democratic Party sees the aspiration to Estonia's state independence not as an abstract slogan for winning popularity among the population, but as a specific way to develop a civil society in Estonia on the following principles:

a representative parliament independently resolving the republic's political and economic problems;

legal safeguards and the assured political rights of the citizens as a consequence of the constitutional enshrinement of a multiparty system;

parliamentary elections based on a proportional system;

equality of the citizens before the law without distinction as to social position, sex, belief, language, or race;

conferment of the status of citizen of the republic without any prior conditions and additional procedures on all permanent residents of Estonia at the time the law is enacted (unless they express a wish differently).

The Democratic Party believes that hasty demands concerning Estonia's secession from the USSR will by no means guarantee the achievement of these goals but could, on the contrary, lead to the impossibility of the achievement of many of them.

The conclusion of agreements on cooperation with sovereign republics, on the other hand, would put an end to speculation on the question of Estonia's separation.

The Economy and Social Policy

Proceeding from its program propositions, the Democratic Party will seek recognition of all forms of ownership.

Historical experience shows that the building of a genuinely democratic state under conditions where its citizens are deprived of the right to property and have been turned into hired workers of the state sector is impossible. On the other hand, the administrative- managerial machinery under such conditions is organized as a class and becomes the collective exploiter of the people. Appearing in the form of state property, public property is incapable of providing for the efficient functioning of the economy. Proceeding from what has been said, the Democratic Party will seek:

the constitutional and legislative enshrinement of all forms of property;

the transfer of industrial enterprises to the ownership of their workers on the principles of joint-stock companies;

transfer of the land to the ownership of the peasants who work it;

the enactment of anti-trust legislation.

The Democratic Party will seek the restoration of a free market and commodity-money relations in full. Money should be a natural measure of labor and consumption. There should be revived interest among the workers in the monetary form of the evaluation of labor. Only by such a measure is it possible to achieve an inducement to labor by economic methods.

Recognizing that the restoration of a free market would lead to the emergence of a manpower market, the Democratic Party advocates the pursuit of a strong social policy, which would guarantee those working temporarily the following conditions:

the payment of unemployment benefit providing for a subsistence minimum;

the creation of state labor exchanges for the placement and retraining of the unemployed.

The Democratic Party advocates the enactment of laws providing for the social protection of mothers, children, invalids, and other needy categories of citizens.

The Way to Freedom and Democracy

The elected Supreme Soviet should be a body which provides for the formation of political and economic structures for the creation of conditions for the election of a democratic parliament. In an independent Estonia, the Supreme Soviet should also decide the following questions:

1. The conclusion of an equal agreement with sovereign republics, primarily with the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], which would be a guarantor of the rights of the Russian- speaking part of the population in Estonia.

2. The enactment of a "zero" law on citizenship affording the right of choice at the time of its enactment between Estonian, Russian, or other citizenship and

ensuring for persons of other citizenship all human rights other than the right to elect and be elected to the supreme authorities of Estonia.

3. To freeze prices prior to the enactment of a necessary and sufficient package of laws, including those on parties, property, land, and the press, and an antitrust law.

4. The deployment of military units on the territory of Estonia with their subsequent gradual withdrawal should be agreed upon under the conditions of an agreement with sovereign republics.

Esteemed Voters!

The Democratic Party needs your support. We are sure that our candidates will not be windbags and will not disappoint their electorate. In voting for candidates of the Democratic Party, you are voting for a democratic Estonia.

Our candidates are:

Valeriy Shulyak in Narva.

Oleg Gogin in Tallinn, Mustamyae.

Eduard Baum and Yuriy Menkov in Lasnamyae.

Boris Tukh in Leninskiy Rayon.

Aleksandr Potemkin in Kolli.

You know the views of the Democratic Party. Unless you wish to live in the old way, remaining hostage to the command-administrative system, vote for the candidates of the Democratic Party, as Russia is doing.
[Signed] The Estonian Democratic Party Election Committee.

Tartu Extremist Attacks Reported on Military

PM0205083590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 May 90 First Edition p 1

[Dispatch from Colonel A. Yurkin: "The 'Green Regiment' on the Offensive"]

[Text] There are reports of fresh incidents involving unlawful actions by Estonian extremists, who committed a night-time attack on the military commissariat in Tartu. Prior to the attack, they burned a soldier's and a militiaman's uniforms, painted signs on the building's walls where the word "occupiers" alternated with threats, and then demanded the expulsion of Russian students from the city's education establishments. All actions by the pogromists were coordinated from a radio bus. A militia group which arrived at the scene of the incident made no attempt to detain anyone, while the militant nationalists did not even think of withdrawing, aware of their impunity.

The outrages in Tartu were organized and the military commissariat was attacked by the Estonian "Green Regiment"—a legal young people's organization for environmental protection. The regiment's objective is "to ensure physical and spiritual purity in Estonia." Its action program envisages struggle for "a free green state and Estonia's demilitarization." The program deals at some length with military service—refusal to serve in the "occupation forces."

The "Green Regiment" has its own uniform with a flash of lightning on a sleeve badge. The regiment is financed, and a bank account has been opened for it. Instructors from the aktiv have attended special training courses. According to posted information, one of the military airfields, where airmen are on combat alert duty to protect the country's airspace, will be attacked 9 May.

Riga Radio Carries 1 May Citizens Congress

Citizenship Law Proposed

LD0105112490

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian at 0800 GMT on 1 May begins broadcasting a live relay of the second day of the Latvian Citizens Congress at the Philharmonia Concert Hall in Riga. Reception is fair.

At 0801 GMT Krastins delivers a report on the citizenship of Latvia. Referring to the situation at the time of founding of the republic of Latvia, he finds similarities in the present-day conditions. He talks about the qualification for becoming a citizen, and says that Army members and those not recognizing the republic would be excluded. Krastins says that the citizenship law is required urgently. The document on the proposal for the citizenship law stated that the Supreme Soviet was not qualified to represent the people, but had the People's Council been qualified he asks. The document would be submitted, but would be worked on.

At 0815 GMT Einars Repse supports the previous speaker, but says that some items were incomplete and needed additional work.

At 0819 GMT Visvaldis Lacis says he could not to agree to a large extent with Repse. In one point of the document, he says, there was an approach to the double-faced attitude of the People's Front. There should be an ethically pure attitude towards citizenship, there should be no hypocricy, there is nothing shameful in Latvian-like Latvia, he says, to frequent applause. Even some Russians or persons of alien origin have understood this, says Lacis.

At 0825 GMT a Ukrainian, speaking in Russian, talks about the rights of citizenship. There is place for other nationalities in a free Latvia, he says.

At 0829 GMT Janis Straume criticizes some aspects at the congress yesterday, particularly some elements of Soviet legislation.

At 0831 GMT another speaker says he thinks that an easy granting of citizenship could result in a permanent

inclusion in the Soviet Union. However, he does not agree with the attitude towards the Supreme Soviet.

At 0836 GMT Kirsbaums refers to the gravity of the citizenship problem.

At 0839 GMT Sergejs Fadejevs from Daugavpils offers some suggestions concerning citizenship.

At 0843 GMT Tolpeznikovs expresses the view that the citizenship law should have been adopted already yesterday. The Russians were afraid precisely of the congress, he says.

At 0845 GMT a speaker expresses concern about the traps set. He makes comparisons with Lithuania, and says their example could not be followed. Citizenship could be granted only after the withdrawal of the occupying Army, he says.

At 0850 GMT (Geidans) asks for the decisions of the congress to be understood, saying that they were steps of despair to save the people.

At 0853 GMT Aigars Jirgens asks for very strict stand to be adopted concerning citizenship, which should be impressed upon the Supreme Soviet. The declaration concerning independence by the Supreme Soviet could not be regarded as valid, while an elected, Seima's declaration could be.

At 0856 GMT the next speaker expresses concern about some of the ideas in Krastins' report and proposes some corrections.

At 0901 GMT Valdis Hartmanis quotes a book by Apkalns, a pastor of the Latvian Army. He also mentions the importance of language, explaining that Latvian was not actually the state language although it was declared to be. Language is also an important factor for granting citizenship, he says.

At 0904 GMT Vilcans makes a brief contribution, and at 0905 GMT the debate is concluded.

At 0908 GMT Juskas, a Lithuanian, says that the citizenship law of Lithuania was a mistake and would mean death for Latvia. He is applauded loudly, after concluding with an appeal for Baltic unity.

At 0911 GMT a letter is read from Gailitis saying that he had been misunderstood.

At 0912 GMT a report is given on the occupation army. The state is not changing if in place of Mikhail the First comes Mikhail the Second, says the speaker. Latvia is still an occupied country. The activity of the Army, KGB, and militia troops should be regarded as a crime. Proposals are given on how to discontinue all these unfortunate aspects including the protection of Latvian servicemen. The speaker is applauded frequently.

At 0921 GMT Pukitis speaks, followed by Vladimirs Konovalovs at 0925 GMT. Konovalovs says that Latvia must follow Lithuania, and quotes Western leaders and also Gorbachev.

At 0929 GMT the next speaker talks about the mafia and its crimes, naming a number of people who should not be working in law protection bodies, specifically Steinbriks and Zemribo.

At 0933 GMT Valdis Atals deliberately speaks in Russian because, he says, no Latvians need convincing.

At 0938 GMT the next item on the agenda is a message to diplomatic representatives of Latvia, especially in Washington and London. A report on the draft text is read and adopted.

At 0945 GMT the congress is adjourned for a 20 minute break.

CPSU Activity Debated

LD0105133990

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian at 1012 GMT on 1 May resumes its live relay of the second day of the Latvian Citizens' Congress at Riga's Philharmonia Concert Hall.

The first item discussed after the break is the Editorial Commission's report on corrections to the decision of the congress on the citizenship of the republic of Latvia and citizens of other countries who reside in Latvia. Various points are discussed and adopted by voting. At 1024 GMT the document is adopted as a whole.

At 1025 GMT Olgerts Eglitis reports on the congress' draft resolution on the activity of the CPSU in Latvia. Eglitis suggests some corrections.

At 1030 GMT the debate begins. The first speaker (Krastins), from Cesis, suggests that the resolution should declare the CPSU illegal.

(Krastins) recalls that Rubiks had declared on television that the next government would be appointed or elected by CPSU members.

Alberts Ozolins then takes the floor to say that the Supreme Soviet should not be condemned that much. He says that he knows from the experience of his relatives that the Communist Party had also engaged in illegal activity also during the period of Latvian independence.

At 1035 GMT the speaker (Stars) states that a book should be published giving information on the persons guilty of crimes against the people.

At 1040 GMT Putnins talks about the repression of people.

At 1045 GMT Zaiga Blumberga-Vasarina from Sweden says that not everybody knows yet about the regular demonstrations in Sweden in support of Lithuania.

At 1049 GMT a report is given on corrections on the resolution on the alien Army.

At 1051 GMT the text of a protest for the detention of Egils Levits is adopted.

Next, the congress examines a proposal for establishing an aizsargi type organization. It is decided not to attach any name to the organization, but to leave it to the committee which must deal with the security of people.

At 1058 GMT Juris Vidins talks about voluntary contributions.

At 1100 GMT a representative of Polish Solidarity, speaking in English with translation into Latvian, greets and offers support from his organization. He mentions a Polish senator who has not been allowed over the Polish-Lithuanian border, and speaks at length about the situation in Central Europe, also quoting the Polish foreign minister on cooperation. Because of Poland's location, it knew the evils in central Europe and in the east (Vorkuta and Katyn), Munich, and Yalta, he says. He concludes by expressing good wishes for the Latvian people.

At 1112 GMT Peteris Leiskalns speaks on behalf of the Editorial Commission on the declaration on land. This proposal is left to the Committee of Latvia.

At 1115 GMT Janis Ozols discusses election report no. 1 on the election to the Committee of Latvia, giving the number of votes in the secret ballot for the candidates from among candidate citizens and citizens.

At 1125 GMT the report is approved.

At 1126 GMT on behalf of the Editorial Commission, corrections are suggested to the resolution on CPSU activity in Latvia.

At 1131 GMT the document is adopted.

AT 1135 GMT a lunch break is announced until 1300 GMT.

Committee Elections Held

LD0105160690

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian at 1300 GMT on 1 May resumes its live relay of the second day of the Latvian Citizens' Congress at Riga's Philharmonia Concert Hall.

The session begins after the break by issuing a correction concerning elections to the committee—someone has been entered twice, but it is decided to include 49 people on the committee.

At 1303 GMT Juris Dobelis reads a draft appeal of the congress to the USSR president, Congress of People's Deputies, and Supreme Soviet.

At 1309 GMT a speaker from Liepaja talks about building the future, and says that a declaration of independence is lacking. He concludes with some spiritual thoughts.

At 1314 GMT several greeting messages are read, in addition to an appeal to prevent a communist from becoming president of Latvia.

At 1318 GMT a proposal is read that the next session be held on 30 June, and 1 July. Someone expresses the view that it should be held earlier, but it is explained that the committee could convene the congress at any time.

At 1320 GMT another mistake in the committee election is reported, and after consideration, it is decided by a vote to include 50 persons in the Committee of Latvia. Discussion continues until 1329 GMT.

At 1330 GMT in reply to a question, it is stated that the presidium does not have exact data on the number of registered citizens, but that there are over 900,000. A Women's League representative takes the floor to say that nothing has been done concerning boys undergoing military service.

At 1335 GMT the Editorial Commission's report is read, stating that the declaration on land and other drafts are to be handed to the committee.

At 1337 GMT a number of minor corrections are suggested to the appeal to the USSR president, congress, and Supreme Soviet. The appeal is adopted.

At 1340 GMT a representative of the Lithuanian Independence Union congratulates the congress and expresses the conviction that victory over the red dragon will be achieved. A delegate expresses thanks.

At 1344 GMT the congress is declared closed. However, a participant says he wants something to be done concerning the declaration of independence in connection with the Supreme Soviet on 3 May. Another speaker says the Editorial Commission has not reported anything on this. The congress concludes with the singing of "God Bless Latvia."

The relay continues with an announcement that a press conference will be held by the committee in one and one-half hours.

Rubiks Addresses Riga May Day Rally

LD0105131590 Riga Domestic Service in Russian 0708 GMT 1 May 90

[Speech by Alfreds Petrovich Rubiks, first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, at the Riga May Day rally organized by the pro-Moscow Latvian Communist Party—live]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] Dear comrades, esteemed compatriots, for over half a century May Day has been and remains the festival of international solidarity of all working people of our planet in the struggle for their

rights, for democracy, for peace, and for social progress. On behalf of the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee, I warmly cordially congratulate all participants in the May Day demonstration in the city of Riga, and, through you, all working people of Soviet Latvia on the international festival of May Day. [applause, cheers]

May Day on Latvian soil has a profound revolutionary tradition. It has been marked as an international festival of unity of the working folk of all nationalities living in Latvia as an expression of their common will in the fight for their rights, for the civilized future of Latvia by means of the socialist choice. All of us, the participants in today's demonstration, are directed inheritors of those who went through the hard school of revolutionary struggle and who experienced the tragic consequences of the most harsh Stalinist repressions, and who with their blood defended the fatherland in the years of the fascist occupation. In paying tribute of deep respect to the feat and memory of past generations, we see our task as being to learn from them loyalty to the socialist choice, fidelity to internationalism, and common human duty.

To be guided by these principles is especially topical today, when the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has called on the peoples to renew society, it has called for consolidation on the principled basis of a renewed democratic socialism. The Latvian CP Central Committee shares the concern and alarm of the residents of the republic at the daily calls being heard for an immediate break of state ties of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic with the USSR, for secession from the Union. In pursuing this aim, the so-called Citizens' Committees, the radical wants of the People's front of Latvia and other anti-socialist organizations and ther leaders are heedless of the tragic consequences of such a step for the fate of the peoples of Latvia; they are heading for an overthrow of the existing state system.

The documents adopted by the Congress of Citizens of the Latvian republic lay claim to a monopoly in reflecting the views of citizens living in the republic, in accordance with an international legal act and so forth. Is that so? The Citizen's Congress wants, by a stroke of the pen, on behalf of the allegedly registered one-half million citizens, to deprive all the others of citizenship, ie. to declare about 2 million citizens of the Latvian SSR somehow no longer to be citizens of their republic. Any state, especially a civilized one, even [word indistinct] political power, does not deprive of citizenship its residents who are dubious or do not support or are even political opponents. For them to propose to citizens of other states, including the USSR, to stand in line, since they are not automatically renouncing citizenship and [word indistinct] that a new, legal government first and foremost will give citizenship to those persons who have announced the desire to acquire it before the convocation of the Citizens' Congress is nothing other than crude pressure on the free will of citizens, and appeal to renounce their principles and [word indistinct]. [passage omitted]

Our principled views on these matters are set out in the decisions and resolutions of the 25th Congress of the Latvian CP and the April 1990 statement by the buro of Latvian Central Committee on these matters. In these documents we insist on the speediest elaboration and signing of a new union treaty providing for genuine sovereignty and independence of Latvia within the USSR [applause], a guaranteed treaty ensuring a guaranteed material, social, and cultural level for the entire populace of the republic. Our party recognizes as anti-constitutional the way of tackling questions in the form of citizenship of the republic taking consideration of the opinion of the whole population by means of holding referenda. [applause]

This policy of the Latvian CP is receiving increasing support among the most varied strata of the republic's popoulation. This is shown by the results of the repeat elections for people's deputies of the Latvian SSR, where deputies from the Latvian CP, and hence our policy, gained a full and convincing victory over the candidates and their platforms of the People's Front of Latvia. [applause, cheers]

The Latvian CP Central Committee, in these complex days for the fate of the people of the republic, appeals to you, the workers and office workers, to peasants and representatives of the intelligentsia, to women and young people, to you, servicemen of the Soviet Army and Navy, to you Latvians and Russians, to all representatives of the over 12 nationalities living in the republic: we ask you to express suport for the policy of the Latvian CP, not to be led by anti-socialist appeals, to maintain calm and civil peace, to defend perestroyka, to defend socialism, not to allow anti-Soviet and anti-socialist laws to be adopted. [applause]

On this spring day, with all my heart I wish all working people, people of all ages and views and faiths, all those who cherish our amber land, success in renewing our life, prosperity, strong health and a joyful mood! May the sun shine upon us more brightly! May warm and pure rains wash our dear land and bring us joy with a rich harvest! [applause, cheers] May each one of us in their home have health and peace forever! Long live May Day, the festival of labor and peace, hope and achievements for all peoples of the planet! [applause, cheers]

May Day Celebrations Held in Riga, Vilnius

LD0105153990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 1 May 90

[Text] Throughout the day we have been telling you about how May Day has been celebrated over the country. We have just received reports from Riga and Vilnius.

May Day this year for the inhabitants of Riga and the whole of Latvia is a time of hope and worry. In two days time, the first session of the Supreme Soviet of Latvia begins work in its new convocation, from which the participants in the All Latvian Assembly of People's

Deputies demanded a declaration of the state independence of the republic, and, in essence, its secession from the USSR. For this reason people came to today's demonstration with slogans saying that the collapse of the USSR must not be permitted, and calling for the friendship of peoples to be strengthened, for consolidation on the principles of perestroyka. The speeches of the demonstrators expressed concern about the future of Latvia.

Many people in Vilnius on the eve of May Day were bewildered: Would there be a holiday at all in the capital of Lithuania? The reason was that the mass media of Lithuania had said practically nothing about holding May Day festivities. But there was a holiday nevertheless. The May Day celebrations were organized by the Socialist Federation of the Workers of Lithuania, which was supported by all the left-wing political forces of the republic and the labor forces of many enterprises and organizations. The May Day celebrations were held at the Lenin monument in the center of the town. The only thing to be regretted was that representatives of the reorganized Communist Party of Lithuania did not take part in the May Day celebrations.

Latvian Congress Provokes 'Stormy Reaction'

LD0105153490 Moscow TASS in English 1404 GMT 1 May 90

[Text] Riga May 1 TASS—By TASS correspondent Galina Kuchina:

The Congress of the Latvian republic's citizens which ended its deliberations here today, declared itself the successor of bourgeois Latvia which existed before 1940.

Its 260 participants adopted a package of documents which proclaimed the aim of restoring the former regime on the basis of the 1922 bourgeois Constitution.

Voting delegates were elected only by those residents who enjoyed the republic's citizenship before June 17, 1940 when Soviet power was restored in Latvia.

Although only less than a quarter of the republic's population participated in the elections of delegates, the congress repeatedly declared that it expressed the will of the entire people.

The congress participants lavishly larded their speeches with such words as "occupiers", "colonialists" and "genocide". They also said that "immigrants defiled Latvia". The Soviet Communist Party was described as a "criminal organisation".

The participants called the present Latvian legislature an "element of illegal system" but decided to use it for restoring the former republic. The delegates threatened that if parliament deviates from this policy, an "alternative authority" will be established.

The congress provoked a stormy reaction from people who followed its work. Many worried residents phoned to the TV studio, from where a meeting with deputies to the new parliament was aired.

Congress speeches increased worries over their future. Residents asked time and again: "How to leave Latvia?"

Latvian Appeal to Leadership Against Occupation

LD0105195890 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 1303 GMT 1 May 90

[Draft Appeal of the Latvian Citizens' Congress to the USSR president, to the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, and to the USSR Supreme Soviet, read by Juris Dobelis (not further identified), at the Latvian Citizens' Congress in Riga's Philharmonia Concert Hall—live]

[Text] The congress of the citizens of the republic of Latvia is the first legal representation of the citizens of the republic of Latvia since 1940, when the people of Latvia, its citizens, were deprived of the opportunity of realizing their sovereign power in the territory of the republic of Latvia according to the procedure laid down by its Constitution.

Taking into consideration that the ultimative note of 16 June 1940 by the USSR to the government of the republic of Latvia and the subsequent occupation of the republic of Latvia contradict the 1928 Convention condemning war as a means of deciding international disputes and violate other norms of international law, as well as the peace treaty of 1920 between Latvia and Russia which binds both sides, the Nonaggression Treaty of 1932 between Latvia and the USSR, the treaty of 1932 on the procedure for resolving mutual disputes, and the Mutual Assistance Treaty between Latvia and the USSR of 1939; that in accordance with the convention of 1933 on the definition of aggression the action of the USSR against Latvia in 1940 is to be qualified as an aggression, that by destroying, imprisoning, and displacing inhabitants of Latvia, by illegally seizing the property of the Republic of Latvia and of its citizens, the action of the USSR executive is in contradiction with the Hague Convention of 1907 on land warfare rights, with the convention of 1948 on genocide, and with the Geneva Convention of 1949 on the protection of civilian inhabitants in wartime, and is to be qualified as an international crime which corresponds to the convention of 1968 on nonapplication of the statute of limitations for war crimes and for crimes against humanity as mentioned in Articles 1 and 2; that the decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 1940 on granting USSR citizenship to the principles of international law; that no kind of territorial appropriations which have been gained as a result of using force or threats of force must be recognized as lawful; that on 24 December 1989 the USSR Congress of People's Deputies adopted a resolution on the assessment of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and its political and legal consequences; that the citizens of the republic of Latvia have unmistakably manifested their will to restore the state power of the republic of Latvia, the Congress of the Citizens of the republic of Latvia

appeals to the USSR Government to re-examine USSR policy of the last 50 years in relation to the republic of Latvia and to start talks without delay with the representatives elected by its citizens.

First: On attributing the legal status of an occupied country to the republic of Latvia;

Second: On starting the deoccupation of the republic of Latvia and on handing over actual power to its legally elected representatives;

Third: On eliminating the consequences of the occupation.

The Congress of the Citizens of the republic of Latvia supports the processes of USSR democratization and is convinced that the USSR, corresponding with its authority and the norms of international law, will be ready to regulate by means of talks the legally unregulated situation, which has arisen during World War II, between Latvia and the USSR.

The Congress of the Citizens of the republic of Latvia affirms that by restoring the state power of the republic of Latvia in the territory of the republic of Latvia it will act in accordance with the principles of international law and the UN Declaration of Human Rights.

RSFSR

Results of RSFSR Repeat Elections Reviewed

LD2804231490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1521 GMT 28 Apr 90

[Summary] Moscow, 28 Apr. (TASS)—The results of repeat elections to the Russian parliament held on 19 and 22 April were reviewed here today at a session of the Central Electoral Commission for Elections of Russian Federation People's Deputies.

Two hundred and seventy five people stood as candidates in the repeat elections for Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic people's deputies in 35 constituencies. In virtually all constituencies these were multicandidate elections, and in Kyzyl territorial constituency there were 21 names on the ballot paper.

According to Central Electoral Commission statistics, less than 70 percent of the electorate took part in the repeat elections, and 3.5 percent of ballot papers were invalid. In 22 constituences there will be a repeat ballot during the next two weeks between the two candidates who gained the largest number of votes.

The session of the Central Electoral Commission also examined the question of repeat elections in the four remaining constituencies. They will take place on 14 June.

Thus, only 34 out of 1,068 seats in the Russian parliament remain to be filled.

State Committee for Prices Chairman Retires

PM0105134390 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 29 Apr 90 Second Edition p 2

[Unattributed report: "At the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium"]

[Text] The RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium has relieved Comrade Aleksey Aleksandrovich Stolbov of his duties as chairman of the RSFSR State Committee for Prices in connection with his retirement.

Manayenkov Supports Idea of Russian Party

PM0105124390 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 1 May 90 p 1

[Interview with Yu.A. Manayenkov, CPSU Central Committee secretary and member of the CPSU Central Committee Russian Bureau, by APN parliamentary observer Vladimir Ostrovskiy specially for RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA; date and place of interview not specified: "Does Russia Need Its Own Communist Party?"—first paragraph is correspondent's introduction]

[Text] I put this question to Yu.A. Manayenkov, CPSU Central Committee secretary and member of the CPSU Central Committee Russian Bureau.

[Manayenkov] This question arose on several occasions in the past, generally before party congresses. It is now being discussed by party organizations in Moscow, Leningrad, and many oblasts in the Russian Federation. There was even an attempt to rapidly organize this Communist Party in Leningrad at the so-called Congress To Revive the Russian Communist Party. However, haste has never been a reliable "adviser."

I will not attempt to appraise this event. I can only attest that some communists consider this idea unacceptable: They believe that it encapsulates the interests of conservative forces within the party which threaten everything that perestroyka has achieved and perestroyka itself. On the other hand voices can be heard saying that a decision to set up a Russian Communist Party must be adopted at the coming All-Russian Party Conference, that is, before the 28th CPSU Congress opens. This stance is explained by a desire to come to the congress as part of a united party organization.

There is, in short, food for thought. The problem that has arisen cannot be solved by using a stereotyped approach and cannot be ducked with formalist delaying tactics. The pressure from below (and this is a common demand) cannot be disregarded any longer.

[Ostrovskiy] Briefly, what are the arguments in favor of a Russian Communist Party?

[Manayenkov] They boil down to the following ideas: The Russian Communist Party will be a kind of linchpin

making it possible to strengthen the CPSU's organizational and ideological unity, will help elaborate coordinated actions within the Russian and USSR parliament, and will consolidate the peoples of the Russian Federation still further. There is another equally important argument: Within a multiparty system it will be hard to create a political mechanism for collaboration between the union republic communist parties without a Russian Communist Party. I don't think we can help noticing the problems that are cropping up in the new conditions. What is more, many people are inclined to regard the formation of a Russian Communist Party as more effective efforts in the struggle for the party's vanguard role. This justification merits attention because the CPSU Central Committee Russian Bureau has not yet been vested with sufficient powers and lacks its own mass media. These are so to speak, the positive aspects of this problem.

[Ostrovskiy] You mean that there are also negative aspects?

[Manayenkov] Obviously. Russia's communists form 57.9 percent of the total membership of the country's territorial party organizations. They are the majority within our party. Misgivings are being voiced that if the Russian Communist Party is registered as an independent party, it will be able to oppose all other parts of the CPSU. I do not think that in this case we should altogether fail to consider the danger of the formation of a "dyarchy" within the party and thus of a split. I would think it appropriate to predict that under certain circumstances a future Russian Communist Party Central Committee may try to find a method of imposing its will on the CPSU, placing the latter in the position of a minority, and it will hardly be possible to avert this by cunning normatives. A different approach is needed here.

We must weigh up all the "pros" and "cons" of the scenario that some of our comrades have proposed for the formation of a Russian Communist Party. We naturally cannot throw out everything that previous generations have created over the decades. I would remind you that the CPSU Central Committee open letter to the country's communists entitled "For Consolidation on a Principled Basis" set out a key idea—that the party should acquire new forces.

It is hardly necessary to remind you that we Russian Communists have always been distinguished by our awareness of our membership of the international union of like-minded people which was created by Lenin, which expresses the fundamental interests of the working class, the peasantry, and the intelligentsia, and which is bound together by the common goal of socialist transformations. I think that even today these interests and this goal determine the essence of the perestroyka policy. The integrity and lasting unity of the CPSU are vitally necessary for perestroyka to succeed. Of course, the weakening of this unity harbors a danger that our common efforts will be undermined.

Quite naturally, there can be no going back. We have no moral or other right to do this. However, in conditions of a multiparty system where more and more parties and movements are emerging in Russia, I believe that we must all realize the indisputability of the fact that the organized formation of Russia's communists into a party, despite all the misgivings, is, in my view, not only desirable but also necessary. That is my personal opinion. Naturally it is up to the RSFSR's [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] communists to make the final decision on this question. We must certainly not waste time. I am convinced that the Russian Communist Party must remain within the CPSU and firmly uphold the principles of its ideology and statutes.

The fate of the fatherland is now in our hands and we must all think about the consequences of each step we take and its advisability in the interests of perestroyka and our peoples' prosperity.

Draft Program for 'Revival' of Russian Party

90UN1413B Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 20 Mar 90 p 2

[Draft propositions of the program for a revival of the Russian Communist Party of the Leningrad Action Committee for Preparation of the Constituent Congress of a Russian Communist Party Within the CPSU under the heading "For Justice, Progress, and Harmony"]

[Text] A meeting of the action committee discussed the draft propositions of the Program for a Revival of the Russian Communist Party.

Changes and additions were made to the draft in the course of the discussion. The document was then approved and offered for discussion in the primary party organizations.

Here is the text.

I. Basic Provisions of the Concept of the Development of Socialism

1. Socialism is an objectively necessary stage in the development of human society. According to the teaching of Marx and Lenin, it is communism which is only just emerging from the preceding system and bears in all respects—economic, moral, and intellectual—the imprint of capitalism. Whereas present-day capitalism contains within it the rudiments of socialism, socialism is communism with traces of capitalism. This is the unity and contrast of these two types of society.

2. Both positive and negative phenomena under socialism have objective, material, primarily economic causes. The contradictory economic basis of socialism inevitably engenders both constructive and destructive trends. It is the struggle of these trends which determines the development of the socialist society. Whereas the negative phenomena are of themselves engendered

objectively, their growth is associated with incorrect policy in the solution of the contradictions of socialism.

3. The basis of the solution of the contradictions of socialism along the lines of its development and an improvement in the life of all members of society is an economy geared to satisfaction of the requirements of the people, results and user value, not a growth of expenditure and value. A policy directing the socialist economy, contrary to its nature, toward value, and not user value, leads to a preponderance of destructive trends breaking down public ownership and undermining public well-being.

4. Scientific and technological progress as the basis of the development of modern society consists of savings of labor. The conversion of savings of labor into additional material benefits and time for the free all-around development of all members of society ensures a consistent reduction in social inequality and the gradual surmounting of class differences and the working people's participation in the management and extension of socialist democracy. At the same time, however, the numerous attempts by representatives of the most diverse social strata and groups to give society a little less and a little worse and to take from it a little more and a little better are engendering the opposite trend of the usurpation of free time by part of society and the enrichment of some at the expense of others. This trend is leading to the appearance of a class of new "socialist" bourgeois avid for political power. A struggle which is being conducted by an alliance of people of physical and mental labor and the working people of town and country for the preservation and development of the socialist fatherland and an improvement in the life of all members of society against petty bourgeois, private-ownership aspirations to live at another's expense is under way in society.

5. This struggle may be successful if it is conducted consciously, in planned and organized manner, and aggressively if the whole way until the complete surmounting of class differences it is led by the class which, first, is objectively the most fully and consistently interested in progress toward social equality and, second, can improve its situation only by improving that of all other social classes and strata. It is this class which, in alliance with them, should exercise political power.

6. No longer an organ of the domination of one class over another, the socialist state is called upon to organize the conscious activity of the working people, oppose the petty bourgeois attempts of some to enrich themselves and develop at the expense of others and defend the country's integrity and sovereignty, proceeding from the fact that in realizing its own interests the foremost class embodies interests common to all mankind also, preserving living conditions and life on earth itself.

7. The working people's creative activity pertaining to the development of that which is communist in socialism may be conscious, planned, organized, and aggressive if the working class and all working people operate under the leadership of a party which heads their creation and struggle for the removal of socialist inequality. Only on this path may the task of the development of morality and spiritual culture and the assimilation of the entire wealth of values common to all mankind, given respect for the national dignity, traditions, and mutual enrichment of the cultures of all peoples and the free harmonious development of each individual, be successfully accomplished.

II. The Communist Party in a Socialist Country

1. The Communist Party in a socialist country is a political party of the working class acting in conjunction with the peasantry and intelligentsia which becomes, as social inequality is reduced, a nonclass public organization. It expresses the fundamental interests, needs, and cherished aspirations of the people and organizes for the solution of the entire complex of problems of the present day the constructive forces of society, ensuring their unity and civic harmony.

2. For the accomplishment of this mission the party, as the vanguard of the class which is the leading force in the overall struggle for the development of each member of society and for the consistent and full surmounting on the basis of highly productive high-quality labor of class differences, is called upon, employing modern mass propaganda media, to combine the creative activity and struggle of the working people with progressive theory making it possible on the basis of the development of Marxism-Leninism to find the best means and methods of realization of the people's fundamental interests and practice genuine democracy.

3. A most important task of the Communist Party in a socialist country is to ensure, on the basis of genuine democracy, a social and political situation and spiritual-moral atmosphere of creative construction and constructive expression, the public scientific elaboration of a state program of the growth of public well-being, and the organization of its concerned, enterprising, and plan-oriented implementation for the purpose of eliminating the lag behind other countries and the distinctive, full-blooded development of the peoples inhabiting Russia and compatriots living outside.

4. The position of governing party does not spare it the impact of the contradictions and opposite trends which exist in society. Moreover, it heightens their manifestation within the party inasmuch as it is joined by people with different beliefs and political goals, including lobbyists, idlers, and careerists using party membership for the satisfaction of egotistical interests and for this reason directly or indirectly opposed to the subordination of personal to public interests. Only by freeing itself from them and developing criticism and self-criticism will the party strengthen itself and become capable of accomplishing the tasks confronting it.

5. In order that the party might successfully serve the interests of the working people the social composition of

both the party as a whole and its executive authorities should reflect the social composition of the working part of society. A preponderance of workers and peasants in the executive authorities of the primary party organizations of industrial enterprises, in raykoms and obkoms [rayon and oblast party committees] and also in the Central Committee, on which V.I. Lenin insisted particularly, given the presence in these authorities of a sufficient number of intellectuals cognizant of their responsibility to the people, truly highly educated people, prevents the party from becoming divorced from the masses and changing from a party of creation to a party of talk.

6. The determination of a party maximum common for all communists, including officials of the party and state apparatus and business executives, in an amount determined by the Russian Communist Party congress as a multiple of the average per capita income in the country, could be a weapon against the alienation of party members and communist executives from the bulk of the working people, whose interests the communists are called upon to serve, and could be a means of regulating the social composition of the party, guarding against the penetration of its ranks by careerists and all kinds of smart operators enriching themselves at the people's expense. The growth of the top incomes of the communists would thereby be possible only given an improvement in the life of the people.

7. Membership in the Communist Party is incompatible with privilege. Renunciation of all privileges presupposes, in particular, that members of the party who have acquired seats in the Congress of People's Deputies in circumvention of public ballot, that is, as is now generally recognized, anti-democratically, via public organizations, could display initiative and refrain from voting, becoming nonvoting observers from the corresponding public organizations.

8. Putting executives and officials of the apparatus on the register in the primary party organizations of major industrial enterprises would contribute to surmounting their divorce from the party and the people. Promotion to higher offices without having worked in a primary party organization and without consideration of its opinion should be precluded.

9. The party performs all its work publicly. Its budget also should be open and should be formed from party contributions and income from party enterprises and distributed by proceeding from the fact that the primary party organizations constitute the basis of the party. Any exclusive socioeconomic activity of the party isolating it from the people is impermissible.

10. Putting the interests of social development above the personal interests of its members, in intra-party life also the party is guided by the principle that the minority should not impose its will on the majority. It is in this plane that the principle of democratic centralism is understood—as requiring the subordination of all executive authorities and all organizations to the collectively formulated will of the whole party. Inasmuch as the process of the formulation of the collective will is a contradictory process and cannot be insured against mistakes, the safeguarding of the rights of a minority which disagrees with the decision of the majority, through a return after a certain time to re-examination of the decision adopted on the basis of an analysis of the process of its practical implementation, is essential. Proceeding from the fact that the primary party organizations are the basis of the party, decisions affecting the interests of the whole party take effect after they have been confirmed by party-wide ballot in the primary party organizations.

III. Strategy and Tactics of a Revival of the RKP [Russian Communist Party] Within the CPSU

1. The strategy for the revival of the RKP amounts to the recreation of the RKP within the CPSU in accordance with the demands which are made of a communist party in a socialist country and the achievement on this basis of the strengthening and development of the party as a whole.

2. All work on the re-creation of the RKP is to be performed not in isolation from non-party people but in alliance with them, the public organizations and the movements through which the working people are in practice approaching recognition of the need to adopt communist positions in solving life's contradictions as a basis. An alliance with all who support the revival of Soviet Russia and the USSR is essential, and joint labor, dialogue, polemics, and, in certain cases, struggle against those who are impeding this process or attempting to undermine it are needed.

3. A form of resistance to the revival of the RKP is the intention to substitute for a constituent congress which could elect the RKP Central Committee an all-Russia conference lacking such authority and postponing the founding of the RKP to the indefinite future. An RKP congress would enable the communists to go to the 28th CPSU Congress ideologically and organizationally united and capable of directing the flow of the congress into the channel of the development of the party as a communist party and preventing its degeneration into a social democratic party objectively relegating the interests of a majority of working people to the background and leading to the restoration of capitalism.

4. Work on the organization of an action congress of Russia's communists scheduled for 21-22 April in Leningrad will make it possible to prepare the constituent congress in the ideological-political and organizational respects, and in the event of the election by this time of a sufficient number of delegates to the constituent congress, to make the action congress a constituent congress. The action congress is to examine the situation in the CPSU, discuss the socioeconomic and political position of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist

Republic], outline the urgent tasks confronting the communists of Russia and measures pertaining to protection of the working people, formulate proposals in respect of the CPSU Program and Rules and outline measures to complete the process of the organizational structuring of an RSFSR party organization within the CPSU prior to the 28th Party Congress. The situation could require the participants in the action congress to travel to the localities to speed up completion of the election of delegates to the constituent congress of the RKP.

5. It essential at the constituent congress of the RKP to adopt the principles of the activity and tasks of the RKP within the CPSU, finally formulate proposals pertaining to the CPSU Program and Rules and discuss the basic propositions of the concept of the socioeconomic and political development of the RSFSR within the USSR.

6. Priority tasks of the elected RKP Central Committee will be the organization of the elaboration by the best scientific forces, those united in a Russian Academy of Sciences included, of a program of Russia's socioeconomic development providing for its revival and precluding unequal relations with other republics within the USSR, its enslavement by foreign and local shadow capital, the broadest discussion of it and its submittal to a congress of RSFSR people's deputies and preparation for the 28th CPSU Congress.

7. The tactics of the revival of the RKP should take account of all the salient features of the current situation and provide for the conversion of the movement for the revival and development of the RKP into the cause of the working people and the whole people of Russia.

New Moscow Soviet Chairman Luzhkov Profiled

PM3004140390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Aleksandr Davydov report "from the Moscow City Soviet": "Vote of Confidence: Election of Chairman of Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee Held 26 April"]

[Text] Presenting the candidate for this post, G. Popov stated, among other things:

"There were alternative candidates, but I nevertheless settled on Yuriy Luzhkov. He does have experience of work in the city soviet executive committee [gorispolkom], but his direct experience of the institution is only recent and he has not yet had time to become "steeped" in it. Luzhkov possesses enviable practical experience as a leader in economic management. And finally, Yuriy Mikhaylovich was described in positive terms by the majority of contenders for the gorispolkom chairmanship with whom I conversed and by many executive committee members..."

Informing delegates about his action program, Yu. Luzhkov spoke in favor of radical reforms of the system of city management and the Moscow economy. He advocated, in particular, the introduction of a market economy while stressing that the switch to a new footing should be effected in a gradual, well-considered manner to avoid its having any adverse effect on Muscovites' living conditions. The candidate outlined quite thoroughly his ideas on how he intends to tackle the capital's most acute problems—food, goods, housing, social protection for the disadvantaged strata of the population, the environment, the protection of cultural monuments...

The program received the backing of the majority of deputies who took part in the discussion. The candidate proposed for soviet chairman received the support of 297 of the 384 deputies who took part in the voting.

Brief biographical information: Yuriy Mikhaylovich Luzhkov was born in Moscow in 1936. He is Russian, a member of the CPSU, and a specialist in the sphere of automated control systems. After graduating from Moscow's I.M. Gubkin Petrochemical and Gas Industry Institute in 1958 he was sent to work in the Institute of Plastics. From 1964 he worked in the USSR Ministry of the Chemical Industry automation department. From 1974 he was director of an experimental design bureau and general director of the "Khimavtomatika" scientific research association. In 1986 he worked in the apparatus of the USSR Ministry of the Chemical Industry and was a member of its collegium, and he became chief of the Main Administration for Science and Technology. He has been a deputy of the Moscow City Soviet in several convocations. In 1987 he was elected deputy chairman of Moscow Gorispolkom.

Measures Needed for a Sovereign Russia Viewed

LD3004145190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 0700 GMT on 30 April carries the 55-minute "Sovereignty of Russia" phone-in on RSFSR issues.

Presenter Viktor Novikov says that the program is not only watched by Russians but by people from all over the federation. The studio guests are asked to introduce themselves and their political standpoints, which they do as follows:

Sergey Dmitriyevich Valentey, candidate of economic sciences at the Economic Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, left of center;
Sultan Ayubovich Edisultanov, head of a department of the State Planning Committee of the Chechen-Ingushetiya ASSR, democrat;
Gennadiy Pavlovich Luzin, doctor of economic sciences of the Kola Scientific Center of the USSR Academy of Sciences, specializing in regional economics;
Mikhail Iosifovich Krotov, doctor of economic Sciences, chairman of the Leningrad organization of the Knowledge Society, communist favoring the rapid economic renewal of the RSFSR economy;

Aleksey Ivanovich Istomin, deputy chairman of the trade union committee at the Novolipetsk Iron and Steel Combine, left of center;
Gennadiy Ivanovich Mineyev, deputy head of the Economic Department of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, favors genuine sovereignty for the RSFSR and supports those who likewise favor this regardless of political coloring.

Novikov's first question to the panel is what they see as the sovereignty of Russia. Mineyev says that a variety of measures would be needed to create a sovereign Russia, covering political, legal, and economic measures. Istomin stresses the need for economic independent activity. Krotov believes the Russian soviet must be disentangled from the central bodies running the entire country and be the real masters of the republic. Luzin points out that at present only the concept of sovereignty is being worked out but unfortunately law-making bills are being adopted simultaneously, which are likely to hamper implementation of the concept once this has been worked out. Edisultanov also favors sovereignty of the soviets. Valentey adds the need for sovereignty for all. Otherwise the Russian government would simply be a substitute for the all-Union government with all the same problems.

Next Valentey says a Riga listener has pointed out that economic sovereignty must entail political sovereignty. Valentey reminds him that no country is really sovereign today when all are interrelated and that one must not look to ideals of two centuries ago.

Krotov agrees with a listener who has asked him whether oblasts in the RSFSR might not have the same righs as autonomous republics, as in the past. He replies that oblasts, krays, and republics should have the same social and economic rights. He favors elevating the status of the Leningrad city soviet which feels its activities are restricted. It should not, Valentey comments, have the status of a union republic. Luzin wonders, in the light of another question, whether Leningrad should be a free economic zone but of what kind? A free enterprise zone, perhaps.

The following exchange takes place on this question:

[Krotov] I agree with the writer of one note I have received. It is from Anna Khalilovna Pergament, who asks, 'Could not the RSFSR oblasts be given the same rights as the autonomous republics? Russia used to have Nizhegorodskaya province and Kazanskaya province.'

I would add, Anna Khalilovna, that there was also Peterburgskaya province and many others. Of course, the social and economic rights of RSFSR oblasts and krays and autonomous republics should be the same and I personally disagree totally with the discrimination that has been introduced in the new laws with regard to, say, the Leningrad city soviet and the other major soviets of our republic. In other words, the Leningrad city soviet has been brought down to the level of a town soviet within the framework of an autonomous republic and it is from this that the draft law to expand the independence of Leningrad stems, as, let's say, a forced measure. Every oblast, every city will be putting forward their own draft laws. So, I repeat, the economic sovereignty of Russia implies the social and economic equality of the 55 oblasts and krays and the 16 autonomous republics.

[Novikov] Incidentally, Mikhail Iosifovich, one of the notes contains a proposal to give Leningrad the status almost of an independent union republic?

[Krotov] It's a forced measure because under the new laws, even those adopted by the new Supreme Soviet, it is impossible to implement the ideas that we, say, in the Leningrad Knowledge Society have developed in practice. In, for example, the sphere of land-tenure regulations or that of developing enterpreneurial and shareholding activities, the Leningrad city soviet does not have the rights we need. We can, the Leningrad city soviet can, for example, fine the Kirov works which is causing millions of rubles worth of damage to the ecology merely something like R3,000. Thus, the local soviets' lack of rights, even for such soviets as those of Moscow and Leningrad, has been retained.

[Valentey] I'd like to add, Mikhail Iosifovich, that there is no need for that to give Leningrad the rights of a union republic.

[Krotov] Of course, we can't...

[Valentey] I am, of course, in agreement with the fact that the autonomous republics, krays, and oblasts be equal in terms of their rights. Only then will we have created a normal Russian Federation. Incidentally, this is including in our concept.

[Luzin] If we are talking about Leningrad, I have a question as well. It's from Vladimir Alekseyevich Markov. What do you think of singling out Leningrad as a separate economic zone? Well, to start with, what kind of zone? If it is a free enterprise zone, then it's hard to give advice off the top of one's head since we'd have to study what Leningrad would like to gain from a free enterprise zone. I reject its being turned into a free trade zone or an export production zone but a joint enterprise zone would be fine. However, if we are talking about separate economic zones within any country, that is hardly expedient.

Luzin then reads two questions, both related to the low standard of living in Russia as compared with the other republics. He has no answer but only regrets that it is so.

Next, Edisultanov has been asked about the sovereignty of the autonomous republics which he defines as "the fullness of power", before turning to another viewer's concern that more republican sovereignty might have a negative effect on the economic mechanism of that republic.

Novikov interrupts to stress that the topic is not the collapse of Russia.

Istomin has been asked whether removing the "right to work" from Russia's legislative code would not be a loss to the people. He agrees that it would but that documents should be filled with genuine meaning, not merely exist for their own sake.

What would be the fate of all-Union enterprises in a more autonomous Russia? Mineyev asks on behalf of a viewer. He goes on to note the great over saturation of Russia by all-Union enterprises. It does not have its own powerful production base as it otherwise might. If this were the case, social problems would be greatly diminished. A Dagestan viewer asks about economic matters at the local level for which Mineyev cites standard rules already in existence.

What would sovereignty give Russia? Novikov gives this as the question he'd like to put to the panel and to listeners. He then reads a question asking whether someone could become a millionaire in the USSR. Another light-hearted question asks if alcohol prices might return to their old prices and whether all towns would have alcohol in abundance. Another is more specific: When will there be good wine in the country? None of these receives more than a smile in answer. More serious are questions asking why there are no women on the panel and why contributors are always neutral or pro the democratic platform. Can we talk about any other republics: sovereignty of Belorussia, Ukraine etc? asks a viewer in the Crimea. Again nothing specific is said in reply. An Aktyubinsk viewer notes in indignation that even though the country may be heading toward capitalism, nothing is available or likely to be.

Next Krotov is invited to talk about a Leningrad venture which came about while Russia waited for its congress of people's deputies to come up with some ideas about economic sovereignty. When it failed to do so, the Russian Knowledge Society, spearheaded by the Leningrad branch, held a competition to find out the best concept for transferring the Russian Federation to economic independence and self-government. Several of the panel were involved in this competition. Krotov then looks at the three main trends that emerged. From Bashkiria came the notion of "Baltic-style" economic isolation. Leningrad however is aware of how that feels, having experienced the Estonian variety. From Sverdlovsk, Kemerovo, and Tatariya came the concept of redistribution to help the less advanced areas of the federation develop in social terms. One has to be aware that this would mean a loss to other areas if funds were taken from the Russian center. It would be a starting measure only. The best version would be "self-evolving".

Edisultanov, the author of one of the concepts submitted to the competition, feels that it is thanks to his involvement in the contest that he is here at all, for which he is grateful. He calls for a rational solution to benefit all regions, leaving no-one out. Mineyev, also involved in the Leningrad competition, notes that there was concern at the competition about all-Union and the republics, since they ignore the fact that autonomous republics are subordinate to Russia and that they should be dealt with via the Russian Supreme Soviet rather than directly with the all-Union administration. People want this explained. Otherwise it emerges that the majority and minority populations within the RSFSR are divided by all-Union legislation.

Mineyev says: "I have to say that these ideas are very interesting and could be used to work out, and such work is now in progress at the all-Union level: how to put these concepts into practice. However, I'd like to talk about the following. A number of speakers at the hearings were concerned, and Mikhail Iosifovich spoke about this, at the effect of USSR legislative bills with regard to the RSFSR and especially because—and this was stressed—such a law on the bases of economic relations between the USSR and the Union and autononous republics is fairly ambiguous. Many simply said that it will not consolidate healthy forces but on the contrary separate them, something that cannot be allowed. Why? Because even the name of the law puts one on the alert. This law attempts not to regulate the relations of the Union with the Union republics but includes the autonomous republics even though all the legislators of the Union are aware that autonomous republics and autonomous formations are, under the Russian Constitution, part of Russia. It would, evidently, be improper to tackle these matters at the Union level, thereby depriving the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation of its rights. I do not think that laws of this kind benefit our unity."

"I have brought a letter with me. There are a lot of questions being asked of us. People are demanding explanations of these clauses. I'd just like to read an extract. Several people signed this letter. I'll just read it. It won't take long. We would like first of all to draw your attention to the law on the bases of economic relations between the USSR and the Union and autonomous republics, which are an organic component of the Union republic. Not only is there a fairly wide range of various types of autonomous formation in the RSFSR, Russia is a country in which the majority of the population is Russian. In this connection, the question arises as to why a Union law, encroaching upon the sovereignty of the Russian Federation, pits the minority against the majority. It seems to us that as a republic of the USSR which is sovereign in every way, the RSFSR alone has the authority to deal with all the internal problems within its state formation."

"The question has been asked point-blank and I think that the people's deputies of our Supreme Soviet, and a session of this is soon to be held, will give this due attention."

Next, Krotov sets about explaining the concept of "self-evolving" [samo-razrabatyvayuschiy] sovereignty, a concept disparaged by Maslyukov and Shatalin, in the Presidential Council. Luzev points out that they oppose isolationism in favor of an integrated economy. It is the

latter that must not be forgotten. It is all a matter of terminology at the moment. Valentey talks about the need to retain money earned at each level in the locality and how to deal with loss-making enterprises. These could be handed over to worker managements or sold. Sales would strengthen the economic basis of the state. He believe that it will take 10 to 15 years to transfer gradually to a market economy, during which he stresses people will not go hungry since there will be a gradual improvement. They will not be worse off during those 15 years.

Luzev reminds him that when things are getting worse measures of some kind are needed to restore confidence in the government. Surely the aim of perestroyka must be to produce more and quickly? With confidence in the government, there is less need for haste. Too many people in the country are living in dire poverty. The Central Asian republics cannot, for example, provide themselves with food. Isolationism is out.

Krotov says that Leningrad has found a solution to prevent having to wait 10 years to improve standards of living in genuinely accelerating conversion. For this, advanced technology must be transferred to the regions. He cites the example of the "Cosmonaut Komarov", a ship sold to a Leningrad firm now able to export ecological information from laboratories installed upon it, for foreign currency.

Following this, Edisultanov explains what measures towards economic autonomy are being taken in Chechen-Ingushetiya. Then a viewer has asked Istomin whether he believes the trade unions are currently engaged in social and economic "demagogy". That is not what he would call it though he understands what is meant and sees in as inevitable until issues are actually settled.

Krotov next reads a query asking why all the Union republics should be economically linked to Russia. The answer is that this is to their advantage since only Russia has a hard currency fund that is not in the red. It is also a matter of historical development.

Mineyev has a question on the percentage of foreign currency reserves earned by Russia. This is given and it is noted that it then goes to the center for redistribution to the other Union republics. This is not fair, Mineyev says, it should stay in Russia.

Valentey has a series of queries all asking when Russia will be "free", "sovereign" or "independent". He lists the economic transformations required before this can be achieved. These are to develop hi-tech industry, to establish small and medium-sized business in order to gain a developed market, and the need to bring those living in poverty to a better standard of living in the period before economic independence is achieved.

In conclusion, Edisultanov replies to two viewers asking about the possibility of autonomy for Chechno-Ingushetiya leading to sovereignty with the Russian republic. Edisultanov says sovereignty is autonomy for the republic.

Medvedev Addresses Gorkiy Party Group

PM3004115690 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Apr 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS report under the general heading "Meetings With Working People"]

[Text] Gorkiy, 29 Apr—V.A. Medvedev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, was in Gorkiy 26-29 April. The party's renewal on the basis of the CPSU Central Committee's precongress platform, the draft new Statutes, and the CPSU Central Committee Open Letter to the country's communists, the reorganization of the political system, the growth in the role of ideological work, and the smoothing out of interethnic relations—that was the range of problems discussed during his meetings and conversations with Gorkiy Oblast working people.

V.A. Medvedev visited the truck plant, where he studied the truck production unit and samples of new equipment. He met with the party aktiv of the sector's leading enterprise. At this meeting support was expressed for the party's course of strengthening its position in society as a social organization. The view was expressed that there should be greater exactingness toward those who are trying to cause a split in the CPSU and start a factional struggle within it. Communists see the solution to the sociopolitical crisis in an increase in the authority of primary party organizations and the abandonment of obsolete forms of administrative edict pressure on the masses. The consolidation of party forces on a principled basis was also discussed at meetings with rural working people—workers at sovkhozes [state farm] in Kstovskiy and Lyskovskiy Rayons.

Addressing students and teachers at the interoblast higher party school as well as social scientists from other higher educational establishments in the city, the CPSU Central Committee secretary had a frank and detailed discussion with them on the sociopolitical situation in the country, perestroyka in party education, and ways of developing the social sciences. The teaching of Marx, Engels, and Lenin still forms the basis of ideological work, V.A. Medvedev noted. But a considerable proportion of social scientists proved unprepared to defend it against vulgarizing distortions and revisions. The tone has begun to be set on social science questions by amateur writers who are inclined to make open attacks on Marxism-Leninism and create an ideological vacuum. Such attempts must be resolutely and consistently rebuffed.

The urgency and acuteness of the problems facing the party in the period of preparations for the 28th congress were discussed today at a conference of the oblast party

organization aktiv, which was addressed by V.A. Medvedev. The Communist Party, the initiator of revolutionary changes, he said, is now at a historical milestone where the future of perestroyka and socialism and the future of our country's peoples depend on its renewal. It is therefore no accident that the CPSU's fate is of profound concern to all its members and everyone who values the ideals of socialism.

Having renounced the advantages that were legislatively enshrined in the political system, the party should transform itself from a party that managed everyone and everything into a real sociopolitical organization whose functions are the formulation of policy, the presentation and explanation of this policy to the people, and the winning of a mandate to govern the country on this basis through the procedure of democratic elections. The CPSU is called upon to exercise its vanguard role with the help of the methods of organizational, political, and ideological work through communists active in particular components of the state and social systems.

It is necessary soberly, without dramatizing the situation, to consider the possible consequences of the objective process of the formation of a multiparty system for the CPSU. It is clear to everyone that if it takes its old baggage into the new situation the party will not be able to retain tis vanguard role, but will be crowded out of the political arena by other social forces if we let events take their course and adopt the position of bystanders. There is no reason for pessimism or political pusillanimity. We should not panic, but seek ways of ensuring the best possible organization of the party's work to ensure its vanguard role. It will be necessary to make major changes to the structure of party committees and the content of all party work so that the CPSU's enormous intellectual and organizational potential can produce real returns, ensuring its supremacy over other parties in terms of the people's support.

Centrally and locally an active quest is in progress for ways of establishing the real power of ordinary communists and the party masses within the CPSU and means by which they can participate in practice in the formulation and implementation of party policy and the monitoring of the work of the party's leading organs and their apparatus. The party is seeking answers worthy of our revolutionary times to all these questions, which are at the epicenter of the precongress debate, and it will find them.

The CPSU Central Committee secretary laid flowers at the V.I. Lenin monument in Gorkiy and visited the city's historical sites. In the labor collectives and party organs and in contacts with the city's and oblast's inhabitants he answered numerous questions. V.A. Medvedev congratulated the people of Gorkiy on the approaching festivals—May Day and the 45th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War.

Visits Motor Works

LD2704224690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 27 Apr 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [A. Tsirulnikov] This morning Comrade Medvedev visited Gorkiy motor works. He visited the assembly shops and talked to workers and managers of the enterprise. They talked about that which nowadays worries people most. Needless to say, issues of production closely interweave with everyday issues and the economy, so that one has to solve everything at once, which is not easy. The mass production of new promising models is being mastered slowly. For instance, the Gaz 3307 truck, which meets all present-day requirements, is produced in the assembly conveyor alternately with the old Gaz 53 truck. The secretary of the CPSU Central Committee met with the works' party aktiv. There are 14,000 communists at the enterprise. The country's biggest primary party organization is naturally living through the same problems that are troubling, at present, the whole of the party. Pre-congress discussions started as early as the end of the last year, and they are still continuing. Here they worked out their own draft political platform for the party. Incidentally, many of its provisions were reflected in the CPSU Central Committee's platform to the congress. At the moment the Central Committee's open letter to the country's communists and the draft party rules are the focus of attention here. At the meetings with Vadim Andreyevich Medvedev many proposals were made. In particular, Comrade Kotelnikov, who is standing as a candidate to represent the works at the 28th party congress, spoke for not considering primary party organizations as the basis of the party, as it is stated in the rules, but rather the party itself, which delegates its powers to elected party bodies, including the Central Committee.

[Begin recording] [Medvedev] The party rules in fact ought to be that document which actually signifies and fixes the delegating of communists' rights to all levels of the party; the rayon, city, and oblast committees; and the CPSU Central Committee. I agree with you that, of course, the party is communists, communists who are organized in primary organizations. Because all the rest, all the superstructures, are party bodies, party bodies to which powers are really delegated. But the delegating of powers—I think this must be clear—should not be determined separately each time, but by some document continually in force. It is such a document that the CPSU rules should be. [end recording]

[Tsirulnikov] In the afternoon Comrade Medvedev met with those attending Gorkiy higher party school. [video shows Medvedev on a platform, addressing a meeting]

Procedural Wrangling in Leningrad Party Reported

PM0105140090 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 1 May 90 Second Edition p 2

[Own correspondent S. Molokov report: "What Is the Way Out of the Crisis? From the Leningrad Party Conference"]

[Text] It seems that the currently fashionable mania for procedural discussions has infected party structures too: The conference delegates spent nearly one and a half hours debating the agenda and standing orders. All the same, the conference started work in a businesslike and constructive mood.

The communists could not but be concerned about the situation in the party, which B. Gidaspov, first secretary of the CPSU oblast committee [obkom] and city committee [gorkom], described in his report as critical. Few people now believe in speedy changes for the better... The difficult experience of perestroyka shows that the chosen path of trial and error is not yet producing tangible results. Discipline has slackened, ideals have been eroded, and a process of sharp polarization has begun both in society, where forces of an antisocialist orientation are forming, and in the party, where defeatist and renegade trends are growing. The crisis in the CPSU has reached danger point. One manifestation of this is the exodus from its ranks. Whereas in 1988, 515 people handed in their party cards in Leningrad and the oblast, in 1989 there have already been more than 8,000, and more than half of this exodus has consisted of workers, while 40 percent of those leaving the party had been members for 20 years or more.

However, having painted this depressing picture, the keynote speaker did not fully reveal the causes or define the objectives of future progress. The emphasis on criticism—albeit justified and deserved—of the center pointed the debates in the same direction. Nearly every speech contained a severe assessment of the Central Committee's actions and subjected the activity of the CSPU obkom to sharp and even cutting criticism. Some delegates called for its work to be pronounced unsatisfactory. But the fiercer the attackers became, the less valid the arguments heard.

And although the party obkom has made many mistakes even over the past year, it did not deserve such a negative attitude. The conference supported by a majority of votes a proposal from a number of delegates not to give an assessment of the work done, but to take note of the CPSU obkom's report.

All the same, the main thing for which the party obkom was blamed was the lack of a firm position and clarity in the tactics of action. And this greatly influenced the nature of the subsequent debate at the conference.

The debate very rapidly developed into an open political battle of extremes—strained and tense. "The report did not contain a single objective or idea to rally and consolidate communists, and that means it does not define the strategic avenues of activity for the Leningrad party organization in the new conditions," A. Chaus, first secretary of Smolninskiy Party Raykom [rayon committee], believes.

"Accurate political assessments are needed," O. Ignatov, chief of the "Lenstroyrekonstruktsiya" Association, stressed in his speech. "Otherwise it is impossible to formulate a program for how to emerge from the crisis and in what direction."

K. Vasilyev, a radio adjuster at the V.I. Lenin Optical Mechanics Association, sees the causes of the crisis, for instance, in the lack of real influence by communists and grass-roots party organizations on higher-level organs, in the disastrous delays in adopting vitally important decisions, and in the increasingly unclear purpose of the party's existence. And Yu. Arkhipov, secretary of the "Izhorskiy Zavod" Association party committee, saw the causes in the fact that the obkom leadership initially gambled on confrontation, rather than consolidation, with the new forces.

The conference became increasingly heated. And gradually, somehow, the businesslike basis of the discussion turned into a purely ideological and even philosophical dispute between supporters of the "democratic platform" and the communists who acknowledge the CPSU Program and Statutes.

On the third day, even after the conference had elected B. Gidaspov from among five candidates to the post of first secretary of Leningrad CPSU Obkom (610 votes in favor), while the next in line, A. Denisov, a USSR people's deputy and professor at Leningrad Polytechnical Institute, received 303 votes, the "active minority" insisted that the delegates elect obkom secretaries actually at the conference. And this is in conditions wehre the obkom members were elected by primary party organizations on the basis of party electoral districts.

It will perhaps seem shameful to recall the third day of the conference. The conference became bogged down in procedural questions mainly provoked by the "active majority."

Without having dealt with organizational questions, the delegates set about discussing resolutions proposed three days earlier on the attitude to the Central Committee letter, the initiative congress of communists of Russia, the party media, the economic situation, and so forth. But after lengthy polemics only one of the eight was adopted—"On Urgent Measures To Give Patronage Assistance to Collectives in the Agro-Industrial Complex." The results were not particularly useful.

So why did it turn out this way? The elections to the conference, which were conducted by the parliamentary method, produced striking results: Of 1,052 delegates, only 76 were workers.

...After three days of heated debates the conference broke off its work, and decided to resume on 5 May.

Tyumen Communists Debate Party's Performance

PM0105135790 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 28 Apr 90 Second Edition p 3

[Special correspondent V. Mamontov report: "Tyumen Oblast Communists—On Their Stance on Perestroyka. The Aim Is Consolidation"]

[Text] Tyumen—V. Shanygin, secretary of the "Yuganskneftegaz" association party committee, started his address at the conference with a statement that has recently become traditional: The party is losing its authority.

"The apparatus has given up and has left the primary party organizations on their own with the people," the petroleum engineer thus described the situation in Tyumen Oblast party organization.

I must admit that this phrase, uttered as if in passing, forced you to think seriously. These words, which are full of internal tension and contradiction, are seemingly typical and extremely essential for an understanding of what is happening in this Siberian area and in the oblast party organization. Although initially you are perplexed by the idea that the apparatus has given up in Tyumen. After all, it was in the depths of this very structure that a real rebellion against the former first secretary arose and then developed into the resignation of the whole obkom bureau. At the beginning of this year, the example of the "apparatus revolution" in Tyumen was published in the newspaper columns in order to confirm that the party committees are not beaten yet. There are communists who are capable of saying to the "number one": the stock of trust on credit has been used up.

Living here in Tyumen Oblast are people with a strong Siberian character, who are not afraid of difficulties. But the contradictions in socioeconomic life have recently become more acute and patience is wearing thin; tension is growing—and the oblast's communists have apparently not found their place yet in this row. Today the ties between primary party organizations and the people are characterized by a dismal figure: A total of 4,820 people left the CPSU on their own initiative between January of last year and April of this year. That means that Shanygin is right: There is hostility, there is an atmosphere of tension. And many people cannot stand it and they leave to go "to the people," essentially to become part of the silent opposition of mistrust.

However, this is not the beginning of something, and it is not an oblast phenomenon. Something else is more important: Did this outflow decrease after Bogomyakov's sensational resignation? The answer was perhaps the most unconsoling thing heard here: It stayed the same. "The apparatus revolution" did not shake the foundations. Which has been of course proved not just by statistics. The report itself that was made at the conference by V. Kitayev, acting first secretary, confirmed that the interim bureau, which prepared the conference, could not change the situation, even if that was in view of the time and powers allotted. A typical admission from the report: "Yes, indeed, we did not make progress in many processes." It was not by accident that many of the speakers criticized the report for the abundance of generalizations, the gloomy atmosphere, and the stereotyped attitudes. And, at first glance, the scathing attitude is quite fitting: The apparatchiks gave in, they gave in again!

But let us look at the situation more closely. The following was to be heard in the lobbies: Here is why the conference itself was somehow not very successful: It proceeded spasmodically, returned to questions that had already been resolved, and sometimes simply got into a rut. It is hard to imagine this, but after all that has happened in the oblast, many delegates demanded that the harsh formula "To acknowledge the obkom's work as unsatisfactory" should not be included in the resolution. An astoundingly evasive phrase was proposed, about the previously adopted decisions not being fulfilled... At first glance, the answer to why such a thing is happening is no secret. From the credentials commission's report, it is clear that there are almost 200 party workers, as well as the leading aktiv, as well as party organization secretaries, among the delegates... There are not many workers and kolkhoz [collective farm] workers (read: rank and file communists) at all—there are over 40 percent of them in the organization, but less than nine percent among the delegates. Do I have to clarify whose hand can be seen in this?

However, when one of the contestants for the post of first secretary was asked this question, he noted quite correctly that this time the elections for the delegates were new and democratic. And today the oblast party organization hall contains the members it voted for freely—no more and no less, no better and no worse.

Of course, this can be disputed. In some places the discussion of the delegates was only a formality, in others there was no initiative in the meeting and it was held with indifference, but in essence what was said is true. It is one thing to make appeals and bandy about the slogan "Change everything." It is another thing to act. For instance, V. Churnilov, first secretary of the Khanty-Mansiyskiy Okrug CPSU committee, made a brilliant speech to the effect that power in the party must be transferred downward, and only then will you be able to say: "This is my party, and not my chief's party." And then afterward, the secretary said, we will decide what rights we delegate to the obkom and how much money we will give it from the subscriptions...

It is true that it is high time to put the question like this. And not just to put the question, but to build and try out such a model for mutual relations in the raykom [rayon party committee] [as published] without expecting additional directions. However, the secretary himself admits: When resolving urgent issues, we delay, we reflect, and we wait first for a conference, then for a congress. "Do we have naive faith, are we waiting for miracles?" Churilov proposed this explanation. It seems that the

point is partly somewhere else: All of us are carrying the psychological burden of many difficult, anarchic, and timid years. And today verbal boldness frequently does not turn into the energy of action.

There is no doubt that all those present wanted to elect a strong, interesting secretary, a personality. And the competitive basis of the election allowed for this—all kinds of people were put forward as candidates. The discussion that took place before the conference in the oblast was sufficiently detailed and meticulous to allow the delegates to adopt an unprecedented decision: They stopped having discussions in the hall and only asked questions, and immediately moved onto the secret ballot.

Today, when the results are known and V. Chertishchev, former chairman of the Turkmen SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Party Control Committee, has been elected as first secretary, the "forecasts into the past" are not so convincing. All the same, it was clear from the reaction in the hall how various statements made by candidates were received. One of them only had to ask permission from the higher chiefs present to "lift the veil" on information about the results of the elections, it seems to me, to lose the chance of being elected: Well, would he go to ask permission from the leadership for everything? Another did not allow for any "cuts" in his "video-clips" and displayed an enviable knowledge of current political structures, was radical to a certain extent, conservative to a certain extent... But like a delayed-action mine, his Komsomol [All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League] got to work—an article in the TYUMENSKIY KOMSOMOLETS strikingly resembled the novel "Emergency on a Regional Scale"...

The harsh spotlight into which candidates were thrown, naturally did not give them any pleasure and it was not a pleasant moment. But these are the realities of the political struggle that communists have to engage in today within a multiparty system, and this was essentially a severe test on all points: on principle, on "biography," and on depth of knowledge and conviction. Of course it is difficult to remain "one on one with the people," particularly today, at a time which is difficult for the Communist Party, but this is the only way of restoring the situation and finding our place in the changing political spectrum. I think that the successful candidate attracted people primarily by his clearly defined businesslike and practical attitude and the fact that he knows how to get out of difficult situations. For example, he became a Soviet deputy in a rayon in the republic that is complicated from a national point of view. In present times, this says a great deal about a man, about his qualities as an organizer, and about his moral criteria.

Now, with two stormy days of debates during the conference behind us, the most difficult thing remains—to move the oblast forward and work out a balanced, realistic program of action. The deceptive feeling of having won a political victory has reappeared—the "number one" has been elected, and "anarchy" has ended. But it seems that the situation in the oblast, the country, and the party is such that all communists will have to decisively rid themselves of simplified ideas about life and their own role in it. It is time to stop dividing people into "good guys" and "bad guys," ordinary people and apparatchiks, and start consolidating the party on a principled, ideological basis. To pass on from "apparatus revolution" to a businesslike attitude and unity.

Ye.K. Ligachev, member of the politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; I.S. Silayev, member of the CPSU Central Committee and deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; and L.I. Filimonov, minister of the petroleum and gas industry, took part in the work of the conference.

CPSU Secretary Visits Tatar Party

PM0105144990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 28 Apr 90 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Kazan Visit"]

[Text] Kazan, 27 Apr—Meetings with G.I. Usmanov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, were held 24-27 April in the primary party organizations of a number of Tatar rayons. He visited industrial enterprises, plants for the processing and storage of agricultural produce, and social and cultural establishments and met with leaseholders and higher education workers.

During the meetings with communists, questions of intraparty life, the role of primary party organizations in the renewed party, the preparation for the Russian Party Conference, and the formation of a body of delegates for the 28th CPSU Congress were discussed in a lively and frank atmosphere. A discussion of ways that the country could transfer to a regulated market economy and the social consequences of this process also provoked particular interest.

In the Tatar Obkom [Oblast Party Committee] G.I. Usmanov had a conversation with the autonomous republic's party and economic leaders. The first economic and social development results of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, which transferred to regional economic accountability on 1 January, were discussed, as well as problems of perestroyka in the republic party organization's activity.

Sakhalin Oblast Soviet Chairman Elected

PM0205084390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 May 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Report by Yuriy Balakirev: "Called to Island from Moscow"]

[Text] Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk—A Muscovite who has never lived on Sakhalin before has been elected head of executive power in Sakhalin Oblast.

Professor V. Fedorov is pro-vice-chancellor of Moscow's Plekhanov institute of the national economy and a specialist in the field of collaboration between the national and the world economy. V. Guliy, USSR people's representative from Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, submitted for the decision of his voters a concept for the economic renewal of the island oblast elaborated by V. Fedorov. It is based on the economy's transfer to a market footing through diversity, competition, and freedom from the center.

"By virtue of its geographical features Sakhalin Oblast is best suited to priority transition to the market," the author of the concept says. "We shall create a market mechanism in an accelerated manner but not with a single leap but by retaining former structures for some time..."

The islanders responded with hope to the radical ideas of the economist from the capital and elected him a Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic deputy. At the first session of the oblast soviet of the new convocation V. Fedorov, who had presented his program to the deputies, became chairman of the executive committee.

Kemerovo Oblast Party Conference Reported

PM0205123590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 2 May 90 Second Edition p 2

[Report by own correspondent V. Kostyukovskiy: "Not a Battlefield, But a Common Home. Notes on the Kemerovo Oblast Party Conference""]

[Text] July 1989 marked the boundary beyond which a change was required in approaches toward, assessments of, and demands on party work. This, more or less, is what conference delegate A. Novikov, party committee secretary at the mine named for Yaroslavskiy, said. In fact, seemingly there was not a speech that did not touch on last year's events in one way or another. The miners' strike dominated life in the Kuzbass for a long time. We are not talking about the notorious "destabilization" of the situation. Not even about the fact that the strike produced a number of significant government documents geared to the social rebirth of this ultra-industrial region. The strike processes identified many enterprising, creatively minded, and practical people throughout the hierarchy; a workers' movement was born and established, and succeeded in becoming a very significant reality and changing the disposition of forces in the oblast's public and political life.

Assessing the "prestrike" stage of the period under review, Obkom [oblast committee] First Secretary A. Melnikov self-critically admitted that the actions of the elected organ and party apparatus had revealed many old attitudes and much sluggishness. So the ideas and decisions that were being adopted often did not match the mood of the masses and were not effective enough. The perestroyka and democratization of society had outstripped the progress of the selfsame processes in the oblast party organization. Much futile effort was wasted on confrontation with burgeoning political forces and trends instead of uniting them to tackle specific tasks. Indeed, subsequently, were there not extreme assessments by certain party officials of workers committees' activities, calls to "do battle" and "organize a rebuff"?

Even today relations are very difficult. There were periods of complete mutual understanding like, for example, the joint letter by the obkom, oblast soviet executive committtee [oblispolkom], and oblast council of trade unions and council of workers' committees which "summoned" a government commission to the Kuzbass to analyze the fulfillment of the poststrike protocol. But they alternated with spells of further confrontation and even open enmity. Both sides are to blame for this. But at a party conference it would have been more useful if the Communists had assessed their own positions before lambasting the leaders of the workers' movement, who are, indeed, sometimes under heavy pressure.

Nevertheless, one must give the party obkom its due for managing, in a very complex situation, to do something to bring about social consolidation and to elaborate objective assessments of the processes that are taking place. I would especially mention the role of Aleksandr Grigoryevich Melnikov, who has not only withstood an onslaught by uncompromising (not praiseworthy in this case) apparatchiks, but has also managed to win over if not the entire elected organ, then at least the bureau and many Communists. It was perhaps as a result of this stance that sensational meetings, with demands for the resignation of bureau and obkom, were avoided in Kemerovo despite all the social tension.

However, other signs of crisis were not avoided. Last year the oblast organization membership fell by more than 9,000, and some city organizations were reduced by 8-11 percent. In the first quarter of this year nearly 4,000 people left the party ranks, most of them workers. There is a multitude of reasons for this, not only problems specific to the Kuzbass. There are signs of a dangerous split in the party.

As far as I can recall, it is the first time there has been such an obvious variety of opinion, conflicting positions, and diversity of platforms at a conference. Two of the elected obkom members said they were withdrawing because they disagreed with the assessments and opinions of the majority. At the very start, representatives of the Kemerovo City organization proposed an alternative agenda. It was rejected by a majority, but this is not disappointing in itself, because a majority is a majority. But hasn't life taught all of us of late to listen more closely, to pay more heed to the most diverse viewpoints? You may not accept a different view, but the only productive approach these days is to amicably listen and respectfully discuss, since this is the only way to achieve consolidation.

The CPSU in conditions of a multiparty system—this is what exercised the minds of many contributors to the

debate on the accountability report and draft party platforms and statute. One must not abandon the production principle of building organizations, some said, because it would lead to the loss of our influence in collectives. But when new parties emerge and start operating in accordance with that principle, others objected, production turns into an arena of political struggle, and you might find there is no one to do any work. The counterargument is that there are no other parties for us to deal with and we will think about it when they appear. Why, there is no point worrying about political opponents... But what about potential colleagues? The "greens," for example, who are a very real entity in the ecologically sick Kuzbass? Indeed, will it not be too late to "think" once the new parties have already appeared?

Both the keynote speaker and the delegates admitted that perestroyka was behindhand in the oblast party organization. Nevertheless, it did not begin yesterday. Its foundations were laid back in 1985-1986 by the new approaches and, I would say, by breakthroughs in cadre policy and democratization of the selection and election of party leaders. This work, which had gotten bogged down, was given a boost following the strike. For instance, Mezhdurechensk Gorkom [city committee] First Secretary S. Shcherbakov was elected last year not at a plenum, but at the actual conference of city Communists, in a multicandidate election. Recently, in March, the Kiselevsk Communists were given, for the first time in our party's history, an opportunity to elect the gorkom first secretary by means of direct elections in party organizations. USSR People's Deputy T. Avaliani was chosen (although, incidentally, practically the entire gorkom left at its "own request," leaving Teymuraz Georgiyevich virtually alone). The July strike also made it imperative to adopt a new approach toward many other issues and to seek nontraditional ways of tackling them. That is why even many radically minded delegates desired not only change, but also a certain continuity in party work. Of course, this has a direct bearing on the personality of the first secretary, whom it was decided to elect at the actual conference.

A special commission, which had been set up in good time as a result of a decision by a previous plenum, having studied oblast Communists' opinions, submitted five candidacies for discussion: A. Melnikov; Obkom Secretary V. Lebedev; A. Bazhakin, first secretary of Zavodskiy CPSU Raykom [rayon committee] in Kemerovo; V. Kudryavtsev, executive organizer of the CPSU Central Committee; and G. Seregin, deputy chief of a Central Committee department (both used to work in the Kuzbass). At the conference itself delegates added T. Avaliani and S. Shcherbakov as candidates. Following the withdrawals, the list for the secret ballot comprised the names of Avaliani, Bazhakin, Melnikov, and Seregin. Before the vote there were many forecasts of who would make the second round. But a second round was not needed. A.G. Melnikov was elected obkom first secretary by a majority of votes.

I can imagine that the new chapter in the life of the biggest party organization beyond the Urals will be determined not least by the following words from the report: "Figuratively speaking, we must all build our Kuzbass home together, and not turn the Kuzbass into a political battlefield."

O.D. Baklanov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and L.D. Ryabev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, participated in the conference's work.

Baklanov, Ryabev at Kemerovo Party Conference

PM0105110390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Apr 90 Second Edition p 2

[From roundup of reports by PRAVDA and TASS correspondents under the general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] Kemerovo, 28 Apr—An oblast party conference has ended here.

A.G. Melnikov was reelected first secretary of Kemerovo Oblast CPSU Committee in a multiple candidate election.

This concluded the first stage of the conference's work. Its delegates will meet later to examine the other items on the agenda, which is associated to a considerable degree with the preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress.

The conference was addressed by O.D. Baklanov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and by L.D. Ryabev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

Western Republics

Ivashko Addresses Ukrainian Academicians

90UN1644A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 31 Mar 90 p 2

[RATAU report on proceedings at session of Ukrainian Academy of Sciences General Assembly: "Scientists Opt for the Path of Renewal"; including speech by V.A. Ivashko, first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party]

[Excerpt] **V.A. Ivashko Speech**

Dear Comrades! This session of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Academy of Sciences General Assembly is being held at a complex and crucial time. Radical changes in the economic and political systems are under way. National self-awareness is being revived rapidly. Spiritual life is acquiring new humanitarian features.

At the same time the confrontation of different evaluations and views is intensifying and outbursts of emotions

and arrogance are becoming more frequent under the pressure of the complex situation in the country. The lack of education and culture is being reflected palpably.

Under these conditions great significance for the fate of the country and the republic is attached to the formulation and implementation of a scientifically substantiated policy, a policy which corresponds to both the requirements of the moment and strategic aims and the people's fundamental interests. The Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee proceeds from the fact that the cornerstone of this policy should be the real political and economic sovereignty of the republic within a renewed Soviet federation.

Considering the national specifics of the restructuring processes, the Ukrainian Communist Party intends to concentrate its efforts in the political sphere on the democratic organization of political power, the genuine power of the people, and the building of a state based on the rule of law; in the socioeconomic sphere, on the creation of an efficient economy based on the latest achievements of scientific and technological progress, a high level of public well-being and people's maximum social and ecological protection. In the spiritual sphere the party will seek the all-around development of the culture of the Ukrainian people and of all national groups living on the territory of the republic. The drafts of the corresponding program documents for the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress will be studied in detail at a Central Committee plenum and submitted for discussion by the communists and all working people of the republic.

Comrades! A most important prerequisite for the successful accomplishment of perestroyka in the republic is multiplication of the intellectual potential of the Ukrainian people. And in this context a leading role belongs to the republic's scientists. After all, as Ivan Franko observed, "actual scientific... work going beyond, in terms of its volume and content, the narrow bounds of utilitarianism and the quieting of current, daily needs is the best measure of whether and to what extent any nation may have a voice in the chorus of cultured nations." Ultimately a nation's potential is determined not only by the average level but also by the pinnacles in its social and moral, cultural and scientific development. And the Ukraine has always had many such pinnacles, which are linked with the names of many native giants of science and culture.

But, unfortunately, we are forced today to affirm something else also. There has been a pronounced diminution in the quantity of republic scientific schools known to world science, many shining names have been extinguished and the importance of the results of scientific research has declined. Currently all of us, however bitter it is to talk about this, are witnesses to a general decline in the prestige of intellectual, creative labor.

Thus profound restructuring is needed in science also. A restructuring which unswervingly enhances the authority of Ukrainian scientists and appreciably increases their contribution to the political, economic, social, and spiritual development of the republic. For this first of all it is necessary to ensure science's real autonomy, in our opinion, which ensues from the general trends and directions of social development.

Let us call things by their names. For a long time relations between science and policy have been stood on their head here, as they say. Movement here has not been from scientific analysis to a political decision but the other way around. The social sciences, as a rule, merely "substantiated" what had already been proclaimed at a party congress or plenum. The natural and technical sciences also existed frequently in the majority of cases under conditions of programs set to achieve the results which the ministries "needed." To what this has led we can see in the example of the Chernobyl tragedy. After all, the "scientific" substantiation of the location of the nuclear power station had been performed, essentially, in the interests of the corresponding department.

Science, however, should also perform the "commission of truth," serve it alone and in this sense be independent. This is why the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Politburo is an active supporter of autonomy in the organization of the activity of the scientific outfits.

We are profoundly convinced that a national science center, which, while making the unswerving development of all branches of science of paramount importance simultaneously performs the role of independent expert at the time of the adoption of all political, economic, and other important decisions, is essential to the republic.

We believe that the republic Academy of Sciences could act in this capacity, but only on condition that it in fact become an independent, autonomous public organization. For this reason it would be expedient for the general assembly session to instruct the presidium and leading scientists of the Academy of Sciences to draw up the appropriate proposals and submit them for examination by the republic Supreme Soviet.

The solution of these and many other questions will undoubtedly demand that the republic Academy of Sciences accelerate its own renewal also. I have no intention of giving one piece of advice or another concerning specific paths for restructuring the Academy. The less so in that a very wide spectrum of opinions in this connection may be encountered in the scientific milieu. So this is entirely up to you. But one thing, in our opinion, is fundamental. It is a question of the fact that the new charter of the republic Academy of Sciences must really make the figure of the scientist paramount. This is why the all-around democratization of the administration of science should be the pivot.

An analysis of world experience suggests that it is also essential at the state level to take many steps to improve the administration of science. It is a question of it being expedient for the republic to have an official body which draws up proposals pertaining to the implementation of

urgent financial-economic, structural, and organizational-legal reforms geared to the increased efficiency of science. Such functions could be exercised by the corresponding committee or commission of the new Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet. I would like to know the Academy's opinion in this connection.

Comrades! In tackling the tasks of perestroyka the Ukrainian Communist Party intends to rely daily and actively on the achievements of our scientists and to closely cooperate with the Academy of Sciences and the VUZ's [higher educational institutions] and sectoral research establishments of the republic. I consider it necessary to express a few thoughts in this connection.

First, the basic sciences now require particular attention in the activity of the research establishments. After all, the lag which has shown through in this sphere is a step toward a real crisis, and not only in science, what is more. For this reason it is necessary to ensure the priority of the development of the basic sciences and increase the amount of resources from all sources of financing intended for this purpose.

Second, it is extremely necessary that the Academy of Sciences define the most promising, "breakthrough," I would say, directions for the development of science and concentrate forces and resources on them. This is demanded both by the very logic of the development of science and technology and the requirements of social progress.

Take if only the following example. Frankly, the republic does not today have a scientifically substantiated acceptable concept for the development of power engineering. We import annually over 57 million tons of oil or more than 93 percent of our consumption. Our own natural gas is sufficient for less than three months. It should be considered that the imported energy resources cost a great deal. Given a transition to world prices, however, we would have to pay not R30 but R68 per ton of oil.

There arises today, therefore, an urgent need to elaborate an optimal concept for providing the national economy with energy, providing for both the creation and extensive application of energy- saving technology and the use of various sources of energy generation, nontraditional included. I emphasize that this is just one example. How many of them are there in reality?

Third, in our view, a fundamental improvement in the situation in the social sciences is needed. Problems of the development of the economy are central and most acute. There is an extreme need for answers to a number of important questions, for example: What should the optimum extent of decentralization of management of the republic's economy be; what functions in this connection need to be transferred to the republic and local authorities; by what economic measures may we most rapidly bring order to bear on our own market and ensure the protection of the republic's interests in relations with other union republics and regions; how to raise the efficiency and, subsequently, diversify more the forms of our economic relations; and so forth.

The complex phenomena caused by the democratization of social life require in-depth study. An intensive process for the reallocation of functions of power between the party and state authorities and various public and political organizations is now under way, as is known. All this undoubtedly requires the application of fundamentally new approaches to the study of the political system of our society and the formulation of the corresponding forecasts and proposals. As the experience of the work of the congresses of USSR people's deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet sessions has shown, we in the republic should also have a scientifically substantiated legislative strategy which corresponds to the particular stages of perestroyka.

Considerable tasks confront historical science. As is known, the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee initiated the elaboration of a republic program for the development of historical research and an improvement in the study and propaganda of the history of the Ukrainian SSR. The creation of the program is at the point of completion. In our view, its realization will make it possible to coordinate the efforts of scientists of the Academy of Sciences and VUZ's and students of local lore. Historians should generally increase the attention they pay to studying the phenomena which are of great social and political resonance. Why, say, should the Academy of Sciences not conduct an international conference or symposium devoted to the quincentenary of the emergence of the Ukrainian Cossacks? As is known, the Cossacks played a prominent part in the history of the Ukraine, the East Slavonic peoples and many European states. I believe that this would be a significant scientific and political event.

We attach great significance to science in the elaboration and realization of a comprehensive program for the development of Ukrainian national culture. But, having examined this question at a meeting of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Politburo, we reached, unfortunately, the disquieting conclusion that there is as yet no integral, scientifically substantiated concept here. This applies fully also to the concept of restructuring the republic's system of public education. And we request that the republic's scientists pay these questions the proper attention.

Fourth, I would like to call your attention to one further extraordinarily important question—the dire need for a fundamental recovery of the ecological situation in the republic. As you know from the material of the last session of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, the situation in this sphere is simply scandalous. And a particularly great deal has to be done here also by our scientists. I believe that this is a real social mandate of the people of the Ukraine.

An indispensable condition for the successful development of science is, as you know, personnel training. And

the education and training of gifted scientific youth needs to be approached anew. A multitude of appeals and slogans was for many years proclaimed in support of this and many plans were drawn up. But, unfortunately, no one ever implemented them. The Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences, the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education and other departments must ultimately solve this problem jointly. It is also necessary to study the possibilities of enlisting the Ukrainian foreign diaspora in this process also. We should also be giving thought here to the transference to our establishments of progressive, including foreign, methods of work and the organization of scientific quests and the fostering of the real patriotism of our scientists, the youth primarily.

I have to say the following also. The time has come to have done with leveling-down in the evaluation of scientific work.

In fact, why are both those who are constantly securing high end results of research and those who are working fruitlessly receiving practically identical wages? The Academy Presidium needs to think about forms of encouraging scientists who have achieved results of a world and high level generally—in their remuneration primarily. I believe that the republic government should accommodate the sensible proposals in this connection. Under the conditions of the republic's self-government such a step is natural and possible.

And, finally, the last point—concerning the work of the party organizations of research establishments. It is they who are called on to contribute to the creation of a general atmosphere of free discussion and the solution of all problems which arise. It is they who should be the trailblazers in surmounting all negative factors in the life of the scientific outfits: the low standard of scientific debate, intolerance of opponents, monopolism in the academic milieu, insufficient glasnost at the time of the allocation of appropriations and social benefits and so forth. Unfortunately, this is how things are shaping up far from everywhere.

One is struck particularly by the fact that the party organizations of the research establishments have of late simply fallen into disarray in the face of the pressure of the unconcealed attack on the party. This is to a certain extent understandable. The patience, delicacy, and aversion to any extreme methods of struggle inherent in the scientific intelligentsia are evidently reflected here.

But I would like everyone to understand clearly that a fundamentally new political situation has been created following the change in wording in Articles 6 and 7 of the USSR Constitution. It is by proceeding from this that we should organize our entire work. We see the renewed Ukrainian Communist Party primarily as an ideological community of people, intelligent, cultured, responsible people. We must therefore by the 28th CPSU Congress and the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress emphatically and uncompromisingly dissociate ourselves from those who are unwilling to work in our party's ranks and who do not share the program, high-minded approaches to the main questions of the development of society.

Under multiparty conditions this is a highly democratic process—if you do not share the ideas of Leninism and disagree with our party's rules, find yourself a group of people who wish to build their lives on different principles.

We are for all-around democratization, but this is not an end in itself but serves to develop and strengthen the party and works for the good our people. What is the core of the activity of any party in the world whatever? The core of the policy of any party is socioeconomic policy, for no one needs a party which merely conducts a discussion of one question or another—this is not a party, it is a club. The experience of two congresses—Lithuanian and Estonian—has posed a very important question. What have these congresses produced? Perhaps they have produced a new approach in socioeconomic policy, a new strategy? No, these congresses signified the disintegration of these parties into two. As the sorry experience of certain countries testifies, this leads to their actual departure from the arena of public life. We do not intend to go this route.

And proceeding from our responsibility for democracy, for perestroyka and for the fate of the Ukrainian state within the renewed federation, we will uphold the party's ideological and organizational unity.

I would like to say in conclusion that we count firmly on our creative cooperation in the renewal of a socialist Ukraine. For my part, I would like to give the assurance that the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee will do everything necessary to facilitate the development of science in our republic.

Ukrainian Separatists Lose Party Membership

90UN1628A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 30 Mar 90 p 1

[Unattributed report: "In the Commission for Party Control Under the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee"]

[Text] On the instructions of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Secretariat, the Commission for Party Control has examined the issue of individual members of the CPSU who have initiated the creation, on the basis of the program and charter of Rukh, of a new political party, an alternative CPSU (LITERATURNA UKRAYINA, 8 March 1990).

The authors of a letter-address contend that the great-power tendency which remains at the heart of the CPSU will not allow the country to be led from its crisis, that "while a single party with a single center for all the peoples of the USSR continues to exist, national, social,

and spiritual oppression will also continue to exist," and that "it is intolerable to work on an imperial Moloch which is masked by false words about 'a renewed federation.'"

The members of the CPSU who were invited to the commission also expressed groundless accusations against the CPSU in the course of the examination of the issue at the commission's session. They declared that they had set their signatures at the bottom of the letter purposely.

For separatist aspirations, unfounded slander against the CPSU, and actions directed at the creation of a new political party, an alternative CPSU, which is incompatible with membership in the CPSU, the Commission for Party Control expelled from the CPSU comrades V.G. Donchik, lead scientific associate at the Institute of Literature of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Academy of Sciences; S.P. Golovatyy, senior scientific associate at the Institute of Social and Economic Problems of Foreign Countries of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences; and A.Z. Burakovskiy, senior scientific associate at the Kiev branch of the Central Scientific Research Institute of Communications.

The issue of the party membership of comrades V.V. Geychenko, I.F. Drach, D.V. Pavlychko, V.V. Teren, and V.A. Yavorivskiy, who made statements at the local party organizations concerning their resignation from the CPSU, is being examined in the established manner.

The Commission for Party Control under the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee continues to work implementing the instructions of the Central Committee Secretariat.

Health Ministry Issues Memo on Chernobyl

LD0105174290 Moscow TASS in English 1057 GMT 1 May 90

[Text] Geneva May 1 TASS—Representatives of the Soviet Health Ministry and the World Health Organisation (WHO) signed a memorandum here today on international cooperation to relieve the torturous medical consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station.

Provision is made for a long-term global programme to protect the health of the population living on contaminated areas as well as people who directly participated in dealing with the accident and cleaning up the aftermath.

An international radiation medicine centre will open in Obninsk. In accordance with the document, the WHO will coordinate international efforts to successfully implement the programme and the activities of the centre.

Belorussian Party Congress To Be Held in Nov

90UN1611B Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 31 Mar 90 p 1

[Decision of the 17th Plenum of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee: "Date for Convening the 31st Belorussian Communist Party Congress, the Report and Election Campaign and the Congress Delegate Representation Quota and Election Procedure"]

[Text] 1. To convene the 31st Belorussian Communist Party Congress in November 1990 in the premises of the Minsk Officers House in alteration of the decision of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee 15th Plenum of 18 October 1989.

2. To submit for the congress' examination the following questions:

1) Report of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee on leadership of perestroyka and the tasks of the republic's party organizations in light of the decisions of the 28th CPSU Congress.
2) Report of the Belorussian Communist Party Auditing Commission.
3) Program documents of the Belorussian Communist Party.
4) Election of executive bodies of the Belorussian Communist Party.
5) Election of the Belorussian Communist Party Control and Auditing Commission.

To deem it expedient that questions connected with the program documents of the Belorussian Communist Party be set forth in the report on the first item.

3. To determine the representation quota for the 31st Belorussian Communist Party Congress at one delegate per 1,000 party members.

4. To conduct the election of delegates to the 31st Belorussian Communist Party Congress on a broad democratic basis and in an atmosphere of competition and choice, given the direct participation of all communists. To entrust the decision on the question of the procedure for the election of delegates to the 31st Belorussian Communist Party Congress, as of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress, to the obkoms [oblast party committees]. The lists of delegates elected in accordance with the accepted procedure will be registered and submitted to the congresses by oblast party conferences.

The communists in party organizations of the Soviet Army and the internal and border forces will elect delegates to the 31st Belorussian Communist Party Congress at party conferences of the corresponding army formations and military units.

The procedure for the election of delegates to rayon, city, and oblast party conferences will be determined by plenums of the corresponding party committees.

To be guided by the recommendations of the CPSU Central Committee March (1990) Plenum pertaining to

the election of delegates to the 28th party congress and the provisions of the draft new CPSU Rules during the election of delegates to conferences and the 31st Belorussian Communist Party Congress and the formation of party authorities.

5. For a decision on questions connected with the organization of the election of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress and the 31st Belorussian Communist Party Congress to form a republic electoral commission composed of the following: V.A. Pechennikov, secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee (chairman); S.A. Bashkevich, first secretary of the Orshanskiy Raykom [Rayon Party Committee]; K.I. Bobko, head of the Brest Obkom [Oblast Party Committee] Organizational-Party and Cadre Work Department; A.M. Gerasimenko, second secretary of the Minsk Gorkom [City Party Committee]; M.N. Yenko, head of the Grodno Obkom Organizational-Party and Cadre Work Department; G.T. Ignatenko, head of the Mogilev Obkom Organizational-Party and Cadre Work Department; A.I. Kovalevskiy, lathe hand at the Belorussian Automotive Plant; A.A. Kostyuchenko, head of the Gomel Obkom Organizational-Party and Cadre Work Department; F.I. Klyukach, head of the Minsk Obkom Organizational-Party and Cadre Work Department; A.I. Mamchits, first secretary of the Kirovskiy Raykom; M.A. Machulenko, second secretary of the Gomel Obkom; S.S. Palyukevich, deputy head of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee Organizational-Party and Cadre Work Department; E.V. Podolyak, secretary of the Minsk Automotive Plant Party Committee; V.P. Polyachenko, mechanic-assembly worker of the S.M. Kirov Minsk Production Association for the Manufacture of Broaching and Cutting-Off Machines; V.V. Chikin, secretary of the Minsk Clock Plant Party Committee; A.I. Yaroshuk, first secretary of the Kletskiy Raykom.

To approve the regulations on the republic electoral commission for the election of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress and the 31st Belorussian Communist Party Congress (appended).

6. To conduct the report and election campaign in the republic party organization after the 28th CPSU Congress within the following time frames: meetings in party groups and shop party organizations, in July-September; meetings in the primary party organizations, in September-October; rayon, city, and oblast party conferences, before 10 November 1990.

7. At the report and election party meetings and conferences to comprehensively analyze the state of affairs in the party organizations, fundamentally evaluate the activity of the elective party bodies and determine measures pertaining to a fundamental improvement in organizational-party and ideological work in light of the decisions of the 28th CPSU Congress.

To conduct the party meetings and conferences in a businesslike, really creative, confidential atmosphere, ascertaining the various views of the communists and ensuring a respectful attitude toward any opinion and the right of the minority to express its standpoint. Cardinal questions of the role and activity of the party in society, its renewal, the democratization of intra-party life, and the affirmation of the power of the party masses should be at the center of attention.

To create everywhere conditions to ensure that true political fighters and vigorous and bold people capable of organizing matters well and changing in the public mind the notion of the party body as a "bureaucratic, officials' apparatus" come to lead the party committees and organizations. To persistently enlist in party work new, fresh forces from the communist ranks devoted to the cause of perestroyka, enjoying the support of the party organizations and with a command of political methods.

8. To instruct the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau to conduct preparations for the 31st Belorussian Communist Party Congress with the extensive enlistment of Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee members and candidates and activists of the republic party organization in an atmosphere of glasnost and candor. As the delegates are elected, to accord them an opportunity to participate actively in the elaboration of the main documents and decisions for the Belorussian Communist Party Congress. To create to this end from the ranks of the delegates special commissions (groups).

[Signed] Ye. SOKOLOV, first secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee.

Sokolov Addresses Belorussian Party Plenum

90UN1611A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 28 Mar 90 p 1

[Report by Ye.Ye. Sokolov at Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee plenum]

[Text] Dear Comrades! Today we have to discuss questions of the preparation and organization of reports and elections in the Belorussian Communist Party, pencil in the time to convene the 31st Belorussian Communist Party Congress, specify its agenda and determine our position in respect of a number of other items.

A most important question here is the timing of the reports and elections. When should these be—prior to the 28th CPSU Congress or after?

The supporters of the first approach put forward the following arguments. The 28th CPSU Congress should have programs for the acceleration of perestroyka in the party and in all spheres of the life of their regions collectively formulated by the union republic communist parties. If we conduct a full-fledged report and election campaign in the Belorussian Communist Party prior to the 28th CPSU Congress, we will thereby be able after it

to concentrate on practical political and organizing activity to improve all aspects of the life of the people of Soviet Belorussia.

The supporters of the other viewpoint also have many telling arguments. First, the framework of the upcoming report and election campaign is extremely constricted in time, and this could lead to some meetings being held in haste, formally, without an in-depth analysis of the processes and phenomena occurring in society and directly on the spot and without a businesslike and political evaluation of the contribution of each communist to the realization of the goals of perestroyka.

Second, the report and election campaign, if held prior to the 28th Congress, would be superimposed on the unfinished work on the formation of the deputy corps of the rayon, city, oblast, and supreme soviets of the republic and would not afford an opportunity to devote the maximum attention to the creation of their administrative and executive bodies.

Third, we must all clearly determine our position concerning section 24 of the draft CPSU Rules, which says that within the framework of the CPSU Program and Rules the Communist Parties of the Union republics are independent.

They draw up their own program and normative documents, in accordance with which they themselves decide organizational, personnel, publishing, and financial questions, pursue the policy line in the sphere of state building and the socioeconomic and cultural development of the republic, support the political consolidation of the citizens and the combination of national and international values and interests and maintain relations with other parties and public movements.

Does this correspond to our interests and aspirations or do we want something else? Do we need our own program and statutes? In a word, comrades, it is a question of our future, of the kind we wish to see in the life of the Belorussian Communist Party. And we will not decide these questions without extensive consultation with all communists, which will take time also.

Fourth, in the present complex social and political situation some communists are linking the precision of their standpoints with the results of the 28th CPSU Congress.

You may ask: What is the view of the Central Committee Bureau? We firmly agree with the opinion of the majority, I emphasize, the majority, of party organizations. They support the second option. But, nonetheless, we would not like to anticipate the decision on the matter, and the speakers will, naturally, have their own arguments in support of this option or the other.

Let us confer thoroughly and adopt the decision which reflects to the greatest extent the interests of perestroyka and the interests of the cohesion and strengthening of the party of communists.

If we decide on the first option, the report and election campaign in the oblast party organizations must be completed by 16 June. The 31st Belorussian Communist Party Congress could be convened on 25 June of this year.

If, however, the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee plenum opts for the second alternative, it would be advisable to hold the report and election meetings in the party groups and shop and primary party organizations and the rayon, city, and oblast party conferences prior to 10 November, and the 31st Belorussian Communist Party Congress, at the end of November. In this case the congress delegates could sum up the main results of the work in the period of perestroyka and chart the main directions of activity for the coming five-year period.

Both versions will require an acceleration in reforming the party organizations and the structure of the party authorities. And the social and political situation also is such that we need to act in anticipation of events. At the same time, however, we all understand that undue haste in the solution of structural questions would be of no benefit. Balance and a careful consideration of the sum total of circumstances and factors are needed more than ever here. Of course, these issues will be dealt with at the 31st Belorussian Communist Party Congress also.

As you know, its agenda was formulated back in October. I will remind you of it.

1. Report of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee on the leadership of perestroyka and the tasks of the republic's party organizations.
2. Report of the Belorussian Communist Party Auditing Commission.
3. The Belorussian Communist Party Action Program.
4. Proposals pertaining to a change in the CPSU Rules.
5. Elections of executive bodies of the Belorussian Communist Party.

If the 31st Belorussian Communist Party Congress is held prior to the 28th CPSU Congress, certain points require amplification. It will be necessary first of all to agree on item 3: what is to be adopted at the 31st Congress—an action program largely characteristic of the republic party organization or program documents of the Belorussian Communist Party as an independent party within the framework of the CPSU? The opinion of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau is unambiguous: program documents of the Belorussian Communist Party.

The wording of item 4 of the agenda could be as follows: draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th Party Congress and CPSU Rules.

It would be correct, I believe, were we to agree today not to make separate reports on items 3 and 4 of the agenda but to set them forth in the main Central Committee report.

In connection with the creation in the CPSU of control and auditing bodies, we should include on the agenda the following item: election of the Belorussian Communist Party Control and Auditing Commission.

If, however, we determine that our congress will be held after the Union congress, the agenda could be formulated as follows:

1. Report of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee on leadership of perestroyka and the tasks of the republic party organizations pertaining to fulfillment of the decisions of the 28th CPSU Congress.
2. Report of the Belorussian Communist Party Auditing Commission.
3. Program documents of the Belorussian Communist Party.
4. Election of executive bodies of the Belorussian Communist Party.
5. Election of the Belorussian Communist Party Control and Auditing Commission.

Now about the representation quota. At the 30th Congress one delegate represented 860 CPSU members. Since then the republic Communist Party has grown by 40,000. It is therefore proposed to elect one delegate per 1,000 communists.

There are several alternatives for delegation to the 28th CPSU Congress, the 31st Belorussian Communist Party Congress and the party conferences. They are all united by the idea of broad democratism and maximum consideration of the communists' opinion. Having weighed all the circumstances, the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau concluded that we could today adopt a final decision based on some one version suitable for the whole Belorussian Communist Party. Ours is a compact republic, and there are practically no differences between the oblast party organizations. As far as the position of the obkoms [oblast party committees] is concerned, it may be expressed by their secretaries, who are well acquainted with the communists' opinion.

If you agree with this line of reasoning, the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau proposes adoption of the version of elections by single-mandate district. In primary party organizations in which the number of the communists corresponds to or exceeds the established representation quota, delegates to the congresses and conferences may be elected in them directly.

It is obvious even now that a keen struggle will develop for delegate mandates. It also needs to be considered that every conceivable "ultraradical" will attempt to avail himself of the new delegate election procedure to win a majority at the congresses and conferences and realize his political ambitions. Individual members of the CPSU have adopted antiparty positions, are denying the party's vanguard role, striking through its history and calling in question the prospects of the socialist idea and the future of the CPSU as the leading political force of society.

This was clearly manifested also at the just-ended conference in Minsk of supporters of the "Democratic Platform." Its organizers are deliberately exaggerating the current contradictions and disagreements and making attempts to create structures parallel to the party.

A comparative analysis of the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform and the "Democratic Platform" shows that they have much in common. But far more in the way of fundamental differences. Surprising, at least, are the pretensions behind the naming of the platform democratic, meaning that the CPSU Central Committee Platform is undemocratic. It is obvious to everyone that this is at least an improper way of putting the issue.

Upon close familiarization with the alternative draft it is revealed that on a number of standpoints it is oversimplified and inordinately ideologized. As far, however, as the most important difference is concerned, it is not so much a matter of theoretical evaluations as organizational delineation. And this represents a real danger of division of the CPSU.

Exaggerating the critical mood of many communists, the ideologues of the "Democratic Platform" in the party movement see the contrast of views and evaluations not as a problem for all-party discussion but as grounds for the creation of an independent party.

The ultimate goals of the leaders of the "Democratic Platform" are as clear as could be. The time has evidently come to sort out who is a true communist, and who only carries a party card, having acquired it fortuitously. There are also, of course, errant party members who require our assistance. But there is no room in the CPSU for those who are knowingly introducing a split in the party ranks. None of us should forget that the party is primarily an organization of the ideologically like-minded. And those who disagree with the communist nature of our party, let them determine their political future not at its expense but outside of it.

We support the propositions of the draft party rules to the effect that a member of the CPSU may not be a member of other political parties and that the CPSU does not permit the formation of factions with their own internal organization and discipline and ideological guidelines incompatible with the program goals of the Communist Party.

On the other hand, the party committees and primary party organizations must do everything to take full advantage of the discussion of the draft Central Committee Platform for the 28th Congress and the CPSU Rules and the report and election campaign for the cohesion and consolidation of all healthy forces in the party.

It is important to enlist the communists in profound, concerned discussion of the kind of party it should be under current conditions and of its role in the restructuring processes. It is necessary to help certain comrades

rid themselves of the fundamentally incorrect notion that with the change in the wording of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution there is a change in the primordial nature and social and political purpose of the Lenin Party. Some people see perestroyka in the CPSU as its conversion into a parliamentary-type party.

We must firmly explain that the main purpose of the renewal of the CPSU is not only not to forfeit its vanguard role but, on the contrary, to make it a political reality effectively influencing all aspects of our life.

Representing the truly political, intellectual, and moral potential of society, the CPSU is the guarantor of an acceleration of perestroyka. It is responsible to the people for the condition of the state, for the situation in the economy and in the political and social spheres, and for the security of the citizens and for the assurance of their rights and liberties.

It is obvious to all of us that the present report and election campaign will be held not only in a complex intraparty but also socioeconomic and social and political atmosphere, which—let us put it this way—affords no grounds for contemplative optimism.

Although the fulfillment of the quotas of the five-year plan as a whole is no cause for particular concern, the seriousness of some social problems not only is not abating but is growing.

Many of our cadres are failing to take account of the fact that we have entered an entirely new stage of economic relations with the other republics, regions, and enterprises. Strict compliance with contract commitments, the more efficient use of centralized and local resources and a search for ways of self-support are now the main thing.

Less than ever now can we tolerate mismanagement in the use of the republic's immense economic and scientific and technological potential. This is manifested most distinctly in respect of resource-saving, in which there has as yet been no appreciable qualitative change.

Losses in the national economy connected with "mass-meeting democracy" are growing. Approximately 800,000 man-days were lost last year in industry and construction alone or 36 percent more than in the preceding year. The republic experienced a R100 million shortfall in the industrial and construction product.

Just think about these figures, comrades. It is a question not simply of economic losses. All this needs a political evaluation and conclusions which the party organizations and communist leaders must draw for themselves.

To whom is it not clear that socioeconomic problems are not solved at mass meetings? Everyone knows that they are increasingly becoming a form of legalized extremism, to which the meetings held in the republic on 25 February also testify, incidentally. Their organizers had one purpose—to destabilize the social and political situation on the eve of the elections of people's deputies, elections which required primarily a cool head and calm reflection, political culture and tolerance.

In order to rebuff the destructive actions and attempts to exacerbate the situation it is essential to strengthen the ties of the soviets and the party organizations to all healthy forces and the working people's independent activity formations and to organize this work not on the basis of passions and emotions but on good sense and responsibility.

It is necessary together with the working class, peasantry, and intelligentsia—and they have sufficient common sense not to succumb to demagogues and bawlers—to seek ways out of the current situation and to surmount the negative trends.

The politicization of the independent activity formations and movements which is intensifying in the republic is manifestly outpacing the growth of the political culture of their organizers and participants. Lack of respect for the law and for state structures and institutions is being manifested as a result. Destructive forces are linking up and an unconcealed attack on socialism, the party, and soviet power is being conducted under the cover of restructuring phrase-mongering.

Ideologues of the so-called Belorussian People's Front are groundlessly opposed to the authorities, both in the center and locally, and to party personnel and are endeavoring to stage mass activities inflaming the situation and disorienting people. The elections of people's deputies showed convincingly that for the sake of achieving their selfish ends extremists of all stripes are openly and brazenly speculating on the current difficulties and shortcomings.

To speak of the main political outcome of the elections at this stage, it amounts to the fact that the republic's working people expressed confidence in the members of the Lenin Party and thereby once again supported its policy of transformations. It may even now be said that competent people's deputies with a state-minded outlook—disciples of perestroyka—will, as a rule, work in the soviets of all levels.

It is significant that in the course of the elections the destructive forces were not even helped by speculation on the Chernobyl disaster. People see the difference between words and deeds and between those who advertise themselves as defenders of the people's interests only by high-sounding phrases and those who display concern for these interests through daily labor.

I must say once again with all certainty that the maximum possible has been and is being done in the republic to safeguard the working people's health. Of course, implementation of the State Program To Eliminate the Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident will take time. But thousands of people could leave the danger zone today even. It was this, in fact, which brought about the adoption of a number of decisions of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau and the

republic government on urgent measures to speed up implementation of the State Program To Eliminate the Consequences of the Accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Electric Power Station in respect of the resettlement and employment of the population.

The Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau and the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers have demanded of the party committees and local soviet executive committees the enhanced personal responsibility of the personnel and supervision of the total implementation of the scheduled measures pertaining to elimination of the consequences of the accident. The efforts of the party and soviet authorities and their practical actions need to be brought into line with the scale of the disaster in which people have found themselves.

And one further question. None of us can remain indifferent to the situation which has taken shape in neighboring Lithuania. The events in this republic are causing legitimate concern and anxiety for the fate of its inhabitants and the fate of our fatherland and the Soviet federation. I am sure that our plenum will confirm the measures adopted by the country's leadership for a constitutional solution of the crisis situation and will express solidarity with the Lithuanian communists adhering to the positions of the CPSU and with all healthy forces of the Lithuanian SSR.

These are the considerations on the plenum agenda which the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau deemed it necessary to convey to you.

Grodno, Vitebsk Oblasts Elect Chairmen

LD0105200690 Minsk Domestic Service in Belorussian 0515 GMT 28 Apr 90

[Summary] At the session of the Grodno Oblast Soviet, Comrade Dubko, an agrarian specialist and USSR people's deputy, was elected its chairman.

At the session of the Vitebsk Oblast Soviet, Comrade Grigoryev, first secretary of the Vitebsk Oblast Party committee, was elected its chairman.

'Bridge of Flowers' To Link Moldavia, Romania

PM3004141590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Eduard Kondrashov report: "Peace Action—'The Bridge of Flowers'"]

[Text] Kishinev—It is only in the last two-three years that the fact that people living on both sides of the River Prut are united by a common language, culture, traditions, and family ties has ceased to be a "state secret."

The fall of the Ceausescu regime initiated a rapid exchange of not just numerous delegations but also ordinary visitors. The inhabitants of the border rayons of Moldavia can now cross the Prut to see their relatives unimpeded—they merely have to apply to the local soviet. The border troops are engaged in dismantling dozens of kilometers of engineering and technical installations along the border, handing land in the "neutral zone" to peasants for agricultural use, and entrusting the keys to gates and passageways into the zone to members of rural soviets.

The Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic government recently instructed city and rayon soviets in the border zone to expand the number of large-scale cultural and sports events conducted with the Romanian side on the border and recommended that national and traditional holidays be jointly celebrated.

The "Bridge of Flowers" peace action with the Romanians, which leading cultural and religious figures in both republics long agreed to hold on the banks of the Prut on 6 May, is to be one such holiday. The Moldavian People's Front is playing an active part in the preparation of this meeting.

Caucasus

Armenian Paper Shortage Forces Publishing Cut

LD2904014590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 28 Apr 90

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1800 GMT on 28 April broadcasts a 3-minute recorded report by correspondent Koryun Khumaryan on the situation in Armenia. He says that in spite of the recent Armenian-Azerbaijani agreement on the removal of the rail blockade, not one train passed through the Idzhevan junction yesterday, and only nine instead of the planned 20 trains were allowed through Norashen. This means, he continues, that Armenia is still experiencing a dearth of construction materials, fuel, necessary goods, and foodstuffs. Many industrial enterprises have either come to a halt, or are working at half their capacity due to the shortage of raw materials and components. He adds that central newspapers printed in the republic did not appear yesterday or that day before, PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA among them.

Khumaryan then interviews Georgiy Torosyants, director of the publishing house of the Armenian Communist Party's Central Committee, who says that about 18 railcars carrying paper, dispatched in February, have not yet appeared, and that all paper reserves have been exhausted since 25 April. Torosyants adds that the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee has decided to print PRAVDA and the local KOMMUNIST and SOVETAKAN HAYASTAN for retail sale only; even this reduced print run can only be continued for five or six days.

New Metropolian Pays First Visit to Baku

PM0105145390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Own correspondent Asim Dzhalilov dispatch under the rubric "Direct Line": "Metropolitan Gedeon: 'May Peace Come to Your Home!'"]

[Text] Baku—The new metropolitan of Stavropol and Baku, the Most Highly Reverend Gedeon, has paid his first visit to Baku to get to know his congregation and give Easter services.

The metropolitan's arrival in Azerbaijan coincided with the last few days of All-Union Charity Week, which has been broadly marked in the republic.

Describing this philanthropic action as very important work pleasing to God during a conversation with journalists, the high-ranking guest urged the republic's inhabitants to actively do good by their secular action and to strengthen friendship and mutual understanding between people, regardless of their nationality and religious beliefs.

Nakhichevan ASSR Supreme Soviet Holds Session

LD0105180290 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0202 GMT 28 Apr 90

[Excerpts] At the session of the Autonomous Republic of Nakhichevan Supreme Soviet the state plan for the economic and social development of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic for 1990, and the state budget, and the execution of the state plan and budget for the same year were discussed. [passage omitted]

The session examined an organizational question. Deputy Aliyeva, chairperson of the Nakhichevan Supreme Soviet Presidium was relieved of her duties in connection with her retirement on a pension. Comrade Dzhalalov, first secretary of the Nakhichevan Oblast Party Committee was elected chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium of the autonomous republic.

Comrade Orudzhev, a USSR Supreme Soviet deputy and secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee took part in the work of the session and delivered a speech.

Georgian May Day Marked by Workers' Meetings

LD0105103190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1000 GMT 1 May 90

[Text] The Georgian capital did not celebrate today with the usual May Day festivities. Meetings were held today at enterprises, educational establishments, and creative collectives, at which the working people discussed the fairly complex problems of the social, political, and economic life of Georgia. There was talk about ways of expanding democratization and glasnost. The idea was expressed that May Day, which entered public life 99 years ago to assert the idea of social justice and the solidarity of working people, is imbued with particular meaning today. Its basic principles dictate the need to consolidate all society's healthy forces as a guarantee that democratic transformations are irreversible.

Georgian Resolution Postpones Elections

90US0768B Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 21 Mar 90 p 1

[Resolution of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet "On Postponing the Elections of Deputies of the Supreme Soviet and Deputies of the Local Soviets of People's Deputies of the Georgian SSR"]

[Text] Deputies and candidate deputies of the Georgian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, rayon and city party committees, public organizations, labor collectives, scientific facilities, and educational establishments have made suggestions to the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet and its presidium concerning the elections of deputies of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet scheduled for 25 March 1990 and elections of deputies to the local soviets of people's deputies of the republic scheduled for 17 June of the same year.

The opinion is stated in the letters and appeals that holding the elections on the dates scheduled is inexpedient. The considerations presented are justified by the motive of introducing a multiparty system.

The Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. The elections of Supreme Soviet deputies and deputies of the local soviets of people's deputies of the Georgian SSR are rescheduled for October and November 1990 respectively.

The term of office of the deputies of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet of the 11th term and deputies of the local soviets of people's deputies of the 20th term are extended accordingly.

2. The Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium will develop and submit proposals for amendments and additions following from the present resolution which should be made in the legislation of the republic.

[Signed] G. Gumbaridze, chairman of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium
V. Kvaratskheliya, secretary of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium
Tbilisi, 20 March 1990

Georgian Liberation Movements' Declaration Signed

90USo763B Tbilisi MOLODEZH GRUZII in Russian 23 Mar 90 p 3

[Declaration of Georgian liberation movements, signed 18 March 1990]

[Text] During 13-15 March of this year in the Large Hall of the State Philharmonic in Tbilisi there was an extraordinary conference of the national liberation movement of Georgia.

The decisions and resolutions adopted at the conference do not reflect the viewpoints of a number of sociopolitical organizations. Positions were expressed by the People's Front of Georgia, the Rustaveli Society, the Ilya Chavchavadze Society, the Green Party of Georgia, the Republic Federal Party of Georgia, the DAS (Democratic Elections in Georgia), and the National Liberal Union. Some of the sociopolitical associations did not participate at all in the adoption of the decisions. Therefore it is quite inadmissible to present the resolutions that were adopted as the position of the entire national liberation movement.

Several political positions have been formed in Georgia today:

1. To boycott all kinds of elections to organs of state power as long as Georgia was occupied and to create an opposition government, which actually means the establishment of a diarchy.

2. To convene a session of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet, not to conduct the elections scheduled for 25 March, and to schedule new elections on the basis of a multiparty system.

3. To hold the elections scheduled for 25 March.

Quite recently two most important events occurred which changed the political situation in Georgia considerably. We have in mind the decree of the extraordinary March session of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet and the introduction by the USSR Congress of People's Deputies of amendments to the USSR Constitution concerning abolishing the leading role of the CPSU and the legalization of a multiparty system.

A decisive moment has come in the life of the Georgian people and other peoples fighting for their freedom. The events in Lithuania contributed to maximum mobilization of imperial forces. It is obvious that they are sparing no efforts to make sure that the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet is not supported by the Supreme Soviets of other republics; they are attempting to isolate it and accelerate the conclusion of a new Union agreement. They are boycotting all kinds of elections under current conditions in order to undermine them and thus to have them postponed for an indefinite period of time without any guarantees, which will benefit only the center. There are real possibilities that as a result of the elections the influence of the forces of the national liberation movement will increase considerably. In this case the peoples fighting for their freedom will oppose the imperial forces not only by means of public opinion and not only in congresses that have the questionable authority of the people's deputies, but will strike the imperial government directly and the national-state level.

But provocation cannot be ruled out, and then a situation would be created in Georgia in which it would be impossible not only to conduct elections but also for the national liberation democratic forces to function.

Under these conditions we consider it necessary to declare the following:

1. A joint representative consultative organ of opposition forces would be naturally included in the political spectrum and would undoubtedly be able to play a positive role in the political life of Georgia.

But if this organ assumed the functions of the government it would cause extreme destabilization of the situation and would create conditions for the intervention of imperial forces, which would have a fatal effect on the national liberation movement and would call the historical prospects of the Georgian people into question.

2. We think that the forces that will protect the real interests of the Georgian people, staunchly and reasonably oppose machinations on the part of enemies of Georgia, and self-sacrificingly fight for an independent and democratic Georgia must necessarily be represented in the actual government of Georgia.

The legislative power that actually exists in Georgia, the Supreme Soviet, should provide for the transfer of power to the legislative organs created through multiparty elections. This is the only peaceful and legal path for the transfer of power that is adopted in the practice of civilized countries of the world which would really lead us to independence and which would reduce to a minimum possible aggression on the part of the Soviet empire.

3. In no case should we give the current Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet the right to resolve issues of state status and mutual relations with the USSR. We support the demand to convene an extraordinary session which must recognize that the right to resolve these issues will belong only to a multiparty legislative organ elected by a direct secret vote. We must do everything possible to make sure that this is carried out as quickly as possible.

The only real solution is the abolition of the elections scheduled for 25 March.

We call for opposition, national, and progressive forces of Georgia to unite and participate constructively in the creation of a representative legislative organ and thus cut off access to power to antidemocratic, marionette forces.

[Signed] The Republican Party of Georgia, the Tbilisi Political Club, the Ilya Chavchavadze Society, the Ivane Dzhavakhishvili Society, the Association of Progressive Democrats, regional organizations of the People's Front of Georgia in Abkhazia, Batumi, Tetri-Tskaro, Bake-Delisi, Mtatsminda, Vazisubani, the aviation plant, and Oktyabrskiy Rayon in the city of Tbilisi.

Georgia Makes Amendments to Republic Constitution

90US0768A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 21 Mar 90 p 1

["Law of the Georgian SSR on Amendments to the Constitution (Main Law) of the Georgian SSR"]

[Text] With a view to enhancing the political transformations underway in the republic and reinforcing the rights and freedoms of citizens, the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet resolves:

Articles 6, 7, and 49 of the Constitution (Main Law) of the Georgian SSR are to read as follows:

Article 6. "The Communist Party of Georgia, other political parties, as well as trade union, youth, and other public organizations and mass movements participate on an equal footing in developing the policy of the state and in managing the affairs of the state and society through their representatives elected to the soviets of people's deputies and in other forms."

Article 7. "All political parties, public organizations, and mass movements operate within the framework of the Georgian SSR Constitution and laws while performing the functions envisaged by their programs and statutes.

"The creation and operation of parties, organizations, and movements whose objective is forcibly to change the constitutional system and integrity of the republic, undermine its security, and fuel ethnic and religious discord are not allowed."

Article 49. "The citizens of the Georgian SSR have the right to form political parties and public organizations and to participate in mass movements that promote the development of political involvement and independent activity and meet their varied interests.

"Conditions for successfully accomplishing their statutory tasks are guaranteed to the public organizations."

[Signed] G. Gumbaridze, chairman of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium
V. Kvaratskheliya, secretary of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium
Tbilisi, 20 March 1990

Central Asia

Kazakhstan Issues Appeal for USSR Unity

PM0105092190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Own correspondents V. Ardayev and E. Matskevich report: "Appeal Adopted"]

[Text] A Kazakh SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet session has adopted an appeal to the USSR Supreme Soviet, the union republic supreme soviets, and all USSR soviets of people's deputies urging them to defend perestroyka and protect our state's unity and territorial integrity.

We urge all deputies, the appeal says, to profoundly realize their responsibility for the future of the renewed Soviet federation, the strengthening of our union, and the normalization of the moral-political situation within the country. Only calm, sensible work within the framework of the law in all spheres of life will lead us to the goal which accords with the fundamental interests of all nations and will breathe new life into our great multinational community. We are convinced that all problems relating to the economic, social, and national-cultural development of any region of the country must only be resolved on the basis of the USSR Constitution, the republics' constitutions, and existing laws. We urge you to utilize all your authority and powers to stabilize the situation within our common home and defend every Soviet person's life, honor, and dignity. For its part the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet will rigorously cleave to these principles in the interests of perestroyka and the whole Soviet people. That is our open honest line. That is the choice made by the Kazakh people and all the republic's peoples....

Kazakh Supreme Soviet Elects Officials

LD3004181590 Alma-Ata Domestic Service in Kazakh 2300 GMT 27 Apr 90

[Excerpts] The first session of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet continued yesterday. A number of chairmen of Supreme Soviet committees were elected. [passage indistinct] Nazarbayev, president of the Kazakh SSR submitted a proposal to elect Isayev as chairman of the republican People's Control Committee. After the discussion, the Supreme Soviet adopted a decision to elect Isayev, chairman of the Kazakh SSR People's Control Committee. Then Nazarbayev, president of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet proposed to elect Aytmukhambetov as chairman of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Court. A matter on appointing the state chief arbitrator of the Kazakh SSR was examined. Teterkin was appointed to this post, which was proposed by Nazarbayev, president of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet. [passage omitted]

In accordance with procedure, the plenary sessions of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet will take place on 14 May of this year.

Oblast Party Chiefs Re-elected in Kazakhstan

PM0105112990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Apr 90 Second Edition p 2

[From roundup of reports by PRAVDA and TASS correspondents under the general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] Alma-Ata, 28 Apr—Oblast party conferences in Tselinograd and Kustanay have completed their work.

They were held in an atmosphere of a critical analysis of affairs and defined priority areas in the socioeconomic sphere and paths of ideological work under conditions of the separation of party and economic functions. Delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress and the 17th Kazakh Communist Party Congress were elected.

A.G. Braun was reelected first secretary of the oblast party committee in Tselinograd, and N.T. Knyazev, who also held the post before, was elected in Kustanay.

New Dzhambul Oblast Chairman Elected

LD0105195690 Alma-Ata Domestic Service in Kazakh 0100 GMT 1 May 90

[Text] A session of the Dzhambul Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies was held, which examined an organizational matter. The session elected (Baydildiyev) as chairman of the oblast executive committee, and released Klockho from this post, in connection with his transfer to another job.

Kirghiz Supreme Soviet Commissions Named

LD3004150990

[Editorial Report] Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA in Russian in its 22 April 1990 issue carries on pages 1-3 the decisions of the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet on the election of the following commissions and their chairmen:

Credentials Commission of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet, chairman Kazybay Alymovich Turganov; Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Issues of the Plan, Budget, Finance, Prices, and Restructuring the Management of the Economy, Chairman Anvar Artykov; Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Science, Issues of Developing Industry, Power Engineering, Engineering and Technology, Transport and Communications, Chairman Ilgiz Torokulovich Aitmatov; Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Agriculture and Food, Chairman Oleg Aleksandrovich Isayev.

The decisions further include Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Construction, Architecture and the Building Materials Industry, Chairman Asan Kozhomkulov; Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Issues of People's Health Care, Labor, the Family, Motherhood and Childhood and the Affairs of Women, Veterans and Invalids, Chairman Sulayman Imanbayevich Imanbayev; Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Consumer Goods, Trade, Communal, Everyday and Other Services, Chairman Yuriy Timofeyevich Shustikov; and Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Issues of Ecology and the Rational Use of Natural Resources, Chairman Kartaybek Mukambetov.

Tajik Supreme Soviet Elects Officials

LD0105173890 Dushanbe KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 20 Apr 90 p 1

[Summary] Today's paper carries decisions by the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet on the election of Bashir Atayevich Aminov as chairman of the Tajik SSR People's Control Committee and of Sharof Makhmudov as chairman of the Tajik SSR Supreme Court as well as on the appointment of Karim Khasanov as Tajik SSR chief state arbiter.

Pugo Comments on Tajikistan Visit

LD2804231590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 28 Apr 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Comrade Pugo, chairman of the Party Control Committee, was in Tajikistan for several days.

[Nikulin] The main themes of Comrade Pugo's conversations, no matter where they took place—in labor collectives or student auditoriums, at meetings with the scientific community or with Dushanbe's party aktiv—were the clauses of the CPSU platform and the draft of the new rules, the open letter from the Central Committee to the country's communists, and the complicated and contradictory processes which are taking place must before the 28th CPSU Congress, both in society and in the party. [video shows Pugo walking, accompanied, around a factory, and the speaking from a podium to a large audience in an auditorium]

[Begin recording] [Pugo] I participated in the work of the city party conference. I have sensed the mood of the party aktiv: I visited many enterprises in Dushanbe. Everywhere there is a normal rhythm of work. Much is being done. But most importantly, as it seems to me, is the present mood. That, I think, is perhaps one of the most important achievements. [end recording] [video shows Pugo talking to interviewer]

Uzbek President Meets Trade Union Aktiv

LD2904084190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0600 GMT 29 Apr 90

[Text] President Karimov of the Uzbek SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] has met the republican trade union aktiv. Their discussion was about the schedule and methods of the transition to a market economy. The republican chief said that the program for the transition should be drawn up with alternative options. The low standard of living of the Uzbek population necessitates price indexation and a properly thought-out system of social guarantees. People need to land. It is intended to bring the land provision for peasant families in the republic to a quarter of a hectare. Moreover, the peasant must be able to purchase not just livestock from the state, as happens today, but also feed. Only if that happens, will strong personal holdings be able substantially to boost foodstuffs in the next year or two. It is intended to distribute the subsidiary farms of enterprises among workers and to sell small municipal services enterprises and public catering enterprises to them.